This is an archive of the former website of the Maoist Internationalist Movement, which was run by the now defunct Maoist Internationalist Party - Amerika. The MIM now consists of many independent cells, many of which have their own indendendent organs both online and off. MIM(Prisons) serves these documents as a service to and reference for the anti-imperialist movement worldwide.
Puerto Rico's relationship to U.$. imperialism and Puerto's Rico class
structure

by MC5
March 22, 1998

The highest question on the agenda in Puerto Rico in this 100th
anniversary of the Yankee imperialist invasion of Puerto Rico is what
should Puerto Rico do about its culture and relationship to the United
States. The question is known as "status" in Puerto Rico.

The popular press paints the question as one of three choices: 1) status
quo 2) statehood 3) independence. The problem with the status quo is that
it continues 100 years of colonialism.

Before the Yankee imperialists there were Spanish imperialists in Puerto
Rico. When the Yankees took over in Puerto Rico, the economy revolved
around agriculture. As in Cuba, sugar was a focal point.

Examining Puerto Rican history this past century, it turns out that we
cannot separate the status question from the question of the class
structure. For example, much of the initial move out of agriculture in
Puerto Rico came from boosting government employment. For politicians to
come quickly upon a large sum of money to hire state employees with, a
relationship with the United $tates was necessary.

As of 1993, the 1.2 million workers were only 17 percent in manufacturing,
six percent in construction and another five percent in communications and
transport. A separate statistic shows that agriculture is now only one
percent of the Puerto Rican economy and three percent of the national
economy counting exports. Hence, what we Marxists call the "productive
sector" is a small minority of the Puerto Rican economy. In this way,
Puerto Rico already mirrors its Yankee master. Most employment is
services. Government by itself is 22 percent of employment and trade is
another 20 percent.

As late as 1950, Puerto Rico was still dominated by agriculture. 36
percent of workers were in agriculture and another 9 percent in
manufacturing, thus giving Puerto Rico a hefty productive sector. In 1956,
manufacturing surpassed agriculture,(1) but today Puerto Rico sports an
economy with 20 or 25 percent of workers in the productive sector, much
like the U.$. economy.

Status: colonial, independent or 51st state

According to Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the Puerto Ricans
should not receive $1 billion in foodstamps, because they do not pay
federal taxes. President Nixon and Congress had approved putting Puerto
Rico and other island colonies on the foodstamp list in 1971. Since then
redneck conservatives like Helms and some liberal colonialists paint
Puerto Rico as a country of mooching sponges. Helms says he cannot explain
the foodstamps hand-out to Puerto Ricans to his constituents.

We agree that Helms has labor-aristocracy constituents. They have proved
to be motivated by racism before. Hence no amount of reasoning about
Puerto Rico would help them on issues related to taxes and appropriation
of labor.

Rather than endure charges of colonialism, the U.$. government granted
Puerto Rico second-class U.S. citizenship. This means the Puerto Rican men
have to serve in the U.S. military forces. 60,000 did so in World War I.
Hence, maybe Jesse Helms should explain to his constituents that Puerto
Rican men die for the U.$.A., but they cannot vote for their
commander-in-chief or the Congress that declares war. Maybe his
constituents would give him a different response if the educated leader so
framed the question. It's not taxation without representation. It's
conscription without representation. Helms should also examine the fact
that profits repatriated from Puerto Rico equal or exceed the welfare
payments to Puerto Rico.(2) By 1978, pharmaceutical companies alone in
Puerto Rico repatriated $1.1 billion in profits. (3)

Beyond the fact that Puerto Ricans have served in all the U.$. wars this
century and continue to serve in the ongoing occupation of Korea and have
unfortunately earned their imperialist citizenship with blood, the Puerto
Ricans also receive foodstamps, because otherwise they would all move to
the U$A, and the ruling class does not want that to happen. The junior
ruling partner known as the labor aristocracy especially does not want all
the Puerto Ricans to move to the United States. As it is, Puerto Rico
loses a net of over 6 out of 1000 Puerto Ricans to emigration each year.
Since the Puerto Ricans do have U.S. citizenship, they would just move to
the Mainland U$A if they endured too much economic difficulty at home in
Puerto Rico. It is this dynamic that has undercut the movement for
independence for Puerto Rico at a political economy level of causation.
Majorities of Puerto Ricans have always expressed economic fear of leaving
the U.S.A. as an independent country. However, if Helms did manage to cut
the foodstamps or the tax advantage for U.$. companies operating in Puerto
Rico, we at MIM would still say right on! The revolution will only speed
up. The choice in Puerto Rico is assimilation, colonial social-democracy
or revolutionary communist independence. The more big mouths like Helms we
can find, the better for our cause. He will cut out the statehood and
colonial social-democratic options.

The belief in the economic necessity of maintaining a strong business
interaction with the U$A led a politician originally for independence
toward forming the relationship widely condemned by Puerto Ricans and
global anti-imperialists as "colonialism." This colonialism is called
"commonwealth" or sometimes "free association." Commonwealth supporters
claim Puerto Rico chose its relationship with the U$A of its own free
will.

Today, the U.S. military occupies 13 percent of Puerto Rican land.(4) The
U.S. Government also makes decisions for Puerto Rico about shipping,
insurance, foreign affairs, defense etc. Boston is the district court for
Puerto Rico. Since Puerto Rico is literally administered by the Mainland,
it is a colony. We recommend Ronald Fernandez's book "The Disenchanted
Island" as the best history of the island. It exposes at length the U.S.
imposition of colonialism and the collaborators within Puerto Rico who saw
to its continuation. Research uncovered in this book is unknown to other
authors we read.

One of the key acts that determined the shape of the current struggle
besides unabated military occupation since 1898 was the president's coming
out for free trade in 1899. That means he favored treating Puerto Rico as
another state and not charging it tariffs on its exports to the United
$tates. President McKinley recognized that the U.$. war with Spain
deprived Puerto Rico of its old trading partner and now Puerto Rico would
need a new one, lest it suffer instead of the Spanish.

In a compromise with the U.S. Congress McKinley imposed small tariffs for
two years, refused citizenship and reserved the right to proclaim free
trade. His legislation became law in 1900. Monies gathered from such tax
collection were turned over to Puerto Rico. (5) Ever since then, the fear
of losing preferential trade agreements with the U$ has been a major
factor to keep Puerto Rico from going independent.

As Uncle Sam thought about Puerto Rico and what to do with it, the War
Department came to an alliance with the island socialists, not unlike the
alliances seen of the Kautskyites and others to his right with European
imperialism during World War I. The War Department believed it was crucial
to hold on to Puerto Rico as a naval base to cork up the Caribbean and it
sided with socialists who wanted statehood for Puerto Rico.(6) Hence there
has been some steady military reasoning that making Puerto Rico a state
was the easiest and surest way to secure military bases in the Caribbean.
It was exactly this reasoning that Reagan and Bush applied in speaking for
statehood and supporting a Puerto Rican party in favor of a larger welfare
state. The first calculation of the ruling class that the Puerto Ricans
could use to their advantage was that class struggle might threaten the
stability of Puerto Rico and hence make the military bases less secure.

The next advantage of the Puerto Ricans as is often the case was
inter-imperialist rivalry. When the Germans and U$A were at war, the
imperialists decided amongst themselves that the Danish better sell the
West Indies to Uncle Sam, because Uncle Sam could protect them better from
the Germans. Wanting not to take care of the mess that such a transition
would entail, Denmark insisted that all islanders be granted U.S.
citizenship. With the aid of a ruling class figure named Arthur Yager,
Congress passed a similar bill in 1917 for Puerto Rico to show the world
that the U$A was more liberal and democratic than Germany.(7) Of course,
it also helped that Puerto Ricans were being conscripted for the war!

The leaders of the Union Party that dominated Puerto Rican politics the
first 20 years of Yankee invasion opposed accepting U.$. citizenship if it
meant that statehood and independence were ruled out. Yet despite their
political voice, the Yankees imposed the hand-picked choice of the U.S.
president for governor on the island even after 1917. They also forced
citizenship on the Puerto Ricans by threatening military force and by
making it practically impossible to get a job without being a U.S. citizen
in Puerto Rico. Only 288 Puerto Ricans out of 1.2 million stood up to
formally reject U.S. citizenship in 1917.(8)

The original motivation of Commonwealth

Like capitulators everywhere, Luis Munoz Marin despaired of his people's
abilities. He didn't think Puerto Rico could make it as a nation.
Originally Munoz Marin was a Liberal with some Marxist ideas for
independence. When he saw the chance though, he got on-board for colonial
social-democracy. While we criticize the individual as a political leader,
it was inevitable that someone like Munoz Marin would arise given the
opportunities that existed in the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship at the
time.

In 1930 he said, "The Puerto Rican masses. . . are as poor today as they
were before the United States took over the island. . . . The American
tariff compels Puerto Rico to buy necessities in the American market at
monopoly prices. . . . It is this flow of wealth out of the island and the
high cost of living imposed by the monopoly market that keeps the bulk of
the Puerto Rican population in the same economic state of thirty-one years
ago."(9)

>From the 1930s till 1968, Munoz Marin monopolized Puerto Rican politics.
However, he changed his position from that of 1930. In essence, he was
impressed with the Democratic Party in the U$A and sought to bring Puerto
Rico under the aegis of the New Deal. He told voters that commonwealth,
independence or statehood did not matter relative to bread and butter.
Although the New Deal had yet to do anything for Puerto Rico, already
Teddy Roosevelt Jr. was saying that Puerto Rico should be a "'show window
looking south.'"(10) Munoz Marin correctly understood that Puerto Rico was
in for a special deal from the imperialists that could not be offered to
all Third World countries. While the imperialist system has no hope of
solving the whole world's economic problems the favored few selected by
Washington can become rich.

In salivating for a special deal with the imperialists, Munoz Marin only
took up the economism of a social-democratic leader named Santiago
Iglesias who came before Munoz Marin. Iglesisas had organized Puerto
Rico's first union, but he was in prison when the Yankees landed. The
Yankee army let him form a union in 1899. From then until his death in
1939, Iglesias sought to follow the AFL in the U$A. This meant taking
advantage of civil liberties to organize for bread and butter and it meant
being pro-statehood.(11) The Socialist Party dissolved after the death of
Iglesias, but others were to take up his politics.

The political basis of colonial social-democracy for a generation was
machine-politics pure and simple. Those who obtained government sector
jobs were expected to contribute to and vote for the PPD--the "Populares."
Always the PPD looked ahead for some source of money to hire civil
servants to support the party. As late as 1974, the PPD was borrowing
money in New York in order to pay for public sector jobs.(12) Beyond the
narrow support of the employed in the public sector, the PPD also gains
brownie points from the public for increasing employment, no matter on
what basis with whatever economic soundness of strategy.

The first 40 years of Yankee invasion, sugar ruled the economy. In 1929,
U.S. companies owned or rented 68 percent of the sugar-cane land which was
one-third of all Puerto Rico's cultivated land. It was the same story in
tobacco and fruit.(13) The first hint of instant money for a PPD political
machine were various promises made of providing $150 million (or less in
subsequent promises) to Puerto Rico based on monies collected from the
Sugar Act of 1934.(14) Between 1935 and 1938, New Deal relief
organizations set up in Puerto Rico did employ 60,000 people and paid $1
million per month in salaries-- all under the administration of Luis Munoz
Marin.(15)

Nothing came of the original promises of the New Deal for a sugar tax for
Puerto Rico but revolutionary nationalist unrest at the time continued to
worry the imperialists. In 1936 after violence against U.$. colonial
officials, the U.S. government proposed independence for Puerto Rico in
four years! Colonial "socialist" Santiago Iglesias opposed it and it was
dead on arrival in Congress.

Luis Munoz Marin made a classic statement on why he also rejected the
proposal for independence and abstained from elections for his Liberal
Party. "'You can't impale me on that have your cake and eat it too. That
is just what I do want.'"(16) He wanted New Deal money and professed to
want independence too; although he would later drop that profession. Thus
in 1936, Munoz Marin was salivating for New Deal money to such a degree
that he decided he would not support independence when offered on a silver
platter. He abandoned his party which won 46 percent of the vote with
"independence now!" as a slogan. Had the "socialists" of the
social-democratic variety supported independence, there would have been a
clear victory.

In 1938, Munoz Marin founded his PPD which won elections till 1968. The
New Deal Democrats on the Mainland never did bail out Munoz Marin despite
his similarity to them. Rather the New Dealers gave Munoz Marin just a
large enough taste of largesse to whet his appetite and create a political
machine.

Instead, World War II bailed out the PPD. Cut off from European liquor
supplies, the United States suddenly increased Puerto Rican rum
consumption. Rum taxes skyrocketed from under $2 million in 1939 to over
$65 million in 1944 and Puerto Rico managed to get a hold of 70 percent of
them.(17) In addition, U.$. war expenditures coursed through the Puerto
Rican economy as well, providing 18.2 percent of that economy in 1945.(18)
With money to spend, the PPD bought parcels of land for land reform thus
further expanding its popularity.

In 1944 the independence movement surged forward and even Munoz Marin
publicly admitted that the majority of Puerto Rico wanted independence.
His party thus smashed the statehood supporters by obtaining 65 percent of
the vote. What is little known is that once again the U.S. government
quietly worked for offering independence, this time with an easier 20 year
transition instead of 4 years and once again Munoz Marin turned down the
bill for independence of 1945.(19)

Although Munoz Marin opposed independence, even his political cronies put
up by his party in elections signed petitions for independence in 1945. 11
out of 19 senators, 22 out of 39 representatives and 42 out of 73 PPD
mayors supported independence. Ronald Fernandez said this amounted to 57
percent of all elected officials.(20)

Munoz managed to maneuver to an extent at that juncture though intensely
criticized for it. Eventually President Truman killed the idea of a
plebiscite to determine the will of Puerto Ricans. It is not surprising in
the aftermath of Truman's colonial impositions in the face of popular
demand, armed struggle arose.

Apart from a nationalist revolt, which we will cover in another article on
Pedro Albizu Campos, the next challenge came with regard to international
public opinion. To persuade the UN to remove Puerto Rico from the colonies
list or non-self-governing territories list as it was called, President
Eisenhower promised to grant independence for Puerto Rico any time it
asked. So it was that in 1953, President Eisenhower offered independence
to Puerto Rico and once again the PPD ignored the offer.(21)

In 1956, major U.S. ruling circles led by Henry Cabot Lodge again raised
the idea of independence for Puerto Rico, thanks to criticism at the UN.
On this question, we learn that despite our admiration for his book, even
Ronald Fernandez believes that a simple principled position of
independence for Puerto Rico was not sustainable. Since 67 percent of
Puerto Ricans had just approved Commonwealth in 1952 elections and thereby
finally achieved formal colonialism through Munoz Marin's leadership,
Fernandez again raises that it was wrong for Uncle Sam to raise the idea
of setting Puerto Rico free. MIM disagrees with Fernandez on this point:
achieving independence through non-violent means however imperfect is
still preferable to having to launch People's War. Puerto Rico's rejection
through its leadership of independence and the discourse concerning it
raise picayune issues in the face of the general principle of
independence. It is a measure of the reality of the annexationist
position, that Puerto Rican and Amerikan authors both perceive that
independence is impractical for this or that reason.

In 1964, Munoz Marin finally retired. 85,000 jobs had been created between
1960 and 1965.(22) The job growth was long overdue, because by 1963 there
were still 28,000 fewer total jobs than in 1948.(23)

Since 1968, there has been a see-saw battle between the statehood
supporters of the PNP (New Progressive Party) and the commonwealth
continuation of colonialism in the PPD (Popular Democratic Party). In
1968, the PNP won elections, but the PPD won in 1972. The PNP reclaimed
power in 1976, but the PPD took it back in 1984 until 1992 when the PNP
reclaimed power yet again. Although the PNP is in power, polls show that
only 36 percent of the public supports their view for statehood; although
it is likely that with the support of U.S. Congress more would support
statehood if Congress offered something tangible, like a specific chance
and transition plan to become a state. If the terms are not too onerous,
it is possible a majority would support statehood.

There is no doubt that it is possible to bend the will of an entire people
and bring about assimilation. According to Marx and Lenin such
assimilation was a progressive aspect of capitalism that prepared the day
of one internationalist humyn race. On the other hand, Lenin strongly
backed national liberation in the colonies and semi-colonies.

The masses of Puerto Rico expressed themselves for independence in the
1940s and 1950s. When they were turned down and their armed struggle was
crushed, they turned to adjusting to their oppression. The Puerto Rican
masses started to pay more attention to choosing their oppressors after
1952, to see if this or that one would provide any small advantage
relative to the other oppressors. Both the PNP and PPD are parties of
collaboration with Yankee imperialism.

In 1965, the United $tates sent the Marines to the neighboring Dominican
Republic to prevent a democratically elected president from returning
himself to power against a U.S.-backed coup. The blood in the streets
reminded Puerto Ricans the price of resisting Uncle Sam. When the
Nicaraguans elected a "democratic socialist" government, Uncle Sam gave
military aid again to the other side and made the people pay in blood for
their choice. For this reason, election results in Puerto Rico and
elsewhere in the Third World only show what the people will say with their
arms twisted behind their backs. In elections, the Puerto Ricans can only
choose how they will be chained to the United States, not whether they
will be chained.

The result in Puerto Rico where the people spoke for independence and the
Yankees rejected it is proof why "democratic socialism" does not work. We
communists reject "democratic socialism," because in this day and age to
achieve a truly free election it is necessary to be able to defeat Yankee
imperialism militarily. To defeat Yankee imperialism militarily one has to
organize a military force, and to be accountable we must admit that it
means applying dictatorship over the Yankee. The Puerto Ricans have tried
for decades "to persuade" the United States to leave, but only
dictatorship (organized force) will settle the question. Without the
freedom to keep the Yankees out, the elections only show what the Puerto
Rican people will say with their arms twisted behind their backs. That is
not to mention the economic pressures exerted on Puerto Ricans considering
their destiny.

MIM is for dictatorship over the imperialist countries led by the
proletariat of the oppressed nations. That means we believe it will only
be organized force that abolishes the current state of colonialism and
neo-colonialism in the world. We also believe that there should be free
trade between socialist states, so that large economies can no longer
blackmail small ones with the threat of tariffs.

We started this section talking about the origins of Commonwealth thought
on economics. Now we turn to the economic bases for wanting statehood.

The economic basis of assimilation

It is thought that Puerto Rico is not particularly rich in natural
resources going beyond its natural beauty, well suited to enjoyment,
botany and tourism. With a population about the size of a U.S. city like
Chicago, many doubt whether Puerto Rico is a viable nation.

We believe Puerto Rico is a viable nation; however, there is an economic
basis for assimilation. It is not much difficulty for the U$A to swallow
Puerto Rico whole. The strongest force is the economic tie to the
Mainland. "Men, as Rousseau remarked, run to meet their chains. Of no
person is that more true than the average present-day Puerto Rican, who,
with the old class alignments breaking down, indulges in a frantic pursuit
of new social status through the ownership of the gimmicks and gadgets
offered by the American system. . . . But because they are willing victims
they become their own executioners."(24)

In this regard, Munoz Marin was the one to set up the standard where
politicians were evaluated based on bread and butter issues devoid of
status politics. Running to meet his chains is an apt description, because
historians have now uncovered that despite public pronouncements to the
contrary by the Congress and Presidents of the U.S. Government, Munoz
Marin did receive the option of independence from the U$A and he turned it
down repeatedly saying it would be an economic disaster. For MIM, this
made shocking reading. Usually a politician does not turn down the chance
to be head-of-state, but Munoz Marin did. He preferred outright
colonialism to neo-colonialism, apparently because he took his own
economic philosophy for Puerto Rico seriously. Since Munoz Marin gave
legitimacy to the idea of putting aside the status issue for
bread-and-butter issues, the other Puerto Rican politicians finally
countered with economic strategies of their own.

Although PNP statehood supporters say that "statehood is for the poor"
(which is the 1973 title of a book by PNP lead Romero Barcelo) because
Puerto Ricans would enjoy more welfare benefits as a state, according to a
1997 San Juan Star poll, 52 percent of the Puerto Ricans making under
$5000 a year oppose statehood. That is about equal to the 52.8 percent who
rejected statehood in a 1993 plebiscite with 75 percent participation.(25)

Nonetheless, the PNP strengthened its hand greatly by changing its stated
reasons for statehood. Where it used to be a tiny minority party, it is
now one of the two major bourgeois parties along with the PPD. Originally
earlier in the century statehood was the project of the Socialist Party,
Republicans and scattered poor. The landed class of sugar planters was the
hard-core money behind the statehood position. Some socialists favored
sell-out to the Mainland in order to gain union protection and minimum
wage legislation. In fact, the statehooders attempted to out-left the PPD
(which had come to sustained power with populism and colonial
social-democracy). 1965 saw the launch of a movement for statehood based
on the idea it would gain minimum wage and other labor protection
standards for Puerto Rican workers. Out of this movement arose a strong
showing in the plebiscite on status in 1967 and Luis Ferre came to power
as governor as the head of the new party called the PNP in 1968. (26)

The PNP argued that it was necessary to have an eight persyn Puerto Rican
delegation in Congress and votes in the electoral college to assure that
Puerto Rico's budget not be cut.(27) Reagan ended up cutting the Puerto
Rico budget in his first term.

Some have noted that as the multinationals repatriated more and more
profits out of the country, the only thing that made up the difference was
the increase of U.S. federal outlays to Puerto Rico. "Federal
transfers--both in the form of program grants, such as those for education
or urban improvement, and in the form of grants made directly to
individuals, such as food stamps--came to play an increasingly significant
role in sustaining the island economy. In 1950, they represented a mere 9
percent of the island's GDP; by 1980, federal assistance accounted for 29
percent and over 60 percent of Puerto Ricans were receiving food
stamps."(28)

One basis for annexationism has been removed with the introduction of
minimum wages. The notion that minimum wage laws in the U.$. will protect
Puerto Ricans has had an influence on wages in Puerto for some time. In
1982, those minimum wages finally fell into line with U.$. minimum
wages.(29) Raymond Carr either did not know or passed over this point, but
the U.$. companies in Puerto Rico have to pay $5.15 an hour.  It is
perhaps difficult for the colonial bourgeoisie to argue that it is
necessary to have statehood to have the minimum wage, when Puerto Rico can
set its own minimum wage for itself. Currently it is $4.25. Thus during
the PNP period of power the wages equalized at the lower end.

Another basis for the PNP is the Cubans who left Cuba after the
revolution. According to Liberal bourgeois historian Raymond Carr, "the
most solid social support for the PNP comes from the Cuban exile
community, many of whom are members of the prosperous former middle class
who have fled the perils of socialism in their home island. . . . Their
twenty thousand-odd votes are critical to the PNP; without them, Romero
would not be governor of Puerto Rico."(30) That is a reference to the
narrow margin of victory in 1980 by the PNP.

Historically, statehood had its support from sugar planters wishing to be
part of the U$A. Important labor, socialist, Cuban and Black leaders
joined in. Although statehood has still not earned majority support from
the poor it has made substantial inroads there as well. Those advocating
independence suffered from not being able to point to tangible resources
and businesses that would keep Puerto Rico afloat if it chose
independence. This situation differed from the Japanese invasion Mao faced
in China, because the Japanese never managed nor intended to administer
the whole country, so substantial parts of the rural economy were left
untouched. Mao set up base areas and organized tangible economic forces
for nationhood.

The new petty-bourgeoisie

Two authors writing on Puerto Rico--Gordon Lewis and Emilio
Pantojas-Garcia-- have followed Poulantzas in talking about the new
petty-bourgeoisie in Puerto Rico. Poulantzas put forward the MIM line on
the new petty-bourgeoisie before MIM existed. He held that the new
petty-bourgeoisie came to replace the working-class in imperialist
countries.

Around 1960, the proletarian character of the Puerto Rican people living
in the Mainland reached its peak. "By 1950, 48.4 percent of the Puerto
Rican migrants in the United States were classified as 'operatives' (i.e.
machine operators and related activities) and 18.6 percent were service
workers. By 1960, 51.8 percent of the Puerto Rican migrants were
classified as operatives and 15.2 percent were service workers."(31)
Approximately 10 percent were unemployed; 8 percent were foremen and 2.8
percent were professionals or technicians. Half a million Puerto Ricans
moved to the United States in the 1950s.

Meanwhile, those who were left behind in Puerto Rico became increasingly
petty-bourgeois in character. "The sectors that increased the most were
the craftsmen and foremen, the professionals and technicians, clerical
workers, and service workers, in that order. If these occupational
categories were translated into the concepts used here the craftsmen and
foremen would be included in the labor aristocracy; the professionals and
technicians as part of the category that has been called the
technobureaucracy; and the clerical workers and service employees, as well
as some professionals and technicians, as intermediary elements mainly
linked to nonproductive activities. They would constitute, in an embryonic
form, what Poulantzas calls the new petty bourgeoisie."(32) Despite the
growth of the Puerto Rican petty-bourgeoisie, Puerto Ricans on the
mainland still had a 46 percent higher median family income as of
1959.(33)

Monthly Review author Gordon Lewis put it this way in the early 1970s with
regard to the formation of two new petty-bourgeois classes in Puerto Rico:
"The growth in the 1950s and 1960s of a new generation of professional
meritocrats who found a new economic base in the social programs developed
by the Popular reform governments. They became, in Angel Quintero Rivera's
phrase, the technocrats of the new industrial welfare state which is
modern Puerto Rico. . . .

"Beneath them--although the class lines are somewhat blurred at this
point--is a new middle class proper, the genuine children of the
embourgeoisement process, the product, sui generis, of the transformation
of the society from a quiet, rural economy into a modern, American-style
urban economy, with its frenetic pace, its frantic search for social
status, its obsessive materialism, and, in brief, its compelling anxiety
to 'make the grade' in a new competitive world. Statistically, it forms
something like 20 to 25 percent of the population. Occupationally, it
includes teachers, government employees, doctors, dentists, welfare
workers, salesmen, owners and managers of satellite service industries,
junior executives, secretaries, mass media functionaries, technicians, and
others. Its physical presence, highly visible, can be seen in the myriad
suburban villa areas that have proliferated in the expanding outskirts of
the major cities, thus converting greater San Juan into a modern
American-style megalopolis, while most of the other Caribbean centers
still remain pre-industrial townships."(34)

Already by 1971, poverty was mainly a rural thing. 73 percent of those
receiving federal aid for the neediest were in the rural areas of Puerto
Rico.(35)

The economy had regressed considerably in the 1960s in terms of
employment, but people had moved out of the countryside and a radical
expansion of state jobs once again cushioned the blow of a shrinking
economy.  In 1964 the government sector provided 12 percent of the jobs
and by 1976 it was 22 percent.(36)

According to Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, it is the new petty-bourgeoisie which
most adamantly opposes independence. Created by economic ties to the U$A,
the new petty-bourgeoisie seeks various ways to maintain that
relationship.(37)

Prospects of development and growth of the Puerto Rican labor aristocracy

Between 1976 and 1988, Puerto Rico generated almost 200,000 new jobs. Much
of what dominated political discussion was how to attract banking business
to Puerto Rico.

It turns out that imperialist capital benefits from commonwealth the most,
because it brings tax-free shelters that would not exist if Puerto Rico
were a state in the union. In 1986, taken as a country, Puerto Rico led
the whole world for providing profits to U.$. direct investors. Not
England, Canada or West Germany matched total profits obtained in Puerto
Rico.(38)

Thus the growth of the role of imperialist capital in Puerto Rico and the
escape of poor Puerto Ricans to the mainland means that the seal of
parasitism is rapidly going into place in all of Puerto Rico. In the 1976
to 1988 period, "service and financial sectors led job creation. . .
Nonproductive or nonmanual categories grew far more than productive ones,
from 47.1 percent of all occupations to 52.3 percent. Productive ones
declined from 40.6 to 34.4 percent of all occupations."(39)

The growth of the labor aristocracy in Puerto Rico is assured the more
Puerto Rico resembles the imperialist country economies. Currently, the
economic situation is comparable to the level of economic development in
Greece. Puerto Rico is a notch above Portugal as well, based on gross
domestic product per persyn. In this range of development we should also
include Korea.

In these countries we see some favorable political fermentation. In Korea,
Puerto Rico and the Six Counties of occupied Ireland, the economic
development level is about half that in the U$A and a national question
has lingered in the air for a long period of time. In each of these cases
imperialism has demonstrated its ability on a limited basis to buy off
chunks of people .by favorable trade, tax or other arrangements. Without
the economic confidence associated with having a closer relationship to
imperialism, these countries would have adopted revolution long ago.

However, when militant labor bureaucrats say the economic conditions are
bad in an imperialist country and expect revolution by determined workers,
they should look at the countries in this batch first. Just based on
economic conditions and not particular political crises, we should not
expect a staunch proletarian movement in the United $tates before we see
it in Puerto Rico. If the workers in Puerto Rico are not in a
revolutionary mood, less can we expect such from U.$. or English or French
or Japanese workers with regard to their economic conditions. While
allowances should be made for particular political crises--like the rape
of Japanese children by U.$. troops in Japan--in general it is a good
measure of ultraleftism to hear people talk about the prospects of
revolution in the imperialist countries as if those prospects were better
or more essential than those in Puerto Rico, Korea and the Six Counties.
Revolutionary gains in the imperialist countries count on strategies
focussed on immigration, the lumpenproletariat, internal oppressed
nations, anti-militarism, environmentalism and proletarian feminism. Even
in these areas, it may not be possible to organize a majority except
against militarism and for the environment.

One thing that our excellent author Emilio Pantojas-Garcia on development
misses is the prospects for a Puerto Rican solution globally. Any bragging
about the abilities of the capitalist system even at this late imperialist
stage to sustain economic growth should be balanced by the cases of
capitalist countries where there has been regression in GNP per capita. As
we showed in MT#1, the facts are that in the Third World, losers outnumber
winners. In fact, even in Europe, the oldest imperialist powers such as
Portugal and Eastern Europe have seen losses of position relative to their
hey-days. It is not that capitalism is a dynamic influence (except
relative to feudalism). Some countries can gain especially in a
combination of favorable tax, tariff and land reform struggles, but others
will just as surely fall back.

It is almost a tautology to say that the strategy pursued in Puerto Rico
cannot be pursued elsewhere. The premise of Puerto Rican development is
that corporations operate there tax-free and Puerto Rico faces no tariffs
to export to the U$A. If all countries were able to operate tax-free
vis-a-vis Uncle Sam, then the corporations would spread out very thinly
and no one country would benefit from such a status. The same is true of
tariff advantages. If all countries had no tariffs placed on their goods
imported into the U$A, there would be a different kind of advantage, but
not the kind where capital concentrates itself in one place.

The fact that Puerto Rico's "model of development" or "showcase to Latin
America" is not reproducible is immediately apparent in Puerto Rico's
reaction to Reagan's CBI-- Caribbean Basin Initiative. Reagan wanted to
make investment and trade advantages available to all of the Caribbean
islands and El Salvador. Puerto Rico objected and critics accused Puerto
Rico of foot-dragging in its administrative role for the CBI. Among other
things, the Puerto Ricans feared that their rum sales would be undercut as
other islands got in on the act of producing rum and selling it to the U$A
tariff-free. In response, the Puerto Rican government even protested
"discrimination"?!(40)

Prospects for revolution

This being the 100th anniversary of the infamous Yankee invasion, the
prospects of revolution are much better. Political energy and focus is
being brought to bear. In 1997, polls conducted for the San Juan Star
showed that the public already rejected certain elements of integration
with U.$. imperialism. For example, support for statehood had failed to
cross 36 percent for several years.

Over two-thirds of Puerto Ricans opposed losing the ability to go to
international sports events and beauty contests as Puerto Rico instead of
part of the United States. 75 percent opposed making English the official
language.

With 89 percent literacy, now more than ever the Puerto Rican masses are
able to compare their experiences with international experiences. For this
reason, 65 percent agree that Puerto Rico would benefit economically by
becoming a state while only 36 percent want to become a state. Thus Puerto
Rico may have reached a point where we cannot adopt a straight-forward
economist interpretation of Puerto Rican behavior.

Having achieved much of the U.$. standard of living, Puerto Rican masses
feel no conscious or unconscious push toward statehood--as long as U.S.
tax breaks for businesses operating in Puerto Rico remain in place.
.Should the U.S. Congress eliminate such tax breaks as often threatened,
we may see a different view from the people who may feel either resentment
or pressure for statehood.

The U.S. Republican Party's attempts to bring Puerto Rico on board as a
state may also backfire, since such an endeavor is bound to be
high-profile. As historians have shown, much of U.S. policy toward Puerto
Rico is simply ignorance and therefore continuation of the status quo out
of lack of concern. When it comes to being in the spotlight, we may find
that the U.S. government officials blunder intentionally or
unintentionally and create Puerto Rican nationalism and better prospects
for revolution.

While the question of status bodes well for revolution, the economic tide
has turned against the revolutionary movement. The growth of the new
petty-bourgeoisie and the appeal of getting on the gravy-train are very
great. On the other hand, we can also hope that the Yankee style economic
development gives the masses a sense of being able to do without Uncle
Sam's foodstamps. The Puerto Rican people may yet come to believe they can
afford nationhood and maybe the nationalization of Yankee assets.

Another factor is the migration away from Puerto Rico of Puerto Ricans and
the influx of non-Puerto Ricans. By 1971, the number of people voting in
Puerto Rico who were not Puerto Rican was 30,000.(41) The U$A dumped the
reactionary Cubans fleeing revolution in Puerto Rico. In addition, there
are those from the Mainland who settle in Puerto Rico for the same reasons
they would to Hawaii or Florida.

Until a Jesse Helms position takes control of the Puerto Rico policy of
the Mainland U$A, it will be difficult even for the new democratic stage
of revolution to occur.  Puerto Ricans who wish to vote can move to the
Mainland and thereby enjoy bourgeois democracy without making revolution.
As New Yorkers or members of other states, they can vote and enjoy the
limited civil liberties of bourgeois democracy. For that matter Gordon K.
Lewis pointed out that Puerto Ricans can and do directly appeal to U.S.
public opinion from Puerto Rico. As long as this is possible and there is
no open fascist dictatorship, prospects for revolution are diminished.

1.Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), p. 231.
2. Gordon K. Lewis, Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: An Essay on
American Dominance and Caribbean Resistance (NY: Monthly Review Press,
1974), p. 52.
3. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. 239.
4. William M. Kunstler and Ronald L. Kuby, intro. Ronald Fernandez, The
Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United States in the Twentieth
Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. xi.
5. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), pp. 15-9.
6. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p.62.
7. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. 71.
8. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. 73.
9. Gordon K. Lewis, Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: An Essay on
American Dominance and Caribbean Resistance (NY: Monthly Review Press,
1974), pp. 68-9.
10. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. 117.
11. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), pp. 157-60.
12. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), p. 215.
13. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), pp. 29-30.
14. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. 117.
15. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), p. 37.
16. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. 127.
17. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p.145.
18. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), p. 50.
19. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. 153.
20. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p.154.
21. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), pp. 187-9.
22. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), pp. 214-5.
23. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), p. 80.
24. Gordon K. Lewis, Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: An Essay on
American Dominance and Caribbean Resistance (NY: Monthly Review Press,
1974), p. 58.
25. Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: 1996), p. 261.
26. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), p. 148.
27. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), p. 152.
28. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), p. 215.
29. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), p. 217.
30. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), pp. 263-4.
31. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), p. 81.
32. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), p. 84.
33. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), p. 92.
34. Gordon K. Lewis, Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: An Essay on
American Dominance and Caribbean Resistance (NY: Monthly Review Press,
1974), pp. 60-1.
35. Gordon K. Lewis, Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: An Essay on
American Dominance and Caribbean Resistance (NY: Monthly Review Press,
1974), p. 65.
36. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), p. 123.
37. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), p. 132.
38. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), pp. 166-7.
39. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto
Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990), pp. 168-9.
40. Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (NY: New York
University Press, 1984), p. 326.
41. Gordon K. Lewis, Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: An Essay on
American Dominance and Caribbean Resistance (NY: Monthly Review Press,
1974), p. 18.