Understanding intelligence tactics
The Sword and the Shield review, part one of three

The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret 
History of the KGB
by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin
(NY: Basic Books, 1999), 700 pp. hb

reviewed by PIRAO chief

The Sword and the Shield is a sensationalist history of the Soviet 
and current Russian intelligence agencies. As such it offers PIRAO 
many lessons in certain areas of unarmed work unconnected to 
building public opinion directly.

Based on an extensive and comprehensive archive of Soviet 
intelligence agencies, The Sword and the Shield can teach us the 
methods of intelligence operatives, both to defend ourselves 
against such operations and to stay out of the way when good 
operations are carried out. In this review, we would like to go 
over some of the concrete methods often called "active measures" 
that intelligence agencies used in the 20th century, so as to 
start toward eradication of naivete in our own ranks. A separate 
review will go over the book's implications for public opinion, 
theory and historical study. (See upcoming issues of MIM Notes or 
MIM's Official Bookstore Online.)

Revolutionary era intelligence work

The initial formation of the Soviet intelligence agencies came 
during the Civil War after the Revolution of 1917. So-called 
Chekists were known for executing opponents in the course of the 
war. Hence, the bullet was a principal weapon of the first Soviet 
intelligence agencies. Andrews claims that the Cheka may have 
killed more people than the rest of the war combined -- "as many 
as 250,000."(p. 28)

Mitrokhin started his career in intelligence in 1948 while Stalin 
was alive. In 1992, he became a defector and the British secret 
service sneaked him out of Russia. Most of the information in the 
book is not from the early Chekhist period but from later work. 
According to Andrew, the Soviet Union basically abandoned the 
strategy of assassination of foreign opponents (and internal 
dissidents) in the 1960s.(p. 362) The only exception was for KGB 
defectors and even they generally escaped harm.(p. 366) MIM finds 
this to be credible as Khruschev came to power and loosened the 
atmosphere for the bourgeoisie in the party, by using the people's 
weariness of fighting brought about by the completion of World War 
II.

False flags

In more of the "Spy vs. Spy" or James Bond mold is the use of 
false identities to accomplish political ends. MIM was surprised 
especially by the first half of the book that many of the 
accomplishments in this area were less spectacular than one would 
have assumed. No doubt Andrew needs to boast various 
accomplishments of the NKVD/KGB in order to sell his book. At the 
same time, he tried to play "objective" observer by shooting down 
KGB claims of success.

In 1923, the early Soviet intelligence agency OGPU infiltrated a 
counterrevolutionary organization and convinced its leader to 
return to the Ukraine to join the anti-communist underground. The 
OGPU captured him when he returned with its agent and executed him 
six years later.(p. 33)

The most obvious and common false flag is diplomatic staff. 
Diplomats who are really spies go to work from embassies. All 
countries do this and attempt not to create a political stink 
about spies from other countries except when exceptional political 
advantage can arise.

It would not be unusual in a large country to have 50 spies that 
the country being spied on knows about, more or less. (e.g. 50 
Soviet spies in France in the Cold War, p. 460) If the host feels 
that it has the 50 under control, it keeps them and if it does not 
or if political advantage dictates, the host expels the 50 spies 
and whips up public opinion toward war in so doing. Meanwhile, the 
other country issues standard complaints about the expulsion of 
diplomats.

Hence, under the imperialist system of state-to-state relations, 
it is a relative factor of peace to keep covert operations covert, 
even when they are known by the target country. If the public were 
inflamed by every covert operation that happened, war tensions 
would rise rapidly. Hence, diplomatic and intelligence bureaus of 
bourgeois countries often try to dampen passions down to some 
extent, even to the extent of calmly accepting the execution or 
imprisonment of one of their own discovered spies if so needed.

In 1941, there were 221 NKVD agents in the U$A,(p. 107) some of 
which were "illegals," people with fictitious identities. Upon 
learning such a fact, the U.$. government or any government has a 
choice: it can close its borders to all foreigners or it can 
accept that such things are going to happen. Most countries choose 
to accept the risks of having foreign visitors, a percentage of 
which are bound to be spies. In fact, the vast majority of 
countries decide not to expel all diplomats to keep out the spies. 
They have decided that the benefits of diplomacy in persyn 
outweigh the negative aspects of spying that comes with diplomacy.

"Illegals" are a case of spy which demonstrates a general 
principle of political warfare. It is possible to damage any 
opponent, no matter how bleak the situation, by using undercover 
methods.

For example, the West skillfully exploited the tensions in Eastern 
Europe stemming from the participation of various countries in the 
invasion of the Soviet Union and the subsequent occupation by 
Soviet troops of the Eastern European countries that sided with 
Hitler. Yet, such tensions themselves can also be exploited. Karl 
Koecher posed as a dedicated anti-communist Czech and infiltrated 
Radio Free Europe, a U.$. propaganda organ. Next he made it into 
the CIA, all the while his wife and himself enjoying regular group 
sex with various diplomats and others with sensitive jobs.(pp. 
199-201)

Sex and other lifestyle questions

Although the use of bullets, covers and bribery are probably 
obvious to most readers, as time went on the Soviet Union's KGB 
increasingly wandered closer to a "sex, drugs and rock'n'roll" 
model instead of bullets and kidnapping as their mottoes. A single 
Soviet agent now exposed and interviewed on public radio was 
responsible for seducing hundreds of wimmin with connections to 
embassies. MIM would say that whether used by Stalin-era 
operatives or by current-day intelligence services, lifestyle 
tactics do accurately reflect the weakness of Western capitalist 
society, a subject we will examine more in the other review of 
this book.

The first line of attack against Western individuals was to accuse 
them of homosexuality wherever possible. This was the preferred 
line of inquisition. This would discredit the persyn in question 
in public or set him up for blackmail. (There was no case of 
lesbians being attacked this way in the book. The viciousness of 
homophobia lands on males, in this context, because males are 
predominantly jockeying for state power in patriarchy.) One target 
of gay-baiting was FBI head Edgar Hoover.(p. 236)

Next in line was the hope of seducing a married diplomat, 
operative or politician and then photographing the scene for 
blackmail later. Equally valid would be photographing acts with 
prostitutes.

When such homosexuality or extra-marital affairs could not be 
found, it hardly mattered. It was possible to invent tales, such 
as abortions being needed by KGB agents posing as innocent lovers. 
In one case, an Italian diplomat found himself fooled into 
believing his lover 1) needed an abortion, 2) had a relative 
accusing him of raping his lover and 3) suffered a botched 
abortion operation that left her an invalid.(pp. 478-9 for this 
and two similar cases) These tactics work over and over, because 
the West does focus so much on such lifestyle questions -- above 
and beyond anything else, with Christianity and other ideas 
playing a major role in guilt in such matters.

In contrast, the Soviets were willing to take information from an 
Amerikan defector from the National Security Agency (NSA) who 
sexually experimented with chickens and dogs for six years.(p. 
178) That is the correct attitude to take toward such lifestyle 
questions. Lifestyle questions are not paramount and the 
information that such an NSA employee could provide was still 
valid information. We at MIM wish to adopt the same attitude, 
because we have our priorities straight and will not be distracted 
from our goals by sensational charges involving sex, alcohol, 
professional decline etc. Comrades who cannot see themselves to 
this point about the persyn experimenting with bestiality need to 
check themselves and their emotions and get down to core 
scientific truths that might make the proletariat a winner in the 
class struggle.

Bullets, false identities, money, use of revenge motivations 
against bosses and co-workers, politics and sex are standard tools 
of intelligence agencies. Some people can be threatened 
physically; some can be bribed; some can be persuaded to political 
defection and others can be blackmailed through sex. In some cases 
of "Romeo" spies, a persyn can help a spouse who married only for 
intelligence information. Beyond the individual situation, it is 
important to realize that both sides of a conflict can employ all 
those tactics.