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List of Chapters
24: "Moral Stimuli"

In addition to economic stimuli, the Soviet capitalist class makes use also of "moral stimuli" to spur on the workers to increase productivity, production and the rate of profit:

"Moral stimuli to labour are distinguished in that they are not directly linked with material incentives...

The Communist Party and the Soviet state have attached, and will attach, ever greater significance to the development of moral stimuli".

(P.G. Bunich: "Methods of Planning and Stimulation", in: "Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and Problems"; Moscow; 1972; p. 40, 41).

"A rational system of incentives can be developed only by combining material and moral stimuli...Under socialism, ideological and educational work becomes a major factor of economic development".

(V.K. Fedinin: "The Economic Reform and the Development of Socialist Emulation", in: ibid.; p. 241).

Contemporary Soviet sociologists hold that, in orthodox capitalist countries, such "moral stimuli" are based on fostering among the working people "....the illusion created with the help of various psychological devices to the effect that there exists a 'social partnership' between workers and capitalists".

(N. Bogomolova: "'Human Relations' Doctrine: Ideological Weapon of the Monopolies"; Moscow; 1973; p. 96).

-- the illusion, that is, that there exists no class difference, no economic conflict of interest, between workers and capitalists: "Bourgeois sociologists... are unwilling to admit the class divisions in... society. They divide all people connected with production into groups according to the functions they perfomr, for example, those dealing with finance, administration, etc., regardless of their class background,... that... every person in the company from top to bottom was an employee....

The brains behind the 'human relations' approach attempt to equate managers with ordinary employees on the purely formal basis that they, like the others, are employed and paid a wage...

The concept of 'common interests' shared by employers and workers is regarded as a factor of key importance in the theory of 'human relations'".

(N. Bogomolova: ibid.; p. 53-4, 55, 66).

In the contemporary Soviet Union, however, an identical illusion is fostered -- here greatly facilitated by the all-pervading propaganda to the effect that the country's real social system remains "socialist": "The public ownership... of the means of production established in socialist conditions has transformed production relations into relations of comradeship, friendship and unity of a collective people who benefit equally from the results of collective work....

The work of economic management is productive work, though this does not in any way mean that it is identical to work done in the immediate sphere of production. They are different spheres in which human labour is put to use...

Under socialism management relations are relations among a community of people who are equally interested in developing production".

(S. Kamenitser: "The Experience of Industrial Management in the Soviet Union"; Moscow; 1975; p. 20, 21).

The leading Soviet politicians are skilled in the demagogic art of building a capitalist society beneath red flags and under slogans of "following the Leninist path to communism": "Guided by the Marxist-Leninist teaching,.... our Communist Party is confidently laying the road to communism".

(A.N. Kosygin: "Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-80", 25th. Congress CPSU; Moscow; 1976; p. 80).

The workers are encouraged to see themselves as "masters of production": "Everything possible must be done to give all personnel the feeling that they are masters with respect to production".

(A.N. Kosygin: "On Improving Industrial Management, Perfecting Planning and Enhancing Economic Incentives in Industrial Production", in "Izvestia" (News), September 28th., 1965, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.), "Planning, Profit and Incentives in the USSR", Volume 2; New York; 1966; p. 42).

so that they should be interested in increasing productivity of labour and so the rate of profit: "It is characteristic of socialism that the workers are interested in the labour process, in their machinces, in the factory".

(V.K. Fedinin: ibid.; p. 230).

On this ideological basis, workers are then encouraged to engage in competition -- called facetiously "socialist emulation" -- with respect to productivity of labour. Such competition maybe between individual workers, work teams or departments within the same enterprise, or it may be between different enterprises: "Socialist emulation is a powerful instrument for stimulating the labour initiative of the masses, for enlisting them in productive activity....

An individual or a collective (i.e., the personnel of an enterprise - WBB) engages in emulation with other individuals or collectives...

The essence of stimulation is displayed in.... the feeling of contest...

The spirit of contest, the desire to vie in skill, dexterity and resourcefulness, can best of all be fostered at an enterprise, within a collective.

The economic reform and the introduction of the sectoral principle of managing industry have created favourable conditions for concrete emulation between enterprises in the same sector".

(V.K. Fedinin: ibid.; p. 229, 241, 242, 244).

Workers, work teams, departments or enterprises which excel in "socialist emulation" receive decorations: "The best workers.. are awarded Orders, medals and other marks of distinction. The most outstanding are awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labour. The foremost enterprises are presented with Red Banners"

(S. Kamenitser: ibid.; p. 15).

An essential aim of "socialist emulation" is stated by Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin to be the raising of the rate of profit: "Socialist emulation should be oriented toward.. the raising of the profitability of production".

(A.N. Kosygin: ibid.; p. 43).

An important feature of the "moral stimuli" designed to encourage workers to maximise the rate of profit is what is called in the contemporary Soviet Union, as in orthodox capitalist countries, "....worker participation in management".

(Resolution of the All-Union Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions and the State Commiteee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Labour and Wages; "On Procedures for Concluding Collective Agreements", August 20th., 1971, in: S. Kamenitser: ibid.; p. 81).

That such "worker participation in management" is far removed from workers' control of industry is demonstrated by the Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, which declares explicitly : "The enterprise is managed on the basis of one-man responsibility".

(Statute on the Socialist State production Enterprise, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 289).

Indeed, the term "worker participation in management" is used by contemporary Soviet economists so vaguely that "socialist emulation" -- already discussed -- is described as "one of its main forms": "Socialist emulation is one of the main forms of mass participation in the management of production... Socialist emulation is one of the most widespread forms of worker participation in management".

(S. Kamenitser: ibid.; p. 83, 123).

Even in its narrower sense, "worker participation in management" in the Soviet Union means no more than that workers (or their representatives) participate in regular discussions with representatives of management in order that their approval may be won for the draft plans for the enterprise drawn up by the management and that the management may hear their constructive suggestions for increasing the productivity of labour and so the rate of profit: "At every enterprise there are regular meetings of the standing production conferences which consider draft plans and their implementation. Techno-economic councils of enterprises, consisting of engineers and workers responsible for innovating new techniques, help the management to select the correct trends for developing technology and the economy...

In carrying out his duties, every director relies on the help of workers and mass organisations in his enterprise, bringing them into discussion on draft plans and other important questions affecting production...

The local trade union works committee gives factory and office workers the opportunity to take part in management through general meetings, production conferences and other gatherings....

Social organisations and the entire work force at the enterprise participate widely in discussing and implementing measures.. to develop and improve economic-production operations at the enterprise.....

The industrial labour force takes part in management through improving production, making rationalisation proposals, searching out latent production facilities, etc.,...

Standing production conferences discuss urgent matters affecting production and make recommendations to the managers".

(S. Kamenitser: ibid., p. 14, 39, 80, 123, 125).

In other words, in the contemporary Soviet Union "worker participation in management" forms part of the ideological structure designed to delude the workers into believing that they are the "masters of production". It is purely consultative: decision-making is the prerogative of management: "Every system of management... includes three elements: a study of the prevailing conditions, decision-making, and managerial guidance in carrying out these decisions....

To manage means to take decisions...

Different levels of management make different kinds of decisions...

Decision-making is a very important part of management".

(S. Kamenitser: ibid.; p. 91, 92, 95, 102).

The characterisation which contemporary Soviet sociologists make of "workers' participation in management" in orthodox capitalist countires, which they describe as "...'workers' participation' planned to exemplify 'industrial democracy' or 'democratic management' and representing one form of 'class collaboration'",

(N. Bogomolova: ibid.;' p. 92).

as "...pseudo-democratic",

(N. Bogomolova: ibid.; p. 93)

is clearly equally applicable to that operated under capitalism in the Soviet Union: "All that is important for him (the employer -- WBB) is to create the impression among the rank-and-file workers that their opinions carry weight, their interests are taken into account, that they are equal partners in the firm, and thereby to stimulate their interest in their work and their sense of responsibility in relation to the affairs of the firm and at the same time to make it appear that the interests of the workers and those of the company are compatibile...

The danger for the workers lying in these pseudo-democratic contrivings resorted to by the corporation is that they give some workers the illusion... that they are their employers' 'partners'...

Despite the great variety of definitions of 'workers' participation' that exist, they all have one thing in common: proposals put forward by the workers are regarded as suggestions which by no means have to be implemented. Final decisions on all matters still rest with the management. Peter Drucker, a well-known supporter of 'workers' participation', writes that 'the self-government of the plant community can only be justified if it strengthens management...' "

(P. Drucker: "The New Society: The Anatomy of Industrial Order"; New York; 1962; p. 283).

"Capitalist concerns only create the appearance of democratic management. Genuine participation in management is impossible given the exploitation inherent in the capitalist mode of production".

(N. Bogomolova; ibid.; p. 92, 93, 94).

Another important feature of the "moral stimuli" designed to encourage workers to maximise the rate of profit is the inculcation in the workers -- in a capitalist economy! -- of a "communist attitude to labour": "The Party will continue to pursue unswervingly its policy of enhancing the communist consciousness of the working people and of fostering a communist attitude towards labour"

(Resolution of CC, CPSU: "On Improving the Management of Industry, Perfecting Planning and Strengthening the Economic Stimulation of Industrial Production", in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 282-3).

"Educative methods... consist in fostering a communist world outlook among the people...

'Communist labour...', Lenin wrote, 'is labour performed gratis for the benefit of society..; it is labour performed without expectation of reward'".

(P.G. Bunich: ibid.; p. 40-1).

"In present-day conditions greater attention is being paid to moral stimuli, to...the fostering of an attitude to work as a patriotic duty...

The Soviet citizen treasures the ideals of communism... These moral traits play an important part in labour activity...

To foster in every worker a highly conscious attitude to labour means to develop readiness and a desire to work not only because someone is driving him on, and not only because his earnings depend on it, but by virtue of high consciousness and moral duty to the collective, to all of society....

Communist labour is labour of the highest productivity,... constructive and conscious labour for the common good without expectation of reward".

(V.K. Fedinin: ibid.; p. 241, 245, 247).

Such "moral stimuli" have as one of their objectives the strengthening of labour discipline in the enterprise: "It is impossible to imagine a factory operating efficiently without strict labour and production discipline".

(A.N. Kosygin: ibid.; p. 42).

"Party, trade union and Komsomol (Young Communist League -- WBB) organisations are obligated... to struggle persistently for... stronger labour and production discipline".

(Resolution of CC, CPSU: "On Improving the Management of Industrty, Perfecting Planning and Strengthening the Economic Stimulation of Industrial Production", in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 282).

"In present-day conditions greater attention is paid... to the strengthening of labour discipline.....

Socialist emulation is inconceivable without firm labour discipline.... Every violation of discipline... and absenteeism spell losses for the collective".

(V.K. Fedinin: ibid.; p. 241, 246).
 


25: Economic Coercion

For the worker whose political consciousness is such that he is unprepared to observe, in the new Soviet capitalist economy, "the highest labour discipline" and to work "without expectation of reward" in order to maximise profit, there are not only the "economic stimuli" already described; there is

"... someone.. driving him on",

(V.K. Fedinin: "The Economic Reform and the Development of Socialist Emulation", in: "Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and Problems"; Moscow; 1972; p. 245).

namely, the director with his powers to penalise the recalcitrant worker in various ways, up to and including dismissal: "The director... will hire and dismiss personnel..., and reward or penalise enterprise personnel".

(Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): "Planning, Profit and Incentives in the USSR", Voume 2; New York; 1966; p. 311).

Thus, in order to stimulate the Soviet worker to maximise the rate of profit of the enterprise, economic and "moral" stimuli are reinforced, where necessary, by measures of coercion: "Proper combination of persuasion and compulsion, of ideological and educational work with administrative measures, is a true way for further consolidating labour discipline".

(V.K. Fedinin: ibid.; p. 247).

"Management should be founded on a rational combination of persuasion and coercion".

(S. Kamenitser: "The Experience of Industrial Management in the Soviet Union", Moscow; 1975; p. 129).


26: National Discrimination

The Soviet Union -- more correctly, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- is a multi-national unitary state composed of 15 Union Republics inhabited by more than 100 nations and pre-nations.

The largest and economically the most developed of the constituent Union Republics of the USSR is the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, which accounts for 76% of the territory and 53% of the population of the country.

Except for the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics on the Baltic, which were joined to the Soviet Union only in August 1940, the non-Russian Union Republics inherited a level of economic development from tsarist days which was considerably lower than that of the RSFSR.

In the period when a socialist society existed in the Soviet Union, the policy of the Communist Party was to overcome this economic inequality between the Union Republics by assistance from the RSFSR to the economically more backward Union Republics:

"The essence of the national question in the RSFR lies in abolishing the actual backwardness (economic, political and cultural) that some of the nations have inherited from the past, to make it possible for the backward peoples to catch up with central Russia in political, cultural and economic respects".

(J.V. Stalin: Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question, 10th. Cngress of the RCP(B), in: "Works", Volume 5; Moscow; 1953; p. 39).

"A new element has been introduced into the national question -- the element of the actual (and not merely juridical) equalisation of national (help and co-operation for the backward nations in raising themselves to the cultural and economic level of the more advanced nations), as one of the conditions necessary for securing fraternal co-operation between the labouring masses of the various nations".

(J.V. Stalin: "Concerning the Presentation of the National Question", in: ibid.; p. 58).

"Assistance to the backward nations in their cultural and economic development, without which what is known as 'national equality of rights' becomes an empty sound... - such is the national policy of the Russian Communists".

(J.V. Stalin: "The October Revolution and the National Policy of the Russian Communists", in: ibid.; p. 116).

"Economic and cultural inequality of the nationalities of the Union of Republics... can be overcome only by the Russian proletariat rendering the backward people of the Union real and prolonged assistance in their economic and cultural advancement".

(J.V. Stalin: "National Factors in Party and State Affairs", in: ibid.; p. 190-1).

"I understand our policy in the national question to be a policy of concessions to non-Russians... That policy is undoubtedly correct".

(J.V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Central Committee's Organisational Report, 12th. Congress of the RCP(B), in: ibid.; p. 235)

This assistance was to take the primary form of assistance in the industrialisation of the economically more backward Union Republics: "Assistance... by the Russian proletariat to the backward peoples of the Union in their economic and cultural advancement.. must first and foremost take the form of a series of practical measures for creating in the republics of formerly oppressed nationalities industrial centres, into the operation of which the local population should be drawn to the greatest possible extent".

(Resolution on "National Facors in Party and State Development", 12th. Congress of the RCP(B), in: J.V. Stalin: "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question"; London 1936; p. 283).

"The immediate tasks that face the leading cadres in the Soviet East are: 1) to create industrial centres in the Soviet republics of the East".

(J.V. Stalin: "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East", in: "Works", Volume 7; Moscow; 1954; p. 137).

"We must see to it that life, industrial life, is pulsating in every district, in every okrug, in every gubernia, region and national republic. Unless we unleash the forces latent in the localities for the purpose of economic construction, unless we lend local industry every support, beginning with the districts and okrugs, unless we unleash all these forces, we shall not be able to achieve that general upswing of economic construction in our country that Lenin spoke about".

(J.V. Stalin: Political Report of the Central Committee to the 14th. Congress of the CPSU(B), in: ibid.; p. 323).

Nevertheless, significant differences remain between the various Union Republics in the level of industrialisation, the national income per capita, the living space per capita, the average wage, the average savings bank deposit per capita, the number of hospital beds and doctors in proportion to population, and so on -- as the tables in Appendix One demonstrate.

Contemporary Soviet sociologists admit these differences, but claim that the policy of the Soviet authorities continues to be a reduction of the differences in the economic, social and cultural levels which exist between the Union Republics:

"The Soviet state.. pays attention to the problems of lessening differences in living conditons in different regions".

(P.S. Mstislavsky: "The Standard of Living" in: "The Soviet Planned Economy"; Moscow; 1974; p. 282).

But, in fact, these differences are increasing.

Table 3 of Appendix One shows that in 1970 the mean of the average urban living spaces in the six above-average Union Republics was 8.6 sq. metres, while that of the nine below-average Union Republics was 6.6 sq. metres per capita -- a difference of 2.0 sq metres. But in 1958 the mean of the average living spaces of the fist six Union Republics was 6.9 sq. metres per capita, that of the second nine Union Republics 5.4 sq. metres per capita -- a difference of only 1.5 sq. metres.

("Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu" (The National Economy of the USSR in the year 1960); Moscow; 1961; in: H.W. Morton: "What Have Soviet Leaders Done about the Housing Crisis?" in: H.W. Morton and R.L. Tokes "'Soviet Politics in the 1970's"; New York; 1974; p. 171).

This point is demonstrated further in the tables of Appendix Two.

Analysis of the fifteen tables in Appendices One and Two reveals the following position AS EXPRESSED AS RATIOS OF ABOVE AVERAGE TO BELOW AVERAGE FOR THE VARIOUS NATIONS OF THE FEDERATION:


    RATIO OF Above Average: Below Average

Russia: 14 : 1

Estonia 14 : 1

Latvia 13: 2

Lithuania: 9 : 16

Ukraine: 6 : 9

Armenia 5 : 10

Byelorussia: 4 : 11

Georgia: 4 : 11

Kazakhstan: 3 : 12

Moldavia: 2 : 13

Turkmenia: 2 : 13

Azerbaijan: 1: 14

Kirghizia: 1 : 14

Tajikistan: 1 : 14

Uzbekistan: - : 15


The picture strongly suggested by the foregoing analysis -- that the peripheral Union Republics have a semi-colonial status in relation to the Russian Republic -- is confirmed by a more detailed analysis of the economy of the most backward of these peripheral Union Republics, Uzbekistan.

The proportion of collective farms in the Central Asian economic region having more than 500 households greatly exceeds the proportion for the USSR as a whole, and for the RSFSR:


Distribution of Collective Farms
by No. of Households (1971)
300 and under         301-500         Over 500 USSR:                             40.6%                             29.0%             30.4%

RSFSR:                            49.8%                             30.0%             20.2%

Central Asia:                     11.5%                              22.4%             66.1%

("Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR" (Agriculture in the USSR), p. 491; in: G. Hodnett: "Technology and Social Change in Soviet Central Asia: The Politics of Cotton Growing", in: H.W. Morton & R.L. Tokes (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 83).



These large collective farms, concentrating on the growing of cotton, employ large numbers of temporary workers from the towns to pick their crop, while a high proportion of the collective farmers opt out of this task: "Every year hundreds of thousands of city dwellers are brought in for the harvest, which causes enormous damage to the economy".

("Khlopkovodstvo" (Cotton-growing), No. 7, 1960, in: G. Hodnett: ibid.; p. 83-4).

In Uzbekistan in October 1962, for example, 186,000 outsiders put in an average of 26 days' work in cotton, while 400,000 collective farmers did not participate.

("Khlopkovodstvo" (Cotton-growing),No. 3, 1964, in: G. Hodnett: ibid.; p. 84).

Cotton-growing for "export" to the industrialised Union Republics -- Uzbekistan itself has few textile mills -- is thus the basis of the Uzbek economy, and it is the policy of the leaders of the CPSU and state to maintain this situation:

"The climatic conditions and specific features of agricultural production in the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus... demand workers with the necessary knowledge and labour habits of farming in these areas. Such workers are, above all, the native peoples of these regions. The mass recruitment of this population into industry, transport, construction, etc., might weaken the development of quite important sectors of agriculture. In planning the development of the economy, the specific features of such regions are taken into account. For example, in the Seven-Year Plan of developing the economy of the USSR for 1959-65, it is indicated that the Uzbek SSR will continue in the future to be the main cotton base of the country. Therefore, basic attention in Uzbekistan will continue to be devoted to the development of cotton growing"

(A.A. Isupov: "Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniia SSR" (National Composition of the Populations of the SSRs); Moscow; 1964; on: G. Hodnett: ibid.; p. 95).

"In developing the agriculture of Uzbekistan,... we need an agricultural complex on a cotton basis".

(N.I. Mukhitdinov, in: "Materialy obedinennoi nauchnoi sessii po khlopovodstva, sostoiasheisia v. g. Tashkente 15-21 oktobria 1957 g" (Collected Materials of the Scientific Session on Cotton-growing, held at Tashkent, October 15-21st., 1957); Tashkent; 1958; p. 31; in: G. Hodnett L ibid.; p. 96).

This policy has led to an actual decline in food production per capita in Uzbekistan:

Food Production in Uzbekistan (1959-65)
(kilograms per capita)
1959        1965
 
Meat                                    18.1             14.5
Milk                                     95.0             89.7
Grains                                  62.2             59.3
Potatoes                              24.8             16.1
Fruits                                     23.4             19.0
(V.S. Nekhai: "The Production of Foodstuffs and the Level of Consumption in Relation to Population", in: A.M. Aminov (Ed.): "Razvitie i sovershenstvovanie sotsialisticheskikh proizvodstvennykh otnoshenii v period stroitelstva kommunizma" (The Development and Perfecting of Socialist Industrial Relations in the Period of the Construction of Communism); Tashkent; 1968; in: G. Hodnett: ibid.; p. 71).

The official policy of maintaining a colonial-type economy in Uzbekistan has naturally led to strong protests against it in that Union Republic:

"Uzbekistan produces 70% of All-Union output of cotton lint, 38% of raw silk and 90% of kenaf fibre. Yet only 2.8% of cotton cloth manufactured in the country, 2.7% of clothes and shoes, 2.6% of knitwear and 2.1% of stockings and socks, are produced here, while the steadily growing share of the republic in the population of the USSR reached 5% in 1970. By quantity of output per capita of light industry products, Uzbekistan occupies one of the last places in the Soviet Union...

Just in the past five-year plan, the average tempos of growth in output of light industry were 8.5% for the nation as a whole, but 3.6% for Uzbekistan...

During the past 35 years not a single cotton textile combine has been built in the Uzbek SSR. Up to now, there are no enterprises for manufacturing woolen fabrics and blankets. There are few knitwear, garment and shoe factories...

During the last five-year plan, the target for capital investment in light industry was fulfilled by about 75%, for starting up new capacity -- by 35%...

In 1969-71, 15 new enterprises were supposed to be built and 8 existing enterprises reconstructed. In actual fact, only 3 are being built and 2 reconstructed. In 1971 36 enterprises ought to have been designed, but in reality only 5 are being designed".

(N.S. Ziiadullaev: "Problemy optimizatsii razvitiia legkoi industrii uzbekistana v svete reshenii XXIV sezda KPSS" (Problems of the Optimisation of the Development of Light Industry in Uzbekistan in the light of the Decisions of the 24th. Congress of the CPSU), in: "Obshchestevennye nauki v uzbekistane" (Social Sciences in Uzbekistan), Volume 8, 1971, in: G. Hodnett: ibid.; p. 101).

"A process of releasing people is taking place as a result of the expansion of mechanisation... Tomorrow, if the brigade size is reduced to 12 people as a result of expanding the mechanisation of labour and raising productivity, many people will be released. Either it is necessary to develop other branches of agriculture, or it is necessary to put industrial units in the raion (i.e., district -- WBB) centres and villages... We have a great natural population increase... Therefore, it is necessary to build food enterprises and enterprises in light industry and non-metal-intensive-machine-building".

(V. Akhundov: Speech to CC, CPSU, March 1965, in: G. Hodnett: ibid.; p. 99).

"The creation of a big textile industry in Uzbekistan is dictated by economic considerations".

(N.S. Ziiadullaev: ibid.; p. 102).

On the other hand, these demands have been denounced as "...manifestations of localism and narrow-mindedness in the leadership of cotton growing when all-state interests were neglected in favour of local tasks".

(N.I. Mukhitdinov: Speech at Conference on Cotton-growing, Tashkent, October 1957, in: G. Hodnett: ibid.; p. 110).

A recent attempt to try to damp down national sentiment in the peripheral Union Republics in order to maintain their colonial-type status was the abortive move, in April 1978, to delete from the new Georgian Constitution the recognition of Georgian as the official language of the Union Republic: "Soviet authorities have reinstated Georgian as the official language of Soviet Georgia after demonstrations there last week over a proposed new constitution which had eliminated the language as the republic's official tongue.

The demonstrations occurred on Friday in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, when several hundred university students apparently marched from the campus about a mile through the city centre to the steps of the Government's buildings where the Georgian Supreme Soviet was meeting to adopt the new constitution...

Georgians, who comprise most of the population, apparently interpreted this change to mean further 'russification' of their republic".

("Moscow Bows to Georgians in State Language Row", in: "The Guardian", April 19th., 1978; p. 7).


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