lution to be conducted simultaneously throughout the army; it should be done by stages instead.[66]

The decision of the central bodies clearly concerned Sinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Kwangsi and Fukien. Indeed, it has been reported that a poster appeared quoting another directive of Mao Tse-tung's to the army which urged it to strengthen precautions against war in the provinces along the frontier with the USSR.

The army managed to achieve a balance between its internal and external commitments. But its new internal responsibility was a grave one: identifying the good revolutionaries among all those who asked for its help. This could not be done without the assistance of the Centre's intelligence services.

[66] Poster of February 15th.

4. Students and Red Guards

For several years the radical Maoist minority in the Party tried to have their ideas adopted through the ordinary methods of discussion, persuasion and example. But when their enemies seemed to have gained the upper hand organizationally they decided to move on to a new kind of action. Their tactics, which had to fit Mao Tse-tung's ideas, were to appeal to the masses by exposing scandals that would shock them into joining forces with the minority to get the discredited leaders suspended from their duties. As long as the aim was only to criticize a few leaders—the proportion was arbitrarily fixed at 5 per cent for the top ranks—it did not, apparently, seem necessary to mobilize all of the masses.

The students might be enough. The workers and peasants had not been sufficiently awakened politically under the Party's rule, so that it would have taken them a very long time to get going. Their latter participation may well have been envisaged, but this involved the danger of large-scale disorders. There must certainly have been arguments for trying to interest the workers and peasants in the debate through the example of the students, who were more easily controlled.

The Maoists had also long wanted to ensure that the third generation of communists would be, and remain, 'red.' Back in 1963 one could have read in the *People's*

Daily[1] that the imperialist world had evil designs on the young people of China, and was counting on the 'peaceful transformation' of the third generation in the Communist world. Mao Tse-tung took the matter to heart. This is confirmed in some lines that Robert Guillain wrote in 1964:

> It has been revealed . . . that Mao Tse-tung, who has not published any major political writings for a long time, has recently presented a very important document to the Central Committee: a plan for the youth of China. It has not yet been issued, but, as is the usual practice, some preliminary summaries have been released. In it the Chairman analyses the nature and the role of young people, lays down the methods by which they are to be won over to socialism, and gives detailed instructions on how they must be better trained for revolutionary struggle.
>
> The most astounding statement is that these directives of Mao Tse-tung's must be taken as applying not only to the coming generation but also to all those that will follow—five, six or even more, according to the Central Committee of the Youth League. This is how long the period of transition to Communism will take, Mao has stated.[2]

As it turned out in 1965–66, the Communist Youth League did not live up to the hope placed in it. It was, in particular, short of recruits. It is easy to think in retrospect that mobilizing the students to criticize the 'authorities' in the Party was killing two birds with one stone: bringing about mass activity, and giving the youth an educational shock. The students were given a vacation and thrown into politics. A revolution in miniature could be attempted by limiting the revolutionary masses to the students, and restricting their targets to 5 per cent of the Party's leading cadres.

But could it have been successful in stopping there, and

[1] May 4, 1963.

[2] 'Year XV of New China,' *Le Monde*, Paris, 1964, pp. 45–46.

thus keeping within limits the disorder resulting from the operation? The students were asked to express their feelings, in the first place about the university authorities who seemed to deserve criticism. During this phase student action went far beyond what had been hoped for from it, thanks to the mistakes made by the Work Teams sent by the Party to take over the Cultural Revolution in educational establishments. The students were then asked to criticize erring Party leaders outside their schools.

From the end of the Eleventh Plenum onwards, all the students took to the streets. The Red Guards were those of them who had already become organized. They hoped to play an organized political role, and saw themselves as auxiliaries to the Party or the army. But it was the *whole* student body that was called upon to arouse the masses of the people.

The organizations that were, strictly speaking, Red Guard ones, were generally very small and they varied greatly. Some were fervent enthusiasts for the ideal of free thought, while others faithfully tried to fulfil the tasks assigned to them within the Party. All factions always laid claim to the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, and Maoism was as much the banner of anti-progressive organizations as of the progressives themselves. But the revolution could not be restricted to the scale of a revolution in miniature, both because of what happened in the provinces—a phenomenon analogous to the one we have observed in the army—and because some radicals had aims more ambitious than a simple struggle among the authorities, even one resulting in a different majority within the Party.

As with many other prolonged revolutions, this one progressed by sudden leaps. The students, who had been the first to be committed to the fray, found themselves leading a movement that was changing without them realizing it. People quite at home in one phase found themselves left behind suddenly and without warning. New splits between groups were caused as the movement developed. At the outset student activists encountered the hostility of the workers and peasants. In September there was clear evidence of friction between them.

The students had long been politicized, but the leaders of the Cultural Revolution were divided over how to form the students into a political force, and thus found it hard to group them into cohesive units. The term 'Red Guards' is generally understood to refer primarily to a small number of front-line groups more militant than the rest. Yet the students had to show the way in a mass support of renovation of the Party, and had to start by establishing for themselves provisional revolutionary institutions in their universities.

Some features marked the students off from the workers and peasants. They did not have a clear-cut class origin, and often argued about how much importance to attach to their comrades' social backgrounds. They were aware of the drawbacks of their intellectual origins, and many of them, conscious of the petty bourgeois tendencies that were particularly strong among them, wanted the student Cultural Revolution teams completely integrated with the workers and peasants in production units. The leaders of the Cultural Revolution did not allow this, probably because the workers and peasants felt reservations about students.

The Cultural Revolution as we know it remained an urban phenomenon. It was in the cities that the students felt free to take revolutionary action, and where their intellectual character led them to discuss finer points of theory. And the petty bourgeois tendency encouraged an extreme left approach that was later to cause some problems.

The first political awakening

We have seen how, in 1964, Mao Tse-tung presented a paper on the training of the young to the Central Committee. His rivals in the Party machine could not let him monopolize this subject. On August 19, 1965, the paper *Kuangming Jihpao*[3] revealed that Chairman Mao and Chairman Liu had both issued important directives on

[3] The daily paper for cultural circles.

education in 1964. It is not known exactly what Liu Shao-ch'i's directives contained, unless they envisaged a double reform: first, in full-time schools where manual labour was to be included in the curriculum, and, second, in the schools where study and productive work were mixed.[4]

The leaders in Peking took some liberties with the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Commenting on the subject of education, the Peking municipal Party review wrote:

> In normal conditions there should be more teaching than political activity. In full-time schools the teachers should spend the hours for study teaching. Comrade Mao Tse-Tung said in 1950 that schools of the old type should be changed, but not in too much of a hurry, without violence or haste.[5]

The schools adopted less rigorous time-tables. There were more extra-curricular activities, more time to spend in the library, more leisure. The student's burden was lightened. P'eng Chen's popularity in Peking was not probably in much need of a boost, but the Communist Youth League should not have neglected its own. Indeed, reports had for some time been stressing that there was a recruitment crisis.

In an organization where the members' ages were between fifteen and twenty-five 'few are under twenty and few are girls.'[6] 'Village membership makes up only 13 per cent; 10 per cent of production brigades do not have a single member and another 30 per cent have only one or two.'[7] 'If an appropriate number of new members is not brought into the League every year,' the same article continued, 'there can be only three possible consequences: as the number of new members become fewer

[4] See Chou En-lai's report to the National People's Congress, *People's Daily*, December 31, 1964.

[5] *Ch'ien Hsien*, Peking, 1965, no. 8. Reprinted in *Kuangming Jihpao*, May 10, 1965.

[6] *China Youth* (fortnightly), 1964, no. 14, p. 24.

[7] *China Youth News*, April 2, 1964, editorial.

than that of the leavers, the League will diminish and its organization will be weakened; if there are many over-age members the League will no longer be a youth organization; and it may happen that in a factory, a commune, a *hsien*, or even in a larger area, members above the upper age limit will form the majority.' The League was one of the first to suffer as a result of the inauguration of the Cultural Revolution. In fact it is significant that the fortnightly magazine *China Youth* announced a series of articles on the constitution of the League, starting in August 1965, that was to run to eleven pieces but was cut short in November—about the time that the Party was divided into two.

Although there was a difference in spirit between Chairman Mao's directives on youth and Chairman Liu's on education, a movement to give students a bigger part in social life and more means of self-expression had been born. Preparations for national defence contributed to this with militia training; and in addition students in the big cities were urged to go among the peasants to join in the Socialist Education Movement. Some of them were sent to the villages from 1964 onwards to take part in the 'Four Clean-ups.'

If this campaign was run in many places as an operation to strengthen the Party, the students seconded to it must have felt that they were being treated as future cadres. The Party machine thus won new adherents. All the third and fourth year students in universities and other institutions of higher education in Peking and several other cities were mobilized for the movement in September 1965 and sent to the countryside, to be followed in November by the fifth-year students. Revolutionary students were later to accuse the university authorities of having wanted to get rid of the most awkward of them in this way. They reckoned that there was more scope for political activity in their universities than in the villages to which they had been sent. But for many young city-dwellers this first contact with political reality, even though it took place under Party control, was a spur to action.

Educational establishments were already excited by discussions on the value of doctrinaire teaching, student participation in work, the use of free time, involvement in the League or in better forms of political activity, and on the student role in politics, especially in the Socialist Education Movement. At this point the news of the Party's May meeting and of the circular of May 16, 1966, reached the universities. The order was given to 'criticize thoroughly all bourgeois reactionary ideas in academic circles . . . and to this end criticize at the same time all the representatives of the bourgeoisie who have infiltrated the Party, the government, the army and the cultural world.'

Seven members of the Peita philosophy department launched an attack on May 25th against the university's first Party secretary and chancellor, Lu P'ing, and a deputy, P'eng P'ei-yun. They displayed on the walls of their university the first poster of criticism in large characters (*tatzupao*) of the Cultural Revolution, signed with their seven names.[8] When the national leaders and the press called them the 'initiators' of the Cultural Revolution they became famous. At their head was Nieh Yuan-tzu. She was a lecturer in the philosophy department and the departmental Party secretary. After a short struggle in the university their *tatzupao* was broadcast on June 1st—on Mao Tse-tung's personal decision, as was later learned[9]—and held up to the whole country as an example to follow.[10]

The victory of the revolutionary staff and students of Peita was approved by the new Peking Municipal Party Committee, in which Li Hsüeh-feng replaced P'eng Chen. The first decisions of the new committee were to dismiss Lu P'ing and P'eng P'ei-yun, to reorganize the university's Party committee, and send in a Work Team.

In other universities in Peking and elsewhere student demonstrations followed the example of Peita. Other

[8] The public was told officially of this in the *People's Daily* of June 2, 1966.

[9] Joint editorial of *Red Flag* and the *People's Daily*, January 1, 1967. See *Peking Review*, no. 1, 1967.

[10] *People's Daily*, June 2, 1966, 'Let us acclaim Peking University's capital-letter newspaper.'

Work Teams were despatched. 'Even before June 1st the teachers and students at Nanking University responded to the call of the Centre and Chairman Mao, and threw themselves into the struggle for the great Cultural Revolution,' wrote the *China Youth News* on June 16th. Nanking's first *tatzupao* was posted on June 2nd.[11] A Work Team was forced on Sian's Chiaot'ung Tahsieh—Chiaota—on June 3rd.[12]

The Party had been familiar with the tactical device of Work Teams since the Socialist Education Movement, and long before. Teams made up of trusted cadres were sent into 'units' where they had to carry out investigations, identify the faults, make changes, or suggest punishments. The favourite method of the Work Teams was an investigation behind closed doors and a secret report. They were not popular. Moreover they did not rely much on the masses as their composition was decided upon from above.

Work Teams as such were not always regarded by Maoists as fundamentally bad. It was the Teams' actions in the schools that pushed the radicals to revolt, and constituted the worst of the offences for which Liu Shao-ch'i was condemned. Liu, as the man in control of the organs of the Centre in Peking, was the man chiefly responsible for the Work Teams.

There were Teams in universities, schools, offices, such public services as banks and newspapers, and even several ministries. Forced to work fast in a political situation they little understood, and told to carry out purges in the name of the Cultural Revolution to which the Party machine gave them no clues, they regarded their job as a 'clean-up.' Instead of getting close to the students, listening to what they had to say, or encouraging them to talk, they stood on

[11] An attack on K'uang Ya-ming, First Secretary and Chancellor of Nanking University, by the students of the secondary school attached to the university. K'uang Ya-ming was accused afterwards of having called 'reactionaries' those who took the side of the *PLA Daily* in the quarrel of the Centres. See *People's Daily*, June 16, 1966.

[12] The University of Transport and Communications, the main centre of student disturbance in Shensi.

their dignity and kept away from them, apart from holding a few public trials.

The journal *Red Flag* later published a study of the activities of the Work Team sent to Tsinghua University on June 9th. It concluded that the team had treated teachers and school Party cadres as 'deep-dyed villains' when there was virtually nothing to reproach them with, and that only a small handful of them had been defended.[13] The students for their part were disconcerted, particularly those of Peita, where the intimidatory sanctions demanded by the Work Team stunned everyone. It was later reported that the team had tried to find who had been responsible for laboratory accidents that had occurred long before the Cultural Revolution, and have them condemned to death.

The cadres of the youth organizations and the class monitors could not understand what was happening at first and held back, while the progressive students raised their voices to say that the movement was being put into reverse. By denouncing the Work Teams for misusing their authority they made themselves its next targets. Everyone, whether young cadres or progressives, wrote posters all the time—partly according to orders; apparently everyone was required to use up a certain quantity of paper and ink every week under the strict eyes of the Work Team. When all the accessible walls in the university had been covered with *tatzupao* permission was given for them to be displayed in rooms. Sometimes posters were hung on lines that divided rooms into corridors.

Work Teams seem to have been an improvised attempt to keep the Cultural Revolution as close as possible to an academic quarrel run by cadres who could rely on the solidarity of the Party machine to prevent any disorders from weakening the Party. Even leaders who later declared their allegiance to the Cultural Revolution, such as Li Hsüeh-feng, appealed then to the full authority of the Party in an attempt to protect the Work Teams. 'To oppose the Work Teams is to oppose the Centre,' he said

[13] Quoted in *Mōtakutō no Chōsen*, p. 34.

on June 26th.[14] It must be pointed out that at this point Mao Tse-tung had not yet returned to Peking, where only one of the Party's two Centres was to be found, and hardly anyone had any confidence in the other one. Rare indeed were the local leaders who could have realized that they would have to cross the Rubicon and use the mass of the students.

However, the progressive students, baulked in their enthusiastic attempts to apply the May 16th Circular—in Sian, for example, they were not allowed to post notices or cartoons in the street, or to stage marches in the town; they had to confine themselves to criticizing the 'Three-Family Village'[15]—now began to discuss the need for reform in education.

Some groups[16] wrote to the Central Committee and Chairman Mao condemning all the old rules and sending in their schemes for reform over the heads of the Work Teams.[17] One of the most famous of these was the letter from seven students at the People's University, Jenta, insisting that henceforward the universities should recruit their students from secondary school pupils who had proved themselves in the Cultural Revolution.[18] There were not

[14] This error was explicitly denounced in the 'Sixteen-Point Directive of the Eleventh Plenum' of August 8th: 'Some of the persons in charge . . . have even advanced such slogans as: Opposition to the leaders of a unit or work team means opposition to the Central Committee of the Party, which means opposition to the Party and socialism, which means counter-revolution. . . . This is an error in orientation, an error of line.' Li Hsüeh-feng was not, however, named.

[15] Directive by Huo Shih-lien, CCP, First Secretary for Shensi Province, June 4, 1966, cited by Andrew Watson, *Far Eastern Economic Review,* April 20, 1967.

[16] E.g. No. 21 Girls Middle School, Peking, and No. 4 Middle School, Peking. See *Peking Review,* no. 26, June 24, 1966, p. 4.

[17] 'Decision on improving the standard of teaching in secondary and primary schools' prepared under P'eng Chen in 1954. See *Peiching Jihpao,* April 24, 1967, article by the Chingkangshan group of Peking Higher Education College.

[18] *People's Daily,* June 12, 1966. The scheme put forward in this letter also wanted courses in the humanities reduced to one, two, or three years, the general use of Mao Tse-tung's works as textbooks, more seminars, and more group discussions.

yet, however, Red Guard organizations in the schools and universities; or rather there were none that could yet be seen from the outside.

The first time that the signature of the Red Guards appeared at the bottom of a document was in an open letter from a group of pupils at the middle school attached to Tsinghua University.[19] This document is dated two days after Mao Tse-tung's return to Peking[20] but fifteen days before the period when there was an exaggerated tendency to see a 'spontaneous emergence of Red Guards.'

Mao Tse-tung came back to Peking on July 18th, and that day marked a real revolt against the Work Teams. Chiang Ch'ing herself came to Peita to encourage the progressives. Students took for themselves the right of association, and the Work Teams were finally abolished on July 24th.[21]

It would have been logical for the progressive students to be the first to take advantage of the overthrow of the Work Teams and the winning of new freedoms. But in many places it was the children of top cadres who took the lead in organizations they created themselves, after actively helping the Work Teams to overthrow the academic leaders in the universities. At Tsinghua University the 'Provisional Preparatory Committee for the Tsinghua Provisional Red Guard Headquarters' was controlled by five students whose fathers were Party dignitaries, including the daughter of Liu Shao-ch'i and the son of Ho Lung. Tsinghua University, where the first Red Guards were formed by the children of top leaders, is a fascinating case of the Cultural Revolution at the end of the period of the Work Teams. Its Work Team appears to have been under the leadership of Wang Jen-chung, who stayed on as deputy

[19] *China News Analysis,* Hong Kong, no. 634, October 28, 1966, p. 5.

[20] See the article by the 'Group of Eleven' from the Chingkangshan organization at Tsinghua University, in *China Reconstructs,* 1968, no. 7.

[21] See Liu Shao-ch'i's first self-criticism.

head of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group for some time, and was therefore presumably orthodox, whereas Liu Shao-ch'i and his wife Wang Kuang-mei offered their services voluntarily as advisers to the Work Team. The following children of top leaders were included: Liu T'ao, daughter of Liu Shao-ch'i and a student in the department of automation, who was in charge of the provisional presidium of the 'Provisional Preparatory Committee'; Ho P'eng-fei, son of Ho Lung and a student of industrial mechanization, a member of the provisional presidium of the 'Provisional Preparatory Committee' in charge of the 'Tsinghua Provisional Red Guard Headquarters';[22] Li Li-feng, son of Li Ching-ch'üan (First Secretary of the CCP Central Committee South Western Bureau) and student of engineering physics, was Ho P'eng-fei's deputy in the 'Three provisionals'; Liu Chü-fen, son of Liu Ning-yi (Secretary of the Central Committee's Secretariat) and student of automation, 'Commander-in-Chief of the Tsinghua Red Guards.' Wang Hsia-hu, son of Wang Jen-chung (who in addition to the position mentioned above was secretary of the Central Committee's Central-South Bureau) and student of electronics, was an official of the Tsinghua's 'Provisional Red Guard Headquarters' and founder of the 'Red Flag Red Guards.'[23] For a short time it was they who led and organized their fellow students.

K'uai Ta-fu, later to be Tsinghua's most famous Red Guard, appeared more as a lone protester than as an organizer. He was tireless in his attempts to raise opposition against the Work Team; he provoked it by holding forbidden discussions; he made himself famous by his letters—copies of which were circulated among the students—to the chancellor, Yeh Lin; he was imprisoned in the university, and went on hunger strike. Later, at the beginning of August, he wrote a self-criticism in which he acknowledged that instead of uniting the greatest possible number of people he had conspired with a few individuals who shared his ideas.

[22] These three organizations were known as the 'Three provisionals.'

[23] See the article by Nogami in the *Asahi Shimbun*, December 10, 1967, morning edition.

When the high officials' children created the university's Preparatory Committee and Red Guards, K'uai Ta-fu led stronger attacks on them. He cast doubt on whether the Preparatory Committee was representative. He demanded elections without further delay, and insisted that the student masses should be consulted so that they could produce their own leaders.[24]

K'uai Ta-fu was a political thinker, and the distribution of his writings, together with those of several others whose positions were much the same, contributed towards the political awakening of the other students.[25] The children of high officials were acting like their fathers, creating hierarchical structures among the students so as to lead them towards predetermined solutions. Whether they realized it or not, they were working for their fathers.

The Preparatory Committee, discredited in the eyes of the majority because its origins were too closely linked with the Work Team, did not last long. Its members, and the children of other leaders, left to swell the ranks of other organizations more like the other small groups blossoming everywhere at the time. Many of these called themselves Red Guard Pickets,[26] and one of these, the West City Patrol, presented one of their armbands to Mao Tse-tung on August 31st.

When these students, who regarded themselves as makers of the Cultural Revolution, saw their fathers being criticized as exponents of the 'bourgeois line,' they had doubts about the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group. Some of them joined the Joint Action Committee (regarded as a reactionary body, of which more below), and

[24] K'uai Ta-fu: 'Eight Problems that Must Now Be Solved,' August 4, 1966.

[25] T'an Li-fu, later the first to be accused of Trotskyism and prosecuted for it, also seems to have been the son of a high cadre. Quotations of his writings sold by the thousands. See Nogami, *op. cit.*

[26] Chiu-ch'a-tui.

were arrested at the beginning of 1967. The first Red Guards were not to remain with the revolutionaries for long.

The purpose of the Red Guards

The withdrawal of the Work Teams was the occasion for public rejoicing which permitted the sponsors of the Cultural Revolution to seize the initiative and mobilize the great mass of the students. The first mass meetings were held in the universities, notably at Peita, on July 25th and 26th, where Ch'en Po-ta himself (the head of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group) came to address the students.[27] Then the students were urged to show their strength in the city. Despite these efforts the two tendencies in the Party ended by making the great demonstration held on July 30th ambiguous: the radicals were celebrating the end of the Work Teams, Mao Tse-tung's return to Peking, and the triumph of the mass line;[28] while the Party machine had invited people to take part in a demonstration against the American imperialist bombing of the cities of North Vietnam. It brought peasant delegations into towns, and these were interspersed among the students. Then the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee was held.

On August 10th Mao Tse-tung went down into the crowd. Contrary to usual practice, he did not warn the Party's secretariat, the propaganda organs, or even the press. His appearance unleashed a storm of enthusiasm, and his presence in the Chungnanhai[29] was celebrated by an unending flood of demonstrators pouring night and day against the outer walls, their joy giving birth to unity.

[27] See *Chūgoku Bunka Daikakumei wo dō miru ka*, p. 214.

[28] *Red Flag* editorial, July 3, 1966: 'Trust the Masses, Rely on the Masses.'

[29] In some ways equivalent to the Kremlin. The offices of the Central Committee and the homes of Party and State leaders are concentrated in a compound beside the Central and Southern Seas (Chunghai and Nanhai), two of the lakes in the western part of the Forbidden City.

The students established themselves inside the city, and their delegations took part in the huge carnival together with everyone else. The Chairman's triumphant return was celebrated amid an endless din of drums and gongs. On August 18th an enormous rally of youngsters was held in T'ienanmen, in the course of which Mao Tse-tung introduced the Red Guards to the world.

The mission these latter were to give themselves was drawn from a slogan put forward by the *People's Daily* ten weeks earlier. Direction through the organs of the press follows a slow and somewhat closed-off progress, particularly when it is the masses who have to be reached. Abstract texts need to be closely examined, and passages giving instructions for action have to be interpreted to the masses by people familiar with the conventions of the procedure. On June 7th the *PLA Daily* had written that 'the essential task of the Cultural Revolution' would be 'to destroy utterly old thinking, culture, customs and ways of life.'[30] Thus it was that the students took it upon themselves to destroy what were often described as the 'Four Olds.'

The Sixteen-Point Decision adopted by the Central Committee on August 8th created an essential safeguard against the movement degenerating into a conflict whose outcome would be unpredictable: it gave the students protection from persecution by the Party machine, and from reprisals when they took the revolution into the streets. According to the seventh point:

> With the exception of cases of active counter-revolutionaries where there is clear evidence of crimes . . . no measures should be taken against students at universities, colleges, middle schools and primary schools because of problems that arise in the movement. To prevent the struggle from being diverted from its main target it is not allowed under any pretext whatever to incite the masses or the students to struggle against each

[30] 'Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the Telescope and Microscope of our Revolutionary Cause,' *PLA Daily* editorial, June 7, 1966. See *The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in China* (3), Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1966.

other. Even proven Rightists should be dealt with on the merits of each case at a later stage of the movement.

It was with the ground thus prepared that the first groups of activists moved into the streets of Peking, changing street names, burning old books, and smashing any words in shop signs that evoked the old society.

During the next few days radio and telephone spread the movement to the provinces. The city of Shenyang (formerly Mukden) had its name changed—on the railway station's nameboard, at least—because when written with the abbreviated character for the first syllable it could mean 'Set Sun,' an intolerable expression when Mao Tse-tung was the 'sun that never sets.' The Red Guards changed the city's name to Hungyang, which meant 'Red Sun.'[31] The *People's Daily* however, kept to Shenyang throughout.

The students showed hostility in the streets to anyone wearing 'calf style' trousers—narrow and tight in the leg—or 'aeroplane' hairstyles—carefully flattened down—or 'winkle-picker' shoes, or anything else reminiscent of the 'Hongkong style.' They desecrated temples, harassed nuns —the foreign ones left Peking—and in the cemeteries they broke open the tombs of past reactionaries, including those of foreigners. The works of dead writers and artists, such as the painter Ch'i Pai-shih, were attacked. Many of the living who were still attached to family mementoes or a western way of life were persecuted, and some disappeared. Many of the objects confiscated were put on show at the Red Guard Exhibition[32] which some privileged foreigners visited in August 1967. Beside cases showing the texts that caused the split in the Party and the originals of the first documents of the Revolution, Sakagaki relates that 268 pistols were displayed, as well as 100,000 gold bars, 120,000 silver coins, Kuomintang flags and uniforms, and innumerable account books and other relics of former properties that ex-landlords were suspected of hiding to use someday as evidence of ownership.[33]

[31] See Konno, *Pekin Kono Ichinen,* p. 41.
[32] In the Peking Exhibition Centre to the west of the city.
[33] *Ajia Keizai Jumpo,* no. 696, September 1967, p. 4 ff.

As some activities degenerated into violence or banditry, Red Guard organizations made rules for themselves and posted them throughout the city. The most noticeable features of these were orders about good behaviour and warnings against false rumours. News was beginning to circulate more freely in China, though not without the exaggerations inevitable when it is spread by word of mouth. Beside posters containing criticisms were wall newspapers with news from the provinces and reports of dramatic events, telling how young revolutionaries had been killed by reactionary groups or even by the security forces. The spread of such news alarmed the population.

As for the information that the Red Guards themselves needed for organizing their operations in attack or defence, this was generally distributed in leaflets, which enabled them to concentrate their members rapidly when they were scattered throughout the city, but carried the risk of setting off a panic. The authors of the rules wanted to combat this and help establish some minimal organization. But beyond this basic moral code and loyalty to the Thought of Chairman Mao, the Red Guard rules were vague about the role of their organizations.

Should they be political bodies? What limits should be put on their activities? The national leaders themselves, who were somewhat taken by surprise by the new situation, gave rather differing interpretations when speaking to the Red Guards in public.[34] They seemed to be improvising. A little later Chou En-lai referred to Red Guards as being essentially organizations of criticism.

It would have been unwise to give them a political role in view of the chaotic mixture of tendencies represented in the organization.

> In the political sphere we must regroup our forces. At present they consist of different sects. . . . Some es-

[34] Speech of December 9, 1966, in the Chungnanhai Small Hall to three organizations (Aviation Institute Hungch'i, Tungfang Commune of the Geological Institute, and Chengfa Commune of the Political Science Institute). As organs of criticism Chou En-lai allowed them to receive the special newspapers for cadres.

tablishments have been deeply affected by the suppression of the Work Teams. . . . We must give them the chance to recuperate and wake up.[35]

A Central Committee directive laid down the form this critical role was to take. It amounted to that of an intermediary:

Proposals on the abolition of old customs, old culture, old ways of life and old ideas shall not be examined and settled by the Red Guard units, but shall be passed on to the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants Association of the commune (or, later, that of the *hsien* if the proposals are important enough), to examine what benefits they would bring and take a decision on them.[36]

But this was not enough to explain what strategic intention underlay the decision to involve the whole mass of the students in criticism of the authorities, even if Red Guard activities did provide an opportunity for giving life to the peasant associations. According to a study published in 1968 by the *Asahi,* Mao Tse-tung said in his closing speech to the Eleventh Plenum that the Party's Ninth Congress would doubtless be held at a suitable moment in the coming year. 'But I would like preparations for it to be referred to the Political Bureau elected at the Eleventh Plenum,' he added.[37]

Mao Tse-tung thus had the next Party congress in mind when he mobilized the students. The point of entrusting the student masses with making criticisms must have been to have enough Party members suspended or expelled to leave his supporters in the majority once more. Lacking experience and a real social role, the students could not play a big part in politics, as Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Central Committee Directive on the Development of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Territorial Units Below *Hsien* level, September 14, 1966. As published in notices posted by the Tientsin Municipal Committee on September 22, 1966.

[37] *Asahi Jyanaru,* 1968, no. 18, 'Wakagaetta tōsōshiki no taishitsu,' p. 21.

already reminding them on August 27th: 'It is very easy to dismiss people, but then you will no longer have any opposition.'[38] In other words, they were carrying out a flanking movement but leaving the Party as it was, whereas a real political reconstruction of society would need all the elements in it.

In their struggle against the 'Four Olds' the students had hitherto played their critical role within the ranks of the people. It was after the National Festival of October 1st, traditionally a time of political truce, that they began to act on the assignment they had been given to make the heads of Party committees their targets.[39] There was an inevitable hardening as a result, and this was called 'rebellion' on the strength of a single quotation from Mao Tse-tung that the students preferred above all others: 'In the last analysis all the truths of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: "To rebel is justified." '[40]

The rebel students were to meet with two kinds of resistance: hostile inertia in many units,[41] and the reaction of the 'authorities.'

Student privilege

As we have seen above, the Sixteen-Point Decision protected the students from reprisals. But there was no way of anticipating how things would develop once the students left their own world to carry the revolution into the heart of the political administration, and then among the

[38] In a speech to Peking and Tientsin Red Guards. Leaflet of September 2, 1966.

[39] The directive in accordance with which the students extended their criticisms to the people in power within the Party was given by Lin Piao at a rally on August 31st, but it was only after October 1st that student meetings decided to take action.

[40] From a speech by Mao Tse-tung at a Yenan rally to celebrate Stalin's birthday in 1939.

[41] 'Trying to spare one's own unit from the struggle between the bourgeois and the proletarian roads will not be tolerated,' said a call from the Rebel High Command of the Capital's Revolutionary Red Guards on November 9, 1966.

workers and peasants. Friction with the two latter groups had been prevalent since September. The leadership of the Cultural Revolution reacted fast, making all possible efforts to prevent any overlapping between the movement among the students and that in the factories and the villages. Mao Tse-tung brought the matter to the attention of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group:

> Please consider this case. The situation is the same at Tsingtao, Sian, Changsha and elsewhere. Organizations of workers and peasants have been formed and are opposed to the students. If things continue like this, we will not be able to solve our problems. The Centre must issue a directive forbidding this sort of thing everywhere. Then an article must be written urging workers and peasants not to interfere in the student movement. In Peking there have been no cases of workers and peasants being incited to attack the students, except when the People's University assembled six hundred peasants and set them loose in the city to defend Kuo Ying-ch'iu.[42] We must popularize Peking's experience and hold it up to the provinces as an example.[43]

Four days later the Central Committee decreed that the workers, peasants and city-dwellers would have to be persuaded to refrain from any interference in the student movement; that the majority of the students were sound and would learn through experience; and that there should be no polemics with the students. If the local people wanted to reply to the students' ideas they should send their comments to the Party committee.[44] Local committees everywhere had to look into and resolve disputes that arose; this responsibility could not be passed on to the masses. The directive added that the heads of the local committees should not be afraid of the students but should talk to them in accordance with the mass line.

[42] Vice-chancellor of the People's University.

[43] Instructions of September 7, 1966, by Mao Tse-tung to Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, T'ao Chu, K'ang Shang, Ch'en Po-ta, Wang Jen-chung, and Chiang Ch'ing. Full text in Konno, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 223–24.

As Mao Tse-tung had asked, the *People's Daily* carried an editorial on September 11th admitting that some people in positions of authority had violated the Sixteen Points. The Red Guards were told that the workers and peasants were capable of making their own revolution. Students should leave them in peace and not interfere in production. A large number of students were, however, sent to help the peasants bring in the harvest.

It thus was decided, for the time being at least, to avoid clashes between different social groups. The students alone were allowed to move outside their own socio-political environment, the universities and schools, to criticize the Party and the government. Workers and peasants could make their own Cultural Revolution on their own territory, but they were not allowed to criticize the Centre or to turn against the students. As for the army, its discipline outweighed any movement toward revolution. It should be added that despite the students' privileges, including the right to operate throughout the whole country, the revolution's leaders sought to limit their effects; and students were repulsed when they tried to interfere in local affairs in districts where they had already established themselves.

From August 1966 onwards student journeys became veritable migrations. They were of two kinds: journeys by provincial students to Peking and other big cities, involving the movement of huge numbers of them, and Red Guard missions to the provinces.

Being able to travel en masse was another student privilege. The Centre invited all the students and some of the senior middle school pupils to come to Peking,[45] and this invitation met with extraordinary enthusiasm among the student youth of the whole country. It was a key tactical decision as it was bound to spread the movement that was already well installed in Peking: in this way the plot was really going to thicken. But for the students it was primarily a new freedom, a chance to get to know their country that had been given to few of them before. The Chinese

[45] The invitation was made on August 31st.

enjoy travelling, but movement is controlled in China and tickets have to be paid for, so that it is mainly cadres and soldiers who have the chance to travel through their country. Now, for a while, a whole generation of young people could travel at will.

Students were allowed on trains without tickets. All they needed were authorizations issued by school authorities and approved by committees.[46] These documents were doubtless often in fact issued by revolutionary organizations, and it became impossible to bring this under control when swarms of passengers overloaded the transport system. There were incidents. Trains were taken over and diverted from their intended routes. All available old wagons, locomotives and boats were brought back to service, and passengers were given priority over freight. Railwaymen worked till they dropped. As the cold northern winter rapidly set in, two million young people, who had not yet seen Mao Tse-tung and were still waiting their turn to do so, stayed on in their rough quarters in Peking, without winter clothes and threatened by epidemics.

Others were still arriving. The flood had to be stopped. Twice in October the authorities declared that no more students should come to Peking.[47] Appeals to physical effort, recommending marches on foot in the tradition of the Long March, were not enough to make people forsake the new and delightful pleasures of travelling freely. The disruption of transport by water and rail made urgent measures of another kind necessary. The public were told that the railways would be taking no passengers for several days while they reorganized themselves. On November

[46] A Central Committee resolution confirming the invitation of August 31st stipulated that all the students of universities and institutes, and 10 per cent of the middle school pupils and administrative personnel, could come to Peking; it also stated how the public authorities were to approve the documents. This decision was made public in official posters, particularly in Shanghai, in the first days of September 1966.

[47] Immediately after the fifth and sixth Red Guard mass rallies in Peking. The authorities tried to make each time the last and send everyone home. See 'Diary of the Cultural Revolution,' *Asahi Evening News.*

16th the Central Committee and the State Council announced the suspension of journeys 'of revolutionary exchange' until the following April, and ordered everyone trying to find transport to Peking to go home.[48]

The same communiqué revealed that up to November 20th nine million students and teachers had been passengers. There were several million still making their pilgrimages who would have to be taken home if they were not going on foot. But those who found places on trains were in no hurry to return home, and they extended their journeys to visit the warmer south. On November 16th the vacations, set at six months back in July, were officially extended: with too many students still away there was no alternative. The public services, especially in Peking, surpassed themselves in resolving the incredible problems presented by moving and looking after so many people.

The licence to travel was justified by another, quite simple, one: that of seeing Mao Tse-tung in person. Thus Peking had not only to welcome and feed students but also to arrange rallies and marches and maintain public order. There were eight rallies, each with a million participants, between August 18th and November 26th.[49] Some of them lasted several days. A brief description of the conditions in which the November 3rd rally took place may give some idea of what they were like.

On the two days beforehand the Central Committee's security office and the State Council Secretariat issued a circular to notify the students visiting Peking and to give them some instructions. In the previous rallies there had been fatal crushes round the T'ienanmen Gate because, when the students reached the stand from which the Chairman could be seen, they were unwilling to move on; while the vast ranks of those following them continued forward so as to crush against them. The instructions insisted that all groups should keep on walking at a steady pace, not

[48] Text in Japanese translation in Konno, *op. cit.*, pp. 225–26.

[49] On August 18th and 31st; September 15th; October 1st and 18th; November 3rd, 10th, 11th, 25th and 26th.

disperse after reaching the Gate, and be on their guard against sabotage and attempts to start a panic. The carrying of arms was forbidden. Two million participants were expected to pass the stand on this occasion. As many students as possible had to see Mao Tse-tung so that they could go home, leaving room in Peking for others. The proceedings also had to be kept short to 'protect the health of the executive comrades of the Central Committee' who would be on the stand.

Despite these precautions there was a standstill in front of T'ienanmen. The Chairman tirelessly urged the students over the public address system to keep moving, but they would not shift. At 5 p.m. Mao Tse-tung withdrew. Chou En-lai finally got the crowd under way again by singing one of the new songs of the Cultural Revolution, 'Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman.' Then he promised all those who had not seen the Chairman—possibly the majority—that there would be another rally.

To prevent these problems recurring, the arrangements for the last rallies were changed. On November 10th and 11th the young people rolled past in trucks, an impressive demonstration of the Chinese army's transport capacity. At the other rallies the youngsters were drawn up along the sides of roads, and the leaders drove slowly past in jeeps.

While the provincial students were coming to Peking to see the cradle of the Cultural Revolution and Chairman Mao, and then returning home with the good news—besides taking in as much of China as they could on the way back—the Peking Red Guards were travelling in the opposite direction, leaving outposts to spread the revolutionary ferment everywhere. The two movements taken together made up the 'great exchange of revolutionary experience' that was to teach those who had not taken part how the people in Peking had dared to take on the leading members of the formidable Party machine. During this exchange the students passed on tactical techniques to each other.

The Red Guards who went to the provinces were far fewer in number than those who went to the capital, but

they made a much more effective contribution to the revolutionary cause. However, if they had confined themselves to the mission of the Red Guard organizations—that of making criticisms—they would have had to be restricted to commissions of investigation. In fact they often put themselves at the head of local students, to whom they gave training for the movement on the spot. This led to many incidents because the local 'authorities' condemned the interference of outsiders in the Cultural Revolution and were able to draw on the instinctive hostility of provincials for troublemakers from Peking.

On September 7th Mao Tse-tung had wanted Peking to be held up to the provinces as an example. How was it that in Peking the movement to criticize the 'authorities' had not led to the 'masses being incited to struggle against each other,' whereas civil strife threatened almost everywhere in the provinces? The explanations for this must be sought in the greater belligerency of isolated Red Guards, the lack of understanding shown by those on whom the Revolution burst fully grown, and the movement's lack of preparation.

Students versus 'authorities'

In the provinces, the Party 'authorities' did not tolerate criticism from Red Guards as they had accepted the confrontation of earlier criticism movements. It may be that persistent rumours as regards Mao Tse-tung's health during 1965 and the first half of 1966 caused a gradual change in the Party cadres' attitude to power. Perhaps the majority of them were growing less and less tolerant of disputes in which anybody could have a say, and had decided that under the new leaders criticisms and purges of the Party would be made by the Party and nobody else. When Mao Tse-tung realized that the cadres were resisting criticism by the masses he was furious. 'Something unthinkable has happened,'[50] he said at the Central

[50] *Asahi Jyanaru,* 1968, vol. 10, no. 18, *'Wakagaetta tōsōshiki no taishitsu,'* p. 21.

Committee work meeting held in Peking from October 8th to 25th, and he insisted that committees at all levels from the centre down through provinces and cities to *hsien* should sincerely accept criticism from students.

Resistance to the Red Guards was also being organized among the masses. Certain Party leaders were encouraging hostile reactions among the peasants and workers, and they had no difficulty finding people willing to resist, especially among the workers who were, with the cadres, the greatest beneficiaries of the regime as their living standards had been greatly raised. Reaction took the same forms as radical activity: forming organizations and making journeys. The conservatives sent missions to Peking to lay their complaints and criticism before the Central Committee's secretariat. They established their own outposts in attempts to obstruct the work of the Red Guards. Organizations from each side conflicted in nearly all the cities. Conservatives, like radicals, got into the trains as best they could, and when they met in Peking they heaped abuse on each other. In February and March 1967 there were groups of conservatives in the main railway stations trying to persuade the revolutionaries not to go to Peking to seek the help of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group.[51] Organizations on both sides tried to interest the Centre and sympathetic groups in the capital in their cases.

The Red Guards for their part came back to Peking to ask the Revolution's leaders for support against the local 'authorities' who were repressing them; the guarantee that had been given to the students by the Sixteen-Point Decision needed to be confirmed. At a meeting on October 6th, Chou En-lai promised provincial Red Guards complaining of violence against them at Kweilin, Sian, and Yangchow that their personal safety would not be threatened when they went home. The Centre would make enquiries and the responsible members of committees guilty

[51] See Nogami's article in *Asahi Shimbun* (morning edition), December 12, 1967.

of violence towards students would be punished, no matter how important they were.

The solution to these difficulties took the form of a revival of radical activity. Criticism was carried out with more determination than ever. Enemies were to be 'expelled and shown to the masses,' and apathy was to be vigorously opposed. Taking part in the Cultural Revolution was now a duty.[52] The attempt to separate the Red Guards from the rest of society by confining them to criticism could be kept up no longer.

From the beginning of December onwards the Red Guards started to carry out arrests. They chose figures in the former Peking Municipal Party Committee and in top positions in the Central Committee, the cultural world, and even the army who had been denounced by the revolutionary leadership. They seized them in their homes and 'showed them to the masses,' presumably freeing them again a few days later. Photographs that appeared in Red Guard papers showed some of them being roughly held by activists, a placard with their name on it hanging from their necks.[53] In between bouts of rough treatment they were urged to account for their faults. Some revolutionary publications quoted their statements.

The first posters of criticism attacking Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing by name date from the same period. On December 2nd the Red Guards of Tsinghua and Peita universities jointly wrote: 'we believe that Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing are Number One and Number Two of the authorities inside the Party taking the bourgeois road.' The leadership of the Revolution let criticism of Liu develop in December and January, though later events were to show that they were not yet authorized to overthrow them. Nevertheless, these criticisms served to bring

[52] The Peking schools where the revolutionaries had not yet made themselves felt began their Cultural Revolution at this period. Joan Robinson tells how the Rebels in the Academy of Medicine came into the majority in November, during an occupation of the institution in the course of which their light and heat were cut off (*op. cit.*, pp. 141–42).

[53] Reprinted in the Tokyo *Yomiuri Shimbun*.

the attacks on T'ao Chu[54] and his group to a conclusion, and those in charge decided to get rid of them.

It should be noted that, especially at this time, criticism was widely extended, and in time it took in practically all of the leaders. Konno reports that around November 20th Ch'en Po-ta and Ch'i Pen-yü, established leaders of the Cultural Revolution, were being attacked in the same way as T'ao Chu, Wang Jen-chung and Chang P'ing-hua.[55] The notices attacking Ch'i Pen-yü were quickly covered over, and Ch'en Po-ta made a brief self-criticism on the matter that was being held against him. Criticisms only continued to be made against the other three. This suggests that criticisms were not controlled in any full sense of the word, but that the Cultural Revolution leadership discriminated by discouraging some attacks while letting others develop. But the initiative always came from the students, whose investigations probed into recent events, giving free play to their imagination. These were then sifted in terms of the tactical policy of the Revolution.

The Tsinghua students once again played an important part in the T'ao Chu affair. Within a fortnight they launched five sensational criticisms. They published Liu Shao-ch'i's first self-criticism[56] and a list of his 'crimes.' On January 6th they posted a kind of diagram giving their view of how the power structure worked. At the top was the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, with

[54] First secretary of the Central Committee's Central-South Bureau, made director of the Central Committee's propaganda department in July 1966, and adviser to the Centre's Cultural Revolution Group. Rose to fourth place in the order of precedence.

[55] Wang Jen-chung, previously first Party secretary for Hupei, and Chang P'ing-hua, previously Hunan's first secretary, were with T'ao Chu both members of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group. Wang Jen-chung had been the man behind the work teams at Tsinghua; hence the special investigations on him by the Tsinghua students that led on to T'ao Chu. From mid-November onwards these two men were out of Peking, leading the Cultural Revolution in their own provinces, probably in isolation.

[56] At the Central Committee work meeting of October 8–25, 1966.

the following comment beside it: 'T'ao Chu, Wang Jen-chung and Chang P'ing-hua have stirred up a second group of the Cultural Revolution.'[57]

T'ao Chu, the strong man of South China, had joined the Group in July when he became the Central Committee's head of Propaganda, and brought two of his chief lieutenants with him. The kind of provincial viceregal power from which he continued to draw his political strength was against the spirit of the revolutionary leadership. The leaders of the Cultural Revolution were ruling on his case at the very moment when the students were unleashing their critical assault.[58] The city of Peking reacted as if subversion of the Cultural Revolution Group had threatened the Centre: its walls were covered with notices proclaiming, 'Defend the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group.'

It should be remembered that all this was happening only a few days after the transformation of the army's own Cultural Revolution Group. This was the time when the revolutionary leaders were setting up a unified command.[59] Mao Tse-tung said later that T'ao Chu was no longer trustworthy.

Liu Shao-ch'i made his self-criticism (the publication of which was one of the most dramatic events of the period) to the Central Committee, whose principal charges against him related to the Work Team policy. This self-criticism was said to have been found wanting. To be more precise, it was not thought enough for Liu to be the only one to admit his faults. Otherwise Liu Shao-ch'i alone, instead of the whole Party, would have been in need of rectification.[60] Liu's self-criticism was firm in tone and discreet on the role played by other comrades, whether rivals or

[57] Konno, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[58] See the report in *Shoutu Hungweiping*, January 6th, p. 167, on a meeting of January 5th at which Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing criticized T'ao Chu.

[59] See Chapter 3 on the army.

[60] Mao Tse-tung introduced the self-criticism with the words: 'It is not the responsibility of Liu alone, but of the Central Committee.' Quoted in *Asahi Jyanaru*, 1967, vol. 9, no. 37, p. 22.

friends. The dominant impression it leaves is that Liu Shao-ch'i was trying to preserve the images of the government and the Party.

Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i respected forms. The campaign launched by the Red Guards in December and January naturally reduced a little further Liu Shao-ch'i's standing in the eyes of the public, but it was only carried to the limit against the T'ao Chu group. It almost seemed that Liu Shao-ch'i only shared T'ao's disgrace inasmuch as he had shown T'ao too much favour.[61] When the Red Guards invaded Chungnanhai on January 26th, harassing Liu and his wife, their action was disowned.[62]

Liu Shao-ch'i was protected from the danger of being 'expelled and shown to the masses.' The big critical attacks on him were always led by leftists trying to inject more passion into the Cultural Revolution and take it to extremes. The insults to which his wife Wang Kuang-mei was subjected when she was tricked into leaving Chungnanhai were also the work of leftists.

The students as a political force

As we have seen, the students had taken for themselves the right of association. They also had the privilege of acting outside the confines of their own 'units.' They did

[61] 'My errors were discussed at the end of the Eleventh Plenum,' said Liu Shao-ch'i in his self-criticism. 'The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was elected, and I joined with the rest in designating Lin Piao as Mao Tse-tung's first assistant and his successor.' See Konno, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[62] On January 8th Chou En-lai said that it was correct to demand that the Liu-Teng line be reversed, but as they were still members of the Political Bureau's Standing Committee it would be wrong to expel them. ('The Diary of the Cultural Revolution,' p. 30.) In fact the revolutionary organizations of the service bodies inside Chungnanhai seem to have conspired to defy the leaders. 'The revolutionary masses of Chungnanhai struggled twice against Liu Shao-ch'i and Wang Kuang-mei in the Huanjen Hall, and once against Teng Hsiao-p'ing,' wrote a small paper produced by Red Guards from Pengpu on March 27, 1967. 'The Chungnanhai rebel revolutionary group is now compelling Liu, Teng, T'ao, and the others to go out from 9 to 10 o'clock to read *tatzupao*.'

not, however, create large and powerful organizations on the scale of the principal areas of the country, let alone the whole country;[63] they formed many little groups that resisted integration. As Ch'en Po-ta said, 'Anarchism and individualism are serious problems among secondary school students. In some schools there is a party or organization for every one, two or three people.'[64] According to Ch'en Yi:

> The Foreign Languages Institute is divided into two sections. Originally twenty-one units were formed. A week later there were over fifty, and a week after that more than seventy. Seventy units for under four thousand students. In other words, over seventy schools of thought. How spectacular! How impressive! This truly is 'a hundred flowers blooming while a hundred schools of thought contend.'[65]

The leaders went into the causes of the tendency to fragmentation. Chou En-lai suggested that the divisions among the students were in large part the result of quarrels over the Work Teams. Indeed, the successive changes in revolutionary policy—Work Teams, provisional committees, Red Guards, rebellion—must have deepened the differences between them, just as the changing policies on the Cultural Revolution threatened the army's unity.

The first combination of Red Guard organizations were the federations calling themselves 'headquarters,' which were centralized liaison bodies. In Peking there were known to be three of these, and provincial Red Guards who had declared their allegiance to the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group rallied to them. In some places, however, particularly Shanghai, local groups had their own ideas and decided to be independent.

[63] The Third Red Guard Headquarters—on which see below—was not an association in the strict sense of the word but a liaison and communication network.

[64] Communication from Ch'en Po-ta to the middle school attached to the Further Education College, February 6, 1967. Quoted in *T'iyü Chanhsien* (Red Guard paper) February 25, 1967.

[65] Quoted in *Hungwei Chanpao*, April 8, 1967.

The First and Second Headquarters were not well-known, at least among the students. They may have been groupings of moderates; but in the provinces the name of the Second Headquarters was used to rally revolutionary workers. The Third Headquarters, on the other hand, was very active. It was the dominant influence in the student movement, and drew great benefit from the support of key political figures. Among the groups affiliated to it were several that were still making themselves felt: the 'Chingkangshan Combat Group' of Tsinghua University, is already familiar; the 'New Peita Commune' at Peking University, founded by Nieh Yuan-tzu, a popular leader since the posting of the first *tatzupao;* and the 'Red Flag Combat Brigade' of the Aeronautical Institution,[66] in whose ranks Lin Tou-tou, Lin Piao's daughter, was active.

Besides these famous names the Third Headquarters also included groups that were perhaps even more significant—the Red Guards of the Central Drama Academy[67] and the Peking Film School. These were student organizations directly influenced by Chiang Ch'ing, Mao Tse-tung's wife, who had been concentrating on political work in theatrical circles.

It is almost certain that the Third Red Guard Headquarters took on the task of passing on the authentic instructions of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group to the students. The missions it sent out to the provinces were more than mere outposts. They were nuclei round which local student groupings formed, often calling themselves the local Third Red Guard Headquarters.[68] Lines of communication with the Third Headquarters in

[66] This was the organization that put up posters of T'ao Chu's speech criticizing Liu Shao-ch'i.

[67] They captured P'eng Chen on December 4th. For the events leading up to this see *Asahi Shimbun,* December 29, 1966.

[68] The March 1968 issue of *Jimmin Chūgoku* (a Japanese-language monthly published by the FLP, Peking) was on Inner Mongolia. In it some Huhehot revolutionaries told how they launched a general offensive against the Work Teams and formed a Huhehot Third Headquarters after Lin Piao's speech on October 1, 1966, and the editorial in *Red Flag,* no. 13, 1966.

Peking were set up, which gave the leaders of the Revolution the advantage of an information service as quick as the government's. Although most of the local groups that joined up with the Third Headquarters were weak and isolated, they still felt that they had a duty to take part in public affairs, and were often involved in the difficult business of taking over provincial newspapers.

While forming federations some organizations continued with a great deal of individual activity, such as the Tsinghua *Chingkangshan* and the Red Flag of the Aviation Institute. Transported by trucks and possessing vehicles equipped with loudspeakers, they were able to intervene within a few hours wherever incidents took place, and could act quickly and decisively. The privilege of acting as shock troops was not confined to a few groups under the Third Headquarters. Other groups not affiliated to that organization could rival them in combat power. Among these were the Geological Institute Red Guards and the *Sanhung* ('Three Reds'), three allied groups from Jenta, the People's University. These were all formidable activist groups, and they took part in the incidents that occurred around the foreign embassies as well as at Peking Airport, when the families of Soviet diplomats were repatriated in February 1967.

It would be wrong to regard brawls, kidnappings, and beatings as the main activities of Red Guards and the *raison d'être* of the shock groups. Although these were organized to carry out 'power seizures' and to defend themselves against rival groups, the most dangerous of which were generally those inside the same establishments, their principal weapons were the pen and the writing brush. Their duty to criticize brought them freedom of the press to parallel their right of association.

Critical articles, results of enquiries, expressions of indignation, professions of faith, small news items, and notices from the staffs of various organizations went from the walls of the city to the pages of the Red Guard papers; or to be more accurate, were published in 'little newspapers' at the same time that they were posted. Any Red

Guard unit of any importance had its ownn organ, of a few pages, published irregularly and sold for · two *fen*[69] to all who wanted to buy it, especially the curioous who stood in line to be able to find out at last what was ; really happening in China.

The first of these unofficial papers camee out in the summer of 1966, when *Hsin Peita* ('New Pekking University'—the title was suggested by Mao Tse-tungg and written in his own calligraphy) saw the light of day (on August 22nd. *Shoutu Hungweiping* ('Capital Red Guuard') first appeared on September 13th. There were maany papers with such titles as *Tungfanghung* ('The Red EEast')—or simply *Tungfang—Hungch'i* ('Red Flag') and *Chuanpao* ('Combat News'), differing not only in the quality (of their production, and their extremist or moderate toneꝛ, but also in the reliability of their news. Some of the ꝑpapers consisted overwhelmingly of polemics.

However, it was soon apparent that whhen these papers carried speeches by revolutionary leaders tthey did not give different versions. The various editorial ccommittees published either almost identical texts of themm or else similar excerpts, generally stating that the texts weere based on the shorthand records of the meetings. There ꞉ thus appears to have been a kind of press office under thhe Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group that ꞉ was responsible for giving papers the texts of statements byy leading figures. Apart from these, the polemics were thhe work of the young revolutionaries and were uncensoored, as can be shown by the leftist attacks which were ꞉ long to trouble the political figures around Chou En-lai. TThere were often editorials and leading articles signed by t the most ardent and gifted of the young leaders of revolutitionary organizations, who won fame not only for their quaalities of leadership but also for the verve with which theyy expressed their ideas. Among them one learnt to recognizeꝛe T'an Hou-lan, the animating spirit behind the Chingkangngshan group of the Further Education College, and Han AAi-chin, head of the Institute of Aviation's Red Flag grouup. K'uai Ta-fu

[69] One-third of a British new penny or oneꝛe US cent.

reappeared. All three were later to be members of the leading group of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee.

The most vigorous organizations and groups of activists were in opposition to other organizations both inside and outside their own establishments. At Peita and the Further Education College the groups led by Nieh Yuan-tzu and T'an Hou-lan were opposed by other groups who felt that they should take a more proletarian line and be less respectful towards the Party. The Institute of Aviation's dominant Red Flag group demanded the elimination of the eight other groups that shared their premises. Beyond this, all bodies affiliated to the Third Headquarters were struggling against all the reputedly reactionary organizations, the most famous of which were the Lien Tung and the 516 Group (May 16 Group).

The Lien Tung, or 'Joint Action Committee'[70] had been created in 1966 on the day of the National Festival, with the alleged aim of defending Liu Shao-ch'i and criticizing Lin Piao and Chou En-lai. Its members included some of the sons of high officials who had been among the first Red Guards, such as Li Li-feng,[71] the son of Li Ching-ch'üan, and a son of Ch'en Yi.[72] The foundation ceremony for this group was held in the Political Bureau's meeting room in Chungnanhai.[73] The Lien Tung slogan was: 'If the father's a hero, the son's O.K. Reactionary father, the son's a louse.'[74] This illustrates the confusion which the measures taken against illustrious veterans of the revolutionary wars caused the children of the Party.

The Lien Tung criticized the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, Chiang Ch'ing and Lin Piao;

[70] The full title was 'Joint Action Committee of Secondary School Red Guards.'

[71] See above. His arrest was mentioned by the Tsinghua organ *Chingkangshan* of February 8, 1967.

[72] According to the Hong Kong paper *Ming Pao,* January 1, 1967.

[73] *China News Analysis,* no. 682, Hong Kong, October 27, 1967, p. 6.

[74] *Kuangming Jihpao,* January 14, 1967.

and it twice threatened the Minister of Public Security. It was finally denounced as a reactionary organization by the *People's Daily* on March 27th after 137 of their members had been arrested by the Public Security forces, probably for a breach of a Central Committee resolution of February 12th limiting the scope of revolutionary organizations to within a single unit—which was the first restriction of the right of association. The Lien Tung crossed regional boundaries, being particularly active in Kwangtung. Its arrested members were not held for long. Public Security released them on April 22nd,[75] after protests from other Red Guard organizations.

In the spring of 1967 the revolutionary leadership did not waste its authority in vain attempts to reduce the power of the most liberated of the student organizations. Instead it urged organizations to form alliances rather than let individualistic tendencies bring them into violent opposition to each other.

The Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group wanted to bring about the creation of municipal and provincial revolutionary committees. These committees were meant to be based on a 'triple alliance' of mass revolutionary organizations, revolutionary cadres and the army. For this mixture to be successful, student organizations had to agree on who was to represent them on the committees. As every group wanted to be represented, new rivalries and divisions arose in place of the unity that was being sought for. In Peking a very stormy meeting took place at Peita on April 8th.[76] Groups from outside the university, supported by the militant organization of the Geological Institute, came along to dispute the political role of Nieh Yuan-tzu, who had probably been playing too prominent a part in the negotiations. Disagreements among students delayed the birth of the Peking revolutionary committee. It was said that agreement on which organizations were to represent the students on the new committee was only reached three days before its formation was announced. As soon as it was set up, the committee tried hard to hasten the formation of unified revolutionary committees in the universities and other institutions of further education in the city. These efforts were not entirely unsuccessful, especially at the Institute of Aviation, where a revolutionary committee was inaugurated with great ceremony on May 20th. But in the majority of cases some organizations were unenthusiastic, refused to co-operate, and remained independently active. The only solution that could be found was gradually to bring the students back to the schools, thus preventing their clashes from spreading all over town, where they were a permanent source of trouble and all too often caused pressure to be put on the revolution's leaders.

[75] See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Tokyo, April 27, 1967.

[76] See especially *Singtao Jihpao*, Hong Kong, April 4, 1967.

The leaders themselves were probably divided on the question of when teaching was to start again. The radicals hoped to have the students as a force at their disposal until the Cultural Revolution had achieved its aims. The others wanted order restored as soon as possible. On March 11th several speakers at a Shanghai rally were in favour of a report on university reform, and called for the strengthening of revolutionary organizations.

The first proposal for a return to classes—a draft directive on education—made on January 13th had to be cancelled for the simple reason that the educational system was still in utter chaos. In February the decision was made to try to reopen primary and secondary schools,[77] and pupils were urged to come back on March 1st.[78] Those who did so found their schools in lamentable condition after being used as dormitories by Red Guards and students from the provinces.

[77] Posters put up by the Red Guards of the 22nd Middle School, Peking, on February 12, 1967. The Standing Committee decided on February 11th to reopen middle schools in March. Teaching would be primarily physical and military training. Red Guards were invited to set up organizations with revolutionary students of working-class origin as their core.

[78] February 25th in Shanghai. A Central Committee notice of February 20, 1967, instructed pupils in rural middle schools and technical schools to go back to their village by March 1st.

Universities for their part were expected to reopen on March 20th, but their premises were in such a state that the decision could not be put into effect. The textbooks—apart from the works of Mao Tse-tung—had all been destroyed and there were no syllabuses. In May the *People's Daily* urged all the students, except those granted special leave by the Centre, to return to their classes. This time the notice had some effect. At the beginning of July the authorities announced that 50 per cent of the universities and colleges in Peking had started their teaching again. But the great unresolved question of curricula remained the subject of interminable discussions.

On March 7th the official press hailed the Central Committee's decision to reopen the primary and secondary schools. Yet Ch'i Pen-yü, a member of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, was still saying to the students, 'To go back to classes after making revolution for six months would be an admission of defeat.'[79] For him political education in the classroom would have been a bore. Instead he wanted to push the revolution further by stepping up the criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i.

As many teachers were not prepared to return to their jobs there was a shortage of staff. In July 1967 the *People's Daily* was still trying to persuade the teachers, refuting each of the objections they could make to starting work again: 'We cannot teach properly.' 'We can't be expected to fetch the pupils from their homes.' 'How can we struggle against indiscipline, prevent brawls, and stop the pupils from ruining State property?' This was why soldiers had to be sent into the schools to act as instructors, enlivening sessions of studying the works of Mao Tse-tung and giving physical training. This was how the middle schools of Taiyuan, in Shansi Province, spent their time during May: in the morning there was one hour of political education and three hours revising mathematics, physics, chemistry and foreign languages; in the afternoon the pupils studied the works of Mao Tse-tung or took part in meetings criticizing enemies of the people and 'evil influences,' learning to investigate once again the mistakes of the past that had been denounced by the Cultural Revolution.[80]

[79] *Pengpu Red Guard,* March 26, 1967.

The reform of higher education was only to be embarked upon much later. It will be discussed below when the Cultural Revolution's balance sheet is drawn up.

The special role of the students

The reopening of the universities was obviously a fundamental question as regards the role of the students in the new political scene. In addition to having helped 'destroy the old,' they had contributed to the overthrow of men in power by arousing the masses against them. Student activity had made it possible to overthrow even T'ao Chu. Then, at the end of December, the workers had joined in the revolution. What role were the students to play in the revolutionary order?

The concept of revolutionary order was of course ambiguous in itself. The Shanghai *Wenhuipao,* which had been calling on students since February 15th to 'return to their classrooms to make revolution,' could not be suspected of conservative tendencies: it had been 'captured' by the revolutionaries at the beginning of January. They might have been following the instructions of the three Shanghai Red Guard groups, who circulated an urgent six-point notice urging the students and teachers who had gone away for the 'exchange of experiences' to come back to their schools to work together for the power seizures.[81] In most schools revolutionary administrations had yet to be installed, and this was a job facing the students. But the revolutionary order also expected the Red Guards, who were beginning to get some political experience, to stay among the masses and bring them into the revolution. Leaders who invoked the idea of revolutionary order may have been influenced as much by a desire to

[80] See *Ajia Keizai Jumpo,* no. 735, October 1968, p. 6.
[81] *Wenhuipao,* February 17, 1967.

keep the students active in appropriate ways as to keep a check on the extreme activists.

The students, aware of their separate status as intellectuals, generally disliked being a group apart. As we have seen above, some of them had proposed that the Cultural Revolution teams and production teams should not be formed separately. In their wish to resolve the contradiction between activities aimed at transforming society and the necessity to sustain it through continued production, they wanted to leave the schools, where their ideological movement was too far detached from the revolution, and take it among the workers.

K'uai Ta-fu was preoccupied with a related problem: during the revolution was a student primarily a student or was he, if of proletarian class origin, primarily a proletarian? If class came first, students had no option but to leave the university for the duration of the struggle to establish a new order. His conclusion was that the universities had to be kept as an entity, irrespective of the class differences within it.

> In the previous period there was a discussion over the slogan 'Revolutionaries are heroes; reactionaries are villains,' and other questions. Then a bad tendency began in the universities, with all kinds of 'associations for the children of workers, poor and lower-middle peasants and revolutionary cadres.' This was hard on all those who did not come from labouring families, especially on professors and administrative personnel. . . .[82]

K'uai Ta-fu later took part in the work of the Peking Revolutionary Committee and stayed with it to the end. The Centre showed its interpretation of revolutionary order by urging the students to form alliances and proposing to them that they should co-operate with the representatives of other organizations in revolutionary committees. At first the reaction of the students was to recognise that one period was now over. The Red Guards of Peking's

[82] K'uai Ta-fu, 'Open letter to the Prime Minister,' August 6, 1966, Tsinghua.

Third Headquarters, who had come to Shanghai to make revolution there, left Shanghai for good on March 10, 1967.[83] They concluded an analysis of the situation with these words:

> Chairman Mao has taught us: 'It is up to us to organize the people. It is up to us to organize them and overthrow reaction in China.'[84]

Nieh Yuan-tzu, K'uai Ta-fu, T'an Hou-lan, Han Ai-chin and others entered the Peking Revolutionary Committee to play the game the Centre wanted them to: alliances, revolutionary committees and reform of education, leading to steady careers as political cadres.

What part was played by such organizations as Peita's Chingkangshan and by youngsters regarded by their comrades as Chinese Trotskyists, such as T'an Li-fu, Yi Lin and Ti Hsi?

The different social origins of students affected how they formed their groups and remained the criteria by which the more proletarian judged their fellows. On February 17th three organizations met in the Workers' Stadium to debate the proposition that discrimination on grounds of heredity should be eliminated. Outsiders came to the meeting to make trouble, and brawls resulted. The majority did not want differences of class origin to divide the students.

But some poor students were more persistent. Peita's *Chingkangshan* was undoubtedly an organization of the children of real proletarians.[85] It refused to compromise with the system, criticizing Nieh Yuan-tzu because of her relationship with the new Peking local authorities, organizing its own defence on the campus, and remaining to the end a thorn in the side of the regime in Peita.

[83] They took their leave of Shanghai in an article in the *Wenhuipao* of March 8, 1967.

[84] In an article by the editorial group of the paper *Chingkangshan* of the Further Education College in the *Peking Daily*, April 24, 1967.

[85] Probably mainly of peasant origin. This organization welcomed members of poor peasant associations to the university. See *Hsin Peita*, September 22, 1966.

At the other extreme, turning their backs on class problems, T'an, Yi and Ti made the most of the sole common heritage of the students, their freedom of speech, and chose a libertarian course. As we have seen, T'an Li-fu said and wrote a great deal, criticizing everyone, even Chiang Ch'ing, Ch'en Po-ta and Lin Piao. Perhaps he now thought it prudent to withdraw. He left for Canton but was summoned to come back if he did not want trouble with the Public Security. This police intervention made him much talked about.

Yi Lin and Ti Hsi had written an open letter criticizing Lin Piao for saying that Mao Tse-tung was greater than Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, adding that his conclusions ran contrary to historical evolution.[86] Ignoring the argument that Mao Tse-tung integrated the whole of Marxism when dealing with contemporary problems, they continued to act as 'theoreticians' and tried to win support for their views.

One should also mention the students who permanently left the universities to go among the workers and peasants and win them over for the revolution, insofar as the workers and peasants accepted them. But most of the students became students again. Those who enjoyed independent ideological activity returned to the scene when a swing to the left gave them their chance.

[86] See the *Revolutionary Liaison Journal* of the International Political Section of Peita, January 1967.

5. The Rebellion at the Head of the Party and the Rebel Leadership

From one anniversary of the Party on July 1, 1966, to the next on July 1, 1967, the Thought of Mao Tse-tung ruled supreme, but between the two dates its interpreters changed. In 1966 the official press designated Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p'ing jointly to celebrate it. In 1967 it was Lin Piao alone.

In the interval the revolutionary leaders had taken a major strategic decision: to throw the workers and peasants into the struggle. The Cultural Revolution was propagated among them, probably going deepest in the cities, but it had gone beyond any plan. The sheer weight of the working masses could have led the movement towards some social changes that were not envisaged in its original political aims. The social demands made by the workers, especially in Shanghai, were no easier to control than the anarchism of the students.

The Party machine continued to function for some time through those of its organs that still obeyed its orders. The Central Committee's Secretariat was thoroughly changed as a result of the Cultural Revolution, but to the revolutionary leaders its strong men were merely the new 'bosses.'

As one power seizure followed the next, the secretariat lost its territories. People in executive positions were perplexed, not knowing whether to obey the instructions coming from what remained of the Party machine or those that