SOCIALIST UPSURGE IN CHINA'S COUNTRYSIDE

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PREFACE

This book is a collection of material intended for people working in the countryside. The preface for it was originally written last September. Now, three months later, that preface is already out of date. The only thing to do is write another one.

This is the situation. The book has been edited twice, first in September and now again in December. The first time, 121 articles were selected, most of them reflecting conditions in the early half of 1955, a few covering the latter half of 1954. Advance copies of these articles were printed and distributed to responsible comrades from provincial, municipal, autonomous regional, and regional Party committees attending the sixth plenary session (enlarged) of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from October 4 to 11, 1955. Their comments were requested. Because they felt that additional material was needed, after the meeting supplementary material was sent in from most provinces, cities and autonomous regions. Since much of it reflected conditions in the latter half of 1955, it became necessary to edit the book again. We cut 30 articles from the original 121, and kept 91. To these we added 85 selected from the newly-received material, bringing the total in the present book to 176 articles — about 900,000 words. The comrades responsible for the editing have gone through all of the material, and have made some changes in phraseology, added notes to explain difficult terms and prepared a topical index. In addition, we have commented on some of the articles, criticizing certain erroneous ideas and making certain suggestions. To distinguish our comments from those of the

editors of the periodicals in which the material originally appeared, ours have been signed "Editor." Because part of our comments were written in September and part in December, there is some difference between them in tone.

Much more than a mere question of material is involved, however. The point is that in the latter half of 1955 the situation in China underwent a fundamental change. At present (late December 1955), of China's 110 million peasant households, more than 70 million (over 60 per cent), in response to the call of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, have joined semi-socialist agricultural producers' co-operatives. In my report of July 31, 1955, on co-operation in agriculture I stated that 16,900,000 peasant households had joined co-operatives. But since then, in only a few months' time, over 50 million more have joined.

This is a tremendous event. It tells us that we need only one year — 1956 — to practically complete the change-over to semi-socialist co-operation in agriculture.* In another three or four years, that is, by 1959 or 1960, we can complete, in the main, the transformation from semi-socialist to fully socialist co-operatives. It tells us that if the needs of this expanding agriculture are to be met, the socialist transformation of China's handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce should also be speeded up. It tells us that the scale and rate of China's industrialization, and the scale and rate of the development of science, culture, education, public health, and so on, can no longer be entirely the same as originally intended. All must be appropriately expanded and accelerated.

Is this rapid advance of co-operation in agriculture healthy? It certainly is. Every local Party organization is giving all-round leadership to the movement. The peasants are taking

* Actually, by November 1956, over 96 per cent of all peasant households throughout the country were in semi-socialist co-operatives and fully socialist advanced co-operatives. Eighty-three per cent of them had joined the advanced co-ops — *Translator.*

part in it with great enthusiasm and in a very orderly manner. Their keenness for production has reached unprecedented heights. For the first time the vast majority of the people see their future clearly. With the completion of three five-year plans, that is, by 1967, the production of grain and many other crops will probably double or treble the highest output prior to the founding of the People's Republic. Illiteracy will be wiped out in a relatively short time, say seven or eight years. Many of the diseases most harmful to man, such as schistosomiasis, diseases formerly considered incurable, we now are able to treat. In short, the people can see the great road open before them.

The problem facing the entire Party and all the people of the country is no longer one of combating rightist conservative ideas about the speed of socialist transformation of agriculture. That problem has already been solved. Nor is it a problem of the speed of transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, by entire trades, into state-private enterprises. That problem has also been solved. In the first half of 1956 we must discuss the speed of the socialist transformation of handicrafts. But that problem will easily be solved too.

The problem today is none of these, but concerns other fields. It affects agricultural production; industrial production (including state, joint state-private and co-operative industries); handicraft production; the scale and speed of capital construction in industry, communications and transportation; the co-ordination of commerce with other branches of the economy; and the co-ordination of the work in science, culture, education, public health, and so on, with our various economic enterprises. In all these fields there is an underestimation of the situation which must be criticized and corrected if the work in them is to keep pace with the development of the situation as a whole. People's thinking must adapt itself to the changed conditions. Of course no one should go off into wild flights of fancy, or make plans unwarranted by

the objective situation, or insist on attempting the impossible. The problem today is that rightist conservatism is still causing trouble in many fields and preventing the work in these fields from keeping pace with the development of the objective situation. The present problem is that many people consider impossible things which could be done if they exerted themselves. It is entirely necessary, therefore, to keep criticizing these rightist conservative ideas, which still actually exist.

This book is intended for comrades working in the countryside. Can people in the cities read it too? They not only can, but should. It is all about new things. Just as every day, every hour, there are new developments in the cities in the cause of socialism, so it is in the countryside. What are the peasants doing? What is the connection between what the peasants are doing and the activities of the working class, the intellectuals, of aH who love their country? A look at this material about the rural areas will help supply the answers.

To enable more people to understand the situation in the countryside, we intend to select 44 of the 176 articles and publish them as an abridged edition of 270,000 words. In this way, those unable to read the entire collection will still be able to learn something of rural problems.

MAO TSE-TUNG

December 27, 1955

THE PARTY SECRETARY TAKES THE LEAD AND ALL THE PARTY MEMBERS HELP RUN THE CO-OPS

(In the *Tangshan Peasants*, April 30, 1955)

This article is very well written. It deserves being the first piece recommended to the readers of this book.

There are still quite a few people everywhere like the ones described in the beginning of the article. Because they do not understand and are afraid of being asked questions, they "make a detour around the co-op." So-called "drastic compression" — the issuing of orders to dissolve whole batches of co-operatives — is also a manifestation of "making a detour around the co-op." But its advocates do not limit themselves to mere passive evasion. Rather with one sweep of the knife they "cut down" (to use their own expression) a great many co-operatives, and in a highly diligent manner. They take up their knife and — chop! — another troublesome problem out of the way. They are always telling you how difficult it is to run a co-operative. According to them, their hardships are simply inconceivable.

Countless examples throughout the country refute their arguments. The experience of Tsunhua County in the province of Hopei is one such example. In 1952 none of the people there knew how to run a co-operative. They solved this problem by buckling down and learning. Their slogan was: "The Party

secretary takes the lead and all Party members help run the co-ops." As a result, they went "from not understanding to understanding," "from a minority knowing how to the majority knowing how," "from the district officials running the co-ops to the people running them themselves." In three years, 1952-1954, 85 per cent of the 4,343 peasant families in the 11 townships of District Ten, Tsunhua County, Hopei Province, joined semi-socialist co-operatives. As for productivity in this district, comparing 1954 with 1952, grain increased by 76 per cent, timber trees by 56.4 per cent, fruit trees by 62.87 per cent and sheep by 463.1 per cent.

We have every reason to ask: If this place could do it, why can't others? If you say it is not possible, what reasons can you offer? I can see only one reason — unwillingness to take the trouble, or, to put it more bluntly, right opportunism. That is why we have this "making a detour around the co-op," that is why the Party secretary does not take the lead, why all Party members do not help run the co-operatives, why co-op members go from "not understanding" to still not understanding, why the co-ops never get beyond the stage where only a minority know how to run them, why running the co-operatives always remains in the hands of the district officials.

Or we have the other situation where certain individuals take the knife in hand and, when they see a troublesome co-operative, hack it down. Nothing will ever be accomplished that way. We have proposed such slogans as "Dynamic leadership, steady progress," and "Make comprehensive plans, give more active leadership." What is more, we agree with the entirely correct slogan raised by the comrades of Tsunhua County, "The Party secretary takes the lead and all the Party members help run the co-ops."

Hasn't there been "dynamic leadership, steady progress," in Tsunhua County? Hasn't there been comprehensive planning and more active leadership? Of course there has. But isn't this dangerous, rash? No. The danger lies in "making a detour around the co-op," and this danger has been overcome by the Tsunhua County comrades. The danger lies in "cutting down" whole batches of co-operatives on the pretext of avoiding rashness. There is none of that in Tsunhua County.

What of the claim that "the speed at which co-ops have been developing has gone beyond the understanding of the masses and the ability of the officials to lead"? How can that be reconciled with the situation in Tsunhua County? The people there demand co-operatives. The officials there have gone from "not understanding to understanding." We all have eyes; can anyone see any danger in Tsunhua County? In three years' time they built up their co-ops step by step. Their grain output increased by 76 per cent, their timber trees grew by 56.4 per cent, their orchards increased by 62.87 per cent, their flocks were 463.1 per cent larger. What kind of danger do you call that? Is that what is meant by "rash"? Can we say that "the speed at which co-ops have been developing has gone beyond the understanding of the masses and the ability of the officials to lead"?

Taking part in the co-operative movement in Tsunhua County is the Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative, originally consisting of 23 poor-peasant families and a three-quarter share in the ownership of a donkey. It was nicknamed "The Paupers' Co-op." But relying on their own efforts, in three years' time its members accumulated a large quantity of the means of production. They "got it from the mountains," they explained. Some of the people visiting the co-operative

were moved to tears when they learned what this meant.

Our entire nation, we feel, should pattern itself after this co-op. In a few decades, why can't 600 million "paupers," by their own efforts, create a socialist country, rich and strong? The wealth of society is created by the workers, the peasants, the working intellectuals. If they take their destiny into their own hands, use Marxism-Leninism as their guide, and energetically tackle problems instead of evading them, there is no difficulty in the world which they cannot overcome.

Finally, we want to thank the anonymous author of this article. Bubbling with enthusiasm, he gives a detailed description in vivid terms of a district in the process of building co-operatives. His article makes no small contribution to the cause of co-operation throughout the country. We hope every province, region and county will be able to bring forth one or more articles as good as this one.

— EDITOR

District Ten of Tsunhua County, Hopei Province, is divided into 11 townships which contain 42 villages with a total population of 4,343 families. Farming co-ops in the district were first set up in 1952, as an experiment. Today, the district has 72 co-ops, some purely agricultural, others combining agriculture, forestry and herding. Eighty-five per cent of all the peasant families in the district are co-op members. The co-operative movement here is essentially sound.

As co-operation spread, all kinds of productive activities in the district developed rapidly. Agricultural output in 1954 was 76 per cent higher than in 1952; there were 56.4 per cent more timber trees, 62.87 per cent more fruit trees and 463.1 per cent more sheep.

And as production rose, the peasants saw a great improvement in their material and cultural life. Fewer and fewer people were short of grain and more and more had a surplus. From the spring of 1953 to date, houses with a total of more than 4,000 rooms were built or repaired in the district, and the number of draught animals increased by over 2,300 head. There was a sharp rise in the peasants' purchasing power. In 1954 they spent a total of 667,000 yuan, 377 per cent more than in 1952.

One important reason why the co-operative movement has been so successful in this district is the conscientious way in which the district Party committee has observed the spirit of the slogan, "Let the Party secretary take the lead and all the Party members help run the co-ops."

FROM NOT UNDERSTANDING TO UNDERSTANDING

In the spring of 1952, the Communist Party Committee of District Ten helped form two farming co-ops as an experiment — one in the village of East Hsiaochai, the other in Wanglao. This was something new. Not only did the village officials and the co-op members know nothing about running a co-operative, the members of the district Party committee didn't know either. So every time district officers went into the countryside, they dodged the co-ops, not daring to try to cope with any of their problems. Even when co-op officials went to the district Party committee for advice on specific questions, it dared not give them a definite answer.

For example, Chen Tai, chairman of the East Hsiaochai Co-op, made a trip to the district to ask Chao Yung-hsing, secretary of the district Party committee, what to do about the investments which all members were supposed to make in the co-op. All Chao said was, "Talk it over with the members. Handle it any way you like, provided everybody agrees."

After the autumn harvest that year, eight new co-operatives were formed. The inability of the district officers to lead the co-ops was more apparent every day: it became the most urgent task of the district Party committee to solve this problem and promote the gradual development of the mutual-aid and co-operation movement in such a way that the Party secretary really did "take the lead and all Party members helped run the co-ops."

The first thing the district committee did was to give the district administration officers a course of instruction on policy in regard to mutual aid and co-operation. Two hours a day were spent studying the "Decisions on Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agricultural Production" taken by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, other relevant instructions issued by higher Party committees, guidance given in the press about establishing and running co-ops, and newspaper reports about the experience of other co-operatives.

On this course, Chao Yung-hsing, the secretary, and all the other members of the district committee were the pacemakers, keeping a step ahead of the others and giving them the benefit of what they had learned. Chao frequently summed up what he had read and explained it to the group. This was quite helpful to the district officers. Whenever one of them was sent to the villages, the district committee gave him a study task, so that he could keep up his studies even when out in the field. On his return to the district centre he was supposed to give an answer to his study problem and offer his notebook for inspection. In this way, all the district officers soon grew really enthusiastic about studying mutual-aid and co-operative policy, and learned quite a bit.

This, however, was all book-learning, and the men lacked practical experience. When they ran into a real problem, they were unable to solve it. As a result, at that time in the co-ops, there were still cases where people were forced to stand around idle, and people weren't working well together, but the district officers couldn't do anything about it. Some of them became very upset. They thought that the policy on mutual aid and co-operation was too complicated, that they would never really understand it.

So the district committee decided to do two things: first, to form a special committee—composed of the members of the district Party committee and the responsible officials of the district government — to lead the mutual-aid and co-operative movement and deal with specific questions connected with the formation and running of co-ops as they arose; second, to send members of the district Party committee to work and actually live in the co-ops, investigating and solving difficulties, and reporting back their experience.

It was fairly common then for people to be kept standing around. This was rather serious, and so the district committee sent Secretary Chao and two other comrades to the co-op in the hamlet of Hungya to introduce a method which had proved successful in the Kuo Yu-en Farming Co-op in Shansi. This was known as the "work to contract and guarantee output" method. It consists of each team or brigade within a co-op contracting to complete a certain job for a certain number of work-points and guaranteeing that the yield will reach a certain figure.

The three remained on the farm for more than a fortnight. During this time all meetings of the district Party committee were held in Hungya. Chao Yung-hsing went over their experience at the co-op, and various ways of doing things were discussed. Members of the district committee frequently called at the co-op to discuss things and see how the methods proposed were working out. By treating this co-op as a testing ground and making a concerted effort to cope with its problems thoroughly, not only was the "work to contract and guarantee output" method successful here too and there was hardly any hanging around on the job, but the quality of leadership also improved considerably. The Party committee members thus began to get some idea of what

was behind the problems of the co-ops and to find a way to solve them.

After the Party committee summed up its work at the Hungya Co-op, everyone was convinced that, to lead the co-ops properly, it was absolutely necessary to make a thorough study of Party policy on mutual aid and co-operation and go deeply into the directives which higher Party committees had issued on these matters. But this was not enough. It was also necessary, taking Party policy as a guide, to come to grips with the practical problems of the co-ops, to apply the experience of the masses, and to improve leadership. At the same time everyone became firmly convinced that, given a willingness to go directly to the co-ops and study their difficulties on the spot, no problem need remain unsolved. That was the best way of discovering problems, of solving them, of educating the masses, and of educating the leaders. To be unwilling to probe into the affairs of a co-op, to keep away from it, was wrong. It was not easy to go deep at first, but after a spell of hard work, results would be forthcoming.

FROM A MINORITY KNOWING HOW TO THE MAJORITY KNOWING HOW

Members of the district Party committee gradually got to understand co-op problems better and learned how to solve them. The leaders began to take the initiative. At that time, however, only four members of the district Party committee and a few administrative officials here and there knew how to lead the co-operatives. The vast majority of district officials were incapable of doing so. Some of them were still giving the co-ops a wide berth whenever they went into the countryside. When people from the co-ops sought them out with problems, they dodged giving answers.

The Party committee then decided to teach all district officers how to run a co-op. It emphasized that all work must centre round mutual aid and co-operation, and that all

officials must learn how to be co-op leaders. To teach them quickly, the committee adopted the following measures:

1) It Undertook to Develop Trainees. At that time there were 25 officials for the entire district. These were divided into four teams, and each team was led by one of the relatively experienced committee members, and accompanied him on his trips to the co-ops. As soon as the officials gained practical knowledge from their observation of the way the committee members worked, they were required to take over and handle the co-ops' problems themselves. In this way many of the officials soon acquired confidence and were able to spot sources of trouble and deal with them.

For example, Chang Chen-min, secretary of the office of the district government, made rapid progress after working together with Secretary Chao on practical problems. In investigating output difficulties on the Chen Tai Farming Co-op in East Hsiaochai, he discovered that they were putting too much emphasis on subsidiary occupations and not enough on farming. He helped the officers of the co-op to change this situation.

2) It Adopted a Policy of "Push Them In; Pull Them In." While most of the district officials now had the courage to tackle problems alone after their practical training, one or two were still scared of attempting anything without a Party committee member at their side. The district Party committee worked out a double-barrelled device to bring these officials on. On the one hand, they were "pushed" into the co-ops. This was done by the district committee sending them to work in designated co-operatives with instructions that if they ran into difficulty they were to try to find a way out with the aid of the co-op's officers and the local village officials. If they got properly stuck the district committee helped them out. On the other hand, the district officials were "pulled" in too. The co-ops were told that if a problem arose, they could summon any of the district officials at any

time. In this way officials gradually overcame their timidity in facing up to co-op problems.

For example, Li Shao-wen, deputy head of the district, had always found himself at a loss when confronted with co-op problems, and was unwilling to handle them alone. But when the district committee sent him to the Chao Jui Farming Co-op to deal with bad organization of labour that left people standing around idle, and the co-op officers and members insisted that he went, he had no alternative. After a fortnight of investigation and hard work, with the help of the district committee, he worked out a solution — a system of contracting for work-points on particular short-term jobs. It proved very successful.

3) It Constantly Summed Up Experience and Improved the Party Leadership and the Ability of All Officials. Once the district officials were all willing to go into the co-ops and deal with their problems, the next step was to improve their ability as fast as possible. The Party committee, besides giving them a chance to learn on the job, started systematically summing up experience. Whenever a committee member solved a co-op problem that was both fairly common and fairly serious, he summed up what he had done, gave a report to all officials and everyone discussed it. The committee also helped the officials sum up and learn from experience. This frequent exchange of experience was a great help in making officials and the district Party committee, too, more capable at work.

Besides this, the county Party committee set up a political study centre. This proved very valuable to district officials in their handling of co-op problems.

For example, the Chen Tai Co-op had been under the thumb of two rich peasants ever since it started almost a year before. They were using the co-op labour to work their land while they themselves went off to do a bit of private trading. This, of course, weakened the co-op. Although the district officials had been aware of the situation for some time, they

didn't know the whys and wherefores or what to do about it. Then the county Party committee made a report at the political study centre on the Party's class policy in the countryside and analysed the situation in the Chen Tai Co-op in the light of it. This cleared up the confusion in the minds of the district officials, and they promptly led the co-op in throwing out the rich peasants so that it became well-knit and strong.

In this way, even before the autumn of 1953, every one of the district's 25 officials could solve co-op problems unaided, and twelve of them showed promise of unusual ability in the field of mutual aid and co-operation.

FROM DISTRICT OFFICERS RUNNING THE CO-OPS TO THE PEOPLE RUNNING THEM THEMSELVES

After the autumn of 1953, as a result of the thorough publicity and explanations of the Party's general line during the period of transition to socialism, the great mass of the peasants became much more keenly aware of the need for socialism. By the spring of 1954, there were already 43 co-ops in the district. But this meant that the district officials could no longer cope with all the work of the co-operatives on their own. It became necessary, in keeping with the maxim that "the Party secretary takes the lead and all the Party members help run the co-ops," for Communists and officials in the townships and the co-ops' officers to learn to do the job thoroughly.

For this purpose, the district Party committee took measures to:

1) Solve Key Problems, Absorb Experience, and Teach on the Basis of Proven Facts. Working on the line that "the Party secretary takes the lead," the district Party committee's secretary Chao Yung-hsing, deputy secretaries Li Chi-tseng and Lu Chen-tang went to three different co-ops and worked on various problems. After solving them, the prob-

lems were discussed by the district Party committee. The way they were solved was summed up and passed on to the district cadres. The solutions were also passed on to the rank-and-file Communists, local government officials and co-op officers in the course of lectures given at political study centres run by the Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth League. In this way, not only did the leaders learn from practical experience; they were able to give thorough explanations to others.

2) Establish Mutual-Aid and Co-operative Networks and Maintain a Constant Exchange of Experience. In the spring of 1954, the district Party committee, in keeping with the instructions of higher Party committees and with the situation in the district at that time, established 11 mutual-aid and co-operative networks — one in each township. The secretaries of the township Party branches were made chairmen of the networks, the vice-chairmen being chosen from among the more experienced co-op chairmen. Members included committee members from the township Party branches, the village heads, the officers of the co-ops and the leaders of the mutual-aid teams. Each township network met twice a month, and district cadres took part. The problems of mutual aid and co-operation were fully discussed and experience was exchanged. Any problem which the meetings could not solve was referred to the district Party committee for consideration and decision.

The advantage of this method was that it did not overtax the district Party committee, the local officials and co-op officers learned quickly, and problems could be solved promptly.

For example, the Yen Man-sheng Co-op used to buy pig manure from its members (some raised their own pigs), taking the entire output and paying by weight. It was found that a few members were mixing too much earth in with the manure so as to get a higher price. This, of course, lowered the quality of the manure. So the co-op changed to a system

of paying according to the number and size of the pigs and how quickly the manure was delivered, and did all the earth-mixing itself. In this way the quality of the manure was kept up without the members losing their incentive to collect it. After this method was reported to the network, 13 other co-ops took it up.

3) Get the Old Co-ops to Look After the New. To help the officers of the new co-ops learn their jobs, the district Party committee put out the slogan, "The old co-ops should help the new; the new ones should learn from the old." The committee urged the officers of the old co-ops to visit new ones and help them, and encouraged the new co-ops to ask the officers of old ones for their assistance, thereby making for a close relationship between the two. This not only promoted unity between the old and the new co-ops and gave the new co-ops' officers regular training; it also made it possible to spot and resolve difficulties as they arose.

For example, when the Chao Hung Co-op was established in 1954, it hadn't the faintest idea how to set about making the "Four Estimates" — that is, of the productive capacity of the co-op's land, what ought to be paid for buying or hiring animals, what should be paid to buy or rent farm implements, and how to calculate the value of each member's daily labour. They wandered from one subject to another for days without getting anywhere and the members began to bicker. Then, without waiting for an invitation, the chairman of an old co-op in the neighbouring village came over, and thanks to him, they sailed through the "Four Estimates" without a hitch.

Some of the co-op book-keepers couldn't keep accounts, but they soon learned with the help of book-keepers from the old co-operatives. The two book-keepers of East Hsiaochai Co-op alone helped eight new co-ops start keeping proper accounts.

4) Organize Visits to See Things on the Spot and Give Practical Education. The district Party committee arranged

two kinds of opportunities for seeing things on the spot, one based on the seasons and the other giving training by observing how specific problems were handled.

The first covered a wide field, depending on the time of year. For example, during spring planting, all or some of the district officials, the township and village officials and co-op officers, would go to a co-op where the district Party committee was working on key problems, and see for themselves how the co-op members were taught to co-ordinate their work with the national plan. At summer hoeing time they could see how to make the best use of labour. In the autumn they could study on the spot how profits should be divided. This helped the co-ops anticipate the major seasonal problems, and since they were no longer being suddenly confronted with difficulties which demanded urgent solutions, their leaders could take timely, practical action in a planned way.

The second kind of study by observation was to go and see how some specific difficulty common to all the co-ops at a given time was dealt with. For example, many new co-ops were formed in the spring of 1954. Some of them were not very clear on the management policy to be followed by co-operatives and always asked the government for more funds than they actually needed. Five co-ops in one little hamlet alone requested an advance of 800 yuan. The district Party committee then organized a "see it yourself" group composed of the officers of 43 co-ops and took them on a tour of Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative, which was run very economically.

When it was started in 1952, this co-op had a membership of 23 poor-peasant families. All it possessed in the way of livestock was a three-quarter ownership in a donkey. It was very short of tools and farm supplies too. None of the members could raise enough money to invest in the co-operative. People called it the "Paupers' Co-op." Yet poor as they were, they didn't rely on government loans, but on their own labour power. Every day they travelled to a mountain ten

miles away to cut brushwood which they sold as fuel, and with the money bought some of the things they needed. From the winter of 1952 to the spring of 1953, they earned a big sum by cutting brushwood. Besides helping out some of the member families, the money was also used to buy an ox, a donkey, 30 head of sheep, and a cart with iron-bound wheels, as well as things like harness and fertilizer.

They continued to cut fuel, and by the spring of 1954 the co-op had acquired a mule, five oxen, two donkeys, 65 sheep, 12 pigs, a cart with iron-bound wheels, and an insecticide sprayer. All of these, to put it in the members' own words, they "got from the mountains."

Visitors to the Wang Kuo-fan Co-op were deeply impressed. They were convinced that only by being economical and planning production in the light of local conditions could a co-op become strong and increase the income of its members. Some of the visiting co-op officers were moved to tears, and pledged themselves to learn from the Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative. The chairman of one co-op which had applied to the government for a loan to buy an animal said, "We can depend on our own labour and get our money 'from the mountains' too."

After this tour, 38 co-operatives cut 2,300,000 catties of brushwood, and with the money they got for it bought implements and animals. Since the spring of 1954 the district committee has led over a dozen "see it yourself" tours, and each has produced a very good response.

5) Divide the District into Areas and Give Training Courses in the Slack Season. In order to give systematic education to government and co-op officials, the district Party committee divided the district into areas and gave short training courses during the slack time of the year. During the courses, in addition to certain key points which the Party committee wanted to put across, anyone could raise any question he liked, and the district committee helped give him an answer. For example, in the spring of 1954, some of the

township, village and co-op officials, although they knew how to start a co-op, did not know how to run it. Using this period when there was no hoeing to be done, the committee divided the district's co-ops into four areas, according to what kind of co-ops they were and their distance from one another. A five-day training course was given in each area. A total of 350 township, village and co-op officials took part. The district Party committee explained several major factors in the running of a co-op and organized discussion groups presided over by chairmen of old co-ops.

Everyone felt that the courses were down to earth and really solved problems. A number of people said they were like a department store — you could get anything you needed from them on how to run a co-operative. This time everyone really began to get the idea how it should be done.

Over the past year or so, because the district Party committee has been using the various methods described above, the township and village officials and co-op officers throughout the district have become much better at running co-operatives. Of the 41 township officials in the district, 16 have become "experts," and 25 are "semi-experts." Of 375 major officials on a village level (such as secretaries of village Party branches, village heads, etc.), 144 can be considered "expert," and 231 "semi-expert." All the village Party branch secretaries, with one exception, are serving as co-operative chairmen or vice-chairmen. They are applying the spirit of letting "the Party secretary take the lead and all Party members help run the co-ops" in a practical way.

A WHOLE VILLAGE GOES CO-OPERATIVE IN A LITTLE OVER A MONTH

(A statement by Wang Chih-chi, Chairman of the East Chuankou Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, Hsingtai County, Hopei Province, on August 15, 1955)

This material is very convincing. The development of a healthy co-operative movement in a particular locality depends on Party policy and the manner in which we do our work. As long as every aspect of our Party's policy on co-operation is correct, as long as the Party does not merely issue orders or over-simplify matters when rousing the people to join co-operatives, but instead reasons with them, helps them analyse the situation, and relies entirely on their understanding and willingness, there certainly will not be much difficulty in establishing co-operatives everywhere and, what is more, increasing output.

The village of East Chuankou in Hsingtai County, Hopei Province, was liberated long ago. By 1952 every one of its 70 peasant households had already joined mutual-aid teams. They had a strong Party branch in the village, and they had Wang Chih-chi — a leader whom the people trusted. All the conditions were ripe. And so in 1952, that village, in little more than a month, organized a co-operative and achieved semi-socialist co-operation.

What about places without such ideal conditions? In those places it is up to the people there to create them. In a few months, or a year, or a little longer,

they can do it. They can create the conditions they need in the course of their normal work. They can set up a few small co-ops; this is precisely what is meant by creating the necessary conditions for co-operation in a whole village, a whole township, a whole district.

The experience of East Chuankou also makes very clear how a Party branch should conduct its educational work among the people, how it should rely on their understanding and willingness to establish co-operatives. The "pointing out of difficulties" method used in this village is worth our special attention.

On the question of organization and supervision of labour, the material describes how the snarl in East Chuankou was untangled, with the result that they greatly increased production from year to year. Facts proved that their co-op was a healthy one. The main indicator by which all co-operatives should measure their health is — is production increasing, and, how fast?

— EDITOR

East Chuankou is a small village in the hills of Hsingtai County, Hopei Province. In the whole village there are only 70 families of which 31 are old middle-peasant and 38 are new middle-peasant families; one is a poor-peasant family. These families contain a total of 290 people who own 670 *mou* of land, or an average of 2.3 *mou* per person. Before the War Against Japanese Aggression, because the land holdings were small and the soil was of poor quality, the peasants led a miserable existence and had to live on chaff and wild roots six months out of the year.

Nineteen forty-two was a year of severe drought but, led by the Communist Party, the village organized four seasonal

mutual-aid teams and managed to pull through, thanks to the side-lines the teams instituted. In 1947 the village completed land reform and all seventy families were organized in seven mutual-aid teams. In 1949, the seasonal mutual-aid teams became year-round organizations. For the next few years, the teams solved some of the manpower and draught animal shortages, and made beginnings in fertilization and improving the soil. Output increased sharply. By 1951 the village was producing an average of 369 catties of grain per *mou*, almost triple the pre-war yield.

To further increase output, it was necessary to add more fertilizer, develop subsidiary occupations, build irrigation works and improve the quality of the soil. But mutual-aid teams could not do these things. The peasants said: "A mutual-aid team never changes. We overhaul it every year but it's still the same."

After the autumn harvest in 1951, the mutual-aid team members began to lose interest. It was just at this time that the village Party branch secretary, Wang Chih-chi, paid a visit to the Keng Chang-so Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Jaoyang County. He saw with what zest the co-op members threw themselves into production, and observed that they were all working away together even in the "slack" winter season. Very interested, Wang Chih-chi learned how to organize a co-op. He had found the way forward from mutual-aid teams.

After his return, the Party committee of Hsingtai County decided to establish a co-operative of 12 to 20 families in East Chuankou, as an experiment. Accepting the task, Wang put the Communists of his village branch through a course of study on the approach to socialism, co-ordinating this with measures to strengthen the Party. This helped give the Party members confidence that they could run a co-op.

To further encourage them, at a meeting of the Party branch, Wang outlined the advantages the Keng Chang-so Co-operative enjoyed over mutual-aid teams and explained how

it was run. He analysed how, in the light of local conditions, the establishment of a co-op would improve agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry in the village, and help build up the barren mountain regions. Wang criticized one of the Communists, Liu Chi-teh, who went broke taking flyers in private trade while neglecting his farm work. This was a lesson for all Party members, Wang said.

The Party members thought these matters over and discussed them among themselves. Then 19 out of 20 Communists, together with their families, registered to join the co-op (18 were new middle-peasant families, one was a poor-peasant family). The only one Communist who didn't apply had more and better land than the others, and was fairly well equipped with animals and farm implements. He was afraid he would earn less as a co-op member.

The village Party branch thought it necessary to have some non-Communists in the co-operative, too. And so the Party members went to the various mutual-aid teams and discussed with them the advantages of agricultural co-ops. After about ten days of this kind of education, the new middle peasants recalled how much they had gained from following the lead of the Party in the past, and many of them decided to join the co-operative. Said Wang Ching-wei:

"If we stick with the Party we can't go wrong. Self-support, Reduction of Rent and Interest, Land Reform, Develop Production — every campaign the Party's led has been for our benefit."

Some of the old middle peasants who were relatively short on land and long on labour, once they understood that part of the co-op's return would be distributed according to work done, felt that by joining they would not be the losers. Families with limited labour power seldom got their ploughing and planting done on time, even though they belonged to mutual-aid teams. Once in the co-op, they would not have this worry any more.

Thirteen families registered for membership, including eight new middle-peasant and five old middle-peasant families. Plus the 19 Communists and their families, that made a total of 32 applicants.

Nevertheless, because this was something new and no one was too clear on the details and there were no regulations to guide them, people had all kinds of doubts. Said one old middle peasant:

"It sounds all right, but I think I'd better wait another year. If it works out well I'll join. Otherwise not."

Bachelors were afraid that grain would be distributed according to the size of families and they would be at a disadvantage. People with large households were afraid they would have to contribute a bigger share of manure than others. The women were also confused:

"It's easy to divide grain," they said, "but how are you going to share things like stringbeans and squash and cabbage?"

The village Party branch collected the various questions and worked out 42 preliminary measures which answered them all. The measures were posted and everyone discussed them. Those 32 families which had already registered their applications for co-op membership had no complaints. Families which had not registered were also quite satisfied, and a number of them wanted to join.

The applicants already exceeded the planned maximum figure of 20 families, and the Party branch was afraid that unless everyone was determined and clear of purpose, many difficulties might be created — especially since the co-op was only to be experimental the first year. It therefore announced that any man who wanted to join would first have to call a meeting of his family. Only if his whole family agreed would his application be accepted.

After five days of family discussions, the number of households wanting to join the co-op reached 59. Among the 27 latest applicants were ten new middle-peasant families and

17 old middle-peasant families. Most of these had decided to apply after careful consideration, but a few "came along" simply because so many other people were joining. Three or four families had had hot debates, the sons and daughters —members of the New Democratic Youth League, and eager for progress — wanting to join, the fathers being opposed. In the end, the fathers were persuaded. "Let the young people run the families!" they said, and applied for co-op membership.

Fifty-nine applicants seemed quite a lot to the village Party branch. It was far more than they had originally planned. No one in the branch had ever run a co-op before, and they were afraid that if it grew any larger it would be hard to handle. They decided to "close the door" and not accept any more applications. But the 11 families in the village which had not sought membership (nine old middle-peasant and two new middle-peasant families) now had a change of heart. They felt that remaining outside the co-op, they "had no future." A middle peasant and the one Communist who had consistently refused to join, preferring to stand on the sidelines, called a meeting of the 11 families and asked the village Party secretary to attend. They pleaded for permission to join the co-op.

"We're all kinds, sizes and shapes," they said. "Even if we formed a mutual-aid team, we'd never get along together, off by ourselves."

The Party member criticized himself. "Before, I was nearly six feet tall when I walked down the street. Now, because I didn't apply for co-op membership, I don't feel any higher than three!"

All the 11 families pressed for application. After the village Party branch talked the matter over, and the district Party committee approved, the co-op accepted the 11 families.

Thus, in a little over a month, the entire village had gone co-operative.

But the village Party branch recalled that in urging everyone to join the co-op only advantages had been talked about;

no mention had been made of the troubles which might arise. To prepare the people for all contingencies, it was decided to give the co-op some publicity, pointing out the difficulties lying before them.

Of course we all hope the co-op will be a success, the Party branch told the villagers that it'll give us an increased yield at harvest. But this is only an experiment. We have no experience. Though others have done a good job of it, we may not. Others have raised their output. Maybe we won't. Another thing to remember is that working collectively isn't as free and easy as working on one's own, or on a mutual-aid team. There are bound to be some restrictions. There'll probably also be quarrels from time to time, and a certain amount of hold-ups in work is hard to avoid. Everyone had better think these things over. Anyone who's afraid of trouble shouldn't join. There's still time to back out. . . .

The branch said that no one should be afraid to "retract" or "reopen the case." "Everyone should make up his own mind."

After a number of public discussions, the branch called for a completely new registration of applications. Only those who really wanted to join should put down their names.

Not one of the original applicants failed to sign up again.

Although the villagers were determined to have a co-operative, they were very concerned about who would be "the head of the family." Would the chairman and other officers of the co-op be people they trusted? At their request, the village Party branch conducted democratic elections, and a 15-man management committee was chosen, headed by the branch secretary, Wang Chih-chi. Everyone was satisfied. Led by the committee, the co-op members divided into four brigades and set to work.

From the time the drive started to form a co-op to the day of its actual establishment, only a little more than a month had passed.

The co-op was now in operation. But everyone was used to working in small mutual-aid teams. They had never tried to organize the labour power of over 140 adults before. At first they relied entirely on enthusiasm, keeping no record of what work was done or how much each member had actually finished in a day. They just plunged on blindly.

Of course this didn't get them anywhere, so they went back to the "fixed points" system they had used in the mutual-aid teams. A person was classified as either a "strong" or "weak" worker, and each day was credited with a definite number of work-points accordingly. This method was followed for three or four months.

It worked out badly. For one thing, the management committee, assigning people to jobs only as they arose instead of planning in advance, was kept running around in circles. For another thing, the members were becoming apathetic. Some of them began to feel, "What if we get to the fields late and come home early? We earn the same number of points anyhow." As one man expressed it: "Whether I push it hard or take it slow, my work-points never change. With all the dawdling going on around here, we'll never raise our output."

Finally the atmosphere became so lax that it was difficult for the management committee to find people to assign to jobs. Things had reached a point where "the chairman was pressing the brigade leaders, the brigade leaders were pressing the members, and the hard workers awaited impatiently in the fields while the lazy ones loafed on street corners."

A new system called "fixed rates with flexible assessment" was tried at autumn harvest. Each member was rated as being capable of earning a certain number of work-points per day. But, taking these points as a basis, what he was credited with depended on how much he actually did in a given day, and how well he did it. Democratic discussion among all the members of his brigade at the end of the day's

work decided whether he should receive more or less than his basic "fixed rates."

While better than the "fixed rates" arrangement, because there were no standards for quality of work, it was very difficult to apply the "flexible assessment" part of the new system. In the evening when the day's work was over, everyone would get together to discuss how many points each member should receive. The arguments lasted half the night. Members said these weren't "flexible assessment" meetings — they were "inflexible battles to the death!" Some said, "My family's food depends on what's decided at those meetings. Why shouldn't I argue?" For a fraction of a point, men shouted themselves blue in the face.

Some members didn't like to hurt people's feelings, and were always willing to give a man a bit more than he deserved. They thought, "An extra couple of points will come out of the co-op as a whole. But if I offend him, that will make bad blood between him and me personally."

Some members couldn't stand losing sleep night after night. "I'll take whatever number of points they give me," they said. "Doing a little extra work won't kill me, but this damn staying up all night might!"

The general consensus of opinion was, "The work is easy to do but hard to reckon. We argue about it for hours, and everyone gets sore at everyone else. By the time we finally go to sleep, we're all dead tired."

Having learned from this experience, in the spring of 1953 after the village Party branch and the co-op management committee talked it over, the co-op adopted a "piece-work" system. In the beginning, the average member doubted whether it would get the work done, while the lazy ones were afraid it would put an end to their coasting, and both were opposed. The management committee, after summing up and pointing out the failings of the previous methods, decided to give the new method a trial on one job first and then gradually apply it to the other work of the co-op.

The test was made in the section for making sun-dried bricks. The men who cut the bricks and spread them out to dry in the sun were given 2.5 points for every hundred. The men who mixed the earth and clay got 1.8 per hundred. Three teams took part in the experiment. It was found that the average member could produce 700 bricks in a day, earning 17.5 points.

When this news spread among the other members, and they realized that the more they worked the more they earned, they became interested in the "piece-work" system and wanted to institute it on their own jobs. Soon the whole co-op was using it. This is how it operated: The total work-days required on a given job was calculated and points allotted for it. The job was then divided among the brigades, which turned it over to their members. Each brigade guaranteed to complete its share of the work.

Productivity increased with the institution of this system. Wang Chen-teh, previously rated as a 7-point man, used to ask only for light work, complaining that his back hurt. After the "piece-work" system was adopted, he earned 11 points in one day carrying the water for planting cotton. As the enthusiasm of the members increased, all jobs were finished ahead of time. For instance, it was originally estimated that it would take 25 days to plant 270 *mou* of cotton. Instead, the work was completed in 16.

At first, only quantity was provided for under the system, and people were producing as much as they could, as fast as they could, with no regard to quality. During hoeing, some members were so anxious to move ahead rapidly that they neglected to break up the ground as they hoed. The fields were covered with solid chunks of earth. When this was discovered, strict quality standards were imposed.

Another failing of the system in the beginning was that it placed no time limits. Some members, secure in the knowledge that certain jobs were theirs, were in no particular hurry to complete them, and often finished their private work

first at the expense of the work of the co-op. Time limits, therefore, had to be set for every job.

Gradually, the system developed to a point where three guarantees were given for each particular job: that a definite quantity would be produced, that it would be of a certain quality, that the job would be completed by a certain date.

But because approximately the same number of work-points were being given for ordinary jobs as for jobs requiring technical skill, for light work and for heavy, some members continued to angle for the easy jobs. The system was amended to correct this situation by making provision for inspection and awards. Besides individual members checking on one another, inspection teams were organized to examine all the work going forward on particular sections of land. Brigades and individual members who did a job especially well were publicly commended or given awards. Those whose work was poor were publicly criticized and, when necessary, they had to do the job over again, or a deduction was made from their work-points.

After operating under the "three guarantees" system for a year, the co-op officers felt that it still did not arouse sufficient concern for production. In 1954, therefore, a system was proposed whereby each brigade would be responsible for certain fields all year round and would guarantee definite output. Some members were hesitant, fearing that they might not reach their targets and would have to make good the difference to the co-op. It was explained that goals would be set for each field according to the quality of its soil, and that fertilizer and labour power would be allotted to it accordingly. Generally speaking, the targets would be set higher than the average yields of previous years but lower than what it was estimated the fields should reasonably be able to produce. Thus reassured, everyone agreed to try the new system out.

All the land of the co-op was divided into sections, taking into consideration the sizes of the fields, the crops to be

grown, soil quality, and distance from the village. Then, depending on their ability, the members were assigned to the various sections, more going to the larger sections, less going to the smaller sections. After a harvest target for the entire co-op was agreed upon, sub-plans were made for the brigades responsible for the various sections, setting forth the kind of crops to be raised, harvest targets, and the number of work-days required. Moreover, a chart was drawn, showing the number of work-days needed for each crop—from ploughing to harvest—plus the target yield to be reached, to help the co-op and the various brigades co-ordinate their plans.

To stimulate enthusiasm, the co-op made a rule that 70 per cent of everything a brigade harvested in excess of the planned target figure would be divided among the members of that brigade, 20 per cent going into the co-operative's reserve and welfare fund, and 10 per cent going to the co-op's award fund. In the event of natural disasters, or the co-op failing to give a brigade its necessary supplies, the brigade would not be held responsible for any losses which might result.

Some work, however, could not be calculated on a piece-work basis. The way a man was scored depended on the nature of his job. Where possible, he was credited on a piece-work basis. Where it was difficult to fix norms for a particular job, the "fixed rates with flexible assessment" method was used. Some jobs were such that there was practically no difference between the way one man did them and the next — like opening the irrigation sluice gates. For these, "fixed rates" were given. Seven points a day were given for the irrigation job, no matter who did it.

The "guaranteed harvests" method gave a great boost to labour productivity. For instance, Brigade Four had guaranteed to plant 76.4 *mou* of cotton, using a total of 611.2 work-days. The result was that it used only 372—a 60.8 per cent increase in labour productivity.

Quality was also improved. When the time came to raise a specified number of cotton seedlings per row — in accordance with the close-planting-in-wide-rows method—the women guaranteed that they would maintain 3,500 plants to the *mou*, and replace any plant that died or grew poorly. Said the members:

"Last year we worked to earn points, and we didn't give a hang about output. This year we've guaranteed to reach definite targets. We've just got to fulfil the plan."

But the co-op still had problems. The chief one was that each brigade thought only of itself. There were eight mules and seven donkeys in the co-op. Every brigade demanded the mules. No one wanted to use the smaller animals. Some brigades worked the mules without even waiting for them to finish eating.

To get the maximum amount of fertilizer on their fields possible, some brigades pretended they drew less fertilizer from the supply depot than was the fact, and this led to no end of wrangling. Some brigades were only anxious to rush ahead, caring nothing for the progress of the other units. This influenced the progress of the co-op as a whole. For instance, at watering and planting time, Brigade Two finished three days ahead of schedule. Instead of helping the other brigades, every one of its members went off to enjoy himself at the fair.

When this situation came to light, the management committee divided both the better and inferior animals equally among the brigades and made them responsible for their care and for accumulating the animals' manure. Each brigade also had to make its own compost. At a meeting of the whole co-op it was explained that when one brigade fell behind it affected everyone's share in the profits; brigades which were in the lead were urged to help the ones having difficulty. It was decided that members could be loaned to other brigades after they had finished the work in their own units, so as to ensure that the entire co-op would complete its plan.

Another problem was the income of members working full time at subsidiary occupations. These people shared in the profits equally with the other members. However, they received no part in the division of income in excess of target figures, and they complained about it.

"If we don't reach our targets we have to pay the difference," replied the members who worked in the fields. "There's no such rule for subsidiary occupations."

The management committee solved this difficulty by treating the subsidiary occupation people as members of the various brigades, in equal numbers. At harvest time, they shared in excess income with the other members of their brigade. If there was any loss, they had to bear their part of the burden.

In 1955, after summing up its experience for 1954, the co-op made the following amendments to its methods:

1) Redistribution of manpower, animals, implements, land sections and use of fertilizer.

A. Manpower: In assigning members to brigades, consideration shall be given to the distance they live from the various fields, the convenience of the leaders, and what members work best together. Each member may appraise his own ability and, after the other members have discussed this, he shall be given a rating. Thereby a reasonable distribution of manpower was maintained. When necessary, suitable readjustments shall be made.

B. Animals: The 13 animals owned by the co-op and which originally were temporarily loaned to the various brigades are now assigned to them permanently, and the brigades are responsible for their care and use. Loans of animals from one brigade to another must be made only on mutual consent and with the approval of the management committee.

C. Implements: The co-op now has its own large and medium-sized farm implements. These will be allotted to the various brigades according to size and condition of the

implements, and the brigades will be responsible for their maintenance. Members must pay for any damage to implements which they borrow for use on their own private plots.

D. Land sections: Members complained that in 1954 the sections were marked out only on the basis of administrative convenience. In 1955 four land sections were created in accordance with quality of soil, crops to be raised and distance of fields from the members' homes.

E. Fertilizer: The co-op shall give credit for all natural fertilizer collected, according to its quality. It shall determine how much fertilizer to give each brigade, depending on the quality of the soil and the crops to be raised on the land section for which the brigade is responsible. If the brigade supplies the fertilizer itself, it shall be credited with its value. Brigades drawing more than their planned allotment of fertilizer shall be required to increase their yields accordingly. If the co-op is unable to supply the planned allotment, the yield target figures may be lowered accordingly. This will prevent any scrambling for fertilizer among the brigades, and will encourage them to accumulate their own.

2) Harvest targets shall be higher than those of average years, but lower than the targets of the annual plan. For instance, the cotton target for 1955 exceeds the 1953 (a good year) harvest figure by 18.9 per cent but is about 10 per cent lower than the planned target.

The 1954 practice of calculating yields in money was changed to calculating them in kind so as to avoid too much attention being paid to industrial crops at the expense of the ordinary crops.

In 1954 points were given for certain kinds of work without regard to circumstances. As of 1955, careful consideration shall be given to such things as physical conditions and weather. For example, in raising cotton, different points shall be credited for planting done with a seeder than for

planting done with drills; a distinction shall be made between hoeing before and after rain.

3) Establish and improve various systems.

A. Inspection system: Because inspection was neither careful nor timely, in 1954 some fields were cultivated badly. Starting 1955, the co-op chairman, the brigade leaders, the team leaders, and the co-op members shall be jointly responsible for inspecting the work on a rotation basis.

B. System of awards and penalties: This system shall be based on the principle of definite points for definite jobs — regardless of whether they are finished ahead of time or require overtime — giving awards for exceeding production targets, and penalizing for failing to reach the mark. Eighty per cent of the earnings in excess of target figures shall be divided among the members of the brigade topping its goal. An additional 10 per cent shall be given to those workers in the brigade who have shown special merit. The remaining 10 per cent shall go into the co-op's reserve fund. No responsibility shall be borne for losses due to natural calamities, but members shall pay 70 per cent of losses which could have been avoided.

C. Financial management: Receipts must be given for all implements and other things loaned to the brigades, and they shall be checked at given seasons of the year. Maintenance men shall be appointed in each brigade who will be responsible for their care.

In the past four years the East Chuankou Co-operative has grown stronger and better by the day. It has been steadily increasing its production.

In 1952, the year of its establishment, its total harvest came to 277,164 catties, 11.98 per cent higher than the return for the entire village in 1951.

The second year, 1953, the co-op gathered 325,483 catties, 17.43 per cent over the 1952 figure.

In 1954, the third year, floods caused a decline in production. The total harvest was 294,522 catties. Although this was 30,000 catties less than 1953, it still was higher than the 1952 figure, and 18.99 per cent more than the yield in 1951 — the year before the co-op was formed.

This year, 1955, the crops are growing very well. In the absence of any natural disasters, according to preliminary estimates, we should harvest about 420,000 catties.

The members' income has also continued to increase. The average villager's income in 1951 was 876 catties. After the formation of the co-op, it rose to 1,060 in 1952 and 1,281 in 1953. In 1954 the figure dropped a little because of the floods. That year the income of the average member was only 1,100 catties. We expect it to be much higher this year.

THIS TOWNSHIP WENT CO-OPERATIVE IN TWO YEARS

(By the Co-operative Production Department of the Communist Party Committee of Kunshan County, October 14, 1955)

Those who do not believe it will be possible to attain an elementary form of co-operation in various localities within three years (the people raised the slogan of achieving co-operation within three years and it has been criticized by opportunists), those who do not believe that areas which were liberated later can attain co-operation at the same time as areas which were liberated earlier, please take a look at this township in Kunshan County, Kiangsu Province! There, they went co-operative not in three years but in two. This was not in an old liberated area, but in a 100 per cent pure and genuine newly liberated area. And this newly liberated area is striding ahead of many old liberated areas. What can you do about it? Pull it back again? Of course not. The opportunists have no choice but to admit defeat.

The people are filled with an immense enthusiasm for socialism. In a revolutionary period those who only know how to follow the routine paths cannot see this enthusiasm at all. They are blind. All is dark before them. At times they rant to a point of standing truth on its head and confusing black with white. Haven't we had enough of persons of that sort? Those who can only travel the well-trodden paths always underestimate the enthusiasm of the people. Let

something new appear and they invariably disapprove, they rush to oppose it. Later, they admit defeat and do a bit of self-criticism. But the next time something new appears, they do the same things again — and in the same sequence. This becomes their regular routine in regard to anything and everything new.

That sort of person is always passive. He can never get going at a critical moment. Someone always has to give him a poke in the back before he will move forward. How many years will it be before that sort of person can walk of his own accord, and do it in a proper way?

Let him walk a while among the people, learn what they are thinking, see what they are doing — that is how to cure his ailment. Let him get some advanced experience from them and publicize it. That is the medicine for rightist obtuseness. May we suggest to him and his kind that it wouldn't hurt to give it a try?

— EDITOR

There were 677 households in Hsihsu Township, Kunshan County, Kiangsu Province. Of these, poor peasants and the lower sections of both the old and new middle peasants constituted 502 households; the upper middle peasants, 123 households; ex-landlords and rich peasants, 52 households. Two agricultural producers' co-operatives were set up in the spring of 1954, ten more in autumn, and still another one in the autumn of 1955. The membership of these 13 co-ops constituted 89 per cent of the total peasant households in the township. This meant that co-operative farming of a semi-socialist character has in the main been achieved in the township.

AFTER THE LAND REFORM

After the land reform in Hsihsu Township was completed in the spring of 1951, the enthusiasm of the peasants, particularly that of the poor peasants and farm labourers who had received land, was greatly increased. At that time, the local Party branch began organizing the peasants into labour mutual-aid teams. The rich harvests in 1952 and 1953 brought the yield of the land to the pre-war level, and the life of the peasants greatly improved. In spite of all this, class differentiation continued to take place in the rural areas. The rich peasants and speculative merchants stopped at nothing to line their own pockets. Tai Huei-po, a rich peasant, paid only five pecks of rice to get back his three *mou* of land which had been requisitioned during the land reform; and, as if forgetting himself, he said: "Anyone who needs money may come and borrow from me." Kuo Huei-ju, a well-to-do middle peasant, bought nine *mou* of land less than a year after the land reform. By 1953 there had already been 11 new rich-peasant households. Among the nine Party members in the township, five did some business and four bought land. On the other hand, the life of a large number of peasants was getting worse. Figures for 1953 showed that 39 households sold their land, 57 households borrowed money from usurers and two poor peasants had to hire themselves out as farm hands. At that time, the poorer sections of the peasantry were getting terribly worried. Some of them said: "If nothing is done about it, who knows the bad old days will not return?"

TWO CO-OPS SHOWED THE WAY

In the autumn of 1953 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China published the general tasks for the period of transition to socialism. After studying the general tasks, the socialist consciousness of members of the local Party

branch was raised. The advantages of getting the peasants organized in the past two years came under review. Comrades were brought to realize that a small-peasant economy was no good and that the road of capitalist exploitation was a blind alley. This was done by asking them to recall what the past was like and compare it with the present, and speak out the bitterness of life in the past. It was made clear that the task of the Party branch was to lead the peasants to set up co-operatives. The Party secretary made a self-criticism of his past mistake in buying and selling draught animals for his own profit and in carrying out exploitation in the mutual-aid teams.

As a result of the popularization of the general tasks there was a new atmosphere in the rural areas, the atmosphere of socialism. On the initiative of seven Party members two co-ops were established embracing 181 peasant households, and 353 households joined mutual-aid teams. The poor peasants and the lower middle peasants felt enormously happy about this and said: "We poor people know which way to go now." But the well-to-do peasants hesitated, and the landlords, rich peasants and counter-revolutionaries resorted to acts of sabotage. The Party branch realized clearly that if the two co-ops were run successfully many other people would follow suit to set up more co-ops. If they failed, that would give the bad elements an excuse for opposing socialist transformation. The Party branch was determined to make the two co-ops a success.

In the course of the popularization of the general tasks, nine peasants were admitted into the Party, bringing the total number of Party members to 18 in the whole township. Fourteen of these Party members had joined the co-ops. After each of the two co-ops had set up a Party sub-branch, with the secretary and three officers of the township Party branch directly leading them, work began energetically.

The first thing was to concentrate upon running the productive work well. It was true that when the co-ops were first

set up, the members' feelings varied. While the poor peasants were in high spirits, the middle peasants wavered. But they had a common desire to make a first-rate job of their productive work. In the spring, the Party branch led the members to build and repair such irrigation works as dikes and ditches and to accumulate manure. The Chipu Co-op, for instance, accumulated enough manure for 267 *mou* of land, several times more than before the co-ops were formed. An average member in a co-op could accumulate enough manure for 1.7 *mou*, while a man working in a mutual-aid team could only accumulate enough manure for 0.6 *mou*. This fact fortified the members' confidence and stunned the middle peasants outside the co-op. In early summer, the Party branch urged the members to complete successfully the harvesting and sowing for the season and improve their farming technique. It also led them to overcome the greatest flood in a hundred years, and made a good autumn harvest possible.

Field work was done chaotically in spring; the members scrambled for work to do like a hive of bees, while the cadres themselves were too busy to give directions, and consequently all were dissatisfied with this state of affairs. The system of short-term responsibility for work was introduced during summer harvesting and sowing, but because the group leaders didn't know how to allocate manpower, chaos, though on a smaller scale, still prevailed and labour efficiency remained low. The chaos was removed in autumn when a plan for short-term field work was drawn up by the production groups which were again subdivided according to the nature of the jobs to be done. It was after a long period of trial and error, coupled with an arduous ideological struggle, that good order in productive work was brought about. The poor peasants and the lower middle peasants on the one hand and the well-to-do middle peasants on the other, for instance, had reacted quite differently to the system of fixed responsibility for a specified job. The former gave positive support to it, while the latter were loud in crying that the work was too heavy

and that they couldn't stand it. It was only when the well-to-do middle peasants were brought to realize that labour was glorious and increased yield was impossible without hard work that an agreement in viewpoint was reached.

During the past year the policy of mutual benefit was examined from time to time in order to strengthen the unity between the poor and middle peasants. Opinions differed greatly in the matter of buying the members' animals and farm tools. The animals were paid 10 per cent less than the market price and this caused general dissatisfaction among the owners. Junks were pooled in the co-ops, but their owners were reluctant to allow them to be used without their tacit approval. They reasoned in this way: "When the co-op is no more and our junks have already been ruined, what shall we do then?" In assessing the yield of land, the grading of the land was fixed too wide apart. In many cases, the land holdings of the poor peasants were unfairly classified as grade 4 and the yields on their land underestimated, bringing in its trail a low dividend on the plots in question when the harvest came. As a result, more than ten households did not get enough grain to pay the agricultural tax. The poor peasants couldn't afford to contribute to the share fund, while the middle peasants, not wanting to, proposed that when a member contributed manure as share it should be spread on his own land. So the poor and middle peasants couldn't get along well. The poor peasants were dissatisfied, accusing the upper middle peasants of selfishness. The upper middle peasants, on the other hand, complained that the poor peasants profited at their expense. Time came for making advanced payment of income to the members, and the Party branch took the opportunity to educate them on the importance of relying upon the poor peasants and uniting with the middle peasants, which was the Party's class line in the rural areas. It took great pains to explain to them why co-operation would benefit all and estrangement would bring loss to everyone. It criticized some middle peasants for their discrimination against the poor peasants, and

some poor peasants for harbouring the idea of sponging on the middle peasants. After consultation it was decided to pay an additional sum of money to the owners of animals who had already sold them to the co-ops and certain adjustment was also made on the price paid for the members' junks. Land which had been rated as grade 4 was changed to grade 3. The Party branch urged the members to contribute to the share fund and made uniform arrangement whereby manure was to be spread according to the conditions of land. The poor and middle peasants hung together since then.

The rich peasants were dealt a telling blow for their wrecking activities. During the past year rich peasants outside the co-ops made frenzied attacks on the co-ops. When the members were busy accumulating manure they fanned the discontent of the middle peasants who had joined by saying: "Joining a co-op may be a good thing, but the work is too heavy and nobody can stand it." Seeing that the low-lying land of the co-ops was flooded, while the high land was not, these rich peasants took advantage of this situation to incite work groups No. 1 and No. 6 which had more high land to break with groups No. 7, No. 8 and No. 9 which had less. They said: "Look, once in a co-op, other people's bad luck will soon bring you down, too." And they did this just at the time when the co-ops were deep in the work of preventing flood and draining the water-logged land. At the busy farming season they baited the mutual-aid team members with higher wages to work for them, and because of this one of these teams broke up. They also made attempts to break up the co-ops. In autumn, when the co-ops sold grain to the state in accordance with government decrees, they hurriedly reaped their crops and stored them away in an attempt to cheat the government about their yield. They said to the co-op members: "There's no freedom in a co-op, but working independently you can eat as much as you like." Seeing that every single act of sabotage committed by the rich peasants produced a bad effect on certain

co-op members, particularly the upper middle peasants, the Party branch lost no time to educate the co-op members, exposed the rich peasants' wrecking activities before the people and sternly took those to task who had been found engaging in unlawful practices. Two rich peasants who had wormed themselves into a mutual-aid team were expelled. All this dealt a telling blow to the rich peasants, while serving to sharpen the vigilance of the co-op members. Some upper middle peasants said: "We know now that a rich peasant is not of the same mind with us. We must keep a sharp lookout whenever he opens his mouth."

The two co-ops were consolidated after difficulties, as mentioned above, were tackled and overcome. The yield for the whole year was 10 per cent higher than the neighbouring mutual-aid teams. The members said in high spirits: "After joining the co-ops, our life has become better and better. The land reform made the peasants able to hold up their heads; co-ops do more than that, they make the land yield more as well." The poor peasants and lower middle peasants who had not joined were so impressed by what the co-ops could do that they applied for membership one after another. Those upper middle peasants who had been passive and wavering also changed their minds and asked to join. Shih Hui, an upper middle peasant, who had secretly been competing with the Tungfang Co-op for a year, got a smaller yield at a much higher cost. In the end he was compelled to say: "I accept defeat. Now I want to join the co-op."

PHENOMENAL EXPANSION

In the autumn of 1954, 53 mutual-aid teams wrote to the Party branch, expressing their desire to set up co-ops. More than 400 households applied for membership in the co-ops. Thus a high tide in the co-operative movement emerged.

Most of the Party members were prepared to lead the peasants in forming co-ops, but as the job was altogether new to

them they didn't know how to get it done. They said: "Let's wait until the district and township functionaries come and give a lead." Certain members were still wavering, saying: "We don't want to join this year, we'll wait until next year when we'll have something more to fall back on." The Party branch realized clearly that it was impossible to lead the co-operative movement unless Party members had reached a unanimous opinion on this matter. So it called three meetings of members on the branch committee and two general meetings of all members to study the decisions on agricultural co-operation adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Co-op functionaries, moreover, reported on the experience of running co-ops in the past year. Through the discussions everyone came to a better understanding, and those who were unwilling to join made self-criticism for their muddle-headedness; those who didn't know how to run co-ops gained more confidence. A consensus of opinion having been obtained, the Party branch proceeded to take stock of the situation in the township. On the basis of the desire of the peasants, the condition of key personnel and the foundation of mutual aid in the locality, it drew up a plan for setting up more co-ops. The plan visualized the establishment of ten new co-ops before the autumn harvest and the expansion of the existing co-ops wherever necessary. Over 60 per cent of the peasant households in the township were expected to join. The rest would be organized into 15 mutual-aid teams to be led by the co-ops. Seventy-seven key personnel in running co-ops were chosen from those mutual-aid teams which were to be turned into the ten co-ops under consideration; 52 of them were poor peasants. They received training through a delegate meeting of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. The preparatory work for the formation of co-ops was thus completed so far as the organizational side of the question was concerned. This was followed up by carrying out propaganda and education among the masses of

peasants, and as a result, more and more peasants applied to join.

At the time, the great majority of the peasants were in real earnest to join. But there were also peasants who, in spite of their desire to join, had many misgivings because they were not quite clear about such matters as the assessment of the yield of land to be pooled in the co-ops, the dividends on land and payment for work, the bringing in of draught animals, farm tools and manure as investment. These people were mostly middle peasants. There were also those who had no love for co-ops although they had applied for membership. In face of this situation, the Party branch called a delegate meeting of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives, a meeting of young members and a women's meeting to publicize the principles and policy of agricultural co-operation and the actual steps to be taken. The increased yield of the two existing co-ops was held up to show the superiority of co-ops. Their functionaries explained at length the measures they had taken to deal with the various questions concerned, so that the Party policy on farming co-operation became clear to all. At the same time, villages in the township sent deputations as well as individuals to visit the existing co-ops. They had a good look at their land, animals and junks. (Some people were worried that co-ops could not take good care of the animals or repair the junks.) They also interviewed different sorts of people in the co-ops: the old middle peasants, the households which had many persons but little land, the orphaned and widowed, etc., so that they were enabled to understand how their income went up after they'd joined. That helped the peasants to rid themselves of their anxieties and stimulate their enthusiasm to join.

The plan drawn up by the Party branch was discussed by the delegate meeting of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. Decisions were reached as to which mutual-aid teams were to set up co-ops, who were going to join and who were not qualified to, and who, because they were unwilling to join,

would not be enrolled for the time being. Then the key personnel who were to run the co-ops and the active elements set out to talk with the peasants, making it clear that all those enrolled should do so voluntarily. It took just a month to set up ten new co-ops; 68 per cent of the total peasant households in the township had joined.

THE CO-OPS WERE GIVEN A CHECK-OVER

With the formation of the ten new co-ops, the Party branch had to assume a much heavier responsibility than before. At the outset, every co-op asked the township functionaries to help solve its difficulties. So many questions claimed their attention at the same time that they could hardly tend to one without overlooking the other. The functionaries and members of the new co-ops did not have any experience in collective productive work and it would take some time to adopt the successful measures which had been used by the existing co-ops. They didn't know how to draw up production plans, and the system of fixed responsibility for a specified job did not work with them. Jobs were assigned on the spot every day, and not a night passed without seeing them busy calculating work-points. When a job was on hand, no matter whether it was big or small, the whole brigade went at it. The members were after quantity and speed, paying no heed to quality at all. Almost without exception, the book-keeping was in a mess. Wastage was appalling. In less than a month the Chipu Co-op used 30 catties of paraffin.

The Party branch made a study of these problems and came to the conclusion that this deplorable state of affairs, if not set right, would lead to trouble. So it was decided that the Party branch should strengthen its leadership over the co-ops.

The Party branch, first and foremost, formulated definite demands as regards winter production, leading the members to improve irrigation facilities and accumulating manure. The purpose was to make preparations for the whole year's pro-

ductive work and to keep every member occupied. All co-ops drew up production plans concerning farm work as well as the use of the land and labour power, organized work teams, divided the land for the cultivation of various crops and put into effect the short-term system of responsibility. Current production was getting on the right track. The Party branch also drew up a plan for increased yield covering the whole year, and urged the peasants to carry out the production plan for each farming season.

In checking over the co-ops, the Party branch introduced a system whereby every Party member was given a specified duty to perform. In addition to regularly calling meetings of its committee to discuss work, it divided the co-ops in the township into two major units. The Party secretary and the township head took the helm of one key co-op, while giving guidance to five new co-ops. The Party committee member in charge of mutual aid and co-operation and the one in charge of financial affairs led another key co-op, giving guidance to the other five. Other committee members and the township functionaries went back to the co-ops to which they belonged to lead production. Every production brigade was put in the charge of a functionary or a Party member. The experience any brigade gained would be extended to the whole co-op. The Party branch used the co-op chairmen's meeting to exchange experience in good time. The meeting was presided over by the Party secretary and also attended by leaders of the mutual-aid teams. At every meeting one or two questions were solved. First, the two key co-ops, that is, the two old co-ops, reported on their own experience, and discussion of it was held in the light of the conditions of the various new co-ops. Decisions would not be made until everything was clarified, and only then the various co-ops were required to carry them out. If there was any snag in the course of their execution, they could go to the key co-ops for further exchange of views. How to prevent the rich peasants from engaging in

concealed wrecking activities also formed an important subject of discussion at such a meeting. A number of rich peasants had secretly curried favour with the functionaries. At the co-op chairmen's meeting a warning was sounded to keep a sharp lookout so that the rich peasants would not have the slightest chance to make trouble. In addition to the chairmen's meeting, there were a committee for directing farming technique, a committee on financial affairs and a committee on propaganda (the last mentioned later failed to function properly). At the time of spring sowing, the question of raising yield was discussed at the chairmen's meeting, and then the committee for directing farming technique met to discuss the concrete steps to be taken to increase the output.

During the busy farming seasons the Party branch organized emulation drives between co-ops, between production brigades, and between the members. In the course of the emulation drives, visits to co-ops were organized, and work done was examined in good time. Work was summed up and assessed regularly to educate the members in collectivism. In 1954 the Party branch summed up the over-all work of the co-ops as many as four times. Each time a comparison was made between the achievements now made and what was achieved in the past; a comparison was also made with those who stood outside the co-ops. This enabled the members to realize more clearly the advantages of getting organized and so gave them a vivid socialist education. On the basis of the members' better political understanding, they were encouraged to criticize themselves for their selfishness, conservative way of thinking and the idea of pulling out to work independently again. This helped a great deal to fortify the members' confidence in running co-ops. Co-op member Shen Feng-liang, who was a well-to-do middle peasant, confessed: "I changed my mind three times in a year. The first time was after the rice seedlings were transplanted; the second, when the plants began to bear ears, and the third, just before the autumn

harvest. Every time I went to my own field and saw the plants growing stout and beautiful, I began to worry whether I'd get less from the co-op than when I worked on my own." The regular summing-up of work helped to set the members' anxieties at rest and inspired them with greater determination to take the socialist road.

As the result of a year's hard work and the check-over given from time to time, the two old co-ops made further progress and the ten new ones were consolidated.

THE WHOLE TOWNSHIP MARCHED TOWARDS CO-OPERATION

Before the autumn of 1955 there were still 148 households which had not yet joined co-ops. The situation was complicated by the fact that the great majority of them were upper middle peasants. In Tanghsiang Village, 27 out of the 29 households which remained outside were upper middle peasants. In Chuhsiang Village nine out of the 11 households which were not co-op members were upper middle peasants. There were also those who engaged in other occupations besides cultivating land. Few key personnel could be found among these peasant households to run co-ops. However, seeing what co-ops could do, all of those who stood outside changed their attitudes. Even the well-to-do middle peasants acknowledged their defeat in production. The members of a mutual-aid team in Peishuanghsiang Village who were middle peasants paid a visit to the co-ops' fields and commented afterwards: "It cost us much more than the co-ops, but their crops are much better. We've stronger men working, but their yield is higher." Chang Lao-tai, a well-to-do middle peasant who had been full of doubts about co-ops, went to the Tanghsiang Village three times to apply for membership in the co-op. Shih Hui-sheng, also a well-to-do middle peasant who had enrolled twice but changed his mind each time, went to

the township government a dozen times or so in the autumn of 1955 to apply for readmittance, pledging that he would never change his mind again. The members of a mutual-aid team in Hengtang Village dismissed their team leader Yao Hui-yuan, a well-to-do middle peasant, for his singular selfishness. They said: "A man of his kind is not fit to be a future co-op functionary."

Taking account of the general opinion of the mutual-aid teams and the condition of functionaries, the Party branch decided that the main task in 1955 was to expand the existing co-ops, while the establishment of new ones was of secondary importance. In the light of the geographical distribution of the mutual-aid teams, the condition of the key personnel and the ratio of the peasant households of different sections, it drafted a plan providing that, with the exception of the 19 households in Hsingkang Village (including ten poor peasants, four lower middle peasants, five upper middle peasants plus six active elements) which would be organized into a new co-op, others in the whole township who applied to join would be persuaded to join the 12 old co-ops. After the plan was adopted the delegate meeting of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives and the general meeting of members were held to give the members an education on this matter. And the key personnel and active elements set out to canvass the peasants one by one whenever necessary. As a result, 134 households applied for membership. By now, all peasant households in the township have joined the co-ops, except 16 landlord households, 36 rich-peasant households, and eight households of dependents of counter-revolutionaries and of bad elements, two well-to-do middle-peasant households, three households which had been the owners of oil-pressing workshops and a loafer.

To meet the new situation the Party branch set up four sub-branches according to the locality of the co-ops. The Youth League and women's organization also set up their branches. The 13 co-ops in the township were divided into four units and an equal number of joint management committees were set up. The joint committees were to be under the guidance of the Party sub-branch. With the setting up of these organizations, a foundation was laid for merging the small co-ops into large ones and for establishing an advanced, fully socialist co-op.

A MODEL OF CO-OPERATION

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This experience should be publicized everywhere. All townships which have completed land reform, set up Party branches and have a number of mutual-aid teams can, in a relatively sound manner and without making too many mistakes, reach the stage of semi-socialist co-operation in a year or two—and increase production to the bargain—provided they follow the same line as Tengchia Township, Chekiang.

Many comrades think it is very difficult to organize co-ops. They say we are sure to make many blunders. And so they hold back, afraid to push co-operation. This is only because they have swerved from the line taken by the leaders of Tengchia.

This line—of going deeply into problems of one place, then applying the experience gained there in all other places—this is the same line followed in District Ten, Tsunhua County, Hopei, and in Chenghsi Township, Fengyang County, Anhwei. It is none other than the famous Marxist-Leninist line which our Party has long adhered to and which has proved so effective in all its work among the people.

— EDITOR

Tengchia Township, Shouchang County, Chekiang Province, was chosen by the Shouchang County Committee of the Communist Party as a "key township" to try out things and set

the pace in co-operation for the mountain areas. It has 420 households with 1,811 people living in three villages. Ninety per cent of its area, or 17,098 *mou*, is mountainous, seven per cent of its area, or 1,323 *mou*, is arable and the remaining three per cent is waste land.

In the spring of 1954, an agricultural and forestry co-operative and 24 mutual-aid teams were organized on an experimental basis. The co-op was named "Kuangming" (Bright Light). The leading officials here were quite clear about what had to be done and were fully conversant with local conditions, so they were able to give effective support to the Kuangming Co-operative and help it increase its output and income. As a result there was a rapid growth of co-operatives throughout the township and its production quickly increased. Now there are four agricultural and forestry co-operatives with 184 households, or 52 per cent of the total households that should be organized in the township, and eight mutual-aid teams with 109 households, or 31 per cent of the total households.

We can sum up the experience of this township in successfully promoting the co-operative movement and in increasing production under the following heads:

1) The "key co-operative" should be made use of to give a lead to mutual-aid teams and individual peasants on how to do their work, and to help them overcome difficulties. The leading officials in the township should make regular arrangements for the key co-operative to give what help it can on its own initiative to the peasants in its neighbourhood in solving production difficulties and also to help the mutual-aid teams work out short-term production plans and improve their farming technique.

Here are some examples:

In 1954, the Teng Kang-yao mutual-aid team was short of draught animals for the spring ploughing. The Kuangming Co-operative came to its aid by renting it a newly bought buffalo.

Teng Teh-kun, a member of the Hua Tung-kou mutual-aid team, fell sick just when his rice was ready for harvesting. His team mates were so busy reaping their own crops that they had no time to look after his. He was worried and his health took a turn for the worse. As soon as the Kuangming Co-op heard about this, it sent five co-op members who reaped Teng's entire crop for him in a single day.

Hsiung Tien-sheng, an individual peasant, couldn't get on with his sowing because he had neither draught animals nor implements. It was the Kuangming Co-op that helped him sow his fields.

All this made a very good impression on the people. And this wasn't all. During the busy seasons, the members of the mutual-aid teams rushed off to work without making sure what was the best way of arranging the various jobs that had to be done. The Kuangming Co-op gave them a hand by sending them some of its experienced members. In the spring of 1954, the Teng Chu-shui mutual-aid team had many jobs to do all about the same time — planting maize, cultivating the fields, transplanting rice seedlings, picking and processing tea. Everybody rushed to work eagerly but didn't know how to go about things. The co-op sent Wang Teng-kao, an active member, to discuss things with the team and they succeeded in drawing up a schedule of work that put the things in order of importance. They decided first to plant maize on the higher slopes of the mountain facing north and then on the lower slopes facing south. They apportioned the work properly between men and women members and arranged a sensible division of labour. Order was brought out of chaos. In the meantime the co-op took the initiative in inviting the most active members of the mutual-aid team to come to the co-op to get experience in working out short-term production plan and in managing production activities. Hsu Chi-lin, the assistant team leader, came back to the team after studying the co-op's methods and worked out a 15-day plan for the team. This got

the enthusiastic backing of the rest of the team and it was fulfilled in 13 days.

In 1954, when the time came to plant maize, the mutual-aid team found that it had no one who knew how to grow seedlings and transplant them. The co-op laid out a sample plot in good time and also sent several officers to help and guide the team. In this way close contacts were established between the co-op and the other peasants, and the prestige of the co-op went up. Peasants who had not previously paid much attention to it, now began to do so. Mutual-aid teams which had refused to admit the advantages of the co-op were now convinced of them. They themselves now rallied round the co-op to learn from it and went to visit it. Its productive and other activities became the standard for comparing those of neighbouring mutual-aid teams and individual peasants.

2) The peasants should be taken round to inspect the fields of the key co-op which should pass on to them its experience in production and co-operation in general.

Mutual-aid teams and individual peasants were taken regularly to inspect the key co-op's work and activities. The advantages of collective production were systematically publicized and the influence of the co-op grew among the mass of peasants. As they inspected the co-op, they compared its work with that of the mutual-aid teams and individual peasants, and tried to make out why the co-op was more productive. Take the growing of young rice seedlings for instance. Those grown by the co-op were larger and greener than those grown by the mutual-aid teams and individual peasants. The leading officers explained why. It was because the co-op, by burning the stubble which covered the field, wiped out insect pests, and increased the soil's fertility. The peasants also compared results as they looked over the maize crops growing on the mountains and learned that the reason why the co-op had grown better maize crops than its neighbours was that it had sown the seed with drills instead of broadcasting. The new method allowed the maize plants to grow up with even

space between them, giving them plenty of air and sunshine, and with deeper roots which made them more resistant to gales and drought. As a result of these inspection tours, the peasants came to understand the advantages which the co-op enjoyed as a result of collective production. They saw that the co-op was able to do things that mutual-aid teams and individual peasants were incapable of. Many examples proved this. The Hua Tung-kou mutual-aid team, one of the key teams, decided to catch up with the co-op in introducing new farming technique. When the co-op adopted better methods, for instance, of weeding and cultivating the plots where rice seedlings were grown, the team tried to follow suit. But as the team worked fundamentally on an individual basis, it could not keep to a well-knit plan of work. Some members did not want to do much weeding as they were afraid it would increase labour costs. So the team failed in its competition with the co-op. The mutual-aid teams also tried to adopt the method of sowing maize seed with drills, but failed because they could not organize all the labour power of their teams according to a single, centralized plan. Experience convinced the peasants that only by organizing co-operatives could they raise output and improve farming technique.

After the autumn harvest, eleven mutual-aid teams in the township which had come under the influence of the key co-operative and got help and encouragement from it decided to turn themselves into co-operatives.

In order to pass on the benefits of the experience of the Kuangming Co-operative, joint committee meetings of the co-ops and mutual-aid teams were held where the most active peasants could hear how the co-op was organized and put under good leadership. At first, the co-op introduced what the members were thinking and what their motives were when they joined the co-op; how political and explanatory work was organized to help them overcome their misgivings; how the preparatory committee of the co-op was set up and how agricultural and forestry work was planned. Later, the co-op

passed on its experience in dealing with trees pooled by members, in organizing the management committee, in working out the co-op's short-term production plan and in organizing production teams and groups, etc. Such information was extremely valuable to the peasants and helped the co-operative movement in the township make steady progress.

3) With the key co-op as its centre, production emulation drives should be promoted among the peasants so as to improve agriculture and forestry.

The increase in the number of agricultural and forestry co-operatives greatly heightened the enthusiasm of the peasants in their work. The leading officials, taking the Kuangming Co-op as the key unit, took a further step in putting forward a plan to expand afforestation and other work during the winter season. At a meeting of representatives of mutual-aid teams and co-ops, the Kuangming Co-op challenged others to join it in a friendly production competition. The challenges were taken up by the three newly organized co-operatives and all the mutual-aid teams in the township, and a friendly competition was started during the winter season.

In December 1954, the Kuangming Co-operative announced that it had enlarged the area sown to spring crops by 49 *mou*, an increase of 22.5 per cent over the winter 1953 figure of 218 *mou*; it planted 56,500 trees, or 54.3 per cent of the number of trees planted in the township and 1,170 catties of tea-oil seedlings; it restored 25 *mou* of tea gardens and sowed tea-oil trees on 160 *mou*; it dug four ponds and built three dams, spending over 700 work-days on them. For this outstanding record, the Kuangming Co-op was elected the model co-operative of the township.

The Chiaoting Co-op carried out co-op policy pretty well, keeping up production while organizing the co-operative. The Hsiatsewu Co-op also had a good record; its members proved themselves hard workers. Both were elected model co-ops. At the same time, three model mutual-aid teams, seven town-

ship model peasants and 24 village model peasants were elected.

This winter production campaign launched throughout the township on the basis of mutual aid and co-operation was a success. The areas sown to barley and rape-seed were 75 per cent larger and five per cent larger respectively than in 1953; 103,950 timber trees, 69,408 tea-oil trees, 8,617 palm trees and 11,925 cypress trees were planted; 820 *mou* of tea-oil plants and 200 *mou* of tea gardens were restored; two thousand catties of tea-oil seedlings were planted.

DILIGENT AND FRUGAL CO-OP OPERATION

(By Wang Lin, reporter on the *Hopei Daily*, May 4, 1955)

The co-op introduced here is the so-called "Paupers' Co-op," led by Wang Kuo-fan. Diligent and frugal operation ought to be the policy of all our agricultural co-operatives — of all our enterprises, in fact. Factories, stores, state-owned and co-operative enterprises, all other enterprises — each should be run in keeping with the policy of diligence and frugality. This is a policy of economy, one of the basic policies of socialist economics.

China is a big country, but it is still very poor. We shall need a few score years before we can make China prosperous. Even then we still will have to be diligent and frugal. But it is in the coming few decades, during the present series of five-year plans, that we must particularly advocate diligence and frugality, that we must pay special attention to economy.

Many co-ops forget the need for economy. This is bad, and should be corrected quickly. Co-ops which are run diligently and frugally can be found in every province, in every county. These should be publicized as examples for all to follow. Co-ops which are diligent and frugal, get high yields and are generally well-run, should be given awards. Those which are wasteful, get very low yields and are generally poorly-run, should be criticized. — EDITOR

In the short space of three years the members of the Chienming Agricultural, Forestry and Livestock-Breeding Co-operative in Szeshihlipu in Tsunhua County, Hopei Province, have grown rich. Once they were as poor as could be. This happened because of the successful running of their co-operative.

The village, which has 154 households, is tucked away in a cluster of trees on the northern slope of Mount Changyu.

Before 1952, every year the government had to distribute over 50,000 catties of grain for relief and well over 100 suits of winter clothes there; and in spite of this aid four households still had a very difficult time. Now these households are living much better than before. Those who once had no place of their own have now built houses, and the houses which were tumbling down have been made as new. Wang Yung used to have only one quilt for his family of seven. Over the past two years the family has bought a new print-covered quilt for every member. Now, too, they have a new house with three rooms. Pointing it out proudly Mrs. Wang said: "When I'd been in the co-op a year I bought a quilt. When I'd been in two, I moved into a new house. If we hadn't joined the co-op, we couldn't have afforded to put up even a shed." These are facts which anyone can see for himself.

How did this poor co-op become rich? Why was there a constant rise in the income of its members? And why had they stuck to it as they had?

BUILT FROM SCRATCH

After the autumn harvest of 1952, the Party Committee of District Ten, Tsunhua County, asked the Party branches to get the peasants to go in for co-operative farming. Wang Kuo-fan and Tu Kuei, members of the Party branch, started canvassing the peasants to form a co-operative. Twenty-three households, the poorest people in the village, joined the co-op

enthusiastically. The co-op had 230 *mou* of land but no carts or farm tools. It had no draught animals except a three-quarter share in the ownership of a donkey! Middle peasants often made cynical remarks like: "What price the 'key personnel'? Used to get winter clothes from the government every year, and now they're forming a co-op!" The peasants in the village usually cart manure to the fields in winter. This co-op had no animals or carts to do the job. In face of these difficulties some members hung back. "When I was in the mutual-aid team," said Wang Yung, "they had four donkeys and an ox. Without a single beast the co-op can't do a thing," adding that he'd made up his mind to leave the co-op after the 1953 autumn harvest. Shao Ching-chang, Tu Chun and some other members proposed to borrow from the government to buy animals and carts. "The government helped us out even before we'd joined the co-op," said Wen Chih-li. "Now we have one, the government should give us more help." The five Party members in the co-op, including Wang Kuo-fan, the chairman, and Tu Kuei, the vice-chairman, guided by the Party branch, took stock of the situation. Wang Kuo-fan's view was that a co-op ought first to make best use of the collective energies of the members to overcome difficulties, ensure increased yields and raise members' earnings. To borrow from the government before there was something to fall back on would cut down the members' earnings later on. He proposed that the members should go to the hills to cut wood and use the money thus obtained to buy carts, animals and tools. A meeting of Party members was called to discuss the problem. Addressing the meeting Wang Kuo-fan said: "You know what the Party says: only labour creates happiness. If we're not scared of a bit of hard work, we'll overcome all our troubles. If we put our backs into it, carts and horses are ours. We can get them from the hills. . . ." Those who had pleaded for a loan changed their minds. The chairman's way was obviously the right one. There were nineteen males in the co-op, and they swore they'd use their nineteen pairs of hands

to build from scratch. So the Party members divided their work. Tu Kuei, the vice-chairman, took the 17 men and lads to Wangszeyu, about ten miles inside the next county (Chienhsi County), to cut wood. The chairman and Wu Hsiu-ying, a woman member of the Party, stayed at home and got the village women busy collecting manure, clearing stones off the fields and seeing to the irrigation ditches. Three weeks later back came the wood-cutters with 40,000 catties of timber. That sold for 430 yuan. The co-op now had some money.

It was getting on for the lunar New Year, and some short-sighted members were all for sharing out the money so that they could all have a jolly holiday. Wang Kuo-fan was against it. If they spent the money on New Year, he said, in a few days there'd be nothing to show for it. Holidays came and went, but they had one worry all the time: how to produce enough to live on. That was something they ought to bear in mind. The members talked it over at great length, and came to realize that they must lay something by for a rainy day. It was daft to play ducks and drakes with all you had. In the end they used the money to buy a cart with iron-bound wheels, an ox, a mule, nineteen sheep, and an assortment of small tools.

Of course that didn't end their difficulties. They now had sheep without folds, a cart without harness, and animals without fodder. Besides, they had two households whose food had run right out. So all the members of the co-op were asked to take out another share so that it could put up a sheep-fold. Every man contributed two large nails, two sticks and two bundles of straw. For the rest, there were plenty of stones in the river bed, and work started right away. When the sheep-fold was finished nine of the men went off to the hills for timber again. It was spring-sowing time, so the other ten stayed at home, and they and the women carted manure to the fields and prepared the land. Three weeks later they'd finished, and the wood-cutters were back too. The timber they'd cut sold for 210 yuan. That meant fodder for the animals and

food for those who'd run short, and the co-op also bought another mule and eleven sheep. Besides this, they bought some equipment and started to run a beancurd workshop.

But you can't wipe out all the effects of long years of hard times at one stroke. When spring sowing began the seed grain wasn't to hand, and over half the members had reached the end of their food stocks. Things looked bad, and some members began to toy with the idea of borrowing again. "If there's no other way out," said Wang Feng-teh, "there's nothing we can do but ask the government for a loan." So the officials called a members' meeting to discuss if there really was nothing else they could do about it. Several people were against falling back on the government instead of finding a solution to their problems themselves. As they rightly said, everything is difficult at the start, but if members gave their minds to it there were probably more ways than one to extricate themselves from their troubles. The discussion went on and on. Tu Kuei and Liang Chin-tien, two Party members, offered to lend grain they didn't need themselves to those who had none, and this set the other members an example of helping one another when they were in difficulties over food. Then members pooled their stocks of seed sweet potatoes and planted out more than twenty plots. Some contributed seed grain they'd kept for their own use, and others borrowed seed from relatives and friends. Spring sowing was finished and the immediate difficulties were tided over. They got more than 500 yuan for the seed sweet potatoes they didn't need themselves. That was a great help to all the members whose food stocks ran short during the summer hoeing.

ANOTHER PUSH

But just before autumn harvest they ran into even worse trouble. While they were waiting for the grain to ripen the food supply of all the members began to run short. Everybody was very depressed. Wang Yung was sorry he'd joined.

"Before I joined the co-op," he said, "my son worked as a farm labourer. He only earned a picul of grain a year, but he didn't have to eat at home. Now he works in the co-op, he earns nothing, and we've got to feed him." One of the members, hoeing his field, piled the scattered stones on the edge of Wang's land. Wang stopped him doing so, saying, "You let it alone, or there'll be trouble. Besides, who knows? I may not be in the co-op after harvest."

Some members proposed that they should eat the crops before they were ripe. The management committee did everything it could to spur the members on to one last push before harvest. It would be the greatest pity to ruin the harvest when it was practically ready. "Pull your belts a wee bit tighter now and we'll have all the more grain in the autumn." It organized teams of members to cut grass and sell the hay to buy grain. But the hay went cheap, and the little money it brought in didn't buy enough to feed so many mouths. Chairman Wang and his family went without food for two days so that other members might have something. When Chao Yung-hsing, secretary of the Party Committee of District Ten of Tsunhua County, asked him about the co-op's troubles, he replied, "My family won't mind missing a couple of meals if the co-op can stand on its own and nobody's ever hungry again." The secretary of the district Party committee kept on telling the members that they could borrow some money to tide them over the food shortage, and that they should turn the grass they cut into compost to save having to buy fertilizer at spring sowing. Finally they borrowed 50 yuan to buy grain.

When autumn came the co-op reaped a large harvest, and the members earned 60 per cent more in real wages than when they had working on their own. They managed to accumulate 2,400 yuan worth of common property, which augured well for increased yields in the future and made the members far happier about the way things were going. Wang Yung, the one who had stopped other people piling stones on

the edge of his land and who had said he wanted to withdraw from the co-op after the autumn harvest, owned 11 *mou*. He had a family of seven, three of them working. When he was in the mutual-aid team in 1952 he harvested only six piculs of grain. The first year he joined the co-op he got 41 piculs. Off he went to see the chairman and a member of the management committee and said, "Let's knock down that line of boundary stones at once. It cuts down the land by a furrow or two, and makes ploughing difficult as well." To which the chairman replied, "You let it alone or there'll be trouble." Wang saw that his leg was being pulled, blushed and said, "I've made up my mind this time. I'll stay in the co-op as long as I live."

A year after it was formed the co-op had settled most of the thousand and one difficulties it was up against, and productive work was going well. But the members didn't crow or show off before the middle peasants who'd stayed outside the co-op because they were doubtful if it could hold its own. On the contrary, they did all they could to help them and establish closer relations. During the late summer and early autumn it poured continuously for days on end. On the seven *mou* belonging to Tu Fang, one of the middle peasants, the weeds grew higher than the crops. Things were as bad with Wen Chih-chuan's three *mou* of sweet potatoes and Wen Yung-chuan's three *mou* of rice. They lost hope and swore there was nothing to do but count the crops a dead loss. Then, in the nick of time, members of the co-op volunteered to give a hand, and the crops were saved.

Another case was that of the middle peasant Wang Yueh. Three in his family worked 30 *mou* of land, and they had a donkey, three oxen and four pigs. In the spring Wang has boasted, "Let the co-op work their heads off. I bet it'll take them three years before their fields produce as much as mine." He had a strip of land that adjoined the co-op's, and quite deliberately planted it with the same crop — maize — as the co-op did. Summer came, and it was time for the second

muck-spreading. The co-op carted manure to their maize-fields, and because they had plenty of labour it was spread almost as soon as it arrived. Wang Yueh also carted manure to his field. It took him all day, and he had to leave it piled up on the edge of the field overnight. During the night it rained cats and dogs, and the whole of the manure was washed away. In the autumn the co-op's crops were splendid, while his. . . . That opened his eyes.

And not only his. It dawned on the middle peasants that the reason the poor ones were making such a fine job of their co-op was that they were all working together and pulling the same way. "If it hadn't been for those fellows with nothing but a shoulder-pole and an axe to work with," said Wang Feng-jen, "the co-op wouldn't have been started at all." People who had once thought that it didn't pay to have anything to do with the poor, now began to give the co-op a helping hand and to ask to join. Wang Kuan-chou and Tu Heng drove carts for the co-op during the day and chopped straw for the animals in the evening. Tung Fu's wife even gave a promise that she'd stop wagging her tongue and abusing the neighbours if they let her join the co-op! Another woman, whose application had been turned down, and who was always quarrelling with, and even threatening to divorce her husband, said: "Let me in, and I'll never quarrel with him again!" Anyhow, the membership of the co-op went up from 23 households to 83.

CUTTING COAT ACCORDING TO CLOTH

So they had their co-op with its economy in a much better state, and with the middle peasants inside it. Thus the members split into two schools of thought. Most of the older ones, of whom the chairman and vice-chairman were typical, took the view that the middle peasants had joined because they saw how the co-op had overcome difficulties and increased its income by hard work, and that although the co-op was cer-

tainly better off, it was still necessary to go on budgeting carefully and working hard. A few of the older members, however, and the middle peasants who'd recently joined, thought that the time had come for the co-op to blossom out a bit. The middle peasants — Tu Feng, Wang Hsiu-shen and others who'd joined — proposed that the co-op should buy their animals and carts to make it more presentable. Besides, they said, that would save their owners from "suffering losses," as they'd be able to use the co-op's animals and carts.

That was a new problem for the co-op. The two proposals were so diametrically opposed that obviously the right answer had to be found if the members were to go on getting bigger incomes, if the co-op was to continue to make progress. The Party branch got Party members and Youth Leaguers discussing the proposals and also canvassed the members for their opinions. One old member, Shao Ching-lin, said, "We must know where we are. There's no point in dolling up the co-op for appearance's sake. It's head and shoulders above those working on their own, but that's because we're organized, and have overcome difficulties and increased output. What's the point of putting on airs?" The other side of the picture was given by middle peasant Tu Chung, who said, "Say what you like, the co-op ought to buy the animals and tools. That'll set the owners' minds at rest."

Wang Kuo-fan, the co-op chairman, who was also a member of the village Party branch committee, summoned a meeting of the management committee to discuss the matter. They came to three conclusions: First, that the co-op simply hadn't the money to buy all the animals and tools at once; they'd be up to the eyes in debt if they did. Secondly, that some of the new members, particularly the middle peasants who'd recently joined, who had asked the co-op to buy the tools and animals, had done so because they thought it would save them trouble, not because they thought it would benefit the co-op. Thirdly, that the best course was for the beasts and tools to remain in

private hands for the time being, and that the co-op should pay the owners for their use.

The next thing was to convince the members that this decision was correct. That meant careful explanation of two points.

First, whether the co-op would gain or lose by buying animals at that stage. They worked it out this way. The new members owned 17 beasts. Suppose the co-op paid an average of 80 yuan for each, that would amount to 1,360 yuan. Then the beasts would have to be fed. Say each needed two catties of fodder and six catties of straw a day, then approximately 12,410 catties of fodder grain and 37,230 catties of straw would be needed a year. That would cost another 1,737 yuan. Then you couldn't keep all the beasts in one place, so you'd have to pay two men's wages to look after them. Assume that each worked 300 days a year and was paid 1.40 yuan a day, that meant another 840 yuan. So the outlay would be at least 3,937. On top of that you'd have to buy harness and gear, and even then you wouldn't have bought the tools from the members. It would mean running up a huge debt. It would take the yields of 500 *mou* to pay it off, which meant that however good the harvest was, the majority of the members would still go short. If the debt wasn't all paid at once the people who'd sold their beasts and tools to the co-op would moan. And anyhow, whether they paid off the debts all at once or by instalments, it would be a terrible setback for the co-op.

The second thing was to convince the owners of animals that they wouldn't lose if the beasts were privately kept and co-operatively used, the co-op paying for their use. The co-op needed animals all the year round to plough, cart earth and manure, and so on and so forth. Suppose the co-op paid 0.50 to 0.60 yuan a day for the use of an animal and used it 200 days a year, the owner would get 100-120 yuan. Besides, if the owners kept their own animals, they could use them at other times to husk rice, pay visits, for carrying, for hire.

Besides that, of course, there would be the manure. Almost everybody kept a pig or two, and between the pigs and the draught beasts they could count on fifteen cart-loads of manure a year, which, at 2.50 yuan a load, would bring in another 37.50 yuan a year. So those who owned and reared their own animals stood to make quite a bit out of them, and would certainly be better off.

These two calculations were so simple that everyone understood the pros and cons. Wen Chih-li, one of the members, said, "Running a co-op's not different from running a home. You only buy what you can afford. It won't matter if we don't buy the carts and horses till the co-op's earned enough to pay for them. It's no good biting off more than we can chew."

So the owners of the animals agreed to the proposal. But then fresh questions cropped up. For instance, suppose the animals were kept by the owners and used by the co-op, what would happen if both wanted to use them at the same time? When the co-op had the use of so many beasts, what guarantee was there that they'd be properly used? As some of the owners said, "People who use other people's property tend to be careless with it." Other members were worried about farm tools privately owned and co-operatively used. What would happen if they were damaged?

That led to more discussion, and it was made clear to members that the co-op would not only be using animals at spring sowing and autumn harvest, but would also embark on various forms of rural development, improving soil, etc., which peasants working on their own couldn't hope to do, so they needn't worry about the beasts not being used. Then, so that owners knew beforehand where they stood, it was decided that they themselves should work out how many days a year the co-op could use their animals and let the co-op know. They also took a decision that the co-op must always have animals to use when it needed them, and that if the owners and the co-op wanted to use them at the same time, the co-op should have

priority, so that production shouldn't be hampered, provided it didn't use them for more than the number of days a year agreed on with the owner. As regards the way animals were to be used and treated, it was made clear in discussion that though animals weren't being turned into common property, they were to be used to work the fields of all members of the co-op, and members would have to look after them just as well as they would any property owned by the co-op in common. The beasts would be allocated to the same production brigade as their owners, who would have to finish the jobs given them in the time set. In this way owners wouldn't have to worry about other people ill-treating their animals. Another decision was that if tools privately owned and in co-operative use were damaged, the co-op would be responsible for repairs. The solution of these problems helped the co-op to avoid the pitfall of ill-considered purchase of means of production, and thus ensured that the co-op could advance steadily.

EARN MORE AND SPEND LESS

After the problem of animals and farm tools was solved, members got into the habit of looking down on such jobs as chopping firewood and cutting grass, and took it into their heads to go in for such side-lines as carting goods and pressing oil, to bring in a bit more money. The co-op called the work brigade leaders together to talk it over and impressed on them the importance of running a co-op by frugality and hard work. There were two kinds of productive work the co-op could do and it had to choose between them. One was to spend a lot of money at the start with no guarantee of the outcome. The other was to increase income by hard work without any capital expenditure at all. When it was put to them in black and white like that, the members plumped for the second way. They gave up the idea of chasing big things and getting rich quick. All agreed that the motto had to be "slow but sure."

In the winter of 1953 they bought three oxen with the money they'd earned from cutting wood. They didn't ignore any possible source of extra income. At the start of the autumn harvest in 1954, when the state was asking everybody to make a first-rate job of the harvesting and threshing, they took a pledge to bring in every single grain. The chairman did a bit of figuring for the members. The co-op was growing 300 *mou* of peanuts. If, said he, they let slip only one pod in every cluster, the total loss would be something like 5,100 catties. It was a staggering figure, and it opened members' eyes. The men swore they wouldn't leave a single pod behind. The women vowed to do the reaping and threshing so carefully that the extra grain would bring in enough to buy a rubber-tyred cart.

Actually, they bought two mules and two rubber-tyred carts at a cost of 1,550 yuan, 200 yuan worth of fertilizer and 180 yuan worth of fodder in the autumn and early winter of 1954. This they did without borrowing a penny from the government. They'd raised the money by harvesting and threshing with special care, by chopping firewood, cutting grass and shelling peanuts for the supply and marketing co-operative. They also took particular care to keep down expenses. In the autumn of 1953 an arrangement was started whereby members kept their own farm tools and the co-op used them and was responsible for their repair. It soon turned out, however, that this arrangement was a big drain on the co-op's finances. Some members used tools carelessly, knowing that if they damaged them the co-op would pay. One member, for instance, ruined a hoe through sheer carelessness as soon as he started to use it. That cost the co-op four yuan. To plug this loophole the co-op adopted a "fixed expenditure on each item" system that had been started by the Wukung Township Agricultural Producers' Co-op in Yaoyung County. It was first tried out by four work brigades, and applied to repairs to small tools only. Each brigade was given 20 yuan a year. If that wasn't enough to cover all repairs, the brigade

had to raise the rest itself. If it was more, the members kept the surplus. The result was that no brigade used the whole amount. At first the system applied only to small tools, and there was still far too much damage to large ones: repairs to such tools in 1954 came to no less than 120 yuan. Nor did it apply to stationery: members helped themselves to paper, ink and paraffin from the accountant's office! So in the spring of 1955 they took a decision to apply the system to all tools. They also fixed expenditure for the accountant's office, for the shepherds and for the transport teams.

Before the system went into effect, the management committee made tentative suggestions and got the members of eight production brigades to discuss and, if necessary, amend them. The middle peasants who joined after the autumn harvest of 1954 weren't satisfied with the arrangement. They argued like this: every brigade cultivated 200 *mou* and used all sorts of farm tools. What use was 30 yuan a year to keep them all in repair? What they really ought to do was to buy new tools. The older members refused to agree. "Look," said one, "if your tools were good enough to use before you joined, why can't you use them now? We must make do with what we have. There's no need at all to buy new ones. It's not asking much to expect you to pay out a cent or so for every yuan the co-op itself spends, is it?" And another added, "Tools don't break just like that, not if you use them carefully. Thirty yuan is plenty if you've got a sense of responsibility."

A lively discussion ensued. It was generally agreed that the proposed system was a good one, and it was adopted and strictly enforced. That stopped the drain on the co-op's resources. As the chairman said, "Constant dripping wears away a stone. The co-op has just enough property to scrape through with. It doesn't look much, a penny here and a penny there, but it all amounts up and you end up with a big loss."

Yes, since it was formed in the autumn of 1952 the Chienming Agricultural, Forestry and Livestock-Breeding Co-operative has overcome many difficulties. People got to see the advantages of getting organized, and the peasants flocked in. Within three years the co-op grew from 23 households to 83, and then to 148. Every single person in the village qualified to join has done so: the whole village has gone in for co-operative agriculture. When the co-op started it had no tools and equipment to speak of. In three years it accumulated more than 6,000 yuan worth of common property, including 12 head of cattle (seven of them out of their own beasts), two donkeys, three mules, five carts (three with iron-bound wheels and two rubber-tyred), and 103 sheep of various breeds. Six hundred *mou* of terraced land have been planted with fruit trees, and a thousand *mou* of barren mountains afforested. Along the river bank north of the village there are 270,000 poplar trees now ten to twenty feet high. Tu Kuei, the vice-chairman, is in the habit of saying, "With the leadership given by the Party and our own hard work, we'll turn Szeshihlipu into a fine, flourishing mountain village in five years. By then everybody will be better fed and better clothed, and we'll all be able to really enjoy the songs of the birds and the scent of flowers when the day's work's over."

RUN THE CO-OPS DILIGENTLY AND ECONOMICALLY, DEVELOP THE MOUNTAIN REGIONS

(By Li Lin and Ma Ming, September 15, 1955)

This is about the Gold Star Co-operative led by Li Shun-ta, where they farm, grow trees, tend orchards and raise stock. In the three years since its inception it has grown quite large. It now has a membership of 283 families. Although located on very poor soil in the Taihang Mountains, because everyone has worked hard, it has begun to take on a new look. Manpower is utilized 110.6 per cent more effectively than in the days before the anti-Japanese war when everyone worked for himself, and 74 per cent higher than in the time of the mutual-aid teams which existed before the co-op was formed. The co-operative's assets have increased from 120 yuan in its first year to 11,000 yuan. In 1955 each member received an average income of 884 catties of grain — 77 per cent more than in pre-war days, and 25.1 per cent more than in the mutual-aid team period. Within three years, the co-operative has already surpassed its five-year plan by 6 per cent.

We can learn from the experience of this co-op. If large increases in output can be attained in places poorly endowed by nature, why can't we do still better in areas where conditions are more favourable?

— EDITOR

The township of Hsikou in Pingshun County, Shansi, used to be a cluster of desolate, out-of-the-way villages in the midst of the Taihang Mountains. Some 1,200 metres above sea level, it was a place of high, bleak ridges and tiny, scattered plots of land with a mere sprinkling of earth. Nature there was pretty grim. For instance, Hsikou Village had 473 *mou* of arable land, but it was carved up into more than 2,700 separate strips. What's more, torrential rain was always washing away the banks of the terraced fields. It was a nightmare to retain water or soil at all.

In the nine years between 1943 and 1951, 26 mutual-aid teams were formed in the whole township. By this form of organization the peasants used whatever labour power and cash they could spare to bank the slopes of terraced fields high up on the ridges so as to retain an increasing amount of water and soil. They also extended the area under cultivation by cutting new terraces out of the hills, keeping the terracing in good repair, and bringing under cultivation land which had been formed by the settling of river silt. Steps like this led to a year-by-year increase in the peasants' income for the township as a whole. By 1950, the mutual-aid team formerly led by Li Shun-ta had been able to increase its annual yield per *mou* by 77 per cent compared with the years before the anti-Japanese war. So a situation came about where people could say proudly, "Nowadays we eat a great variety of food and enjoy all sorts of relishes with our meals." That was a great change from the days before the anti-Japanese war when the peasants would tell you, "We've got to fill our bellies with bran and such green-stuff as grows wild. Even millet meal is a luxury!"

But because the different households in the mutual-aid teams farmed mostly on their own, they found it impossible to undertake much in the way of bigger jobs or introducing any sweeping reform in farming technique to develop the hilly regions. So at that time it was out of the question to bring about any radical change in this poverty-stricken area. Then,

in 1952, Li Shun-ta, answering the call to raise yields, set the pace by starting the Gold Star Agricultural, Forestry and Animal Husbandry Co-operative. The peasants gave it a ready welcome, and in its first year, it grew so fast that by the end of the year 51 per cent of all peasant households in the village were in it.

AN INSPIRING PROSPECT

The way the Gold Star Co-op grew and consolidated itself meant that you could start considering the next step — how to get out of the mountain districts the wealth that must be there. But it wasn't easy to discover how to ensure constantly growing yields, how to exploit the natural resources of the locality to the full. The peasants who had toiled there for generations couldn't see any way out for the poorly endowed place. As they put it, "There are gullies and bare rock everywhere! How can you think of tilling land by machinery and marching towards socialism when you can't even find a plot big enough for a tractor to turn round on? We've pooled our labour and draught animals, and tried every feasible technical improvement. There just isn't any way of getting bigger yields — there's not a dog's chance."

So when Sang Jung-ho, a well-to-do middle peasant who wasn't in the co-op, moved to the plains of Luan County, five others including Li Teh-tsai, whom we shall be mentioning again later, determined to follow suit. The district, village and co-op officials were at a loss to know what to do about this new problem: Make them stay? No, the prospect of better yields wasn't so encouraging, and really it seemed as good a way as any. Let them go their own way? That wasn't any good, either. If they went there'd be no guarantee that the yearly production plan would be fulfilled. Besides, there were so many hilly regions in the country; who was going to develop them if things were allowed to drift like that?

To cope with this situation, the Pingshun County Committee and Hsikou Village Branch of the Chinese Communist Party started taking steps to get the masses on the move. In the light of the policy mapped out by the higher Party committees on the all-round development of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry, they drew up a practical long-term plan for developing the hilly regions. This really did give the peasants a glimpse of the bright prospects of socialism. Again, early in 1952 the Pingshun County Party Committee led the peasants in Hsikou to make an on-the-spot investigation, taking all relevant factors into account, of how best to exploit the possibilities of developing agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry to the full. Having done this, they went on to draw up a comprehensive plan for the three-year period 1952-54. This plan called for an increase in the annual income of the village from the equivalent of 925.48 piculs of grain to 2,175 piculs. It called for steps to conquer the drought that always threatened all the non-irrigated land in the village. These included the building of small dams and reservoirs at seven points, and the storage of every possible drop of spring and rain water. Besides this, 120 *mou* of land which had been covered by silt was to be prepared for cultivation. It also proposed that wild slopes should be planted with fodder grass as a means of developing animal husbandry. This plan was a great stimulus to all the peasants because it gave them confidence that by their own efforts they could transform their barren hills out of all recognition. It made Kuo Chang-tse, a peasant who had moved out of the area, regret that he hadn't stayed. It made Li Teh-tsai, Kuo Pao-shan and others, who had been about to follow Kuo Chang-tse's example when the plan was announced, change their minds and settle down to the work of making their home village a better place to live in.

The return of Li Shun-ta from his visit to the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1952 led to even greater activity in Hsikou. Li showed his fellow villagers the pictures he brought back

with him, pictures of dense forests, big lumber mills up in the hills, towering, magnificent buildings, roads climbing up to the mountain tops, and so on, all in Siberia. He went into details about how, guided by Stalin's plan for transforming nature, the peasants on the Siberian uplands were planting trees everywhere and producing huge quantities of timber, and how collective farmers in the hills of Georgia went in for a combination of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry and were using machinery and power. This made the peasants see that their home and the Soviet Union had something in common, made them realize that what the Soviet Union was today Hsikou might be tomorrow. It also let them see that the combination of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry which the Siberian peasants had started was the right road for them to take.

Li Shun-ta impressed on his fellow villagers that, however far they looked into the future, they should start from where they stood. So they drew on Soviet experience of developing hilly regions and, bearing in mind actual local conditions, revised their former plan of work and extended the period it was to cover from three years to five. Then, after the Party published its general line of policy for the period of transition to socialism, they worked out a 15-year comprehensive plan for the development of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry. This plan specified which areas were suited to each type of farming. Eighteen thousand *mou* of bare slopes in the township were to be closed off and planted with various kinds of fruit and timber trees and grass; of the 500 *mou* of shoals and mud-banks in the river, 300 *mou* were to be reclaimed, and cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry and bees of good breeds raised in large numbers. When the whole plan is completed, Hsikou will be a place dotted with groves of trees and flocks of cattle, and the income per head will be nine times as large as in 1952. In the process of drawing up these plans the Hsikou Party branch ran a series of meetings to find out what the peasants thought about it all, so that nothing

that might lead to increased production should be overlooked. It constantly explained what the plans were and what the carrying out of them would mean. This was a real inspiration to the peasants, who became more and more enthusiastic about developing their hills. Now all the co-ops in the three villages in Hsikou Township have merged to form a big one that embraces 97 per cent of the 283 households. From personal experience the peasants have learned that only by pooling and making rational use of all their labour and financial resources can they fulfil the 15-year plan.

RATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR

They wanted the long-term plan of work to be a success, but it looked as if the labour formerly employed on agricultural production on some 1,920 *mou* of arable land would not be enough for the all-round development of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry in a vast area covering 20,800 *mou* of upland. In the old days labour was used very inefficiently. The peasants used to have such sayings as, "You work your guts out half the year; the other half you idle away the time." "January, plenty to eat, February, just rest, early March, still may be some rest." Since the mutual-aid teams were set up the peasants had somewhat outgrown this long-standing habit of enjoying a slack season in winter, but the waste of labour power was still appalling, because the conflicting claims of collective labour and individual farming were still not settled.

The organization of the Gold Star Co-operative provided conditions favouring the better use of labour, and it took two steps towards rationalization.

The first was intended to improve the division of labour, and fell under three heads:

1) Labour was to be organized in line with the needs of both the long-term plan of work of the co-op as a whole and its annual plans. They set up teams for field work, and sec-

tions to take care of forestry, animal husbandry, capital construction and the financial side respectively, all under the management committee of the co-op. At the same time every bit of labour available was put to productive work, and care was taken to give out work in such a way as to be within the capacity of the individual member and to give the special aptitudes of everybody full play.

2) They introduced a rational system of paying for labour which ensured that quality and quantity of work were up to standard and allowed the various production targets to be reached. At the start people had tended to concentrate on current agricultural production and forget about the long-term plan. That was because no provision had been made for remuneration of work put in on capital construction, afforestation and reclamation of alluvial land. Later on they worked out a scheme to pay for every bit of labour, and this ensured that both current and long-term targets were reached. Some members tended to go all out for quantity at the expense of quality so as to gain more work-points. To check this tendency piece-work system was started for all important jobs. That had the effect of improving both quality and quantity. The principle of equal pay for equal work done by both men and women was strictly applied, and in 1955 alone women contributed 8,967 work-days—35 per cent of all work-days put in on agricultural production.

3) They cut down every possible bit of labour wasted on non-productive work. For instance, at one time all manure for the distant upland plots had to be carried there by hand. The new idea was to build byres for the cattle there, so that manure accumulated right on the spot. That saved something like 2,400 work-days a year. In 1955 the amount of labour spent on odd jobs was cut to 3.3 per cent of all work-days, compared with 7.8 per cent in 1954.

The second measure was a labour emulation drive organized by the Party and a propaganda campaign to bring to the constant notice of the co-op members the great things being done

in China to build socialism, to show them how concerned the Party and government were about people living in the hilly regions, and to publicize production results on the co-op itself. All this filled the peasants of Hsikou with a great love for their native place and gave them confidence to battle against nature. "What are a few hills?" you hear them saying nowadays. "Our future is boundless!"

In the dead of winter when the earth was still frost-bound and deep under snow you found co-op members scaling the heights to blast rock and repair the stone banking of the terraces. An extra 95 *mou* of alluvial land recently added to the acreage under cultivation was won by peasants who brought rocks from afar to bank plots and retain the sediment that would otherwise have been borne away by flood water. Here every inch of soil won, every tree planted, meant so much heavy toil.

In 1955 the co-op put in 61,368 work-days on agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and subsidiary occupations. On an average each able-bodied man contributed 220 or more work-days a year, and each able-bodied woman 78. That meant that the extent to which labour power in the co-op was being utilized was 110.6 per cent more than in the days before the anti-Japanese war, and 74 per cent more than in the days just before the birth of the co-op itself.

STRICT ECONOMY

Any general development of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry required enormous financial and material resources. This was something for which the co-op had to rely on its own resources: they couldn't just ask for state assistance. But at that time the co-op had but little capital. So the management committee studied the situation and decided to make do with whatever local resources they could lay hands on. Hard work and thrift: that was their motto. Every single thing they could put to use they used. Every-

thing that would bring in money they did. This is the record of their efforts:

1) They tried out every possible means of increasing income and accumulating capital to expand production. In the four years between 1952 and 1955, the annual sum which the members invested as capital for this purpose ranged from 14.3 to 28.23 per cent of the gross annual income. In 1955, the co-op made use of the tiny plots of waste land on the edges of fields and village and so gathered an extra autumn harvest of 310,000 catties of vegetables. Since a proposal by the vice-chairman, Shen Chi-lan, that women members should be persuaded to go out and collect sheep dung was adopted in the spring of 1955, the co-op stored more than 1,000 yuan worth of it in the course of the year.

2) They constantly reduced costs in every branch of production. The co-op originally planned to raise a hundred pigs and buy 30,000 catties of bran and 5,000 catties of coarse grain each year to feed them. But the women members who looked after the pigs found out that they did quite as well with more wild green-stuff and corn-cobs, less bran and no coarse grain at all. So in 1955, when the number of pigs had increased to 137, they were fed on 35,000 catties of green-stuff which the women had gathered, and 149,000 catties of corn-cobs. That saved grain and bran, to the value of 1,800 yuan. Formerly, huge quantities of maize stalks were used as fuel, and fertilizer had to be bought. In the past two years, the peasants have given up the practice. In 1955 they prepared 9,600 piculs of compost out of rotting maize stalks. That was enough fertilizer for 160 *mou*.

3) They cut out waste and reduced expenditure on non-productive items. A plan to build 60 new sheds between 1952 and 1954 was stopped and part of the old cotes and caves were used as sheep-pens and cattle sheds. In its early days the co-op lost 2,000-3,000 yuan on animal husbandry because of poor management. In 1955, it saved 6,470 yuan by cutting five unnecessary items in the expenses. The co-op gathered

more than 570,000 catties of hay for the use of the cattle in winter.

In dealing with all the matters mentioned, the Gold Star Co-operative paid particular attention to collecting and applying rationalization proposals made by the members. Members were properly paid for any work they did and received an adequate return on any investment they made in the co-op. The exact amount was fixed by discussion. This ensured that the co-op got what was needed for the annual investment in production and helped to increase the amount of common property owned by the co-op year by year. The value of this common property has increased nearly a hundred times; that is, from 120 yuan in 1952, when the co-op was set up, to 11,911 yuan in 1955.

THE FACE OF HSIKOU IS CHANGING

For the past four years the co-op has been carrying out the policy of running co-ops thriftily to develop the mountainous areas. And Hsikou Township really has begun to take on a new appearance. From the top of Mount Houpei, the highest point around, the place looks like a picture: The lush green of newly planted trees blends with the crops in the terraced fields. Thriving crops of maize and millet cover the newly made terraces and uplands. In a year or two, the Canadian poplars will have grown huge. Apple trees from Northeast China and grape-vines from Tsingtao will be bearing fruit. Pastures have been extended and now more than a thousand horses, cattle and sheep graze there. In 1955, the gross income of the co-op, it is estimated, will be equivalent to 862,766 catties of grain, of which 609,663 will come from agricultural production. That means an average income of 884 catties a head, a 77 per cent increase compared with the days before the anti-Japanese war, or 25.1 per cent compared with the days just before the co-op was started. This income is 23.3 per cent higher than peasants outside the co-op get. As

far as the total value of output is concerned, it will be 0.6 per cent over the target set in the township's five-year plan.

Increases in production have made it possible for the peasants to live better. Nowadays it's quite common for them to own rubber shoes, electric torches, umbrellas and blankets. The number of primary schools in the township has risen from one in the days before the anti-Japanese war to four. The co-op runs five spare-time schools attended by 442 of its members. Besides this, 114 young peasants, men and women, have joined literacy classes. Forty-nine of them have reached a good standard of literacy, and 22 have learned 500 to 1,000 characters. Classes have also trained 43 people as bookkeepers, tallymen, readers for the newspaper-reading groups for illiterates, and technicians for the co-op. The co-op has its own library, wireless sets, telephone, bags for taking books to those working in the fields, a musical group, newspaper-reading groups, and other educational facilities and entertainments. The new public health and midwifery centres have simple but good equipment, and keep matters affecting public health before the peasants. And talking about changes in the sphere of public health, the peasants of Hsikou say, "Before liberation, we had two lots of blood-suckers — the landlords by day, and bugs and fleas by night. Sometimes you had to move out into the courtyard because nobody could sleep a wink indoors. Now we can sleep in peace at night and work with joy in the daytime."

They sing a little song in Hsikou nowadays:

O'er the whole of Hsikou Chairman Mao's like the sun,
Life's been improving since the co-op began!

Full of confidence, the peasants of Hsikou are now making greater efforts than ever, and paying even stricter attention to thrift as they go ahead with their plan to transform their township.

TWELVE CO-OPS GIVE A BIG BOOST TO STOCK-RAISING

(By the Office of the Communist Party Committee of the former province of Jehol, September 20, 1955)

A well-written article. It can be brought to the notice of all stock-raising co-operatives.

— EDITOR

THE HERDSMEN OWN THEIR OWN LIVESTOCK AND LIFE TAKES A RAPID TURN FOR THE BETTER

The Uniut Banner in Jehol Province is a vast area: it stretches 300 *li* from east to west and 160 *li* from north to south. Sparsely populated but rich in water and grass, it has extensive pasture-lands. The Banner has seven administrative districts — the local word is *nutak*. One of which is entirely agricultural, three engage in livestock-breeding, and the remaining three go in for both. Uniut has a population of 59,419 in 7,793 households, and 18,253 of them — 30.9 per cent of the total — are Mongolians. In 1947, the people in the pastoral areas decided to join with those in the agricultural areas in carrying out land reform, which did away with feudal oppression and exploitation once and for all. For the first time in their life, many impoverished herdsmen owned livestock of their own and became masters of the grassland.

Over the past few years, local branches of the Chinese Communist Party and the local authorities at all levels have, as Chairman Mao has advised, encouraged people to "get or-

ganized and go in for more stock-breeding." So, giving proper consideration to the needs of different localities, they have helped poor herdsmen take on productive work and make livestock-breeding their main occupation. By concerted effort and close unity between the various nationalities, local bandits were wiped out. Having thus restored peace, the government decided to exempt the people from taxes. This helped lighten the burden on the herdsmen and improve their conditions. Besides this, the government raised the prices they paid the people for their livestock and animal products. These measures helped bring about a rapid development of animal husbandry and completely changed the face of these formerly poverty-stricken pastoral areas.

According to 1952 statistics, Uniut then had 147,656 head of livestock — 7.4 per cent more than in the previous peak year, 1943. The number of cattle had grown by 58.4 per cent, and goats and sheep were nearly as many as in the peak year. As animal husbandry throve, the people's income greatly increased. In 1952, for example, the average purchasing power of the people was 4.7 times that of 1949. The herdsmen's life and habits have changed too. They have gradually switched to a more settled life. Take the Zukht *gatzaa* (township) of the seventh *nutak* for instance. In 1952 it had 170 one-storeyed houses, half as many again as in 1947, while the number of yurts (tents) fell by 23 per cent.

Great improvements have also been made in the rearing and management of livestock. The natural increase is faster, and the death-rate has dropped. Statistics for three pastoral areas for 1952 give the breeding-rate of cattle as 92 per hundred, which was 10.2 per cent higher than in 1951. In the second *nutak*, 5,361 out of 5,476 cows (i.e. 97.9 per cent) were served. As to livestock devoured by wolves, or lost by disease, 1949 figures gave 333 horses, 3,497 cattle and 7,441 sheep. In 1951 they were down to 98 horses, 1,057 cattle and 2,031 sheep. That is, the number of livestock lost in 1951 was 8,085 fewer than in 1949. Something that deserves special

mention in the management of livestock-breeding is the growth of certain rudimentary forms of co-operation covering wolf-hunting and joint grazing, and of mutual aid and co-operation in pasturing. As a result, less livestock was lost than when flocks and herds were looked after separately and by individuals, and they bred faster. These rudimentary forms of co-operation were well received by all concerned.

A CHOICE OF TWO ROADS

The situation as regards social classes in the stock-breeding areas has changed greatly since the rich harvests of 1949-1951. According to investigations made by a working team from the Jehol Provincial Party Committee in the afore-mentioned township, there were 74 households in the village before land reform. Three of them tended cattle for others, 37 were poor herdsmen, 29 were fairly well-to-do herdsmen, one was a well-off herdsman, three were big livestock owners and one was a landlord. Putting it another way, the poor and not well-off were 93.4 per cent of all households; the well-off herdsmen were 1.3 per cent; and the big livestock owners and the landlord, 5.3 per cent. By 1952, the life of 72 households in the township had improved; 22 of the households which used to lead a pretty difficult life were no longer hard up, while the number of well-off herdsmen had increased to 23 households. At that time most of the poor herdsmen owned two cows; besides the income they got from farm produce and subsidiary occupations, they did odd jobs for others, and so were able to live fairly decently. Most of the middle herdsmen had three or four head of cattle, and the average income was 840 to 1,000 catties of grain a head. Some of the middle herdsmen had grain left over after they'd bought food and clothing. Well-off herdsmen had, on the average, at least six head of cattle, and the average income was more than 1,080 catties of grain a year a head. They lived comfortably. Some of them even had hired labour to help them in their work.

As a result of the increase of livestock, various forms of management have come into being. One way is to employ hired hands. Take the same township for example. In 1950, 40 households (or 54 per cent of all the households) jointly employed hired hands to look after their livestock. By 1951, this increased to 49 households (or 65 per cent of the total number of herdsman households). Among these two were those of big livestock owners and 33 of middle herdsmen.

In the management of agriculture, in 1950 there were 13 households (17 per cent of the total number of herdsman households) which employed people to till their land and paid them either a proportion of the earnings agreed upon by both parties, or a third of the earnings which were equally divided into three parts: one-third was for labour, one-third for the land and the remaining one-third for draught animals and farm tools. In 1951, there were nine such households. Usurers were also becoming more and more active; some even lent money at 30 per cent interest. After production has developed, even some Party members and officials who did not have a clear understanding of socialism employed people to till their land and paid them a fixed amount of the earnings; they also became money-lenders and tried to earn money like capitalists.

Another form of management is co-operation in grazing. From 1949, when it was first encouraged, to the beginning of 1952, 14 co-operative grazing teams, 23 work-exchange mutual-aid pasturing teams and 238 rotation pasturing teams were formed in the Banner. These rudimentary forms of mutual aid and co-operation manifested their worth in the following ways:

1) The livestock was looked after by people whose special job it was, and as a result the death-rate fell.

2) They economized manpower: some people could be relieved of the work of pasturing and engage in tilling instead. That settled the question of manpower.

3) The people's income increased. Take the Punsak Team for example. In 1949, the members of its eight households had only 189 head of big livestock. By 1952, however, even after they had sold 109, they still had 479 head left.

4) Work done haphazard by individuals gave way to work based on mutual aid as a first step to co-operation, and this raised the efficiency of labour.

But this rudimentary form, the mutual-aid team, still failed to do all that the members wanted in the way of increasing production, and many herdsmen asked for stock-breeding co-operatives to be formed.

In December 1951, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party circulated inside the Party the Draft Decisions on Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agricultural Production. In co-ordination with the campaign to strengthen the Party organization, the Banner Party Committee educated its members in socialism and criticized capitalistic tendencies on the part of some Party members. This was an eye-opener to the herdsmen. Genden, a Party member, said: "I've too many livestock to look after by myself. If I employ other people to see to them, I'd be following the example of the big livestock owners. The only way out of the difficulty is to join the co-operative." Erdenkhu, in charge of women's affairs, said: "If we stick to the old ways and don't organize so as to pasture the livestock together and pay everybody for the work he does, we can't make socialism a reality." Mingan-Bayan said: "It's not enough just to have more livestock. I've got to improve the strain, too. If we go on working on our own, a single household will never be able to afford to buy a single shorthorn. If we join a co-operative, we shall have more people, more strength, and things will be easy." Kombu, who tended cattle for others, said: "With the Communist Party leading us, my life has been improving. But it's hard for us to go on improving it single-handed. If we join a co-operative and share out the work among ourselves according to everyone's skill and ability, we'd all get rich if

we do our work well." In response to requests from the most active of the poor and not so well-off herdsmen, in April 1952 the Banner Party Committee set up two livestock-breeding co-operatives in the Zukht and Dzhalnud Townships as an experiment. Thirty-nine households, or 15.8 per cent of the herdsman households in the two townships, joined the co-operatives, bringing in with them 2,693 head of livestock, 81 per cent of all they owned. The number of herdsmen who joined the co-operatives was 31.6 per cent. In 1955, 60 per cent joined the mutual-aid teams, among whom were 114 Party members, constituting 58.3 per cent of all the Party members (179) among them.

HOW THE CO-OPS WERE FORMED

It took more than a month to set up the two co-ops. A fortnight or so was spent in thorough discussions; and in the next three weeks, specific problems were discussed and solved. The following work was done under these two heads:

1) There was an intense campaign of propaganda and explanation for the purpose of clearing up the wrong notions of the herdsmen. At the beginning, it was found that the members' views varied quite a lot. Over 40 per cent of them had faith in the Communist Party. "The Party," they said, "has given us guidance all these years, and our life has been improving. We certainly shan't go wrong if we follow the Party and take another step forward." Even so, they still had no clear idea of what the advantages of having a co-op were. The others had lots of worries. Some felt that they'd "lose face" if they didn't join the co-op, while others simply drifted along with the current and went the way the wind blew. Some feared that they'd be left alone and were afraid of being looked on as backward. Others, again, were unwilling to join the co-ops and did so only reluctantly after much persuasion by their sons. Even when they were already in the co-ops, some members were still half afraid they might

lose by it, so their attitude was to hang on in the co-ops and see what came of it. Generally it was the younger members who were keen, and the older ones who had misgivings. But after thorough propaganda and explanation all these problems were cleared up. A lot of careful calculations were made, and after that members found out that they had nothing to lose by joining the co-ops, and so they left off worrying.

2) Specific steps were taken to solve problems that cropped up. At the beginning, when the co-operatives were first set up, mistakes were made in distributing dividends. For instance, when the animals belonging to members were pooled in the co-ops, they were calculated in terms of "standard cows" — ten sheep were taken as equivalent to one cow. Members found this very confusing. For by this method they would not be able to know the number of animals they had handed in to the co-op. Quite a few of them said: "It's just making our animals the common property of everybody." Basing themselves on comments from the members, the chairmen of the co-ops, after thorough discussion, decided to assess the value of the animals at the time they were pooled. But this method was not good enough, either. It was too troublesome to make an assessment every year. So, as neither situation was satisfactory, the chairmen got the members together for democratic discussions and thorough consultations, and together they worked out a sound and acceptable way of pooling the animals as shares and of paying bonus.

A. In accordance with the different kinds of animals and the earnings that could be derived from them, dividends were distributed according to the number of shares each animal was worth. The value of each animal was assessed according to local market price, with ten yuan to a share. It was then worked out how many shares each herdsman was entitled to after his animal was pooled in the co-op. When the members withdrew from the co-ops, they could take back their animals according to the number of shares they held.

B. The proportion in dividing dividends was based on the kinds of animals, the amount of labour entailed and the amount of profit derived. For cows, the proportion was fixed at 50 per cent for labour and 50 per cent for the animals. For sheep, it was 40 per cent for labour and 60 per cent for the animals; and for horses, 20 per cent for labour and 80 per cent for the animals. The proportion for by-products as milk was fixed at 60 per cent for labour and 40 per cent for the animals; and for wool, 40 per cent for labour and 60 per cent for the animals.

C. If anything happened to the animals, the action taken was to depend on the circumstances. For losses that could be prevented, such as working the animals to death, losing them or letting them be eaten by wolves, the co-ops were to be held responsible, and the owners could get back their shares for these animals. In the case of unavoidable losses or losses which occurred despite steps taken to prevent them (e.g. from rinderpest), the co-ops and the owners shared the loss. The co-ops were to be responsible for the loss of young born to animals in the co-ops.

D. In order to look after those animals which had not been put into the co-ops, the co-ops undertook to pasture them, if the owners wanted them to and paid for it to be done. All the members said they were satisfied with this method. As for the organization of labour, the members of the co-ops were divided, according to their ability, into teams in charge of rearing and grazing the beasts, dairy-farming, agriculture and subsidiary occupations. On how to calculate work done and assess work-points, it was decided that a work-day should count as ten points. All this was to be decided democratically, taking into account each person's strength and ability, experience, skill, and the quantity and quality of work actually done. If work were sometimes done well and sometimes not so well, the work-points could go up or down, as the case might be.

LIVESTOCK-BREEDING CO-OPERATIVES PROVE THEIR WORTH

After the two co-ops were set up in the Banner in 1952 as a sort of experiment, experience was gained. In the spring of 1954, another two co-ops were set up. In autumn of the same year, eight more were formed. At present, the whole Banner has 12 livestock-breeding co-operatives with a membership of 192 households. There are 9,536 head of horses, cattle, sheep, donkeys and camels, of which 7,641 head (234 horses, 2,736 cattle, 4,671 sheep and goats) have been put into the co-ops by their owners as shares: that is 80.2 per cent of all livestock owned by the members. Almost all the rest — 1,792 head of old and weak animals (212 horses, 674 cattle, 733 sheep and goats, 155 donkeys and 18 camels), constituting 18.8 per cent of all livestock — the members have kept for their own use. Finally, there are 103 head of livestock—1 per cent of total (14 horses, 10 cattle and 79 sheep and goats) owned by the members collectively. Each of the three pastoral areas in the Banner has at least one co-op; one of them has as many as five. Of the 22 villages which go in for livestock-breeding, nine have co-ops (of these villages three have two co-ops each, the other six have one each). Of the households engaged in livestock-breeding—3,299 in all—5.8 per cent have joined the co-ops.

Now about the size of the co-ops—(a) the number of households in the co-ops, and (b) the number of livestock. On the average, each co-op has 16 households — the smallest 11 and the largest 29. Each co-op has an average of about 800 head of livestock of all kinds (including those kept by the members for their own use). Two old co-ops have about 1,700 head, while ten newly established ones have about 7,800 head. The Chienchin Co-operative in the Third District has the fewest — 213 head.

The composition of the co-ops. All 12 livestock-breeding co-ops in the Banner were formed out of all-the-year-round

mutual-aid teams. These co-ops are comparatively strong, with 34 Party members, 45 Youth Leaguers and 50 other live-wires. Except for two co-ops which have Youth Leaguers but no Party members, all the others have two to four Party members each; one has as many as eight. These co-ops were generally set up after six months of discussions and consideration. It even took a full year to set up some of them. They have proved a success and shown their worth. They have become a necessary transitional form in helping the herdsmen set about socialist transformation.

The 12 livestock-breeding producers' co-operatives have shown their superiority in the following ways:

1) By means of these co-ops, the extremely scattered, backward and individualistic way livestock-breeding was run has been changed into a co-operative economy, semi-socialist in character and run collectively. Difficulties arising from shortage of labour and the chaotic management which characterized the scattered and individual efforts in the past were solved by unified management and planning, democratic administration and centrally planned distribution of labour. Generally speaking, in the two or three years after they were formed, the output of these co-ops was 20 to 30 per cent greater than that of mutual-aid teams or of herdsmen working on their own. The co-ops have proved to be "the most economical, most effective and fastest method" of developing livestock-breeding, and the only road which herdsmen who formerly worked on their own can take to socialism. These co-ops have made a great impression on the herdsmen. They always say that the co-ops, with so many members, have the strength and ability to do things they cannot do individually. There are more ways in which a co-op can increase production. Their animals are fatter and larger, breed faster, and fewer young are lost.

2) Such co-ops improve the management and administration of livestock-breeding, and lead to more skilful ways of rearing beasts and increasing the rate of breeding. The live-

stock have increased rapidly and fewer died, because a new system was introduced by setting up special teams with the specific responsibility of taking charge of grazing, caring for young animals, preventing animal diseases, and so on. Thorough, business-like methods of administration have replaced the old, careless ways which left everything to the hazards of nature. Artificial insemination has largely replaced the old haphazard method of letting the animals breed by themselves. The co-ops now split their animals up into groups of suitable size and then detailed a definite number of people to look after them, bearing in mind how far off the pastures are. The general practice is to herd the animals to the grassland in spring, take them to the marshes in summer, and to the sand-hills where grass can be found in autumn. This method of shifting the beasts to different pastures in different seasons and making rational use of pasture-land, has led to the animals gaining rapidly in weight. The co-ops have sunk wells on the grassland and build pens and sheds. As a result, the animals have become much more resistant to disease. The co-ops are able to breed from selected beasts, keep enough stock-getters, mate the animals at definite periods, improve the technique of mating, know definitely when animals are in heat and reduce sterility. That means that more young animals grow up strong and healthy. The breeding-rate of females of all kinds on the First Red Glow and First Red Flag Co-operatives is 1.5 per cent higher than that of animals owned by local herdsmen, while the death-rate is 10.9 per cent lower. The conception rate of served animals in the 12 co-ops is over 95 per cent. On the Second Red Flag and Second Red Star Co-operatives, the rate is 100 per cent. By the end of 1954, the total number of livestock was 47 per cent greater than when the co-ops were first set up. The net rate of increase was 8.7 per cent, and the quality of the animals improved.

3) Because the co-ops have operated a plan for an experimental division of labour and skills, the best possible use

can be made of labour. The co-ops are thus able to pursue quite a variety of occupations, with livestock-breeding as the main one, and so raise the income of the members. With regard to division of labour and craft, the management committees of the co-ops have put into practice a responsibility system after the division of labour has been made. They have put the finances and accounting on a sound basis, improved management, made a rational reàdjustment of labour organization in accordance with the members' abilities, made appraisals of work done and allotted work-points in a rational way, set up a system of giving awards to encourage the members, gradually put into practice a responsibility system for production in the various seasons, and thoroughly carried out the principle of "to each according to his work." All this has made members put their hearts into their work and has increased their income. Let's take four old co-ops as examples. Before they became co-ops, the people engaged in individual farming and subsidiary occupations, and their total income was about 4,400 yuan. But now their total income has increased to about 5,400, a 31 per cent increase over what they used to get before the co-ops were formed. The Zukht Co-operative has organized 46 men and women members in a proper way, and made a careful arrangement of the work to be done by them. Nine of them are in sole charge of pasturing the livestock, seven work in the dairy, and the rest, in accordance with the needs of production work in the different seasons, help in moving the livestock to different pastures, caring for the young of animals, cutting osiers, building sheds and sinking wells; and in summer and autumn they cut 320,000 catties of grass. During intervals in their regular work, twenty of them cultivate 120 *mou* from which they receive 1,132 yuan; they also cut 5,000 catties of *mahuang* (joint fir) from which they can get 220 yuan. Over the past two years, trees were planted on 25 *mou* of land by collective effort, thus combining agriculture, forestry and livestock-breeding and making them support one another. All the co-

ops have increased their income from all their undertakings. At the end of the year when the distribution of income was made, it was found that, besides giving the members what they should get, there was some common property accumulated, and this provided a material basis for the expansion of production.

4) The setting up of livestock-breeding co-ops has strengthened the work of preventing animal diseases, killing wolves, combating natural calamities, and has ensured good harvests. For instance, contagious pleuro-pneumonia of cattle, anthrax, Brucellosis, parasites, rabies, glanders and sheep scab are extremely harmful to the breeding of livestock, and it is exceedingly difficult for individual herdsmen to rely on their own strength to combat them. In dividing the animals into groups for pasturing, the co-ops can give technical guidance, inoculate the animals in good time against diseases or isolate them for proper treatment, and, by separating diseased animals from healthy ones, check the spread of disease and reduce the death-rate. Wolves are a great menace in the pastoral areas. Since the animals have been put under collective management, all the co-ops have organized wolf-hunting teams, and have set up a sort of co-ordinated defence system with neighbouring co-ops, teams and villages. This has basically checked the menace of wolves. In 1949, wolves took a toll of 11,271 head of big and small livestock in the Banner. But since the establishment of the livestock-breeding producers' co-operatives, wolf-hunting teams have been strengthened and the livestock of the co-ops are basically free from the menace of wolves. The co-ops have also helped mutual-aid teams and individual herdsmen launch a hunting campaign against the wolves. In 1954, in the whole Banner only 912 head of livestock were killed by the wolves.

5) Under the guidance of the state and in accordance with needs in the expansion of industry and agriculture, it is comparatively easy for the stock-breeding co-ops to do away with conservative ways of thinking, improve breeds, make use of

mowers and other new types of machines, develop dairy-farming on a small scale, increase raw materials for industry and consolidate the worker-peasant alliance. The state stock-farm in the area has 27 head of Holstein cattle, 7 shorthorns and 190 merino sheep (of which 25 are merino rams from the Soviet Union) as stud beasts. In 1952, it helped the Zukht Livestock-Breeding Co-operative put 42 ewes to the rams, and 42 lambs were born the next year. In 1953, another 91 ewes were put to the rams, and 72 lambs were born in 1954. All the lambs born survived and grew up well. The first batch of fine-wool lambs born in spring 1953 weighed 94 catties each in autumn, 18 catties more than local breeds. The work of improving the breed of sheep in all the 12 co-ops has practically been accomplished; at present the breeding of Holstein cattle and shorthorns which provide both milk and meat is being popularized among the herdsmen. Because of collective management, the Zukht Co-operative has ample means at its disposal. In 1953, it set up a small dairy, and bought some small machinery for it. With these machines it made powdered milk, and its income has more than doubled. Another example: a mower can cut 10,000 catties of grass a day. That would take a man ten work-days. Thus the work of the members has been lightened and the amount of fodder stored has been increased.

6) After the livestock-breeding co-ops were set up, the members who used to live wide apart from each other have been, wherever production work called for it, enabled to live in community. This has not only facilitated the management and administration of livestock-breeding and the exchange of experience, but has also made it more convenient for the herdsmen to learn to read and write, thereby raising their understanding of socialism. In the past, the herdsmen were in the habit of moving about in the different seasons; they settled wherever they could find water and grass, living far apart, with little chance of getting any education. After they got organized, they began to live together in community,

they have now their own houses, and their animals have proper sheds. So it has come about that men are leading a prosperous life and animals multiply rapidly. The old way of living in isolation without much contact between the households has been done away with; the educational level of the herdsmen has been gradually raised and their health improved. In the Zukht Co-operative, only two members could write a few simple words in the past; the rest were illiterates. Now there are 23 members (13 of them women) who can read and write; seven members can write simple letters and read newspapers in Mongolian. More and more people are learning to read and write, and their socialist understanding and collective spirit are continually becoming greater.

7) All the co-ops have gradually accumulated reserve and welfare funds to be used to buy medical equipment and cover other expenses in combating animal diseases, to buy small tools and instruments, and for the welfare of the members. Thus the herdsmen's inability to cope with difficulties in the past when they worked on their own has been overcome and the expansion of livestock-breeding on a sound basis ensured.

8) The livestock-breeding co-operatives have not only manifested their superiority as described above. They also play a most important part in bringing about the socialist transformation of the pastoral areas. The establishment of these co-ops and the settlement of the herdsmen in certain areas in community have greatly facilitated the co-ordination of work with supply and marketing co-ops, credit co-ops and handicraft producers' co-ops, thereby enhancing the development of co-operative economy in the pastoral areas.

The masses of poor and not so well-off herdsmen have come to know from experience the superiority of the livestock-breeding co-ops, and are anxious to join them. In early September 1955, it was reported that 120 households of herdsmen had asked to be admitted into the co-ops. After hearing Chairman Mao's report on agricultural co-operation, Bayankheshge, a herdsman who worked for the government, said

happily: "We've worked in mutual-aid teams for three or four years. Now we'll have a brighter future!" The Banner Party Committee has drawn up a plan for the expansion of stock-breeding co-ops: Apart from expanding the existing co-ops, they plan to set up nine new ones in 1955 to include 336 households — about 11 per cent of all herdsman households in the whole Banner. In 1956, they plan to set up another 18 (with an average of 16 households to each). And they also plan to establish an additional 19 before spring ploughing in 1957. So the plan is to establish a total of 46 co-ops, with a membership of more than 20 per cent of all herdsman households in the Banner. In some townships half the herdsman households will have joined the co-ops. Thus after a few years, co-operation in livestock-breeding will have been practically accomplished.

WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCE

1) Our Party enjoys a high prestige among the herdsmen. The poor and not so well-off herdsmen are extremely anxious to get organized and develop production. The few herdsmen who have become better-off since liberation also have great faith in our Party. Though they are not very enthusiastic about co-operation, they can be persuaded to follow the road to socialism, because they do not have enough labour of their own to tend the large number of livestock they have, and because they know that to employ people to tend their animals is not something they can be proud of. In the past few years since liberation, a foundation has been laid for co-operative pasturing and the herdsmen have already formed the habit of temporary co-operation in pasturing. Besides, there is the example set by the old co-ops and the influence of the great drive to agricultural co-operation which has swept the country. Because of all this, there is bound to be an upsurge in the co-operative movement in livestock-breeding, too, in the

not too distant future. This is something we should be able to foresee.

2) To the herdsmen the animals are both the means of production and the means of life. The herdsmen love their animals as much as peasants love their land. The animals are living things, and the herdsmen have a great affection for them. It is necessary, therefore, to follow properly the policy of voluntariness and mutual benefit in the course of setting up a co-op, and to carry out the work of persuasion and education thoroughly. Generally, it takes longer to establish a livestock-breeding co-op than to set up an agricultural producers' co-operative — the preparatory work takes a month or so. The concrete problems of a livestock-breeding co-op must first be discussed thoroughly, and only after the herdsmen have given their approval do we persuade them to contribute their animals as shares. Because of the seasonal character of livestock-breeding, co-ops can be set up either in spring or winter. There are, in fact, many occasions which may call for the establishment of a co-op, and it is comparatively easy to take up the question of setting up such a co-op with the herdsmen, and expand co-operation in livestock-breeding as may be required. As the herdsmen themselves need mutual aid both to do their work and make up for their lack of manpower, it is necessary to act cautiously in the pastoral areas, and to actively carry out the principle of "comprehensive planning and firmer leadership." Those who lead must be at the head of the masses and not lag behind them.

3) Before a co-op is formed, proper preparations must be made.

First, a co-op must be established on the basis of mutual-aid teams which are, at present, the most simple and practicable form of co-operation of a rudimentary socialist character. Large numbers of them are already established, and they are the form most easily accepted by the herdsmen. The mutual-aid team will also be the main form of organization for the herdsmen for some time to come. Leadership

given to this form must be greatly improved. The consolidation, expansion, and advance of mutual-aid teams to higher forms lay a reliable foundation on which co-operatives may be gradually built. This is because the mutual-aid teams have capable men to lead them, the animals in the teams are accustomed to live together, and the people in these teams have experience in centralized management. Thus, when a co-op is set up, the herdsmen will not feel that it is something for which they are not prepared, and the animals, too, having worked with the mutual-aid teams, and being used to being together, will not trample upon or jostle one another and cause losses as would probably happen if they were put altogether all of a sudden.

Secondly, we must train leaders in the co-ops; we must, in particular, seriously set about choosing and training people as chairmen and book-keepers, besides people to rear the animals and safeguard them from disease. As to ways of training, we must, besides opening short-term training classes, organize visits to other co-ops every so often, or invite chairmen of old co-ops to tour the mutual-aid teams to give lectures, or even ask the co-ops to take responsibility for training batches of apprentices, for setting up a network for mutual aid and co-operation in livestock-breeding, and in the course of practical work, training batches of leaders for the new co-ops.

Thirdly, we must pay attention to the make-up of co-op membership. We must first help the poor and not so well-off herdsmen to join: between them these constitute 65-75 per cent of all herdsmen. Generally speaking, we do not for the time being try to get the better-off herdsmen to join. The big livestock owners, local landlords and landlords and rich peasants who have fled to these pastoral areas from other places should definitely be barred from joining.

Fourthly, in setting up a co-op, consideration should be given to the following points: that the economy in pastoral areas is of a scattered and unorganized character; and that

the herdsmen live wide apart and are always on the move. When a co-op is being set up, discussions and democratic consultations with the herdsmen should be thoroughly carried out. Old habits and working practices of the herdsmen should be taken into consideration, and it should be seen whether enough functionaries are available. A co-op should not be too large in its early stages. To run a co-op diligently and economically should be promoted. We should not be too hasty in building houses, changing the herdsmen's abode or asking them to live together in settlements. There must be comprehensive planning; the conditions of the pasture-land, how and where the herdsmen live, and the conditions of the various strata of herdsmen should be fully grasped; there should be unified planning regarding people to run the co-op, of labour power, livestock, pasture-land, land for industry and agriculture, etc. Efforts should be made to find out if disease is prevalent among the animals so as to prevent it spreading after the animals are brought together.

4) The principle of voluntariness and mutual benefit should be strictly adhered to. Before setting up a co-op, arrangements should be made regarding the contribution of shares and the division of bonus. (A) There are two ways of entering the animals as shares into a co-op: (a) All kinds of animals entered as shares are reckoned in proportion to the "standard cow"; the owners themselves stand to gain or lose when the animals gain or lose in weight. (b) Pay the owners a certain amount of money for their livestock, and give them bonuses for the shares they have contributed. Of these two forms, the herdsmen prefer the latter. (B) When livestock are entered as shares, we should see to it that members have milch cows for their own use; consideration should also be given to the fact that the members are in the habit of eating mutton and riding horses and should be allowed to keep an appropriate number of sheep and horses for their own use. Apart from looking after collectively-owned livestock and those which have been entered as shares, the co-op should also, in accord-

ance with the principle of mutual benefit, take on the responsibility of pasturing such animals as members have kept for their own use. (C) A co-op needs money for fodder, injections against diseases and administrative expenses. So when animals are pooled, besides reckoning them as shares contributed by members, some of them should be set aside as reserves for the co-op. (D) Reserve and welfare funds may be accumulated gradually as in the case of agricultural producers' co-operatives. As livestock-breeding is something which brings in a steady income and as the animals breed pretty fast, under normal conditions the reserve and welfare funds should generally not be less than those of agricultural producers' co-operatives. But, at the beginning, these funds should not be too large. (E) Rationally fix the payment for a work-day, bearing in mind the number and kind of livestock. (F) In dividing bonuses, we should abide by the principle that bonuses should mainly go to labour, with appropriate consideration to payments for animals; bonuses mainly take the form of animal products and products of agricultural subsidiary occupations. So as to ensure that the animals increase in number, young animals, stock-getters and females must, as far as possible, not be distributed as bonus. Consideration must be given to spreading the income of the herdsmen because of the seasonal character of animal husbandry. For this reason, the main produce may be divided among members once a year, and by-products twice a year. This does not affect the co-op's production, and will be more convenient to members.

5) Livestock-breeding co-ops must pay constant attention to the work of consolidating themselves; they should pay special attention to increasing and protecting the animals, improving the breed, and raising the quality of produce. They should also popularize experience in carrying out the "responsibility system" as applied to pasturing the animals in groups of varying sizes and detailing special people to look after them; rationally readjust the organization of labour and

payment for work done; put financial management and accounting on a sound basis; rationally distribute animal products and products of subsidiary rural occupations, and continually increase the accumulation of common funds of the co-ops. As the increase of its animals and animal products indicates whether a co-op is being well run or not, livestock-breeding should be its main occupation. Labour power should be made proper use of; experienced and able people should be put in charge of stock-breeding; the teams and brigades of the co-op should be rationally organized, and people capable of rearing animals should be included in the co-op's management committee. Better leadership must be given to livestock-breeding, and vigorous steps taken to improve skill. Proper attention should be paid to such important work as the mating of animals and preventing disease; management and administration must be improved to ensure the increase in the members' income. With all this as the basis, the management of agriculture and subsidiary occupations should then be improved so as to bring about a further increase in the members' income. But this must not be done at the expense of livestock-breeding; agriculture and subsidiary occupations must not supersede livestock-breeding, which is the main occupation of the co-op. Economic help should be given to poor herdsmen to ensure that they hold a predominant position in the co-op.

6) Political work must be well carried out, and cultural and educational work improved. They are important, for they help in running a co-op well. As the great majority of the members of a livestock-breeding co-op are people belonging to national minorities, it is necessary to pay special attention to pursuing the Party's policy towards such minorities, and educate members to work for closer unity between them and respect their habits and customs. Both before and after setting up a co-op, political work must be done well and kept up. The leaders must at all times know exactly what the viewpoints and ideas of the members are, so that they are

always able to do whatever is necessary to convince them, bring them to see the right way of looking at things, and continually improve their understanding of socialism and make them keener on their work. The socialist understanding of the members must first be improved to provide a basis for reforms in the co-op; such work should not be considered as a simple matter, to be done in haste. Attention should be paid at all times to the training of Party members, Youth Leaguers and other active people, and also to setting up branches of the Party and Youth League. Women's work should also be properly attended to. Party members and Youth Leaguers both inside and outside the co-op must be taught to set an example in rallying the masses inside and outside the co-op, so as to ensure that the co-op does its work well. The Party and Youth League should also try to recruit more members, to provide better leaders and ensure the consolidation and healthy expansion of the co-op.

THE ROAD FOR FIVE HUNDRED MILLION PEASANTS

(By Li Kai and Ching Shen in the *People's Daily*, November 28, 1955)

This co-operative, consisting of three poor-peasant families, in a few short months has had an enormous influence on the entire countryside. Everyone has heard of this remarkable, valiant little co-op in Hopei Province. It has strengthened the courage of all our poor peasants.

— EDITOR

I

In his report on "The Question of Agricultural Co-operation" Chairman Mao Tse-tung says, "In one very small co-operative of only six households in Hopei Province, the three old middle-peasant households firmly refused to carry on and left. The three poor-peasant households decided to continue at all costs, stayed in, and the co-operative organization was preserved. The fact is, the road taken by these three poor-peasant households is the one which will be taken by five hundred million peasants throughout the country. All peasants working on their own will eventually take the road resolutely chosen by these three poor-peasant households."

The small co-operative which Chairman Mao singles out for special mention is one organized by Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang, three poor peasants living in the village of Nanwang, Anping County, Hopei.

Our interest in this co-operative roused, we paid it a visit, arriving on November 21, 1955. We immediately noticed the exciting and stimulating atmosphere there. Early morning found the peasants, both men and women, out working in the cold wind, sweeping up fallen leaves for compost. At dusk, coming home from the fields, the peasants formed a long procession on the narrow road, calling to each other and exchanging news about the work of the day. "More than two hundred households have joined the co-op lately," the village functionaries told us. "To make sure of a good harvest next year, the members started agitating to take only ploughed land into the co-op with them. By tomorrow" — November 24 that was — "the co-op members will have finished ploughing 4,700 *mou*." The previous year the snow caught the villagers with more than 500 *mou* still unploughed. The fields lay deep under snow and they had to wait till spring before they could do anything more.

"Listen to Chairman Mao and follow the road taken by Yu-kun and the others. Join the co-operative and make it a success!" That has become the watchword for the peasants of this village. Those who had already joined all wore smiling faces and looked very pleased. Members of the village co-operative preparatory committee were as busy as bees, some looking over and fixing a price for the farm implements with the members, others checking the books and planning how to put the co-op's land to the best use. "If you'd come in spring," said Wang Mi-kuei, the Party secretary, "you wouldn't have seen anything like this. At that time quite a number of well-off peasants were clamouring to get out of the co-operatives! They weren't at all keen on work. But since the small co-ops merged into a big one, those who backed out have come back. Things are run quite differently now."

Yes — in the short span of one year, a tremendous change has come over Nanwang Village.

II

The high tide of the movement to go over to agricultural co-operation reached Hopei in the autumn of 1954. The three small co-operatives in Nanwang Village quickly turned into two fairly large and six small co-ops. Instead of 21 households in the village, the co-operatives now boasted 264. Wang Yu-kun, a Party member, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang, all of them poor peasants, showed how brimful of enthusiasm for socialism they were. They were not only the first to join a co-op, but they did their utmost to make it a success. Some of the better-off peasants, though, had joined the co-op intending to grab whatever they could get out of it. They pretended to be keen but they weren't really interested in making the co-op do well. They were, on the quiet, calculating how to advance their private interests. The Party secretary at that time, an upper middle peasant by the name of Wang Wen-chang, failed to carry out the policy of the Party. He only looked after the interests of the well-off peasants. Ten out of the fourteen brigade leaders and deputy leaders in the medium-sized co-op which he led were also upper middle peasants. The three poor peasants, Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang, belonged to this co-op.

As soon as the co-operative was formed, its members decided that draught animals owned individually should be pooled in the co-op at market price, because most of the members had animals and fodder of their own. On the afternoon fixed, the poor peasants and lower middle peasants who owned draught animals brought them to the co-op. The well-off peasants, however, Wang Wen-chang among them, did not produce their mules. As if that wasn't enough, the leaders of the co-op decided to let the peasants who had kept their mules keep 30 per cent of their fodder too. But the poor and lower middle peasants who had pooled their mules were told to hand in all the fodder in their possession so that it could be used

to help the teams which hadn't enough. (These teams were short of fodder precisely because several of their members had kept their mules at home.) Wang Yu-kun and other poor peasants in the co-op fought hard against this unjust decision, which served the interest of the well-off peasants at the poor peasants' expense. No sooner had Wang Wen-chang said that mules were not to be pooled in the co-op than Yu-kun asked him: "What's the idea? Why should the better-off households keep their mules and the poor peasants' mules farm the co-op land?" Seeing that things were not going the way he wanted, Wang Wen-chang sold his mule without a word to a soul. Wang Yu-kun also took the co-op leaders to task over the question of fodder. "Those who brought in their draught animals," he said, "have to bring in more fodder, while those who didn't are allowed to bring less. You're only making things easy for the well-off peasants. Why don't you think of the poor ones?" "It's a question of mutual aid and brotherly love," argued Wang Wen-chang glibly. "Pooh!" said Yu-kun, "you talk of brotherly love when you want the poor peasants to bring their fodder. Why don't you ask the better-off ones to show some brotherly love when the poor peasants have no grain for food?" Wang Wen-chang had no answer to this. However, the responsible Communist members of the co-op still did nothing in the way of examining their own bourgeois ideas. They even grew worse and began to neglect their duties — Wang Wen-chang, for instance. There were some who tried to discredit Wang Yu-kun. At one time, when Wang Yu-kun's kiddy had died and he was feeling depressed, they told the county Party committee that he showed no interest in his work and wasn't carrying out Party policy (by which they meant the opinion of a mere handful of Party functionaries, an opinion which worked against the interest of the poor peasants). But Wang Yu-kun fought back. At a Party meeting in which a comrade from the county Party committee took part, he exposed their failure to stick to a class stand. Their scheme to discourage Wang Yu-kun failed.

In spring 1955, the well-off peasants not only displayed no fervour in work, but also started to spread rumours among the people. "It's impossible to keep the co-op going," they said. "The organizing of it is having a bad effect on agricultural output." "Let's split it up into smaller co-ops — we'll be able to manage small ones better!" But most of the poor and lower middle peasants were determined to stay in the co-op. The only trouble was that the Party organization needed a shake-up that would bring the poor peasants out on top in the co-op. But worse happened: the functionaries who came to help the villagers consolidate their co-ops were swayed by the views of a small number of well-off peasants and rashly decided to split this medium-sized co-op into seven little ones — one for each of its production brigades. The six households of Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi, Wang Hsiao-pang and the middle peasants Wang Chen-huai, Wang Chen-fu and Wang Lo-ho were organized into one of these little co-ops.

III

The functionaries sincerely believed that after this split the small co-ops would flourish. But contrary to their expectations, the small co-ops ran into difficulties: the question of members wanting to withdraw popped up time and again. This was because a number of the better-off peasants had no real wish to get the small co-ops going. What they wanted was to change the bigger co-op into smaller ones and then kill off the smaller ones. Wang Wen-shuang, leader of one of the production brigades, was an upper middle peasant who, before the co-op broke up, gave his solemn word to the functionaries that if the co-op split up, he would run a small co-op well. But when the split occurred he cried off being the leader on the pretext that he was not up to it, and

asked the members to elect another chairman for the small co-op. Some of the members wanted to elect Li Wu, a Party member, but he made them elect Wang Tan-tan, who was politically backward and no good as a leader. And before very long, since Wang Wen-shuang did nothing to help the chairman he'd sponsored himself, this co-op went on the rocks.

While the upper middle peasants were clamouring to walk out of the co-op, a number of Party and Youth League members and the most active of the poor peasants continued to push ahead along the road pointed out by the Party. Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang were in the forefront of this group. At that time, bitter struggles over which of the two roads (socialism or capitalism) to follow were raging in Wang Yu-kun's co-op. The wheat sown by the co-op in the just under five *mou* of land owned by Wang Chen-huai (an upper middle peasant) grew exceptionally well. Every time Wang Chen-huai walked past his land he started making selfish calculations: none of the other six households in the co-op had land as fine as this piece of his, and he felt that there was no advantage for him to be in the same co-op as the poor peasants. When he saw how some small co-ops went to pieces, he talked it over with his brother, Wang Chen-fu, also a middle peasant, and they decided to withdraw from the co-op. Another middle peasant, Wang Lo-ho, also asked to withdraw when he heard their decision. Although Wang Yu-kun tried to explain the government's policy to them and point out the right road to follow, hoping to induce them to stay in, he had no success. "We don't want to take that road as yet. We'll wait a bit and see," they said.

In May, the three poor peasants who wanted to stay in the co-op had a meeting. "Look," said Yu-kun resolutely, "the Party tells us that if we want a good life for ourselves and everyone else, we've got to persist in going the co-operative way. I shall follow the Party's advice — I'm going to stay in the co-op. What about you?"

"My mind's made up," said Hsiao-chi. "There's no other way for a household like mine except to join the co-op." "I've had enough of going it alone," said Hsiao-pang. "Let them withdraw. As long as you two want to carry on, I'll go with you." This determination of theirs to make the co-op a success proved to be a tremendous force. They agreed that even if the other three households insisted on backing out, they would carry on. They decided that in that case they would take one of the co-op's two oxen and carry on with three people and one ox.

Not long afterwards, a work team sent from the county and district to put the co-ops on a sound basis arrived in Nanwang Village. At a meeting, the work team comrades asked the peasants what they thought about things. The three middle peasants still said they wanted to withdraw from the co-op, but Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang vowed that they would stay and carry on without the other three.

What was it that made these three so determined to stay in the co-op? Let's examine the case of each.

Wang Yu-kun was a man in his prime, but he had suffered countless hardships in the old society. Before the land reform, he was one of the poorest of the poor peasants in the village. To make a living, he had had to work as a hired hand for the landlords. After he received land in the land reform, his life got gradually better. He was as active as anyone in the struggle that ensued during the land reform; it was then that he was admitted into the Communist Party. However, though he owned about a dozen *mou* of land, he had no farm implements and shared the ownership of a draught animal with another peasant, so the yield he got by individual farming was low — only a thousand catties or so of grain — and he had a large household to feed. Life wasn't easy for him. The Party's policy of encouraging agricultural co-operation showed him the direction to take and gave him strength. So in the co-operative movement in 1954 he was

a real live-wire in leading the peasants to organize co-operatives.

Wang Hsiao-chi is a younger man — a member of the Youth League. He and his mother well remembered the hard, bitter days before the land reform. After his father died, his mother had to bring him up alone and they were constantly short of food and clothing. After the land reform, their living conditions improved, but they had no farm implements and only part ownership of a draught animal shared with three other peasants. He was young and inexperienced and knew little about farming, so the yield of their land was low, and it was still hard for them to make ends meet. When the Party pointed out that the road of agricultural co-operation was the only sure way for peasants to shake off poverty, he talked it over with his mother and was one of the first to join the co-op.

The third, Wang Hsiao-pang, in his childhood had known the bitter experience of having to beg with his mother to live at all. After the land reform, because he lacked many of the things that a farmer needs he was far from successful in working his land. He dreamt of ways of making life more comfortable but it was impossible to achieve anything on the basis of individual farming. He had neither draught animal nor tool, so he always had a hard time coping with the sowing. Even when he did manage to get the seed in, it was still hard to tend the crops well without this, that and the other. He used to go round a lot with Wang Yu-kun and other Communists, so as soon as he realized that it was only by taking the co-operative road that he could shake off poverty, he was filled with a burning desire to make the co-op work well. In the drive for co-operation in 1954, Yu-kun, Hsiao-chi and he were the keenest in the whole village.

At the time when there were three households in Wang Yu-kun's small co-op demanding to withdraw and three others steadfast in wanting to carry on, the proper thing for the

work team to do was to cherish and foster the socialist fervour of the peasants, support them in their actions and help them make a go of their co-op. But instead of doing so, the work team thought that a co-op had to look like "a proper co-op" . . . how could three households achieve anything? So they sought out Wang Yu-kun and told him, "Look, you've only got three households now. You can't run a co-op on that, but we don't mind if your three households turn themselves into a mutual-aid team." These words were like a dash of cold water over Yu-kun's head.

To all appearances it did look as if the people in Nanwang had cooled off in their struggle for co-operation. Actually, the struggle went on without a moment's respite. That very evening, Yu-kun got Hsiao-chi and Hsiao-pang together. "It's like this," he told them. "The other three households are determined to back out. The work team thinks that there are too few of us and we haven't got the conditions for a co-operative, so they tell us to form a mutual-aid team. In my opinion, it doesn't matter whether we call ourselves a team or a co-op. We must still go on owning the draught animal collectively, share in contributing fodder, and work collectively to make a good job of our farming." The others agreed and so they carried on.

IV

Not long afterwards, news of these three peasants who refused to be deterred from taking the road to socialism reached Peking and the ears of Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao praised their action and fervour for socialism and told the Party to give them its backing.

Early in July, Anping County Party Committee sent Comrade Chou Chiu-hsueh to help the three peasants run their co-op. They held a meeting on July 18. When Chou explained that the Party leaders supported them in their desire to stay in the co-op, small as it was, they were no end encouraged. "Ever since I was told, about twenty days ago, to turn the

co-op into a mutual-aid team," said Yu-kun, "I've been uneasy and unsettled. I couldn't help feeling that nobody ought to block the road pointed out by the Party. And it turns out that's really so."

The four of them discussed how to make a success of the co-op and came to the conclusion that results would tell—they must make a good showing on their land. Although they had not much in the way of tools, they must still show an increase in yields and produce more than the peasants who worked on their own.

That summer there was nothing but trouble. Locusts made an appearance in the two *mou* of late millet in the northwest corner of the village. The millet ears were just beginning to form, but if the locusts touched them, the crop would be finished. Wang Yu-kun, very worried, dashed off to buy insecticide and applied it. The pests were exterminated. Soon, however, another batch appeared, and this time there were more of them than the first time. Yu-kun and his fellow members worked like Trojans and exterminated them as fast as they appeared, so their two *mou* of millet suffered no damage. But the early millet belonging to Wang Chih-pin, a peasant farming on his own, suffered severely from the pests because he was unable to take effective measures to wipe them out. In the autumn, the co-op reaped 150 catties per *mou*. Wang Chih-pin only got a little over 50 to the *mou*.

One blazing summer day at noon it was so hot that the leaves of the maize curled into rolls, but two men wielded their hoes in a battle against weeds in the maize field in the northwest corner of the village. They were Hsiao-chi and Hsiao-pang. There had been a lot of rain that summer and the weeds had run riot. Yu-kun's small co-op decided that they must clear them at all costs. When others retreated under the shade for rest, they carried on doggedly. In the finish, on the co-op's 40 *mou* of land, you couldn't find a single stray weed. What a contrast that was to the land next to theirs belonging to Wang Lo-tai, a peasant working on his

own. He had had no time to hoe properly and weeds were everywhere.

The co-op, of course, needed money to carry on its work, but where were they to get it from? The three members told one another they had just got to cut down expenses and save every possible penny. For several months the only thing they spent money on was oil for lamps and a bottle of writing ink. Before harvest time, the government saw that they were really hard up and gave them a loan of 200 yuan which they bought a cart with. This bit of help gave them new heart.

It was with such dogged persistence that the three poor peasants battled against all kinds of difficulties and finally increased the yield of their land. In 1954, before the three households were organized, all they reaped from their 40 *mou* was 950 catties of millet, 1,600 catties of maize, 1,300 catties of peanuts, 450 catties of cotton and 3,000 catties of sweet potatoes — the equivalent of approximately 6,580 catties of grain. In 1955, as a co-op, they reaped 1,800 catties of millet, 1,980 catties of maize, 2,000 catties of peanuts, 700 catties of cotton, and 5,000 catties of sweet potatoes — the equivalent of approximately 9,950 catties of grain. They had increased their yield by more than 50 per cent compared with the year before. Naturally the real income of the three households was also greater than before. After deducting expenses, each household still had 1,100 catties more grain than the previous year. Compared with peasants outside the co-op they were far better off. Wang Lo-ho, one of those whose household backed out of the co-op, farmed his land with tools pretty much the same as those used in the co-op. But just when the crops needed tending most, Wang Lo-ho fell ill. His fields became choked with weeds and he only got an average of 150 catties per *mou* from his 19 *mou* of land, which was 90 catties per *mou* less than the co-op reaped.

When Yu-kun and the other two started their tiny little co-op, well-off peasants who had not joined a co-op jeered

at them and sarcastically called theirs "The Giant." But the spirit and determination they displayed in following the road of agricultural co-operation at all costs and the fact that they did increase the yield of their land finally convinced everyone. No one mocked them any more. Nobody jeered about "The Giant."

The county Party committee not only backed Wang Yu-kun's co-op, it also reorganized the Party branch in Nanwang. Wang Wen-chang, the Party secretary who had insisted on taking the capitalist road, was expelled.

V

When Chairman Mao's report on "The Question of Agricultural Co-operation" went out to the countryside, it also reached Nanwang. When Yu-kun heard that Chairman Mao himself had praised them, he hastened to take the good news to Hsiao-chi, Hsiao-pang and their families. When she heard about it, Hsiao-chi's mother was moved to tears. "So Chairman Mao himself knows about our co-op too," she said. "Chairman Mao takes a real interest in us peasants." And she urged her son always to listen to the words of Chairman Mao and see that the co-op did well. The Party branch also passed Chairman Mao's directions on to the peasants and Nanwang Village was in a state of rare excitement. Members of the Party and Youth League and the live-wires among the poor peasants who were keen on the co-ops now held their heads high. Yu-kun, Hsiao-chi and Hsiao-pang were so busy that they hadn't a minute to rest, going round and using their own experience to convince the peasants that they should join the co-op. In a few days, they persuaded nine households to apply for co-op membership. People who had backed out now realized how wrong they were and wanted to join again. Some upper middle peasants who were dubious before and others who had withdrawn also decided to plump for the co-operative road.

A headquarters to direct everything — the village co-op preparatory committee — was set up. The villagers elected Yu-kun its vice-chairman. Excited and glad, the peasants applied to join the co-op. Two hundred and eighty households were admitted as members, that is, 85 per cent of the peasant households in the village were drawn in. "We must run our co-op well. By autumn next year, we'll be able to report to Chairman Mao on the results of our large co-op." That was what the members and their leaders told one another to spur themselves to do even better.

Nanwang Village is a fine little place and we found Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang to be people bent on going the socialist way. When we look at them, when we look at Nanwang Village, we can clearly see the road to be taken by our five hundred million peasants. We wish them greater success as they march forward on the road of agricultural co-operation.

THEY INSIST ON TAKING THE ROAD TO CO-OPERATION

(By Shih Shu-fang, in the *People's Daily*, September 20, 1955)

This is an extremely interesting story.

Socialism is something new. A severe struggle must be waged against the old ways before socialism can be brought about. At a given time, a section of society is very stubborn and refuses to abandon its old ways. At another time, these same people may change their attitude and approve the new.

In the earlier half of 1955, most of the well-to-do middle peasants opposed co-operation. In the latter half, a number of them changed their minds and indicated their willingness to join, although some did so only because they hoped to obtain control of the co-op. Another group wavered a great deal. They said they wanted to join, but in their hearts they were not willing. A third group was composed of people who stubbornly insisted that they would wait and see.

Village Party organizations should be patient on this question. Control of the co-op leadership must be established in the hands of the poor peasants and the new lower middle peasants. Therefore it does no harm if some of the well-to-do middle peasants enter the co-operatives a little later; in fact it is better that way.

—*EDITOR*

There is an agricultural producers' co-operative in Tungwang Village, Hsinlo County, Hopei Province. It is a small co-op composed of three poor-peasant households and one family of lower middle peasants. When it first got started it came up against many difficulties. But its members, uniting as one man, have overcome all the obstacles in their way and advanced steadily along the co-operative road.

NO MUTUAL BENEFIT, NO CO-OP

In September 1954, the movement for mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture was going forward vigorously in Tungwang Village. Two mutual-aid teams with 12 member families were reorganized into an agricultural producers' co-op. Lei Huan-teh, the leader of one team, became chairman of the new co-op. Lei Hsi-tao, who had led the other, became the vice-chairman.

Chairman Lei Huan-teh, however, failed to run the co-op according to the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit. In 1954 when it was time for sowing the winter wheat, Li Lao-suo, one of the members, made a suggestion. "We must try to find a method for recording work-points," he said. "We'll make a mess of things if we aren't careful from the start." But Chairman Lei wouldn't hear of this. "What's the use?" he retorted. "We're all good neighbours. It would do no harm if one of us got a bit more or less than his due." So the sowing was done in a disorganized way, without any definite system of registering how much work each member had done.

Chairman Lei did not agree to a work-point system because he thought he personally had nothing to gain from it. Although he had some thirty *mou* of land, he was the only real worker in his family. Both of his sons were weak and could do no heavy labour. When the sowing came, he alone took part in it, leaving his sons to look after the pigs at home. Lei Hsi-tao, the vice-chairman, saw this and did the same.

Naturally, there was discontent among the members. "It's bad enough that we work without writing down points," said Li Wu-mao, a poor peasant. "But now they've gone even further, leaving their sons to take care of their own pigs at home. We really can't stand any more of this." When Chairman Lei heard of his remark, he flew into a rage. "Old Li," he thundered, "if you want to stay in the co-op, all right; if not, you can get out."

That same autumn, Chairman Lei led some members in setting up a carpenter's shop. Generally speaking, it is only fair that all the members should have a chance to take part in subsidiary occupations of this kind. But Chairman Lei and others made a rule: if you didn't invest eight yuan in the shop, you couldn't work in it. As a result, poor peasants like Lei Lai-hsi and Lei Tung-erh were barred from the work. Then something even more unfair happened. The co-op had bought a mule. The money came from a government loan, for which the poor peasants had to pay interest, just as the middle peasants did. But that mule worked all winter for the carpenter's shop, in which no poor peasant had a share. Meanwhile the heaviest part of the farm work fell on the shoulders of the poor peasants, since they had no part in the subsidiary occupations. For example, Lei Tung-erh, who built eight pig sties in one stretch, received nothing for his labour.

"LET'S PART FRIENDS"

A work-point system was finally adopted in the spring of 1955. Chairman Lei felt that he had nothing more to gain from the co-op. So he began to instigate the other middle peasants to withdraw with him. Sowing-time had come again. The middle peasants worked their land with the help of their draught animals and carts. The fields of the poor peasants were left utterly neglected. Lei Lai-hsi, a poor peasant, had four *mou* of land, which had not been sown in time. The

carts moved back and forth across his plot, leaving deep wheel tracks which remained for a long time.

When the work of checking over and consolidating the co-ops began, the middle peasants led by Chairman Lei insisted on withdrawing. Not wishing to appear singularly backward, Lei began to urge some poor peasants to get out too. "If the co-op doesn't break up," he told Li Lao-suo, a Communist, and Li Wu-mao, an active poor peasant, "I'll give it up and go to Shansi Province." "You can go if you like," Lao-suo answered. "We'll carry on." Chairman Lei talked to Li Wu-mao several times about this. But Li stood firm.

Meanwhile groups of cadres from the township, district and county governments came to help the co-op. They and the leading peasants in the co-op continued to stick to the principle of uniting with and educating the middle peasants. Members of the township Party committee also spent twelve days showing the middle peasants the prospects of socialism in the countryside, and explaining the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit. But although the middle peasants got satisfactory answers to all the questions they raised, they left the co-op just the same.

The poor peasants, on their part, were determined to make the co-op succeed. "The Communist Party has led us to liberation," Li Wu-mao said, "and we'll certainly go all the way with it to socialism. I've drunk bitterness when working on my own, without even a cart or a draught animal to help. Nothing can make me go back to that."

"We've seen a better life since land reform," said Lei Shun-tao, a lower middle peasant. "But as far as production is concerned, we're still up against difficulties. We can't overcome them unless we keep up our co-op. I'll follow where the co-op leads."

"Never mind the difficulties!" declared Li Lao-suo, as if swearing an oath. "I'm a Communist. I'm not afraid of

them. If we all put our shoulders to the wheel, we can certainly make this small co-op a success."

He was elected chairman of the co-op.

NO IMPASSE

The news that the co-op was reborn occasioned much comment in the village. The common view was that it couldn't live long, for lack of draught animals, carts and so on. And in fact the co-op was beset with difficulties in its new start. In this critical period, the township Party committee decided to send two of its members, Li Chung-erh and Lei Yin-hsueh, to guide the work. Li spent two days with the members, helping them to map out a plan for the current year. It was time for spring sowing and the only draught animal the co-op could boast of was Lei Shun-tao's small, emaciated mule, which was too weak to do much. Its cart was in bad repair.

Chairman Li Lao-suo went to the Party committee with his trouble. "Don't worry," Party Secretary Lei Chiu-wei told him. "You can fix my cart and use it. We can spare it for a while." Lei Hsin-hsi, a poor peasant who lived in the same courtyard with Li Wu-mao, also offered help. "Don't bother," he said generously, "you can use ours." So the question of cart was solved.

Then came the work of sowing. The middle peasants, just before they withdrew, had played a trick on the co-op: They had ploughed and sown all their own land, which had laid neglected after the previous autumn harvest. When they got out, the co-op still had 17 *mou*, all of which belonged to the poor peasants, unploughed and unsown. The poor peasants grasped the nettle. As their mule was too weak to draw the plough by itself, they sent two men to help it, one dragging the plough in front and the other pushing it from behind. One day Chairman Li took the mule and worked the potato fields, which were hard and dry. Man and the animal worked

with such vehemence that at the noon break they were too exhausted to eat anything. It was with greatest difficulty that the co-op ploughed its 17 *mou*, plot by plot.

"Between the green and the yellow" (the pre-harvest period), as the saying goes, there wasn't enough food for men or fodder for the beast. Though the chairman tried to borrow right and left, he could not get enough to feed all the people. Again he went to the Party committee for help. Li Chung-erh, a committee member, lent him 20 yuan and 400 catties of hay. "For a new co-op with little capital like yours," he said encouragingly, "difficulties are bound to crop up. But they can be overcome, if you all work with one mind."

It was now June. The crops on the sandy soil were drying up fast under the blazing sun. The co-op members used all their strength to water the land day and night. They fought the drought as one fights an enemy on the firing line. The men helped the mule to pull the water-wheels and took its place when it was tired. These strenuous efforts lasted almost three months.

After the wheat harvest there were more and more farm work. They had to hoe and water the fields and plant sweet potatoes at the same time. And at this juncture Li Wu-mao, who did the most work, fell ill. Chairman Li Lao-suo, who was also secretary of the township people's council, was tied down with government wheat-buying work. Only Lei Shun-tao pressed on with the hoeing.

For a time there was a real danger that the six *mou* of potato fields would be left unplanted. The peasants, at their wits' end, called on the four women in the co-op. The women, complete strangers to field work, had to learn sowing from the very beginning. Li Wu-mao, in spite of his illness, had had to go out to teach them, and to look after their seven children. They finished planting, but there was still five yuan to pay for potato shoots. The co-op's creditors were inexorable. Penniless and desperate, the peasants sent Lei

Shun-tao to the Party committee to seek help. Li Chung-erh again lent them the money they needed, from the funds of his own co-op.

VICTORY

The co-op did not end up the way some middle peasants in Tungwang Village thought it would. On the contrary, it advanced along the path indicated by the Party, the path to which the members of the co-op had long been devoted. They came out victors at last.

Local peasants who worked on their own and lacked labour power and animals, lost much of their crop in the 1955 drought. But the small co-op, relying on common efforts of its members, overcame all sorts of difficulties and kept its land supplied with water at all times. As a result, its crops suffered no damage. The maize yield reached 250 catties per *mou*. By the autumn of 1955, they expect to reap a rich potato crop of 20,000 catties from 13 *mou* of land, with 2,000 catties per *mou* as the best yield. The groundnuts (planted on three *mou*) and other crops also came up well. Part of the harvest from one *mou* of egg-plants was sold for about 60 yuan; the total yield would bring 80 yuan or more. With this income, the co-op would be able to defray its miscellaneous expenses for the year and return some of its loans.

In 1954 when the co-op members were still in a mutual-aid team of four households, their food crop was 8,854 catties. The 1955 crop, however, is expected to total 13,300 catties — 4,000 catties more than 1954. Li Wu-mao, a poor peasant, had a crop of some 1,600 catties in 1954; but he has good reason to expect 3,000 catties this year. Lei Shun-tao, a lower middle peasant, did not get enough to eat in 1954; but he is going to get 8,000 catties of potatoes alone in 1955. His life will obviously be much better. Lei Kou-pa, who withdrew from the co-op, will probably get some 1,300 catties less grain this year than in 1954. The reasons were the drought and lack of manpower due to the bad health of one member of his family. "If I had stayed in the co-op," he said regretfully, "I wouldn't have suffered such a big loss."

Would you care to ask Li Wu-mao about the year's harvest for the co-op? "Well," he would answer with a warm smile, "if we hadn't persistently carried on the co-op, no one would have dreamt of such a rich crop." "To be sure," Lei Hsin-hsi's aunt would put in with envy. "Everybody thought this small co-op a short-lived thing. But what has happened now? They have definitely pumped life into a co-op that 'died'!"

WHO SAYS A CHICKEN FEATHER CAN'T FLY UP TO HEAVEN?

(A report from the Anyang Regional Communist Party Committee's Office for the Co-operative Movement, originally appearing in the November 2, 1955 issue of the *Honan Daily*)

This is an excellent article. It will open the eyes of a great many people. The Party organization in this place never wavered on the question of co-operation. It stood four-square behind the destitute peasants in their demand for a co-op and in their victorious competition with the well-to-do middle peasants; it firmly supported them as they grew from a small co-op to a large one, increasing their output year by year, till by the third year the whole village was in co-operatives. The well-to-do middle peasants had jeered: "They've less money than an egg has hair, yet they think they can run a co-op. Can a chicken feather fly up to heaven?" But that is just what this chicken feather did.

Here we had a struggle between two alternatives — socialism and capitalism.

China's rich peasants are economically very weak: that part of their land which they worked in a semi-feudal manner was taken from them during the land reform. The great majority of the old type of rich peasants are no longer able to hire labour, and they have an unsavoury reputation. But the well-to-do and fairly well-to-do middle peasants are quite strong, and they form 20 to 30 per cent of the rural

population. An important aspect of the struggle in China's countryside between these alternatives is the peaceful competition between the poor peasants and the poorer middle peasants on the one hand and the well-to-do middle peasants on the other.

Let us see who increases production in a two or three-year period: Is it the well-to-do middle peasants working alone? Or is it the poor peasants and the lower middle peasants working together in co-operatives? At first only the co-ops organized by some of the poor peasants and lower middle peasants compete with the well-to-do middle peasants. Most of the poor peasants and lower middle peasants are still watching from the sidelines. At this stage both sides are fighting for adherents. Standing behind the well-to-do middle peasants are the former landlords and the rich peasants. They give their support to the well-to-do middle peasants, sometimes secretly, sometimes openly. Standing on the side of the co-operatives is the Communist Party.

Party organizations should follow the example of the Communists in Nantsui Village, Anyang County, and firmly support the co-operatives. Unfortunately, not all the rural Party branches have done so. And where they didn't, confusion arose.

First of all, there were public debates on whether or not a chicken feather can fly up to heaven. Of course this is a serious question. In thousands of years has anyone ever seen one that could? The impossibility of such a feat has practically become a truism. Where the Party does not criticize this old saw it may bewilder many a poor peasant and lower middle peasant. Moreover, with regard to administrative staff and, further, with regard to material resources — such as the ability to raise loans — the co-

ops have a hard time if the Party and the government do not give them a hand.

The reason the well-to-do middle peasants dared trot out such moth-eaten proverbs as "chicken feathers can't fly up to heaven" was because the co-ops had not yet increased their output, the poor co-ops had not yet become prosperous, and the individual, isolated co-op had not yet become one of hundreds of thousands of co-ops. It was because the Party had not yet gone to every corner of the land with banners flying and explained the benefits of co-operation. It was because the Party had not yet pointed out why, in the era of socialism, the ancient truism that "a chicken feather can't fly up to heaven" is no longer true.

The poor want to remake their lives. The old system is dying. A new system is being born. Chicken feathers really are flying up to heaven. In the Soviet Union they have already got there. In China they've started their flight. Chicken feathers are going to soar up all over the world.

Many of our local Party organizations did not give strong backing to the needy peasants. But we cannot put all the blame on them, because the higher authorities had not yet struck a mortal blow at opportunist thinking, nor made an over-all plan for the promotion of co-operation, nor improved the leadership of the campaign on a nation-wide scale.

In 1955, we did these things, and in the space of a few months the situation changed completely. The people who had been standing on the side-lines came over, whole groups at a time, to take their stand with the co-operatives. The well-to-do middle peasants also changed their tune. Some applied to join the co-ops. Others prepared to join. Even the crustiest die-hards among them didn't dare to argue

any more about whether chicken feathers could fly up to heaven. The former landlords and rich peasants were completely deflated. The punishment which the People's Government meted out to a number of counter-revolutionaries who had been endangering public security and trying to wreck the co-operatives also had some bearing on this.

In short, in the latter half of 1955, a fundamental change took place in the balance of power between classes in our country. Socialism made a mighty advance. Capitalism took a heavy fall. With another year of hard work in 1956, we can, by and large, put socialist transformation in the transition period on a sound footing.

— EDITOR

Prosperity Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Nantsui Village, Anyang County, Honan Province, was founded in the spring of 1953. It was at the start a tiny, poor co-op of 18 households, but it had Chang Huai-teh, a member of the Communist Party, at its head. Led by the Party branch, they kept together, taking the rough with the smooth, determined to take the socialist road and work valiantly and well. Finally they got the co-op running very well indeed, and it grew to 88 households. The whole village joined in co-operation. This particular co-op is now the standard-bearer of the co-operative movement in all the villages around.

FROM A POOR MAN'S TEAM TO A POOR MAN'S CO-OP

The poor peasants of Nantsui Village received land during the land reform, but because they had no money, because their soil was poor and because they were short of animals and implements, they still faced many difficulties. Trying to find a way out, in the autumn of 1950, Chang Huai-teh,

Chang Huai-fu and another poor peasant began swapping labour on some jobs and working together on others. In 1951, when the People's Government called on the peasants to organize and increase output, they were the first to respond. They expanded their three-family unit to a seasonal mutual-aid team of seven poor families. As a result of the team's efforts, their wheat yield that year rose from 100 catties a *mou* to 120.

In 1952 the team grew to 11 families (ten poor-peasant families, one lower middle-peasant family) and worked as a team all the year round. Although the team was now larger, it still did not have enough farm tools; it had only seven donkeys and four wheel-barrows. In the busy seasons, men had to drag the ploughs and harrows themselves; manure had to be carried by wheel-barrow or in baskets hung from shoulder poles, and the crops were brought from the fields in the same manner. Some of the well-to-do peasants in the village jeered and called the team "The Paupers' Brigade," "The Shoulder Pole Company," and "The Skinny Donkeys." Nevertheless, its members were able to do many things as a team which they had not been able to do working alone. There was no longer any question of weeds strangling the young plants, or flooded fields, or not being able to plant on time. Yields increased.

By friendly co-operation they were able to minimize or eliminate the effects of natural disasters and human misfortunes. That year, 1952, right in the middle of the spring planting, poor peasant Chang Kuang-li fell seriously ill. The whole team went to visit him. They helped him pay for a doctor and attended to all the work in his fields. So that he could rest with an easy mind, they hoed his seven *mou* of cotton three times, although the custom was to hoe only twice. Chang Kuang-li's plants came up thick and strong. When he left his bed and saw them, he was moved to tears. In the autumn, his cotton crop averaged 150 catties to the *mou*. He had never had such a harvest.

"Organization makes us strong; with unity and mutual help you will be able to do much better." That was the conclusion reached by every member of the team.

In the winter of 1952, when the Communist Party was busy with a campaign to strengthen the Party and to increase membership, Chang Kuang-li and a number of other enthusiastic poor peasants consulted the village Party branch about the team becoming a co-operative. Chang Huai-teh, the team leader and secretary of the Party branch, made several trips to two co-operatives in neighbouring villages to learn how they worked. After the campaign to strengthen the Party was concluded, the village branch put forward a plan that Chang Huai-teh's team should combine with another mutual-aid team to form a co-op. There were 23 families in the two teams. After a winter spent in discussion and preparatory work, the co-operative was formally established on the first day of 1953. Five middle-peasant families dropped out, saying, "You go ahead first. We'll wait and see!" That left ten poor-peasant families and eight of the lower middle peasants who were determined to take the road to co-operation.

THEY KEPT THEIR CHINS UP

When the co-op was formed, some of the well-to-do peasants ridiculed it, saying, "They've less money than an egg has hair, yet they think they can run a co-op. Can a chicken feather fly up to heaven?" The co-operative was just getting started, and it is true it came up against all sorts of problems. At the height of the spring planting only 12 of the 18 families had enough to eat. Tsui Feng-lung, Chang Shou-sheng and two other poor-peasant families had to hire themselves out as farm hands. Any day they couldn't find work, that day their families had nothing to put in the cooking pot. Worse difficulties were encountered in production. Seven draught oxen were so weak from lack of fodder that if they fell, they couldn't get up. The co-op didn't even have enough

money to buy proper hemp rope: they had to tether their animals with straw ropes. If their attention wandered, the oxen would give them the slip and eat the crops. The well-to-do peasants made up a sarcastic jingle: "We don't care a jot for ghoul or ghost; the co-op's oxen scare us most."

All that the members had been able to bring to the co-op were a dilapidated old cart, two crude ploughs and four seeders — none of them all of a piece. There were no replacements for parts that were missing, and not even a whip to drive the ox. When they used the cart to haul coal, it was always breaking down, because the animals were weak and thin and the drivers didn't know their trade thoroughly. Middle peasants with carts were fed up having to help them out on the road, and finally refused to travel to the mine in company with the co-op teamsters. At that time the co-op was an isolated little island in the village.

But thanks to the firm leadership of the Party branch (six of the seven Communists in the village had joined the co-op), the members were determined to make a go of it. Chang Huai-teh, secretary of the village Party branch and chairman of the co-operative, said at a Party meeting:

"I'm a Communist. We have a hard time at home. But even if my family has to go without food for three days I'm not going to stop leading the fight to put our co-op on its feet. I'll never bow my head!"

His attitude strengthened the resolve of the other Communists. "We'll see this thing through," they said. "We're going to make that chicken feather fly right up to heaven!"

The Party secretary often told them stories of the Long March — how the Red Army climbed the menacing Snow Mountains and crossed the dreaded Grasslands, to remind them of the way Communists fought and conquered formidable difficulties. This helped to put them on their mettle.

The co-op members rallied together and solved their problems one by one. Some of them received loans or subsidies from the government, but they did not rely entirely on this;

they helped one another in a spirit of class solidarity. When the family of the co-op chairman had nothing to eat, the other members on their own initiative chipped in with three pecks of grain. When there wasn't enough grass to feed the animals, Communist Chang Kuang-li set an example by removing two broken window frames and two cross-beams from his house, selling them and giving the proceeds to the co-op to buy fodder. The other members were so stirred that they too set about making their inanimate belongings serve their living possessions. Using Chang Kuang-li's "method," they raised ten-odd yuan — enough to solve the fodder problem temporarily. Later, the government loaned them 10,000 catties of cotton-seed cake, which ended the fodder shortage for good.

They also became more efficient at carting coal. The Party branch called on them to "learn the things you don't know how to do. What three men are doing let two men do." With Communists Tsui Feng-wu and Li Chen-yu taking the lead, all the co-op's teamsters were soon doing their work well.

The Communists and the other co-op members were indeed "breathing the same air and sharing a common destiny." This was why everyone concerned was thoroughly optimistic about the co-op's future. The one exception was Li Yung-hsiang, a man who had become a lower middle peasant even before land reform. He was still not well-to-do, but he was slightly better off than the average co-op member. When he joined he had invested a large rickety old cart and a half share in the ownership of an ox. He was afraid he would not get a square deal in the co-op, and at one time was thinking of pulling out. But finally the warm co-operative friendliness of the poor peasants and the general enthusiastic atmosphere convinced him that he should stay in.

In this way the co-op members not only got through spring — for them a time of empty bins and larders — but they also planted 120 *mou* of cotton on time and according

to plan. By giving them a loan of 550 yuan, even before their wheat ripened, the government encouraged them to expand productive activities. They used the money to buy two mules and a cart. They became more enthusiastic about their work than ever.

"It's not going to be a poor man's co-op much longer," said the people in the village.

THE RESULT OF THE CONTEST

Not long after Prosperity Co-operative was formed, some of the relatively well-off middle peasants went into action. Tsui Chin-kao and eight other well-to-do middle-peasant families plus two poor-peasant families organized a mutual-aid team (actually it was a co-operative disguised as a mutual-aid team). They jeered openly at Prosperity Co-operative and secretly planned to compete with it. These middle peasants were confident that with the rich soil, good carts, good animals and ready cash at their disposal, they could crush Prosperity Co-operative and strengthen their own position as leaders of the mutual-aid team. But the result was that they lost the contest and Prosperity Co-op won. The mutual-aid team harvested an average of 95 catties of cotton per *mou*; their millet averaged 160. The co-op's 103 *mou* of millet land gave a yield of 200 catties to the *mou*; its 118 *mou* of cotton fields gave a yield of 120 catties per *mou* on the alkaline-free land and 93 catties per *mou* as a combined average of the alkaline-free and the alkaline land together. The co-op's millet yield was 40 catties a *mou* above that of the mutual-aid team. Because the co-op had quite a bit of alkaline land, its average cotton yield was less than the team's, but it was still better than the average for the entire village — 90 catties to the *mou*.

How could a new co-op, which was so poor, get such good results? First of all, because, led by the Party branch, its members were frugal and worked hard. Some of them had

been discouraged when they saw the mutual-aid team's carts carrying load after load of fertilizer, bought at the supply and marketing co-op. They were afraid Prosperity Co-operative was too poor to compete. But the village Party branch encouraged them, urged them to use every available moment collecting natural fertilizer. They built three big privies which all the families in the co-op agreed to use. They also got "fertilizer" by tearing down the compound walls and brick oven-beds of every member and making good use of the dirty earth thus obtained. In this way they were able to get enough good fertilizer at a very small cost.

Secondly, they responded to the call of the Party and the government to improve methods of cultivation. Since liberation, experience had taught them that they could be sure of one thing — that the advice of the Party and Chairman Mao was always sound. They planted their cotton close together but in widely spaced furrows as the government recommended and, except on the small plots of alkaline land, replaced any plants that did not come up. This preserved an unbroken line of growing plants. As the cotton grew, they took turns watching over it, seeing to it that every plant was exposed to sunlight and the breezes. The cotton ripened early. There were few spoiled bolls. The harvest was large, and it fetched a good price.

What impressed people most was the co-op's excellent millet harvest. It was obtained by sowing the improved "Huanung Number Four" seed on all 103 *mou* of the co-op's millet fields and using the "single seed and close planting" method. The harvest was a record-breaker.

In the mutual-aid team, however, no one wanted to try out new techniques. The mutual-aid team not only failed to use better seed and go in for close planting, but some even said, "In the old days when we had no Communist Party to lead us, we got good crops without close planting." Well, that autumn there was a big storm just before the harvest. The plants of the mutual-aid team, growing wide apart, had

no strength to withstand the wind. Many were destroyed and the team had to stand the loss.

Prosperity Co-operative achieved such a remarkable increase in production that more peasants wanted to join. The lives of the members took a turn for the better. Even peasants still outside the co-op exclaimed:

"It's a poor man's co-op no longer. That chicken feather is flying all over the sky!"

Twenty-six peasant families applied for admission. "If you don't let us join, we'll push our way in," cried some of the poor peasants and lower middle peasants.

And the mutual-aid team? Not only did no one want to join it, but several of its original members dropped out. Two of them pleaded to be admitted to the co-op.

FROM SMALL TO BIG, FROM POOR TO PROSPEROUS

After the 1953 autumn harvest, the village Party branch summed up the accomplishments of the co-op in the year since it was established and cited them in support of the Party's general line of policy during the period of transition to socialism. The success of the co-op was offered as a vivid and tangible proof of the superiority of socialist methods, and it strengthened the conviction of people both in the co-op and out that the co-operative road was the right one to take.

"We've got animals and carts now," said the co-op members. "Our output is higher. We're living better. We don't have to use shoulder poles any more. We'll never forget the Communist Party as long as we live."

The leader of a mutual-aid team, Chang Shun-chang, a lower middle peasant, applied with all five member families of his team for admission to the co-op. "We'll go along with the Party branch wherever it leads," they said.

Now that most of the peasants understood the advantages of co-operation, two more co-ops were formed in the village. The three co-ops had a total of 64 families — over 60 per cent

of the village's 104 households. Prosperity Co-operative increased its membership from 18 families to 35. Of these, 18 families were poor peasants, 13 were lower middle peasants, and only 4 were middle peasants who had become well-to-do since liberation. It was still composed mostly of poor peasants.

In 1954, its yields were also considerably greater than in 1953. The wheat output rose from 140 catties a *mou* to 158, millet from 200 to 212, cotton from 93 to 123.5.

This proved that poor peasants and lower middle peasants could, when led by the Party, organize co-operatives and run them well. There was absolutely no justification for looking down on them or saying that a co-op could not be run successfully without the well-to-do peasants.

In the autumn of 1954, inspired by the achievements of Prosperity Co-operative and the fine results obtained by the co-ops in Kuowangtu and other villages where mechanized cultivation had been introduced, the three co-ops combined so as to be big enough to warrant the use of farming machinery. They also increased their membership by another 24 families. Except for 14 families of former landlords, rich peasants, and two families under surveillance for criminal activities, everyone else in the village — including all the 88 poor and middle-peasant families — were now in the co-op.

In the year that followed, the three-in-one co-op operated on a large scale, using farming machinery, and planting in conformity with the national plan for their region (except for 30-odd *mou* set aside for grain and a few vegetable plots, their whole 1,100 *mou* of arable land were planted entirely with cotton). As a result, their 1955 harvest promised to be even more striking than those of the two previous years. Four hundred and twenty *mou* of wheat fields have averaged 198 catties to the *mou*. Twenty-six *mou* sown and cultivated by machinery have brought in an average of 267 catties. On 1,004 *mou* of cotton fields (including 400 *mou* of cotton planted after the wheat was harvested), the goal set was 124,142

catties, and the brigades working there gave a guarantee that they would reach that figure. Now, according to preliminary estimates, they should obtain at least 132.5 catties a *mou,* which will bring in a total of 133,317 catties — 9,175 catties more than the original plan. The third brigade is responsible for 204 *mou* of cotton fields. Under the plan it had guaranteed the very high figure of 29,946 catties. It has already gathered 27,310 — 91 per cent of plan — and still hasn't finished harvesting. In the absence of any sudden natural calamity, it will easily reach its target.

Income of the individual members of the co-op has also increased from year to year. The table below shows the figures in yuan for seven families over a three-year period.

Name	*Status*	*Number in Family*	*Income (Yuan) 1953*	*1954*	*1955**
Tsui Feng-wu	poor peasant	5	372.64	488.77	666.73
Chang Kuang-li	„ „	4	153.90	238.70	455.30
Tsui Feng-lung	„ „	4	225.70	347.10	462.90
Chang Shou-sheng	„ „	2	217.00	368.20	445.60
Tsui Feng-cheng	new middle peasant	2	700.20	1,029.00	1,036.00
Hsueh Wen-kuei	lower middle peasant	5	238.30	538.30	607.20
Li Yung-hsiang	middle peasant	4	319.60	411.30	508.90

Many poor members have become prosperous. Of the 35 original members of Prosperity Co-operative, at the time of the 1954 autumn harvest 28 families had enough grain over and above what they needed as food for the coming year to be able to sell 3,000 catties to the government. That year they banked 1,500 yuan in the credit co-operative. According to preliminary estimates for 1955, only seven families — widows, old folks and invalids and the family of one man who works on the administrative staff of the township office — will earn less than they did in 1954, though they will still have enough to live on comfortably. All the other 81 families in the enlarged co-op will earn more. Chang Shou-sheng, who used to be the poorest member of the co-op, had a surplus of 80 yuan in 1954. In 1955 he and his wife earned 445 yuan. They expect to deposit about 200 yuan in the credit co-op after putting aside enough for all their 1955 living expenses. When the final balance for 1955 is struck, there should be many more new depositors.

The enthusiasm of the members soared when the estimated income figures were posted. On October 8, twelve members cut over 5,000 catties of green-stuff for compost, an average of more than 400 catties a man.

Why was the co-op able to continuously increase its output, to grow from small to large, from poor to prosperous, from weak to strong? Because the Party branch in Nantsui Village firmly carried out the Party's class policy in the rural co-operative movement. Following the lead of Prosperity Co-operative, peasants throughout the township formed fourteen more co-ops. Prosperity Co-operative's chairman and accountant became leader and chief accountant respectively of the network of co-ops in the townships of Chentsunying and Taochiaying. Prosperity Co-operative has become a model for peasants in all the surrounding townships and a standard-bearer in the forefront of the co-operative movement.

*Estimated.

THE "BACKWARD AREAS" ARE NOT NECESSARILY ENTIRELY BACKWARD

(By a work team of the Communist Party Committee of the former province of Jehol, October 15, 1955, in the Chengteh *Masses' Daily*)

For many Chinese, 1955 can be said to have been a year of dispelled illusions. In the first half of 1955 many still clung tenaciously to certain misconceptions. But by the latter half of the year, they could hold out no longer and had to begin believing in the new.

For instance they had thought that the people's demand that the whole countryside go co-operative within three years was an idle dream; that co-operation in the north could be achieved more quickly than in the south; that it was impossible to run co-ops in the backward areas, in the mountain regions, in the national minority areas, in the areas populated by several nationalities, in areas stricken by natural calamities; that it was easy to form a co-op but hard to make it strong; that the peasants were too poor and had no way of raising funds; that the peasants were uneducated and so lacked people who could act as book-keepers; that the greater the number of co-operatives, the more blunders they would make; that co-operatives were growing too rapidly for the political consciousness of the people and the level of experience of the officials; that the Party's policy of unified purchase and supply of grain and its policy on co-operatives were causing the peasants to lose

enthusiasm for work; that unless the Party immediately backed down on the question of co-operation, the worker-peasant alliance would be endangered; that the spread of co-operation would produce a vast pool of surplus labour for which there would be no outlet; and so on. Many more similar ideas could be cited—illusions, every one.

All of these illusions were completely shattered by the criticism of the Sixth Plenary Session (Enlarged) of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1955. Now, a high tide of socialist transformation is sweeping the nation's rural areas, and the people are dancing for joy.

This should be a serious lesson to all Communists. Since the people have this enormous enthusiasm for socialism, why were many of the leading organizations completely unaware of it, or only slightly aware of it, just a few months ago? Why was there such a difference between what the leaders thought and what the great mass of the people thought? Taking this as a lesson, how should we handle similar situations and problems in the future? There is only one answer. Don't lose touch with the people; be adept at recognizing their enthusiasm from its very essence.

—*EDITOR*

Several days ago we made an inspection tour of Chaoliangtze Village, Chengteh County. It was known as rather slow in its development of agricultural co-operation and showed a number of weaknesses in various fields of work. We used to think that such a village must go through a long period of reform before new co-ops could be organized. Investigation on the spot proved that we were wrong.

WHERE WAS THE WEAKNESS?

There was only one agricultural co-operative in this village of 190 households. Its members came from 30 households, about 15.7 per cent of those in the village. The local Party branch was weak. It had eight members, half of them active, the other half rather backward. Some of the backward members lagged so far behind the situation that they became stumbling-blocks to the co-operative movement, while some individual members habitually violated discipline.

Other organizations in the village were also weak. For instance, only four of the nine members of the village people's council were able to do their work. Of the 27 members of the Youth League only nine could be regarded as competent. As a result, it had not been possible to carry out various Party policies successfully. The most striking example was the repeated failure of the village to fulfil its quota of grain sales to the state, resulting of resistance caused by the spontaneous tendency towards capitalism among the peasants.

The answer to all this was not far to seek. The trouble rested mainly with the leadership. The members of the Party, the Youth League and the village council, with a few exceptions, were honest and hard-working. Their family backgrounds were good. However, they had gone without education for a long time. They had been given work without the necessary instructions on how to do it, and those who normally showed more enthusiasm in their work had the work piled on them. Those who were politically backward had not been educated or criticized, and as a result they had deteriorated. The few bad elements had not been held in check, and so had been able to sabotage the village work with impunity, to cause trouble between the local officials, throw cold water on the active elements, and so on. The Party and Youth League members and village officials who worked hard got no support. Lacking resourcefulness, some inexperienced officials were apt to resort to simply issuing orders, which isolated them from the masses. Those who were found to have a shortcoming were not given timely advice. The only way of dealing with them had been to point out all their mistakes in a lump and throw them out. Nine village heads had been dismissed since 1949. For fear of committing mistakes and being sacked, many once enthusiastic leaders became hesitant in their work. Under such circumstances, the village gradually became "weak spot." As it was difficult to get anything done in such a village, no one was interested in coming to work there, and this led to further weakening.

THE PEASANTS' MORALE IS HIGH

From the above we can see that the backwardness of the village was due to the weakness in leadership. The poor and less well-off peasants, constituting over 60 per cent of its people, were not backward at all. They wanted to set up new co-ops. This desire was particularly strong among the more advanced of the poor peasants and the lower sections of the new and old middle peasants. Early in the summer of 1953, quite a number of poor peasants had wanted to organize co-ops. But the district government considered the village backward, had no capable leaders and therefore could not set up co-ops. No leadership was given. Nevertheless, the peasants' enthusiasm for co-op farming continued very high.

In the autumn of the same year, 17 forward-looking peasants of Chaoliangtze Village took the initiative in setting up a co-op which grew to include 30 households in the spring of 1954. Seeing that many co-ops were being organized in the neighbouring villages, five mutual-aid teams started to make preparations to change over to co-ops in the summer of 1954. In the autumn four co-ops were set up on the basis of six mutual-aid teams. Some 50 households hoped to join them. The peasants were very keen indeed at that time. The poor

peasant Li Yung-lin, for example, put aside his best soya-bean seed, planning to take it to the co-op next year. Yet the district government still thought that the village lacked the necessary personnel, and that conditions were unripe. When the 1955 spring ploughing came along the four co-ops collapsed. The reason was that no one helped them to settle their problems, and this caused much dissatisfaction.

But the peasants were not easily discouraged. To pave the way for co-operative farming this autumn, the five mutual-aid teams led by Wei Feng-tung, Wei Yung-chen and others secured the approval of the district government to plant more than one thousand fruit trees. The poor peasants and the lower sections of the old and new middle peasants were particularly eager to begin co-operative farming. Their eagerness became all the greater when they saw that nearly all the peasants in the neighbouring villages had joined co-ops and were living better as a result of their good harvest in 1955. So in the autumn, during the harvest season, they too discussed going over to co-op farming.

At present, some mutual-aid teams have already drawn up plans as to who should be admitted into their future co-op, who should be the chairman, the book-keepers, members of the management committee and so on. The latest information is that 94 households are ready to join the co-ops after the autumn harvest, and 61 of them are particularly firm in this resolve. Of the 94 households poor-peasant households number 28; lower middle-peasant households, 50; upper middle-peasant households, 16.

The fact that over 60 per cent of the peasants long for co-op farming is a stimulus toward it. As for the Party branch in the village, it must be noted that the great majority of its members are good. A drive to rectify wrong ideas was carried on among them after they heard the directives of the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung on the question of agricultural co-operation. The advanced members were commended, the backward criticized,

the very bad ones expelled. As a result, nearly all the Party members became active. Those who had been backward criticized themselves at the general membership meeting. One said, "In the past I only thought about myself. The idea of building socialism never entered my head."

Many active peasants came to the forefront from among the rank and file, when they understood the spirit of the directives issued by the Central Committee. We found, after investigation, that there were 32 peasants who, apart from their unswerving determination to join the co-ops, were potentially good leaders. They could form the nuclear force for the rapid growth of co-operation.

All this proves that a weak village in the course of the development of co-operatives can be made stronger. This can be done provided that we draw our strength from the Party branch in the village, and from rank-and-file peasants who are enthusiastic about co-operative farming.

It cannot be said, however, that everything was all right in this village, even though, as we have mentioned, it had fairly good conditions for the development of co-operative farming. As the movement expanded, many problems came up:

First, while most of the poor peasants and the lower sections of the old and new middle peasants were plunging into this movement, the well-to-do peasants became uneasy. They had doubts and worries.

Secondly, as the training of leaders had been rather neglected up to then, the high tide of agricultural co-operation found them insufficient in number and low in quality. Moreover, the leaders were not well distributed. Some mutual-aid teams were even controlled by people with strong capitalist ideas.

Thirdly, the mutual-aid teams were poorly organized. Of the 13 such teams five were dominated by well-to-do peasants. Former landlords were found in some of the teams.

Fourthly, in order to meet the requirement of the co-operative movement, it was necessary to consolidate the Party branch and strengthen its leadership.

In view of this situation, it is necessary to draw up, as quickly as possible, an over-all plan for agricultural co-operation for the whole village. Without such a plan, sham co-operatives, or co-operatives made up exclusively of middle peasants or poor peasants, may emerge. Too many officials might be concentrated in one co-op and while others are left with no capable leaders. Such co-ops would be hard to consolidate and more difficulties would crop up. Therefore, the leadership must keep abreast of the situation, and divide their work. It must see that all current jobs are well done, and that the over-all plan for agricultural co-operation is drawn up in good time. The peasants must have good leadership in such jobs as collecting manure and ploughing up the fields after autumn harvest. The 1956 crop will depend largely on this.

EVERYTHING ACCORDING TO PLAN

On the basis of the eagerness of the peasants to organize co-ops, and the condition as regards officials and leaders, the village Party branch has drawn up a plan to set up three farming co-operatives after the 1955 autumn harvest. It plans to draw in 71 peasant households of the most active poor peasants and the lower sections of the old and new middle peasants. Meanwhile, seven households will be added to the existing co-op with its 30 households. Thus the total number of households that will have joined the co-op in the autumn of 1955 will be 108, or 56 per cent of all the households of the village. The 32 households of poor peasants, or belonging to the lower sections of the old and new middle peasants, who are still outside the co-ops, will be drawn in by the autumn of 1956. By then, there will be 140 households in the co-ops, over 73 per cent of all those in the

village. Of the 36 households of upper middle peasants only those who are really willing to join co-ops will be drawn in after the 1956 autumn harvest. The rest will be allowed to remain in the mutual-aid teams. It is expected that most of them will also join the co-ops after the autumn harvest of 1957. As for the former landlords and rich peasants, 14 households in all, they will in no case be admitted into the co-ops before 1958.

To pave the way for formation of co-ops in 1956 it is necessary to train enough key personnel. This should be done right now, through the medium of the mutual-aid teams and existing co-operatives. Twenty persons to take up key jobs in co-op farming are to be trained by the teams and co-ops within a year. To strengthen the ranks of the Party, active peasants tested in real work will be admitted as members. Capable persons will be assigned to strengthen the leadership of the mutual-aid teams.

The village Party branch, in line with the above plan, has first of all carried out a division of responsibility among the leadership. The village head is responsible for leading the autumn harvest work and for seeing that the fixed quota system for producing, purchasing and marketing grain is carried out. The secretary of the village Party branch is responsible for leading the work of the co-operative movement and speeding up the training of 31 active workers which it needs. These workers are to be given proper jobs — they will do propaganda among the peasants, playing an active role in the autumn harvesting and subsequent ploughing.

Secondly, the peasants' enthusiasm for organizing co-ops should be directed into the proper channels of current work — they should devote themselves to preparing for the 1956 crop. In the first place, they must be persuaded to keep enough seeds for the next year and to plough up the fields well after the autumn harvest. The peasants who are prepared to join co-ops must be told in a clear-cut way that they

must plough up their fields well after autumn harvest. They must not muddle through this work just because they are going to join co-ops. It should be pointed out beforehand that those who have not turned up their fields after autumn harvest, or have done it in a slipshod way, will have work-points deducted when they join. In addition, the peasants should rear pigs and shut them up in pens to accumulate manure, so that there will have enough manure for the co-ops in 1956.

Thirdly, the Party branch must study carefully the directives on the question of agricultural co-operation put out by the Central Committee and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. That is because it must explain government policies to the peasants and help them overcome their doubts and worries, so that the peasants will not sell their draught animals before they join the co-op.

It is up to the peasants — those who really want to join the co-ops — to decide whether they want to sell or rent their draught animals to the co-ops when they are formed. In the purchase of farming animals from the peasants the co-op should not pay less than the market price, and the terms of payment must not be unduly long. Fair terms should also be given when the co-op rents animals from its members. The owners of animals should be given enough fodder when the co-op shares out its grain stalk.

All these measures have already yielded good results. For example, the well-to-do peasant Chi Kuang-teh, who had wanted to sell his animals, changed his mind when he was told about these things.

Fourthly, the key personnel of a new co-op should be checked carefully and given proper jobs to do. Two co-ops should be set up this November. The book-keepers of the existing co-op who have gained experience should train new ones during the winter.

OPPORTUNISM IS FALLING, SOCIALISM IS ON THE RISE

(By Li Yi-chun, October 7, 1955)

In many localities there is a practice prevalent almost to a point of being universal — right opportunists within the Party, working hand in glove with the forces of capitalism, are preventing the great mass of poor peasants and lower middle peasants from taking the road to co-operation. This article describes the situation with particular aptness. The writer furiously attacks the opportunists and stands up for the needy peasants.

Some individuals, although they call themselves Communists, show little interest in the socialism we are now building. Not only do they fail to support the enthusiastic people — they throw cold water on the people's heads.

In China, 1955 was the year of decision in the struggle between socialism and capitalism. This decisive struggle was reflected, first and foremost, in the three conferences called by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in May, July and October. The first half of 1955 was murky and obscured by dark clouds. But in the latter half, the atmosphere changed completely. Tens of millions of peasants swung into action. In response to the call of the Central Committee, they adopted co-operation.

Over 60 million peasant households in various parts of the country have already joined co-operatives as

the editor writes these few lines. It is as if a raging tidal wave has swept away all the demons and ghosts. Now we can look at every member of society and see exactly who is who. It is the same in the Party.

By the end of this year the victory of socialism will be practically assured. Of course, many more battles still lie ahead. We must continue to fight hard.

— EDITOR

The upsurge in the agricultural co-operative movement began to reach Hsinching District on the outskirts of Shanghai in the autumn of 1954. The poor peasants were saying, "Our families are poor. If we don't organize co-ops, we'll never straighten our backs." So they took an active lead in preparing to set up co-ops. Those who did a bit of petty trading as well closed down their business and asked to join. Some of the middle peasants followed suit. In Hungnan Township, which goes in for cotton and market gardening, there wasn't a single exception. Before autumn, eight agricultural producers' co-operatives were set up. All who had not yet joined the co-op set out to "herald co-operation" by making a success of the mutual-aid teams and amalgamated their 45 mutual-aid teams into eight. These teams, with their larger membership and greater scope, quickly accumulated common property; after one summer harvest, they bought 47 sprayers. The mutual-aid teams, people said, were already "practically as good as a co-op," and it wouldn't take much to reorganize them into one. After the autumn of 1954, twenty mutual-aid teams in ten villages asked the Party branch in Hungnan Township to be allowed to form co-ops. The branch took notice of the popular demand, looked into the local conditions and planned to set up seven co-ops in the winter and spring of 1954-1955, with 50 per cent of the peasant households organized into them. But the district Party committee, influenced by the policy laid down by the suburban working committee

— to "compress" the original plan for the growth of co-ops, gave the people of Hungnan, who were so keen and enthusiastic about taking the socialist road, neither support nor guidance. So a fierce struggle started between the masses, who wanted to push ahead, and the conservative, timid, and bureaucratic leaders.

The Hungnan villagers were against this delaying attitude from the start. "If you don't help us to set up a co-op, we'll set it up ourselves." And they did! The peasants of Pailoutou, a village which grew mainly cotton and rice, were the first to set up a co-op on their own initiative. They presented the district Party committee with a *fait accompli,* and the committee had to ratify it as an exceptional case. That made the masses more enthusiastic than ever. Ignoring the three strict conditions for establishment of a co-op imposed by the district and township leaders, the poor and lower middle peasants stepped up their preparations. They called mass meetings, went into conditions in their villages and studied the policy regarding the setting up of co-ops. Yachanglang, Yaolang, Yaopinlang and three other villages started market-gathering collectively. In Hsuchiatang, Nanshenhsiang and other villages, they collectively raised 36 piglets and four sows. Groups of peasants in the villages sent in detailed reports on their discussions and their plans to establish co-ops to the township official — reports brimming over with enthusiasm and confidence.

Chai Chung-chin and two other poor peasants in Yachanglang Village, for example, wrote in a report dated December 21:

"After the enlarged meeting of the people's congress which the township authorities called, we went back to our village and called a mass meeting to tell people all about it. Everybody was in high spirits. We discussed the advantages of a co-op, and everyone voted for starting one and joining. It was too good an opportunity to miss, so we began enrolling them there and then. At this first meeting eight households put their

names down. At the second, after some members of mutual-aid teams had held family councils to settle the doubts and worries in their families, ten more households joined. We have held several meetings since then to discuss what needed doing if we formed a co-op. At the first we discussed our market-gardening plans. We decided that we should first have to get together plenty of glass. There were sixteen crates of it lying around. Second, we discussed setting up reed or straw wind-breaks, started them on the 4th, and have now finished nine. We have just over a catty and a half of tomato seed which will do for fourteen rows, and we shall have one row of unstaked tomatoes. We have a catty and a quarter of sweet pepper seed which will make four rows. Next spring, we reckon to have about 25 *mou* of tomatoes, 10 *mou* of spring cabbage and 320 head of cabbage for seed. We shall have early kidney beans transplanted. We are getting other seed ready. As for the task of unified buying assigned us, in fulfilling the state's planned purchase plan, we guarantee that it will be fulfilled on the 26th. We have practically collected all the tax in kind for the autumn, and nearly all the households working on their own have paid up. Two more families have joined, so we now have 20 families, with 27 men and 33 women counted as full labour power, 40 boys and girls and 2 persons without labour power. We have 163.252 *mou* of land, including small plots. We ask for the co-op to be formed in the spring of 1955."

But although the peasants in the villages which make up Hungnan Township showed themselves so keen to take the socialist road, the district leadership still couldn't come to a decision. On the contrary, in view of the fact that a few upper middle peasants who had joined the co-op because everybody else was doing so were peevish, the district leaders got the idea that "the situation was tense" and adopted the foolish policy of retreat — the policy rationalized as "concentrating all efforts on consolidation, and waiting till things are better before going on." Four or five times in succession

they cut the number of co-ops which it was intended to set up. In the autumn of 1954 they had given their word that new co-ops could be set up in the spring of 1955. Now, equally definitely, they said that no co-op would be set up in the market-gardening areas in the spring. The villagers of Hungnan had asked at the end of 1954 for co-ops to be formed, but not till February 14, 1955, was the formation of two approved. As a matter of fact, Yachanglang Co-op had already collapsed by the time the district Party committee approved it.

The wrong-headed tactics adopted — first letting the matter drag on, and then cutting down the number of co-ops to be sanctioned — were actually just what the rich peasants wanted — to follow the capitalist road. Because the district leaders took such a long time to agree to form and help Yachanglang Co-op, the wavering upper middle peasants spoke up and said they didn't want it set up at all. Three such families actually withdrew. Then five more followed suit, so that when the approval of the district Party committee did come through, there were only twelve households left. The rich peasants seized the opportunity and made the most of it. They got up to all sorts of tricks, such as pretending to be poor, giving bribes, "marrying" a dead daughter to the dead son or brother of poor peasants, to get on the good side of the poor peasants and other live-wires so as to be able to put a spoke in the wheel of socialist transformation of agriculture. In Haoshang Village, where a co-op had been set up, four out of nine rich peasants carried out overt acts of sabotage. Chen Po-yu, calling himself "a wronged rich peasant," pretended to be poor so as to gain public sympathy. Chu Chin-hsiang got round the mother of Chao Lin-ken, a poor peasant who was vice-chairman of an old co-op in Haoshang Village, by sending her gifts of food. Chu Chin-tu, another rich peasant, shamelessly cajoled Shih Lin-ti, vice-chairman of Chungtung Co-op, by marrying his dead daughter to the latter's dead elder brother. A rich peasant's daughter, the wife of Ho Chi-jen, an upper middle peasant of Yachanglang who wanted to see the co-op

set up, said to her husband, "They don't want to set it up, so what are you fooling around for?" If Ho went off to meetings in the evening, she wouldn't let him in again to sleep: she even threatened to split the family. And all the time she kept pressing Ho Chi-jen to go and work for her parents who were rich peasants. In the long run, Ho gave in and stopped working in the mutual-aid team. All this properly damped the enthusiasm of a few of those who had earlier demanded co-operative organization. "They say we'll reach socialism in a few years," they said. "Actually it'll take ages."

But the overwhelming majority of poor and lower middle peasants of Hungnan were still prepared to fight to get co-ops set up. Hsu Lung-ching, a poor peasant of Hsuchiatang Village, when he heard that the township officials would not let co-ops be formed, asked, "Why can't we have them? Everybody wants them, the mutual-aid teams have had three years' experience, and the pigs have all been brought together." The officials first tried excuses, saying that they "hadn't enough people to do the job and hadn't enough experience of giving guidance." But the peasants were not standing for that. "If you can't lead," they said, "just help. If you can't help, we'll ask other townships to give us a hand." At last the officials were driven to finding a new excuse that the district hadn't given the O.K. But the peasants cared little about O.K.'s. Some said, "Let us start the co-op first and talk about O.K.'s later. Let them do the O.K.-ing, we'll do the organizing." Others said, "All right, let it be an 'illegitimate' co-op. Let's merge the land, and we'll call it a co-op ourselves, though we don't have to tell outsiders it is." Many villages wouldn't budge and insisted that property publicly owned should remain so. In Hsuchiatang and Yachanglang, they still kept their pigs collectively. In Hsuchiatang, they put 350 yuan of public funds derived from the selling of pigs in the credit co-op and firmly refused to share it out. In Yaopinlang and Kaochiatang, land was still kept under com-

mon management. In certain villages the peasants, fearing that the township wouldn't let them set up co-ops, held discussion meetings in the evening so as to stop the local authorities knowing about it. Wang Kuo-hsiang, a poor peasant of Wangchialang Village, said, "If you disagree, we'll ask Paopei Township to show us how." Several times he went to Hsiao-pinlang Co-op in Paopei to get the benefit of their experience, and finally the villagers set up a "spontaneous co-op" on their own.

All this time, the Party branch in Hungnan Township, under the influence of the district leaders, had been hesitating and wavering, and did not dare to support the masses. Originally ten villages in the township had demanded to organize co-ops. The Party branch, however, planned to set up only seven. The plan was submitted to the district leaders, and two more were lopped off. It was not that the township people were convinced by the instructions of the district leaders, but as they were so unsure of themselves, the only thing they could do was carry them out. However, the peasants criticized them repeatedly, and they were forced to reconsider the problem, and finally started to come down on their side. In April 1955, taking up the case of one of these "spontaneous co-ops" in Wangchialang Village, the district Party committee told the township officials: "If you can talk them into stopping it, do. If you can't, try wielding the big stick." The officials refused, and told Wangchialang Co-op that if they carried on, they'd have their full backing. Dying in the last ditch, as it were, the district Party committee was forced to agree, only stipulating that Wangchialang Co-op should be given the strange name of "co-operative team." But on the day the name "co-operative team" was sanctioned, its members prominently labelled all their vegetable baskets "Wangchialang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative"!

From then on nobody or nothing could hold back the tide of agricultural co-operation in Hungnan. Beginning in August 1954, the peasants who had pressed so strongly for

co-ops, who had broken through all obstructions from above — all the dithering, delaying, dictation and damping down — at last managed to set up three. In September 1955, there reached Hsinching District the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's directive and Chairman Mao Tse-tung's speech, saying that the peasants were to be given the full support in their drive ahead with the agricultural co-operative movement. After that, the wrong attitude of the leaders of the district Party committee, their habit of looking backward and forward, hesitating and being timid, was put right. Poor peasants who had so eagerly demanded a co-op but had been kept out ran round excitedly telling each other the news. Chu Jen-ti, a poor peasant of Yaopinlang Village, mentally counted up all the households in the village, and grinned: "We shan't be long now," he said. "Everybody except Shao Miao-lin (an upper middle peasant — *Ed.*) is longing to join." Another poor peasant Shen Pao-ti of Kaochialang looked at the fields and said, "The kidney beans have been picked and the radishes are filling out. If we are going to set up this co-op, the sooner we do it the better." The twenty households of Luchiafenshan couldn't wait any longer. Wang Cheng-hua and other poor peasants got cracking of their own accord, met four times, worked everything out and formed their co-op. The co-op in Yachanglang Village had been dissolved, but it had funds still not shared out, so the members decided not to share it. The co-operative movement is going strong all round here now. The Party branch in Hungnan Township got all its members discussing an ambitious plan to bring the whole township into co-ops. Everybody was in high spirits. Pan Fu-ti, who lived in Tientu Village, said: "They say our village is backward. But we're not, or not all of us. We want, we insist on taking the socialist road too." And he went on to suggest that a co-op should be set up in Tientu in 1956. As a result of the Party discussions, the plan for the formation of co-operatives in the winter of 1955 and the spring of 1956 was extended. By spring, there should be 25 co-operatives in the township instead of 11, and 72 per cent of all peasant families will have joined them. Thus, semi-socialist co-operation shall be completed basically in Hungnan Township in six months' time hereafter.