

## THE CO-OP THE LEADERS DIDN'T WANT

(By Chen Tai-chih, *Shensi Daily* reporter, August 31, 1955)

*This article tells a moving story. We hope every reader will study it carefully. We especially invite those comrades who do not believe that the people are eager to take the road to socialism, and the comrades who are always ready to grasp their knife and "cut down" co-operatives, to give this article their closest attention. Daily and hourly throughout the countryside the socialist factors are increasing. The great majority of the peasants are demanding the formation of co-operatives. A large number of intelligent, capable, fair-minded and enthusiastic leaders are springing from the midst of the people. This is a very encouraging situation. Our most serious failing is that Party leaders in many places have not bestirred themselves to keep up with it.*

*Our present task is to get the local Party committees at every level to take a positive Marxist-Leninist stand on this matter and assume responsibility for the entire agricultural co-operative movement, and lead it enthusiastically, gladly and wholeheartedly. They should not re-enact the story of Lord Sheh who loved dragons but was frightened out of his wits at the sight of a real one. They have been talking about socialism for years, but now that socialism has come looking for them, they are afraid of it.*

— EDITOR

In the winter of 1953, an agricultural producers' co-operative was set up in Shangtsun Village, Kuotu District, Changan County, Shensi Province — the first one in the district.

Only about four *li* away lies Yangtsun Village. Its leading people, Wei Ting-tung, Wei Yao-nan, Chang Ke-hsin, and many other peasant activists, often inquired how the co-operative in Shangtsun Village was getting on with its crops.

After the co-op had shared out its autumn harvest, Wei Ting-tung called on its chairman, Tan Chung-chih, and had a talk with him about the increase in the income of the members. Peasants in the mutual-aid teams in Yangtsun also learned about the co-op from their relatives and friends in Shangtsun. Seeing that the co-op had a promising future, that its output of farm products was greater, and the income of its members higher than in the mutual-aid team, many Yangtsun peasants became eager to set up a co-op themselves.

In the winter of 1954, all the neighbouring villages were talking about the same thing. In order to prepare the people of Yangtsun for co-operative farming, the district committee of the Communist Party invited them to hear reports on how co-ops were being formed in some neighbouring villages. In addition, the leading peasants in Yangtsun often organized their fellow villagers to study the subject. The snow was knee-deep in the fields and long icicles hung from the eaves. Yet the peasants, without needing any persuasion, flocked to the village meeting room every night when the bell for studies was sounded.

The surging tide of agricultural co-operation was a great stimulus to the people of Yangtsun Village, particularly to those poor peasants who burned to join a co-op. Later that winter, after the first group of co-ops had been set up, new co-ops mushroomed in all the surrounding areas. Even tractors were expected in the locality soon, as a plan had been worked out for a tractor station in Shangtsun.

Inspired by a general enthusiastic desire to take the socialist road, the Yangtsun peasants asked again and again to found a co-op. Some complained: "It is about three years now since the mutual-aid teams were set up in our village. What conditions are lacking for a co-op?" The leaders — Wei Ting-tung and others — saw that the peasants were really very enthusiastic. Besides, they themselves longed to see a co-op in their village as soon as possible. So they decided to prepare for it by setting up a combined mutual-aid team — a large team made up of several small ones. This method had been employed in Tungfu and Hsifu Villages where co-ops were being formed at the time.

#### A BIG COMBINED MUTUAL-AID TEAM WITH EIGHTY HOUSEHOLDS

Their proposal was supported by the township head. But several key people feared that some mutual-aid team members might not be willing to join. It was decided, therefore, that those willing to join should apply for membership individually. When this was announced at a mass meeting, the peasants were so quick to respond that it was as if someone had set off a string of firecrackers. That very night, more than fifty of the ninety-odd households of the village applied to join the combined team. Early next morning more peasants knocked at Wei Ting-tung's door, telling him that their households would join. They had made up their minds, they said, when they had gone home and talked the matter over with their families, after the previous night's meeting. Later that morning, still another thirty households applied, bringing the total to over eighty.

Earlier, something else had happened in Yangtsun. Wei Ting-tung, Wei Yao-nan, Chang Ke-hsin and others had proposed to merge the five mutual-aid teams they led, and to persuade any members who disagreed to withdraw. In their

plan, the amalgamation would include only these teams. But when this was made public, it met instant and wide opposition. Many peasants criticized those leaders who had proposed it. "Can't we all take the path of socialism?" the peasants said. "Why should your teams do it alone? We are for the voluntary principle; anyone who wants to take the road can do it. It is unfair to keep us out." Seeing the peasants' brimming enthusiasm, the leaders had to let them apply their way.

On the fifth day of the first lunar month of 1955, just after the Spring Festival, the combined mutual-aid team started moving manure to the fields. Although organization was not good, working spirit was so high that the peasants were already at their job, lanterns in hand, before dawn broke. In the course of the work, however, a difference of opinion arose. One man complained that his manure had been moved too late; another protested that his ox had been loaded too heavily. There was a mass of different opinions. Men who had joined the team in a flash of enthusiasm began to waver. The combined mutual-aid team had rushed forward too hastily; now it was bursting at the seams. Soon afterwards, it broke up.

#### SECOND APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

In the second lunar month, new co-ops began to be set up again in Kuotu District. When the district Party committee sent some cadres to Kungchang Village for this work, those Yangtsun peasants who were bent on having a co-op raised their demand once more. The committee began to help them to achieve their desire. But when the peasants had heard three reports on how to organize a co-op and were expecting the last one (on how to solve the concrete problems), the committee decided to stop work in Kungchang and Yangtsun Villages.

The peasants were very critical of this. They asked why the committee workers should substitute a "cold water bath"

for Chairman Mao's policy of "active leadership." Some suggested that they should set up a co-op themselves. Wei Ting-tung asked the Party branch secretary whether it would be possible to set up a co-op in the form of a combined mutual-aid team. The secretary disapproved of this proposal, but the branch committee made a thorough study of the situation. It suggested that the peasants grow their autumn crops on one continuous tract of land, to lay the foundation for establishing a co-op after the summer harvest.

Seeing that the Party branch had made this suggestion and that the peasants were eager for a co-op, Wei Ting-tung and other leaders in the village set four conditions under which members of the existing mutual-aid teams could join the new combined team. They were: 1) cotton must be put under a unified management; 2) autumn crops must be grown on one continuous tract of land; 3) vegetable plots must be reserved after the standard of a co-op; 4) all members must invest enthusiastically in the team's production.

Many poor peasants and new middle peasants supported these conditions. The evening they were announced, 36 households applied for membership. Then, just as it was happening in those villages where regular cadres were leading the setting-up of co-ops, all applicants were examined to find the degree of their socialist consciousness, and whether their families were all willing to join. The proposed staff of the combined team were also examined one by one, their merits and demerits being considered fully. Some of them even made self-criticisms at the meeting.

As a result of this examination, four households withdrew from team participation while five others applied to join. Finally, an agricultural producers' co-operative came into being, with the poor peasants occupying a dominant position (of the 37 member households, 28 were poor peasants). But they still called their co-op a "combined mutual-aid team" in dealing with the outside.

#### COMBINED MUTUAL-AID TEAM IN NAME; AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS' CO-OPERATIVE IN FACT

After the formation of the "combined mutual-aid team," with the general agreement of the members, the summer crops continued to belong to the peasants owning the land on which they were grown. Just as in an ordinary mutual-aid team, peasants had to make up by paying wages any difference between the amount of work they did on others' land, and what others did for them. The summer crops were harvested very smoothly, without a single dispute arising among the members.

As for autumn crops and cotton, they were apportioned in the following way: 52 per cent went to pay for labour, and 48 per cent was paid as dividends on land shares. In order to protect the interest of members who had more cotton fields than others, the dividends for cotton were distributed only among members who owned or worked in the cotton fields.

In deciding the payment for the work done by draught animals, the method was first to make a rough estimate of the work each ox or other animal could do, and then to record the work it had actually done on that day. Before the summer harvest, the "team" members wanted to pool their draught animals into the "team" for collective rearing. But when Wei Ting-tung, its leader, told this to the head of the construction section of the county people's council who stopped briefly at Yangtsun on an inspection tour, the latter did not agree.

"Even agricultural producers' co-ops don't encourage their members to pool their draught animals into the co-ops," he said. "Still less should a mutual-aid team. You haven't gathered your summer harvest. If your team pools the animals, what will you do if you meet trouble in the summer harvest?" Accepting his advice, the leading members of the "team" decided that the payment for work done by the mem-

bers' draught animals should be made on the work-day system.

As for land, the members' fields were evaluated and contributed as shares to the "team." A land share represented either a section of cotton field with a normal yield of 70 catties of raw cotton or a section of land which could normally produce 300 catties of wheat.

Like an agricultural producers' co-op, this "combined mutual-aid team" had a management committee and production brigades. It had no stockmen's section, because the draught animals were still fed by the members; no storekeepers' section because the farm implements had not been pooled; and no section for subsidiary occupations because the "team" still managed none. But it had all other sections of an agricultural producers' co-op; such as those for culture and education, technique and inspection.

#### LEARNING FROM NEIGHBOURING CO-OPS

Naturally, such a co-op, which had been set up only through the persevering efforts of the peasants themselves, could not expect its difficulties in farm management to be few. Fortunately, however, its members were able to solve many problems by learning from good friends and close relatives who held key positions in co-ops in the neighbouring areas.

They received great help, for instance, from the Tungjuchia Village Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, farming land that borders on Yangtsun Village. When members of the two co-ops rested after field work, they often sat together and talked about co-operative farming.

When the members of the Yangtsun Co-op did not know how to draw up plans for reaping their summer harvest and sowing the autumn crop, they invited a book-keeper from the Tungjuchia Village Co-op to guide them.

When some skilled members did not know how to calculate the work-days due them after they had worked for

other people, Wei Ting-tung solved the problem by seeking advice from the chairman of the Hochihpei Agricultural Producers' Co-op. Now that the autumn harvest and sowing are approaching the Yangtsun Co-op is carefully studying the harvesting, sowing and wheat-growing plans of the May Fourth Co-op in Shangtsun.

This was why the secretary of the township Party branch said in explaining the reasons for the good production of the co-op: "First, the members do their jobs voluntarily; nobody has been forced to do anything. With the voluntary spirit, many kinds of work can be done well. Second, the leading co-op members are eager to study. If there is anything they don't understand, they ask others for explanation." Telling about how the co-op had kept going, Wei Ting-tung said: "The Party's policies are good. If you don't understand, you must learn from others."

#### THE DISTRICT AND TOWNSHIP CADRES ALSO GAVE SUPPORT

In the later days of the "combined mutual-aid team," when the district Party committee and township Party branch saw the fairly good results it was getting, they began to give it considerable help. The district Party committee ordered its cadres staying in the neighbouring villages to help the "team." The township Party branch frequently sent its cadres to the "team." Leading "team" members were also invited to attend conferences of co-op chairmen called in the district and the township.

At one time, for instance, the "team" lacked a system of responsibility in transporting compost. The work was computed according to the number of parts into which it had been divided in a day, and which the members had done, no matter whether the manure had been carried far or near and whether the work had been done well or not. When this caused dissatisfaction among the members, the "team" lead-

ers asked the secretary of the township Party branch for advice. He told them that they should first find out how much time it would take to bring a cart of manure to the far fields and how much to the near fields; then compute the work on this basis.

When the wheat fields were being harrowed, some leading members of the "team" proposed to draw women into the work by giving them more work-days than were their due. Hearing this, the secretary of the township Party branch thought they had misunderstood the principle of equal pay for equal work. He told them that the women's work-days should be computed by the exact amount of work they had done; that it was improper to give the women more than the right number of work-days. They should prompt the women to work, he explained, by raising their outlook on life, not just by crediting them with more work-days.

#### SUCCESSSES ACHIEVED IN PRODUCTION

After the peasants themselves had formed their co-op, they began to produce with unstinted enthusiasm. As soon as the "team" came into being, they dismantled the city wall and with the money they earned they bought manure. In 11 days they tore down 41 battlements and were able to buy more than 1,400 cartloads of manure which they applied to all their cotton and autumn crop fields. Now, both their cotton and their autumn crop are growing much taller than those grown by villagers outside the "team." This is one of the important reasons why the "team" members feel confident.

When Wei Cheng-fu, one of the members, saw the crops in his field, he said: "Crops never grew so well in my fields before. It's since I joined the team that they have become so abundant." Another member, Nan Chih-chieh, a poor peasant who had migrated from Shanghsien County, said: "With such good crops, I'll have enough grain to eat from

my land shares alone, not to mention the earnings I'll get for my work-days."

After careful investigation, the Kuotu District Party Committee found that Yangtsun Village had all the conditions for setting up a co-op. It decided that an agricultural producers' co-operative must be formally established there before autumn harvest. It has now sent cadres to make a check of the "team" and solve some practical problems for it.

## TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE OFFICIALS CAN LEAD THE FORMATION OF CO-OPERATIVES

(By Yeh Han in the Sinkiang Tien Nan Daily,  
October 16, 1955)

*This is a good article. One can see from it that the Uighur peasants are very eager to take the road to co-operation. They have already trained the personnel they need for putting semi-socialist co-operation into effect. Some people claim that co-operation cannot succeed among the national minority peoples. This is not so. We have seen that the Mongols, the Huis, the Uighurs, the Miaos, the Chuangs, and other minority peoples already have quite a few co-operatives, some of which are composed of people of various national minorities. Moreover, all very successful. This fact demolishes the erroneous viewpoint of those who look down on the national minority peoples.*

— EDITOR

### IN THE FACE OF DIFFICULTIES

In the spring of 1955, the Seman District Party Committee (Shufu County, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region) drew up a plan and started getting ready to set up thirty agricultural producers' co-operatives in the winter of 1955 and spring of 1956. When the summer crops were distributed, the district committee found itself in difficulties. Members began to be dubious about whether the plan was feasible. But this

passed. As harvest time approached the peasants got really keen on joining the co-operatives. Members of mutual-aid teams on their own initiative visited co-ops and asked the members to tell them how they had increased production and how the co-op's income was shared out. Many members of mutual-aid teams and individual peasants applied to join the existing co-ops. Members of the permanent mutual-aid teams which had been preparing to turn themselves into co-ops came to the district committee and said they wanted to make the change before winter wheat sowing. The district committee looked into the situation and decided that the peasants were in the right frame of mind and that the time was ripe to go ahead with co-operatives. But though the committee was now more confident, they were still chary of letting them develop freely, because some of the leading members of the committee were pondering over a very important question — how were they going to find people to take the lead in setting up the co-ops and getting them going. It was work that would take a lot of people when such a number of co-ops were to be set up, and it still take people to put them on a sound footing after they were set up. There were only sixteen people on the district committee all told. Take away those who had to do the ordinary office work and one or two others who had to be left free to look after the affairs of the whole district, and you only had about ten people who could actually go down to the township to give a hand in the work. The committee was already short-staffed because the South Sinkiang Regional Committee of the Party had taken some of its members from its work team, some before and some after the summer harvest. There was plenty of work to be done among the 26 existing co-ops — preparations for distributing the year's income and giving these co-ops a proper check-up. They turned the matter over and over again, but there didn't seem to be any way of getting round the shortage of people to do the job. What were they to do? The only way to solve this problem would be to ask the high-

er authorities for more. "If more people are made available 'from above,' " thought the comrades on the committee, "we'll set up more co-ops. If we can't get any, we won't set up so many." They went even further than that, saying: "Even if co-ops are set up, they can't be put on a firm basis unless there are the people to do it. Perhaps it's better not to set them up at all."

The reply from above came back quickly: Not one more for the district, so that was that. The comrades on the committee could see only one thing for it: to cut the number of new co-ops to be formed. They tried to cut the plan by proposing to set up 12 co-ops, either before or after autumn harvest, saying that it wasn't really such a small number, considering how few people they had. But the peasants went on clamouring louder and louder for more co-ops to be set up. And the directives from the higher authorities which reached the district committee one after another also demanded a greater growth of the co-operative movement. This forced the comrades on the committee to reconsider things. Was there any good reason to alter the plan when preparations to set up 30 new co-ops had been going on ever since the spring? Was there any reason for a pace-making district which the regional and county committees had been nursing and encouraging for a very long time to slow down the pace of the co-operative movement? Ought we to let the co-ops develop to the full, as the peasants were demanding? Or ought we to "drastically compress" the plan because there weren't enough officers? If the former, how were we to get over the question of leadership? These were the difficulties the comrades on the district committee were up against.

#### LOOKING FOR THEM "DOWN BELOW"

The higher authorities were adamant. The regional and county committees knew the situation in Seman District, and were convinced that compression of the district plan was out

of the question: they must let the co-ops develop to the full. Difficulties had to be overcome. If it wasn't possible to set up the co-ops by the existing methods or leadership, the methods had to be changed. They told the district committee bluntly that they must turn to full account the enthusiasm of the peasants, and the capabilities and understanding of policy of the officials actually in the township and village. In mid-August, the regional committee relayed Chairman Mao's report on agricultural co-operation to the comrades on the district committee. It was a great inspiration to them. It was only then that they began to turn their attention to the township and village officers and decided to let them take the lead in forming the co-ops. Going further into the matter, the district committee found that they were perfectly capable of taking on the work. They'd been hardened in the course of many political movements over a long period. They had a pretty high level of political understanding and most of them had the makings of leaders. There was a Party branch in each of the nine townships in the district with more than a hundred Party members all told. Still more important was the fact that the mutual-aid and co-operative movement in the district had started early. Every township had its co-ops, and most of the township and village officials had taken part in running the co-ops. In every township the Party branch had organized beginners' courses and this stood them in good stead. And as they were already quite familiar with the policy governing the setting-up of co-ops and how they were to be run, they were, for the most part, quite capable of giving the peasants a lead without outside help. Moreover, the best of the people who had been running the existing 26 co-operatives and gained some experience, could also take the lead in forming new ones. The peasants who were preparing to form themselves into co-ops had been turning the idea over in their minds for a long time, and had been helped and educated by the district and township authorities for quite a while, so conditions for forming co-ops had never been

more favourable. The township and village officials had another advantage: they knew what the actual conditions were, and were on good terms with the peasants. It was far easier for them to tackle problems than anybody "imported" from outside. If you could use them, there was the question of leaders to set up the new co-ops settled. All this made the comrades on the district committee feel far more sure of themselves. They drew up a bold plan to set up 36 co-operatives in the autumn and winter of 1955, the first 22 to be formed before the autumn harvest and winter sowing. Then, after further investigation in all the townships, they made the latter figure 25. Township and village officials plunged into the job with confidence. In a fortnight—from September 18 to about October 1—the work of establishing the new co-ops was practically finished. In fact, besides the original 25, an extra co-op was set up at the demand of the local officials and peasants. That meant that, counting three co-ops which were affiliated to other co-ops, there were now 29 new co-ops in the district, embracing over 700 peasant households. To establish them it took 26 township officials, 29 from the villages and 28 from the older co-operatives. The new co-ops were all well up to standard: they got the peasants quickly off their mark; they tackled problems as they arose; and the members were really keen on boosting production. From the time the village co-ops started to be formed slackness in farm work stopped. A new spirit took its place—the desire to do a real good job. This winter (1955) 80 per cent of the co-ops will be in a position to use up to 35 bags of compost per *mou* on their wheat fields. That is more than middle peasants normally use. Things like this are, of course, mainly the outcome of the whole year's preparation, but it must also be put down to the work put in by the local officials who gave the lead. True, concrete problems were not solved as carefully as they might have been when the co-ops were being set up, and proper regulations have still not been drawn up, but what shortcomings there

are can be cured. All this shows how wrong those comrades on the district committee who weren't prepared to trust the local people were, and the way the work actually developed has been a lesson to them.

#### GIVE THEM A FREE HAND

The local officers were able to do this important job because, trained and helped by the district leaders, they drew on previous experience in organizing co-operatives, took a proper attitude to their work as leaders and grasped the proper way of giving leadership. This is how the Seman District made sure that the local officers did carry out this work energetically and well.

First, the district committee, because it wanted to give the local officers a clear understanding of the way to set about forming co-ops and make them more able by learning from such work as had already been done, had a thorough discussion with the township officers about how to select the most suitable areas, how to turn the enthusiasm of the peasants to good account, and how to select and train people for key jobs. This it did before the organization of the co-ops started, and when committee members were visiting townships for a final check over the situation. In mid-September, the district committee called a meeting of the township officers to go over with them the proper procedure and methods of work in the light of the actual situation, and help them clear up an important question: how to avoid interfering with production while the co-ops were being set up.

Secondly, the district committee clearly explained the policy and methods to be pursued in forming the co-ops. Before new co-ops were formed, it issued a pamphlet based on the experience of the older co-ops and opinions expressed by the peasants and taking into consideration the ability of the township comrades. This pamphlet gave in plain words the committee's views on how best to solve various practical problems.



After the pamphlet had been distributed in the townships, the district committee summoned the principal township comrades to the district office to discuss it item by item. They did this in order to give them a better understanding of the Party's policy towards the different classes in the countryside, to ram home the point that membership of the **agricultural** co-operative movement had to be voluntary and based on mutual benefit, and to show them how to apply this policy and this principle whenever problems cropped up. After they went back the district committee did everything it could to settle any doubts and problems they had, and to nip any misconceptions about how policy was to operate in the bud. It also gave them a copy of the regulations of the Kuang-mang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in the same district, a pretty good one, for reference. These were all steps intended to make sure that the township and village comrades understood what the policy was and applied it in their work.

Thirdly, the district committee helped the Party branches improve collective leadership. To leave the formation of a co-op to a Party branch secretary or to leave a single township officer or Party member in charge in a village or co-op, would inevitably result in questions being shelved or not fully recognized, and that was bound to lead to shortcomings and errors. That is why ever since preparations to set up the co-ops started in 1955 the need for collective leadership had been so much stressed. Party branch meetings made a close study of the areas chosen and the comrades picked to lead the work. The question of mutual-aid teams also came up for discussion at the Party branches every so often, and they chose suitable people to give the teams a hand. When they actually started forming the co-operatives, the Party branches took further steps to improve collective leadership. First, they studied and took collective decisions on the way work was to be done, the individual plan for each village, and how work was to be shared out between Party members and town-

ship officials. At the time when the co-ops were being formed, the village and Party officials put in a record of the number of households in each co-op and their class status, lists of candidates for the co-op management and supervisory committees, and their proposals for solving certain problems. These were then examined by the Party branch committees, and finally discussed and decided on at co-operative members' meetings. Any particularly important questions which cropped up during the work were put before the Party branch at the first possible moment.

Fourthly, the district committee took steps to see that frequent tours of inspection were made to ensure a more timely exchange of experience, to correct shortcomings and to give special help to the weak links. After the work of forming the co-ops was started, three members of the district committee responsible for the job made daily rounds of the township and villages to see how things were going. It used to take them about a couple of days to inspect the whole township. When problems were found and solved the district committee members used to come together to exchange experience, form a considered opinion about how to improve the work, pass it on to those concerned, and then continue with their rounds. Sometimes, when quite a lot of problems cropped up in one township, they would go there, call meetings of members of the Party branch or of the township officials and give them tips and clear up doubts in their minds, so that they knew the principles, policies and intentions of the higher authorities, and became better fitted to carry them out. In this way they gave the local people a great deal of help in solving problems as they arose, and also made sure that serious errors were avoided. Because it was real hard work, because the area was big and there were not enough district officials to be sent to the townships and villages to give leadership during the establishment of the co-ops, the district committee found this collective study of problems and

these tours of inspection an extremely important way of guiding the work once the co-ops were set up.

Lastly, the district committee took steps to deal with the mistakes and shortcomings the township and village officials made in setting up the co-ops. The mutual-aid and co-operative movement grew so fast that of course mistakes were made — things like going all out for large co-ops and large numbers of co-ops and forgetting all about quality. There were cases, too, where individuals took action which ran counter to policy, like ordering and forcing peasants to join the co-ops and interfering with the interests of the middle peasants. These errors had to be quickly put right, and they were corrected mainly by education, not by reprimands, because mere reprimands were likely to discourage officials from showing initiative. In the initial stages, quite a few of them did not fully understand the principle of advancing steadily and setting up co-ops batch by batch. All they wanted was to get more and more people into the co-ops, not realizing how harmful it was to drag in those who weren't politically ready to come in. There were others who showed a tendency to drag well-to-do peasants in against their will and keep the poor peasants out. In such cases the leading comrades on the district committee always patiently explained to them and made them clearly understand the policy and principles of the Party. For example, in one of the villages a really serious mistake was made: Peasants were actually lined up to sign for membership. To put this right the Party branch did not reprimand the local officials as a group, but button-holed every one of them singly, clearly explained policy, and let them correct their own mistake. In that way the Party branch not only righted a wrong, but preserved their confidence and initiative. We think that is the proper way of doing things.

## MY EXPERIENCE AS CHAIRMAN OF A LARGE CO-OPERATIVE

(As told by Liang Hsiang-sheng, Chairman of the First Masses' Co-operative, Chungshan County, Kwangtung Province, to a work team sent by the county authorities; first published in "Strengthening Co-operatives in Chungshan County," May 1955)

*Do not think that the co-operative movement can advance on a large scale only in the old liberated areas, but not in the areas liberated later. This view is not in keeping with reality. Co-operation can be introduced on a large scale in the later liberated areas too. Some counties, districts and townships which were liberated relatively late will probably achieve co-operation at the same time as, or even sooner than, the localities liberated earlier. There are already a number of cases which prove this point. It all depends on whether the Party leads the movement properly, whether it can keep mistakes down to a minimum.*

*This article is the record of an interview with a co-operative chairman in Chungshan County, Kwangtung Province. Judging by what he tells us of his work, he is in no way inferior to co-op chairmen in the old liberated areas. In fact some of them are probably not up to his standard.*

— EDITOR

## UNTANGLING MYSELF FROM ROUTINE

Our co-op was originally only a little one — 16 households — till in the autumn of 1954 it was enlarged to 130 households. I had been chairman for a year. In my endeavours to lead a co-op of this size well I ran into a good deal of difficulties. A turning-point in my work came in the spring of 1955 when our co-op started getting ready for ploughing.

When our large co-op started work, everything was chaos. Every day, morning, noon and night, I was besieged by crowds of people all demanding that I should solve their problems, big and small. One would ask, "How many boat loads of silt should we put on this plot of land?" Another would say, "Today we hauled the silt further than yesterday. How many work-points does it rate?" A production brigade leader would ask, "Who's the best man to send to handle the scoop on the silt hauling?" The cashier would ask, "What shall I do? There's no money for oil for the capstan." All this flustered me so much that I got all of a daze.

At the time I wasn't at all clear about my own duties, so I just dealt with whatever business came to my attention. I even took it on myself to go from house to house to fetch members when they failed to turn up for work. As soon as I got up of a morning, I started rousing people and getting them out to work. I did a lot of work but very little thinking. As the saying goes, I was so busy picking up sesame seeds that I neglected the water-melon. Muddling along like this only made things worse, and my work became less and less systematic. I couldn't get a moment to spare to sort things out.

Then I asked myself: What is the most important thing for a co-op chairman to do? What are the key things to concentrate on?

My experience as chairman of the small co-op taught me that first of all I must get a grip on production so that the co-op could go about its work systematically. That meant I

must devote myself to the production plan and the proper organization and use of labour.

Remembering this, I did my best to concentrate on these important problems and leave other work to the other co-op officers. For instance, I asked the book-keeper and cashier to handle the financial side of the co-op, although in the past the bank always paid out on my private seal alone. I also made the vice-chairman responsible for such work as buying and hiring boats. As for seeing that members turned up for work and giving out jobs, I made this the responsibility of the leaders of the production teams and groups, though I always discussed the matter with them beforehand. In this way, I left myself enough time to consider how best to arrange the production work of the co-op and really guide it along the right channels.

## A LEADER MUST DO MORE THAN SET AN EXAMPLE OF KEENNESS

Although I realized that my first duty was to see to production, there still remained the big problem of how to do it and provide good leadership. The way I'd led the small 16-household co-op was to take part in farm work myself and set a good example on every job we did. In those days, I used to plan how to arrange the work of the co-op while working in the fields. At the most I only left a bit earlier than the others to look over the work done on other plots of co-op land. In this way I always had a good notion beforehand of what production problems had to be tackled, what we were to do next and when members were to be given new jobs. In those days, I was simple and thought I could lead production by taking part myself and doing everything well. For instance, when we were doing the summer cultivation and the sun was blazing down and many of our members thought it was too hot to work, I set an example by keeping going.

The other members followed suit, and we got the cultivation finished.

But this method of leading didn't work at all after we turned into a large co-op. At first I continued to work in Group 1 of Brigade 1. I even went so far as to get up extra early every morning so as to chase the members out of bed and get them to work. But nobody could get 300 members of 130 households moving this way. On the contrary, by burying myself in one group of one production brigade I didn't know what was going on in the co-op as a whole. I didn't know how much progress was made with the work, how much silt had been put on, or how much land had been turned. I hadn't an idea how many members were turning up or not turning up to work, how work was allocated or how efficient the members were. In the evenings when I got together with the vice-chairman and the production brigade leaders I found them in the same fix. They were all too busy setting an example in one particular group to discover how the whole production brigade was getting on. This made planning of work quite impossible.

Only then did it dawn on me that when I went to the fields to lead the work, I must have something specific in mind. I should go there to find out how things were and discover problems, but not just to set an example. With this in mind, I left off burying myself in one particular group of one particular brigade, and started making the rounds of the fields. Every day I toured them, finding out how each production brigade was getting on, talking things over with the leaders and members of the brigade and finding out what the general situation was.

#### GOING TO THE FIELDS

In the very first few days in the fields I discovered many problems.

First of all, a number of brigade leaders and group leaders simply had no idea of how to hand work out and show the

men how to do it. They couldn't see that it was necessary to divide the men into temporary working groups according to the needs of the moment. For instance, spreading silt was originally a job that seven people could manage easily: one to handle the spade and five or six to carry and spread the buckets of silt. But some of our brigade put 14 men on to this job, and Group 2 of Brigade 2 had all 22 group members on it. Of course everybody got in everybody else's way and someone was always standing around waiting idly. . . . It was a sheer waste of labour. I promptly discussed the matter with Wu Jun-kuei, leader of the brigade. He'd already noticed that some of his men were standing idle but couldn't think of a better arrangement. Besides, he wasn't bold enough to suggest a new method of work. In a short session on the spot I pointed out that doing it in the old way was just wasting time, and we decided that he should split his men into temporary working groups. The 22 members of Group 2 were therefore split into three small groups, who did a far more efficient job.

The second thing I discovered was that some of our members were so eager to get a lot done that quality suffered. I found that Lu Chuan-hai in Group 4, Brigade 1 made a very poor job of hoeing, hacking up one row of stubble and leaving the next, covered by the soil thrown up, untouched. I made the members of his group come and look at his work, asked them whether this way of hoeing would increase the yield, gave the culprit a telling-off, asking him if he realized who'd suffer from his rotten work.

The third thing I discovered was that the way we calculated work-points wasn't at all fair. In brigades with leaders who weren't particularly forceful, members often found it difficult to decide what work-points should be given to each person. Usually, at the meetings to decide the work-points nobody said anything, so after a while they stopped having them, and the work-points weren't properly discussed at all. The result of that was a falling-off of enthusiasm among the

members. I explained to the brigade leaders how to fix a standard individual norm for each job done by the group and decide the work-points due to the individual by comparing his work with the norm. Still the members couldn't get used to it and thought it far too complicated. So I had another talk with the vice-chairman and we worked out piece-rates based on a fair level of individual skill.

In my daily rounds I also discovered other problems such as absenteeism.

I came to see that this way of touring the fields was a good way of getting to understand things in the co-op and unearthing problems. It was far better to get down to the fields myself and have short sessions with the brigade leaders on the spot than to wait till the evening and get them to report to me at a meeting. I found out far more, and my officers weren't tired out by late evening meetings. Besides, in my trips round the fields I took in at a glance the number who'd turned up, the mood of the members, how efficiently they were working and the quality of the work done. The problems I discovered on my rounds I brought to the attention of the vice-chairman and the brigade leaders when we got together for a few minutes in the evenings.

I gradually found out too, as the months went by, that I must know what I wanted before I went on such tours. It was no use roaming round at random. By this I mean two things: First, I had to know whatever was specially important at any given time. For instance, when it was getting on for time to transplant seedlings, I concentrated on keeping track of the brigade and group plans—when and where they were going to start, whether they had enough people to finish it in time and so on. When transplanting started, I looked into the way work was arranged and divided among the members, for instance, to make sure that the number of people lifting seedlings and the number transplanting them were about right, so that neither group was kept waiting. Then I paid special attention to setting the correct piece-rate

and seeing that it was applied. The second thing was to know when to concentrate on areas needing extra care. As a rule, I went to the production brigade which had run into trouble or had the biggest problems to find out the situation for myself. For instance, when we finished transplanting in the ordinary fields and switched to transplanting in the tidal fields (that is, fields which are flooded by tidal rivers when the water rises and drained when the water ebbs), Brigade 1 could only work half time because the land they were working on was flooded. I went to the field where they were working and got them to build up the embankment round the field and this stopped the tidal water flowing in. Then they were able to work full time again.

#### KNOWING THE FIGURES

If you wanted to lead our large co-op well and see that its production plans came off, you couldn't just depend on impressions and do things on the spur of the moment. I certainly couldn't get a proper picture of what was happening in our co-op by merely trusting to impressions. You had to get down to figures—to know, for instance, how many members turned up for work every day, how much work they did, how efficient they were, how work was progressing and whether we could finish our jobs in time. Once I had such facts at my finger-tips I was able to tackle a host of problems.

When we first started getting ready for spring ploughing in 1955 we still didn't realize that to lead the work of the co-op one had to master the important figures. We learned this from bitter experience. At that time I didn't even have accurate figures of the number of households, the number of people in them and the manpower we had in the co-op. As for the number of people who'd turn up for work every day, that was also an unknown factor. Sometimes so many turned up that we hadn't got the tools to go round and didn't know what to do with them. Sometimes so few turned up there

were not enough people to man the boats, and we'd paid for the hire of boats we couldn't use. It was all a terrible mix-up.

Later, we took a rapid census of the households, the number of people and estimated their labour power. We set the strong ones — those who could be counted as "full manpower" — to dig up the silt while the others were set to hoeing or spreading the silt. In the evenings we went over the number of absentees. If we found the figure on the high side we looked into it and did something about it. In this way we gradually learned the importance of figures. For instance, at first, efficiency in dredging up silt was quite low. Then we started recording the amount dredged up by individual boat teams and discovered that one boat, manned by Wu Lien-shen's team, was able to do 480 loads a day. Most of the teams were doing about 300, and the weakest no more than 270. Now, why did they vary all that much? We tracked it down and found that most of the boat teams started out pretty late in the morning and left off rather early. Also, people in a team didn't work in step with one another — some were slow and some were fast. But Wu Lien-shen's team was different. They not only worked longer, but they worked at an even speed, and the men handling the scoop, the capstan and the boat worked well with one another. That was why that team was so efficient. When we found this out, we promptly passed on their experience to the other boat teams, and so they were able to do better. On another occasion it was nearly time to start transplanting and I wanted to check whether the production brigades and groups would be able to get ready in time, so I asked each group to estimate the number of work-days they'd need to complete their preparations. Group 2 of Brigade 1 had been taking it easy and going ahead leisurely. I went to them myself and with them calculated the number of work-days they'd have to put in before spring ploughing. When they saw that they couldn't possibly start transplanting in time if they went on working like that, they

got busy immediately. They began to start early and leave off late, split up the work better and speed up so much that they finished their preparations in good time.

My experience over the past few months has shown that before I can direct production according to plan and organize and make rational use of labour I must first have plenty of facts and figures. I'm no scholar, but I usually tried to take down as many figures as I could. Sometimes I enlisted the help of other people and asked them to make an entry in my notebook. Sometimes I got the book-keeper to help me take down the figures quoted by the brigade leaders when they came to report on the work.

But this was only a beginning. Lately we made a few bad mistakes in our work because we hadn't the right figures to help us. For instance, because we didn't work out beforehand how many work-days it would take to transplant seedlings to a stretch of land, how long the work should take and when it would have to be finished, we went about it leisurely and took longer over transplanting than peasants working on their own and in mutual-aid teams. Another thing was that we didn't have a clear idea how many seedlings were needed to the *mou*. When we were transplanting we made a rough estimate and thought that we had too many, so we sold some. Then in the end we ran short of seedlings for a hundred *mou* or so.

#### GETTING MORE ASSISTANTS

To lead a co-op as big as ours well naturally called for the efforts of more than one person. The job had to be shouldered in common by all the officers of the co-op.

At the start, however, we were all inexperienced and often fell down on the job. For instance, at the meeting of officers, Liang Chi-an, our vice-chairman, was given the job of leading the work of hauling silt, but he didn't know how to do it. He hadn't the faintest idea how many people turned up

for work every day, how much silt they got, how efficient the teams were, or what his members thought about it all. Once when some of them failed to come to work, instead of finding out why they were getting slack he pitched in himself. He was so busy standing in for someone else that he had no time to look after other things and clean forgot to tell people that a low embankment round the paddy field wanted repairing. One night all the water in the paddy field seeped away and silt hauling was held up for a whole day.

When accidents like this happened I felt I must give my comrades the benefit of my experience. "You can work yourself to the bone," I told Liang, "but it's not half as good as when you persuade all the members to give a hand. An officer can't just depend on what his own two hands can do; he must use his brains too. Now, you lead the work of hauling silt, so you ought to have all the necessary figures and see from them where the problems lie. For instance, you can find out just what Wu Lien-shen's experience in scooping silt is and get the other teams to use his method. Isn't that far more sensible than just working your own guts out?"

Ordinarily when I got together with my officers and brigade leaders the first thing I asked them was, "Now what's the main problem you're up against these days?" or "Look now, what are the duties of a person in charge of supplies?" My intention in asking such questions was to get them thinking and making them work out ways and means for themselves.

In training officers, the important thing is not only to improve their skill but to help them develop politically. Some of our officers were vague about what their work meant, some were easily daunted by difficulties. It's up to me to help them and give them encouragement. Take the case of the leader of our Brigade 5 for instance. The members of Brigade 5 are a very mixed batch, quite a few of them used to be pedlars and poor vagrants. They weren't used to hard work and were difficult to lead. The brigade leader lost

confidence more than once and wanted to give up being an official. "On your shoulders," I said to him, "rest the rice jars of scores of households. How can you pack up and leave the job half-done?" Afterwards I gave him some advice on the best way to lead his members, and we talked about the best way of arranging work and settling work-points. That's how I helped him to gain confidence in himself.

## A PARTY BRANCH LEADS THE MUTUAL-AID AND CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT CORRECTLY

(In *The Work in Shensi*, No. 18, July 6, 1955)

*This is a useful article. All rural Party branches should follow the examples it cites.*

*Reports from a number of places confirm the need for the co-op management committees to elect one of their members to take charge of political education. Such persons should be elected in all co-ops and devote themselves to political work under the leadership of the Party branch.*

*The establishment of a "mutual-aid and co-operative network," or a "joint management committee of co-ops," like the one in Yanghopa Township, Shensi, obviously is a good idea.*

*Of one thing we may be sure — working people, given proper political education, can overcome their shortcomings and correct their mistakes. As the reader can see, thanks to the political work done in this township, co-op members who had been privately trading in pigs gave it up, while those who had been starving the co-ops' oxen soon fed them fat and sleek.*

— EDITOR

Established in 1952, the Communist Party branch of the Yanghopa Township, Hsihsiang County, Shensi Province, now has 22 members. All of them play active and leading roles in local mutual-aid and co-operative organizations.

Led by the Party branch, 72 per cent of the township's peasant households are now organized. There are nine agricultural producers' co-operatives in the township, to which 40 per cent of its peasant households belong.

The experience of this Party branch in leading mutual-aid and co-operative work is as follows:

1) Intensify political education, carry out regular criticism of bourgeois ideas, and raise the socialist consciousness of Party members.

Party members get education as they pass to full membership at the completion of their probationary period, and also through a system of "study days." In 1952, when the Party branch had only seven members, three of them were buying young crops (making forward purchases for personal profit), hoarding grain and lending money on interest; one was preparing to go into business to make money; and another, with backward ideas, intended to quit the co-op work. Meeting the situation squarely, the Party branch put through a programme of education, during the transference of the probationary members to full membership, on the qualifications for Party members. There were also courses of study on two resolutions of the Party's Central Committee: on mutual aid and co-operation, and the development of agricultural producers' co-operatives.

Bourgeois ideology among Party members came under criticism, and was duly corrected. The central task of the Party branch was clarified. After discussions, the Party branch decided to adopt the system of "study days" which has been enforced from 1952 to the present.

Another method used was to unfold criticism and self-criticism while the year-end appraisal of members and the seasonal work check-ups were being made. In 1953 a certain unsatisfactory situation was revealed: criticism and self-criticism had been neglected; there was no unity in the Party branch; Party members did not speak out their views at the open meetings but made complaints behind each other's



backs; some stayed away from Party meetings on pleas of ill health; others felt "they had more shortcomings after joining the Party than before." For example, Chang Pang-wan, a probationary member, refused to listen to criticism because he thought that the Party branch deliberately wanted to "discipline" him. Confronted with this situation, the Party branch carried out criticism and self-criticism among the members, as a means of education during the year-end appraisal and seasonal check-ups. The responsible Party members led off by examining their own shortcomings. As a result, the members were greatly enlightened. Now the practice of criticism and self-criticism within the Party branch has become more extensive, and progress has been made in implementing the principle of democracy in Party life.

Personal talks also helped some members to straighten out their thinking. Chou Sheng-kuei, a probationary Party member, for instance, became depressed when he was criticized by the Party branch and the co-op for his conceit and self-complacency. The Party branch assigned a committee member to talk with him on several occasions, gradually making him see his own mistakes. Now he is working enthusiastically.

Because of the continuous efforts of the Party branch in giving political education to its members, the latter are setting good examples and play leading roles in all kinds of work. Their active influence and energetic work have virtually put on the right track the running of the seven agricultural producers' co-ops already set up, so that the co-ops grew better crops than the peasants outside. As a consequence, the Party's prestige has been enhanced and the peasants' desire to join the co-ops has become very strong. Many peasants have eagerly demanded entry, saying: "The Party members are more at home in the matter of policy. We'll do whatever they do," or "We'll certainly make no mistake if we follow the advice of the Party branch."

2) Practise collective leadership and division of responsibility, and strengthen the Party branch guidance in the work of mutual aid and co-operation.

Formerly, whatever happened in the township — important or otherwise — was brought by the village people to the Party branch secretary. A situation came about in which the secretary alone handled all the work, while other committee members had nothing to do and many things were left unattended to. Therefore the Party branch made a decision to carry out collective leadership and division of responsibility. The secretary was to be responsible for over-all leadership; the deputy secretary was to lead the key co-op; and the township was to be divided into four sections, each to be put under the charge of a Party branch member (or members), and each section was to have division of labour among Party members whose duty it was to render reports to the Party branch and make a study of the problems concerning mutual aid and co-operation at regular intervals. These arrangements righted the condition in which some committee members had too much to do while others had too little, and so gave full play to the role of the Party branch organization.

During the 1955 spring ploughing, for instance, Chang Michun, a Party branch committee member who had been assigned work in a co-op, initiated discussions with the co-op members about their jobs. They then subdivided their work on a responsible basis. The result was that, within seven days, they completed the hoeing of 16 *mou* of the co-op's land to be sown to rape-seed and 36 *mou* of wheat fields.

To enable the various township organizations to play their full role in making the mutual-aid and co-operative movement successful, the Party branch has applied the method of dividing responsibility among committee members for their leadership. Committee members concerned with organization are to be responsible for directing the work of the militia, the supply and marketing co-ops and the credit co-ops. Committee members concerned with propaganda are to be responsible for

directing the work of the Youth League, the Women's Federation and the propaganda network. Weekly meetings are held to discuss and settle questions arising in various organizations.

For different periods in the course of the establishment and consolidation of the co-ops, the Party branch sets different tasks for the Youth League, the Women's Federation and the militia. These organizations then map out their own annual or seasonal plans, in accordance with the plans and wishes of the Party branch. When a co-op is being set up, the Youth League branch, complying with the purpose of the Party branch, puts its members into action. Thus the Youth Leaguers have played an important part in helping organize the co-ops. For example, Youth Leaguer Liu Chun-lan, a country girl in Changchiatsui Village, persuaded her father to join an agricultural producers' co-operative, induced a mutual-aid team to join the co-op, and convinced three peasant families—living in the same courtyard with her, who had never wished to organize before—to join the co-op as well. She also helped Yang Jih-chen and four other peasant families to set up a mutual-aid team.

3) Intensify the political education of the co-operative and mutual-aid rank and file.

The Party branch helped the co-ops to set up the system of political education assistants. To these it gave guidance on how to understand the outlook of the co-op members on different questions, and enlighten them accordingly. In the spring of 1955 five co-op members in the co-ops—Shangying and Hsiangchiawan—were trading in pigs. Other members wanted to follow suit, saying, "If they can do it, we can too!" So the Party branch directed the co-ops to organize their people for studying the co-op regulations, so that they could better understand the character of an agricultural co-operative. The result was that their mistaken notions and deeds were quickly corrected.

Li Chia-sheng, a member of Hsiangchiawan Co-op, was in charge of feeding cattle belonging to the co-op. He gave better treatment to his own cattle to the neglect of those which were co-op property, so that, within a month, the latter lost weight. Li Ta-cheng, the co-op's vice-chairman and political education assistant, had several talks with the stockman to make him see his mistake. Realizing he was in the wrong, Li Chia-sheng began to feed the co-op's cattle as carefully as he did with his own, and all of them grew fat. This was a typical case which the Party branch used to educate the stockmen in all co-ops. Those who had lacked a sense of responsibility in caring for co-ops' cattle changed their attitude.

4) Recruit new Party members, side by side with the training of active elements in the co-ops and mutual-aid teams.

As soon as the work of setting up co-ops began, the Party branch paid attention to the selection and training of activists. Altogether 42 activists were trained, of whom 40 became co-op officials. From among these officials the Party branch has, from time to time, enlisted some Party members; and now 20 possible candidates are under consideration. The possible candidates selected from among the active elements in the mutual-aid teams and co-operatives were people who had distinguished themselves in different kinds of movements. Party members were then assigned by the branch to be responsible for different tasks in the practical training of these candidates, for observing their work, inducing them to attend Party lectures, and giving them specific assignments to test them in practical work. When they fulfilled the conditions for joining the Party, they were individually admitted to its ranks.

5) Guide the mutual-aid and co-operative organizations in reforming agricultural technique.

On the basis of mutual aid and co-operation, the Party branch popularized advanced experience in close planting of rice and sowing wheat in rows. Through demonstrations and

inspection trips which it arranged, the peasants, when convinced, willingly adopted the new technique. In 1954 when close planting of rice (at 10.5 inches' intervals in each direction) was first introduced, most of the peasants were not convinced of its advantages. Some said, "This won't work in Yanghopa. If we adopt such a way, we won't even get straw, not to say rice!" Others said, "These Communists are queer people. They meddle in other people's business, and even butt into our farm work!" Seeing these worries among the peasants, the Party branch first summed up the experience of Chou Sheng-kuei, who had reaped a rich harvest of rice from close planting on his 3.2 *mou* of land. Then it arranged a visit to his field by the mutual-aid team heads, Party members and Youth Leaguers. This example was widely publicized. With the Communists and Youth Leaguers in the lead, the method of close planting (10.5 inches apart) was put into effect on three-quarters of all the rice fields in the township in 1954. The result was that the average yield per *mou* reached 520 catties.

6) Strengthen the guidance of the mutual-aid teams and co-ops through the joint management committee of co-ops.

Under the guidance of the Party branch, a joint management committee of all agricultural producers' co-operatives in the township was set up in December 1954, with the secretary of the Party branch as its chairman. The committee's first job was to train co-op officials and organize inter-co-op emulation, thus making the officials more confident and the rank and file more enthusiastic. In the spring of 1955 the joint management committee established a system of regular fortnightly meetings, on the first and the fifteenth of each month. It also intensified the political education of the co-op officials and organized them to study the management of the co-operatives, as well as experience gained in the rational close planting of rice and cotton. These studies gave the co-op officials confidence. They said that these regular meetings really solved

problems and should be held more often in future. Furthermore, the committee organized a competition among six co-operatives. It also sponsored a cattle show. These activities did much to consolidate and improve the agricultural producers' co-operatives in the township.

## HOW CHUNGHSIN TOWNSHIP LAUNCHED A MUTUAL-AID AND CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

(By Liu Yao-hua, in issue No. 82 of *The Work in Kweichow*,  
May 13, 1955)

The line followed here is correct. This township has five co-operatives, seven combined mutual-aid teams, three year-round mutual-aid teams and fourteen seasonal mutual-aid teams. Their total membership amounts to 98.4 per cent of those peasant families which ought to be organized.

Prior to December 1954, the Party branch of the township had not placed the main emphasis on leading the mutual-aid and co-operative movement; Party members were afraid that leading the mutual-aid teams would prove too difficult. Instead of relying on the method of "The Party secretary takes the lead and all the Party members help run the co-operatives," the Party branch leaned heavily on the work team (sent to help them by a higher organization, apparently).

Rural Party branches in quite a number of places show this spineless attitude toward agricultural co-operation. Not only the Party branches—it is possible that even some of the higher committees of the Party do the same. This is the crux of the problem. Whether the socialist transformation of our agriculture can keep pace with the speed of our national industrialization, whether the co-operative movement can develop in a healthy way with few flaws and

guarantee an increase in production, hinges on whether or not the local Party committees at all levels can quickly and correctly shift the emphasis to where it belongs. Work teams should be sent, but—and this must be made clear—they go to help local Party organizations, not to replace them, not to immobilize their hands and brains, not to let them rely on the work teams for everything.

This Kweichow township achieved outstanding success in only a little over five months from the time it changed its attitude in December 1954. They didn't rely on the work team there, but pitched in themselves. And the Communists were no longer afraid of difficulties.

A change of this sort depends first and foremost on the secretaries of the Party committees at various levels—province, autonomous region, region, autonomous chou, county, autonomous county and district—and on the Party branch secretaries. They must assume their full responsibilities in agricultural co-operation. If they are afraid of trouble, of difficulties, if they do not throw themselves personally into this great task confronting them but merely pass it on to the rural work departments of the Party or to the visiting work teams, not only will they be unable to complete the job—they will cause a great many mishaps.

— EDITOR

It was in 1952 that a Party organization was first set up in Chunghsin Township, Fengkang County, Kweichow Province. There are at present 20 Party members in the township. A local Party branch committee with five officers has been formed, and the members are divided into four groups, with due consideration to the place where they live. During the spring

ploughing this year, the movement for mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture made further headway. An additional 30 peasant households working on their own joined the mutual-aid teams. Since spring the co-operatives have been further consolidated. Through the study of co-op regulations by its members, management has been improved, the responsibility system introduced, the members' enthusiasm for production increased and the previous lack of unity among the members overcome. At present, 98.4 per cent of the peasant households in the township that can be organized have either joined the mutual-aid teams or the co-ops. There are now five agricultural producers' co-ops, seven joint mutual-aid teams, three permanent and 14 temporary mutual-aid teams.

The main reasons why it has been possible for mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture to develop on a sound basis in this township are as follows:

- 1) The Party branch has improved its method of work and has made great efforts in giving concrete leadership to the expansion of mutual aid and co-operation. After the county Party conference in December 1954, the local Party branch committee examined its own work in the light of the decisions taken at the conference. It found that it had not yet centred its attention on developing mutual aid and co-operation, but relied too much on the work teams sent by the higher authorities to do the job. The education of its members was also found to be not thorough enough, and, as a result, some Party members shirked their responsibilities in leading the mutual-aid teams for fear of difficulties; some of them had not even joined mutual-aid teams. It was recognized that all this ran counter to the spirit of the Party directives. In view of the conditions and problems existing in the branch, education by the Party showed its members that two paths were open to the peasants: they had to choose either the socialist path or the capitalist path. The Party members were also taught what the basic tasks of the Party in the rural areas were. All of them were asked to join mutual-aid teams or co-ops,

and to do their best to make a success of the organizations they joined. Then the Party committee officers drew up a plan for a clear division of labour. One officer was to be responsible for administrative work. The Party branch secretary was made responsible for leading the five co-ops, with the Chunhsing Co-op as the key co-op. The deputy secretary and another officer of the branch committee (who was the township head) took charge of the mutual-aid teams, the key team being that led by the peasant Chu Ke-chih. Furthermore, mutual aid and co-operation were made the central tasks of the Party branch. Through the development of criticism and self-criticism around this central issue, Party group meetings were made richer and became closely linked with the conditions in the countryside. These measures guided the 20 Party members in the township to work whole-heartedly for the expansion of mutual aid and co-operation. They carefully studied the Party policy and strengthened their leadership of the mutual-aid and co-operative movement.

- 2) Through the networks of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives, the Party branch achieved all-round leadership of the mutual-aid and co-operative movement. As early as 1954, a township committee for the expansion of mutual aid and co-operation was formed, which organized eight mutual-aid and co-op networks. But because the Party branch did not offer much help in the way of providing leadership, meetings of the mutual-aid and co-op network were seldom held and this organization therefore did not play the role it should have done. The Party branch committee strengthened its leadership of this organization in order to give all-round leadership to the mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. The decision was made to hold a meeting once a month at which the experiences of the key co-ops or teams would be popularized, the Party policy on mutual aid and co-operation explained and studied, the method of leadership discussed, etc. Before each meeting, adequate preparations were made to ensure its success: the Party branch committee made it a point to seek advance

help from the personnel of the work teams sent by the higher authorities in analysing the situation in the co-ops, summing up experience, discussing existing problems and finding their solution.

3) A sound method of leadership was adopted. This method was to have the good co-ops influence and lead the mutual-aid teams, so that the co-ops and teams in turn could influence and lead the individual peasants, and to establish key points in an area so as to influence and lead the entire area. The five agricultural producers' co-ops were set up in five different areas of the township, with the Chunhsing Co-op as the key co-op to guide the work of the mutual-aid team led by Li Fashiang. The other four co-ops all used the method of exchanging personnel to guide the mutual-aid teams. The whole township was divided into eight areas, each with its own key point. Under the unified guidance of the Party branch, and led by Party members, experience was exchanged through the mutual-aid and co-op networks.

4) The peasants were educated by the example set by the "key points" which were given full attention and set up as models for the others to study and emulate. This method was used whenever anything new—particularly any innovation in farming technique—was introduced. For example, in accumulating compost, selecting seeds, improving seed beds, etc., the Party branch always used the Chunhsing Co-op as the "pilot plant" to gather experience before carrying it out on a large scale. The mass movement to accumulate more compost, for example, was organized after the peasants were invited to see for themselves the good results obtained by the Chunhsing Co-op.

The main problem that still remains in the leadership of the local Party branch regarding mutual aid and co-operation is that it does not give enough attention to the temporary mutual-aid teams, and that it does not persist in doing its work in accordance with the system it has adopted.

## THE CO-OP NETWORK SYSTEM SHOULD BE PROMOTED NATIONALLY

(By the Rural Work Department of the Chekiang Provincial Committee, Chinese Communist Party, October 23, 1955)

*This is a fine article, well worth introducing. Co-op networks should be set up everywhere and become a regular system. Now most of our co-ops are small and it is necessary for the townships to link them together in networks. The districts should also have co-op networks. In the future, when most of our co-ops become medium-sized and large, district-wide networks should be particularly stressed.*

*We hope that in 1956 there will be co-op networks in every district and township. Of course, in those townships where all the peasant households have joined together in one or two big co-ops, it is not necessary to form networks.*

—EDITOR

## NEW PROBLEMS

Lungnan Township in Yuyao County, Chekiang Province, is partially mountainous. It consists of 12 administrative villages with 1,369 households. In the spring of 1954 two agricultural producers' co-operatives were organized there. The district Party committee attached one of its functionaries to these co-operatives to give them guidance. In winter of the same year, 15 more co-operatives were set up while the two old ones were expanded. At this juncture, 47.6 per cent

of the total number of the households in the township had joined co-ops.

But at about the same time the Party committee functionary stationed in the co-ops was transferred elsewhere. A new problem arose: there were now many co-ops but too few trained people to lead them in their work. The four local functionaries tried to lead by dividing the work, each taking charge of a part, but it was not long before they found themselves unable to cope with the many questions that came up. For instance, the head of the township peasant association, while on his way to Co-op No. 6 to help settle problems, was stopped by officers of the Co-op No. 12 who requested him to help them overcome a bit of trouble. Then, at midnight on the same day Co-op No. 5 asked him for help because its production officer wanted to walk out of the co-op. The few township functionaries rushed back and forth from morning to night, and had their hands full all the time. Five of the co-ops, in fact, had never been visited by a single one of these men in all the six months since they were established. Other co-ops had been visited, but there were many questions which the functionaries were unable to settle, or "settled" in a wrong way. The co-op members complained that the functionaries "can only give birth to co-ops, but not bring them up."

The functionaries, on their part, felt that rushing around to fill gaps and meet crises as they arose did not work. They therefore adopted another method: to arrange a division of labour among the functionaries so that each of them could lead one co-op as a key point, while making himself available to help a few other co-ops. This worked out somewhat better. But it led to tendencies to overstress the key co-op and overlook the others or vice versa. About this time, the township functionaries and leading co-op members were called to work on the agricultural tax collection, on the planned purchasing and distribution of grain and other tasks. Some officials of agricultural producers' co-ops also held concurrent posts as directors or supervisors of credit or supply and marketing co-

operatives. Their leadership over the producers' co-ops therefore became lax. As a consequence, more and more problems came up. Most of these co-ops had no production plans and the division of labour among their members was haphazard. Each morning the peasants rushed to see the co-op chairman and consulted on what jobs had to be done. In the evening they assessed the work the members had performed, and decided on the work-points credited to each of them until midnight. Five of the co-ops had no fixed working area; their financial problems had either not been dealt with or had been dealt with badly. Seven co-ops in the mountainous area fixed their quota for forest products in the same way as the quota for rice. This resulted in the members felling large quantities of timber (Co-op No. 6 alone felled 100,000 catties). By early April, very little had been done to prepare for the spring sowing. Four co-ops were short of rice seeds, of which they had 1,200 catties less than they needed. Farm tools, generally speaking, had not been repaired.

For fear of difficulties, the township Party branch requested the district Party committee to send people to assist it. The co-op leaders too asked the township to find ways and means for them. They complained that there were too many meetings which interfered with work but still left many problems unsolved. The co-op rank and file were dissatisfied too, saying that if things went on that way, they wouldn't have anything to eat by next year. People who had not joined co-ops were sarcastic at their expense, "Before the functionaries come, all you can do is cool your feet. When meetings run into the middle of night you get hungry and the next morning, your eyes are sore. When problems are not settled, you are worried to death!"

#### THE CO-OPERATIVE NETWORK

The township Party branch, under the leadership of the county and district Party committees, and after discussing local experience and studying that of other areas, decided to

organize pivot co-ops, and integrated mutual-aid and co-operative networks. Existing agricultural producers' co-ops were divided into three groups according to their geographical location. In each such locality a mutual-aid and co-operative network was set up. In each network, one co-op, centrally located and staffed with capable and active leading personnel, was chosen as the pivot. Three members of the Party branch took personnel charge of the three networks. In each network, a Party group was set up as the leading core.

The first question which came up when this system was established was to remove the doubts in the minds of the township functionaries. They had believed up to then that, to get the work done, one functionary should handle only one co-op. For example, Sun Tien-feng, deputy chief of the township administration, had said, "You can never stop eight bottles with seven corks!" People who spoke in this way could not see the wisdom and strength of the masses. They did not understand how to rely on the masses in their work. When the co-operative networks encountered early difficulties, the township functionaries tried to do everything themselves. They opened every meeting with a lengthy report, and concluded it with a summing-up speech while the others present said not a word. Everything hung on the township functionaries.

But later they themselves, through practical experience, came to see the importance of taking the mass line. The secretary of the township Party branch attended a meeting of the co-op chairmen called by the first of the three pivot co-ops to discuss questions such as the search for new sources of manure, pig-rearing, composting, etc. He found that the questions discussed were real and solutions suggested were practical. He was impressed, saying that a discussion among co-op officers was much better than the speech-making of the township functionaries. The head of the township peasants' association became convinced when he learned about the ex-

perience of this co-op in working out a seasonal system of responsibility. "One man rushing back and forth can only solve one question in one co-op," he said. "The network is much better; it can solve many questions at once."

In grouping co-ops into networks, attention must be paid to geographical proximity and similarity of production activities. To illustrate, all the six co-ops in the second network were located near each other in the partially mountainous area and their co-ops were much the same. Because of this, the network was able to work in a regular way. But in the first network, two co-ops were located in the partially mountainous area while four others were on the plain. When a meeting of the network was held, the co-ops farming in the hills wanted to talk about strawberry-picking while the plain area co-ops wanted to discuss the reaping of the early spring crop. Neither took any interest in the other's problem.

As to the question of selecting the pivot co-ops, these were at first designated by the Party branch without asking the opinion of the masses. There was one pivot co-op which did not come up to requirements, and the other co-ops in its network were not satisfied. It was only when a new pivot co-op with a sound foundation, capable and active leading personnel and central location was selected that the masses were satisfied. A pivot co-op must learn with an open mind from the experience of other co-ops in its network, and it must guard against conceit and complacency. The one in the second network temporarily committed the mistake of ignoring the opinion of its associated co-ops, with bad effects on co-operation and unity. The situation was remedied when they were called upon to "learn from each other, and exchange experience with each other." After this, meetings took the form of informal discussions at which experiences were exchanged and opinions were freely expressed, and questions were discussed in a more lively and penetrating way.



## ACTIVITIES OF THE NETWORKS

The principal activities of the mutual-aid and co-operative networks in Lungnan Township were:

1) The meeting of co-op chairmen. Popularly known as the "network meeting," it was held at five to seven days' intervals, mainly to exchange experience and answer questions. There was a central topic for discussion at every meeting. Sometimes it concerned the assignments of work by the township functionaries, at other times it popularized the experience of the pivot co-op. It was also popularly called "the meeting of wise men."

2) Meetings on special subjects. These were not held regularly but depended upon the needs at various seasons, e.g. some meetings dealt with production technique, accounting, pig-rearing, etc.

3) Field visits and inspections. This method was adopted when it was necessary to popularize advanced production experience, check over production and promote emulation.

4) Individual contact. This was done when it was necessary to settle certain specific problems of different co-ops or to exchange views on different ways of thinking.

Through such activities the 17 co-ops in the township were checked over and consolidated. In 1955, their production was 20 per cent greater, on the average, than in 1954, and 98 per cent of the co-op members were enjoying high incomes. A peasant saying arose: "The mutual-aid and co-operative network is like a polyclinic; it has departments of both internal (meaning the discussions and meetings) and external (meaning field visits and inspections) medicines."

The system of pivot co-ops and the co-operative networks overcame the difficulty of "few personnel for many co-ops." Questions in separate co-ops were settled by following the examples set by the pivot ones, with the encouragement of the whole network. When spring cultivation began, one of the pivot co-ops introduced its experience in working out produc-

tion plans and carrying out the system of definite responsibility for each job. This helped the co-ops in stopping the confused situation in which there had been no production plans, division of labour had been haphazard, and labour power had been wasted. At sowing time, and during the transplanting of rice seedlings, the pivot co-op also set examples. It arranged for field visits and popularized better ways of seed selection and close planting.

Seven co-ops in the mountainous area, benefiting from the experience of their pivot unit, dealt correctly with the question of pooling trees in co-ops, thus setting their members' minds at ease and stimulating them to plant 75,000 pine trees.

Lack of experience on the part of the township functionaries was also remedied. Their opinion can be summed up as follows: "We used to rush back and forth, looking here and there; we had only a rough idea of things but were never well informed in detail. Now that we take part in the work of the pivot co-op, our knowledge increases with every problem handled in practice. The co-operative network is a school in which we can learn how to run co-ops." The leading personnel of the co-ops also found the right way. Their opinion is: "We used to ask the township to help us out when we were in trouble. We couldn't do anything else. Now, when we have problems, we bring them to the network meeting for discussion."

The active elements in the co-operative grew in number and fewer people held concurrent positions. This was brought about through the appointment of assistants and discussion meetings of book-keepers and technicians. In the summer of 1955 while the work of planned distribution of grain was at its high tide, the Party branch and the leading personnel of the co-op arranged a suitable division of labour among themselves, ensuring that leadership in co-op affairs was exercised continuously and normally. One of the active co-op leaders said: "Formerly, we were both officials and messenger-boys. The co-op chairman did everything; the committee members

depended on the chairman; the co-op members didn't care. Now everybody has something to do and in every line there are people who know their job well."

#### REMAINING PROBLEMS

The pivot co-ops and the mutual-aid and co-operative networks have done much in the exchange of experience. But they still have not done enough in the way of checking, speeding their work and giving practical assistance to the co-ops. Hence, certain co-ops are still lagging behind.

There are not as many inter-network activities as there are within each network; the contact with the mutual-aid teams and individual peasants is still less.

The township Party branch has not yet fully solved the problem of how to deal satisfactorily with other tasks while still centring its main work on mutual aid and co-operation. It often happens, at meetings of the pivot co-ops and the co-operative network, that the functionaries assign to the co-ops some general administrative work which interferes with the network's regular activities.

#### NEW SITUATION, NEW PROBLEMS

(By Chang Tien-chu, Fu Yen-lung, Hao Ching-min and Sun Jung-sheng in the *People's Daily*, May 22, 1955)

*This material is useful and well worth attention everywhere. It describes the attitudes taken by the various categories of peasants in the countryside.*

*The poor peasants are the most enthusiastic about co-operation. Many middle peasants want to "wait and see a little longer." They enjoy "taking their ease outside." Actually what they want to know most is whether or not it would be profitable for them to invest their means of production in the co-op. This will determine whether they act one way or another. Many of the well-to-do middle peasants are very much opposed to co-operation. The worst of them sell off their means of production, pull out their capital, or organize fake co-ops. A few even tie in with former landlords and rich peasants and do bad things.*

*We hope all comrades working on rural problems will make sure to observe and analyse the attitudes taken by the various categories of peasants in their own particular localities, and adopt policies appropriate to the situation.*

*The material points out an incorrect tendency to slight the mutual-aid teams, while paying close attention to the co-ops. It recommends that over-all plans be made for both, and that both be given suitable consideration. This is correct. The "mutual-aid team and co-op network" method is good because it*

*takes both the co-ops and the teams into consideration. The co-operatives must really help the mutual-aid teams and the peasants farming individually to solve their current production difficulties. The fund which has been allocated by the government for poor peasants who lack the necessary capital to invest when they join co-ops must be sent to the villages at once. Those poor peasants who have not yet joined co-operatives should be told that they can draw on this fund any time they are ready to become members.*

—EDITOR

Pingfang, Shuangchuan and Wufu are three villages in Naho County, Heilungkiang Province, which made tremendous progress in agricultural co-operation in 1955. Pingfang has ten co-operatives comprising 67 per cent of its peasant households; Shuangchuan has eight, comprising 49 per cent of its households, and Wufu, four, with 27 per cent of its households. Fifty-seven per cent of the households in the three villages have not yet joined; they have 49.3 per cent of the total labour force available and own 45.3 per cent of the draught animals. Of the land they own, 42.7 per cent is dry land and 53.4 per cent paddy fields. These peasant households outside the co-operatives are organized in 61 mutual-aid teams.

A number of changes have taken place as a result of the big increase in the number of agricultural co-operatives in the spring of 1954.

1) **Change of attitude.** Every social group in the countryside has felt keenly the impact of agricultural co-operation. The question of which way to go has become a central topic of discussion in the villages.

Two hundred and sixty-five poor-peasant households have not yet joined the co-operatives. But the overwhelming majority of them have long wanted to farm co-operatively,

so they have given a pledge that they will run their mutual-aid teams as well as they possibly can so as to create conditions in which co-operatives can be started. To equip themselves to do so, in the autumn of 1955, six poor-peasant households in Chang Hsi-kuei's team in Shuangchuan who had no horses bought some at the time of spring sowing. They are up in arms against anyone who makes disparaging remarks about the co-operative and relentlessly unmask any act of sabotage on the part of the rich peasants. But at the same time they still show a certain dissatisfaction with and have misgivings about the existing co-operatives. They are far from satisfied with the rule that a new member must, regardless of circumstances, contribute a sum to the co-operative as investment, based on the manpower in his household. (In the six co-operatives started in 1955, almost every member made his contribution on this basis in the form of seed grain and fodder to the share fund.) They see too that the co-operatives as at present constituted operate on too narrow a basis and that the things they produce are too simple and too much of a muchness to give full rein to the abilities of people with special skills. They wonder how they will be able to make a living if they get no work after joining the co-operative. Besides, some of them are single men who do not want to join because they are used to moving from place to place and are unwilling to tie themselves down.

There are 32 middle-peasant households who have not joined the co-operatives. They hold varying views, because the growth of co-operation varies from village to village and each co-operative has its own method of dealing with means of production. In villages where there is only a small amount of co-operation the middle peasants are inclined to put off joining as long as possible, and do not want to produce more than they had in the past. Their attitude is to wait and see, and they say: "There's more freedom outside than in." In villages where there is a large amount of co-operation a general feeling springs up among the middle peasants that

they should lose no time in building their fortunes. Their method is extensive farming — cultivating as much land as they can and growing more crops which will fetch a higher price. Five co-operatives in Pingfang stopped paying out dividends on land before the time was ripe and paid too little for other means of production. The peasant households who have not joined the co-operatives think it is not worth while cultivating their fields to the best of their ability or buying any means of production. A middle peasant in Hsiping called Sun Ching-yun used to store up each year enough manure for four or five *shang* (a *shang* is 15 *mou*). In 1955, however, he only stored enough for three. Moreover, there are some individual households who muddle through their work and go in for feasting and drinking. Eight households sold fourteen *shang* of their land. They won't have much more time, they say, to roam outside the co-operatives. On the other hand, the co-operatives in Shuangchuan deal with land and other means of production in a proper manner, and so the peasants outside them go about their work without anxiety, accumulating and carting manure and buying means of production with good heart. The way they look at it is this: Any means of production they buy now can not only be used to work their fields, but when they join the co-operative they won't be on the losing side either.

Some well-to-do individual households in which capitalist tendencies are deeply ingrained, adopted an attitude of passive resistance towards the co-operative movement and made every effort to free themselves from restrictions. They sold their cattle and other means of production, concealed their capital, and set up sham co-operatives or mutual-aid teams. Liu Yung-ho in Shuangchuan mortgaged his eleven *shang* of land and sold his three horses. Yang Fu-tien in Wufu sold all his seven cattle. And they do not conceal their opinion that by acting in this way they are saving themselves trouble when they join co-operatives and sparing themselves the sorrow of seeing *their* property turned into common property. Wang

Sheng, a new rich peasant in Pingfang, started a sham co-operative in collusion with seven landlord and rich-peasant households, an expelled Party member and a few peasants who fell into his trap. When he was exposed he sheered off to another place which is backward in the matter of co-operation and set up a sham mutual-aid team. Shih Nai-tsai in Shuangchuan played a thousand tricks to stop twelve households which had newly moved into the area forming mutual-aid teams, and tried to get them to join a sham one. There are plenty who have moved to backward villages to go on exploiting people there.

2) **Change in the composition of mutual-aid teams.** The composition of a number of mutual-aid teams underwent a great change because at the time new co-operatives were set up, their best people were taken away from them and part of the members joined co-operatives. Figures for the 61 teams in the three villages show that 16 teams are new ones consisting of scattered households, 30 have changed half their membership, and a mere 15 retain their original members. This change brought with it many new problems in the course of consolidating and improving mutual-aid teams in 1955.

Keeping down the size of mutual-aid teams does not make for better farming technique. Among the teams in the three villages, those with three to five households number 21, those with six to ten, 33, and those with ten or more, a mere seven. The teams with over ten households are mostly those which are all set to establish co-operatives in 1956. They have more horses, plenty of labour and capital, and they run their production well and in high spirits. As for the teams with six to ten households, not a few of them are "strong-with-strong," well-to-do teams. Generally they are not short of means of production but of labour. Some of them have enrolled poor-peasant households, but such households are scared that the well-to-do households will throw them out as soon as they have no use for them. The teams with three to five households are mostly composed of poor peasants, with few horses,

few capable hands, little capital, who find it hard to produce much and show little enthusiasm in their work.

In economic position members of teams may be poles apart. A situation has arisen where the very well-to-do households and the very poor both keep away from the co-operatives. The make-up of some mutual-aid teams is pretty complex. This is not so striking in villages where there is only a small amount of co-operation as in those where co-operation is widespread. In Pingfang seven of the twelve households in the mutual-aid team led by Chao Yu-chi are well-to-do peasants, five are poor peasants who have little land and such horses as they have are sorry jades. The poor peasants are feeling low-spirited, and have no confidence in their future while working in the team. "I want to join the co-op," said Sung Tien-ching, one of its members, "but I can't afford to pay the contribution to the share fund, and probably I shan't be given the right kind of work anyhow. Even in the team, they (the well-to-do households) have never asked me to join their meetings. There's really no way out." In certain teams you still find landlords, rich peasants and persons under surveillance. Such circumstances make it more complicated and difficult than ever to carry out the correct class policy in mutual-aid teams.

Mutual-aid teams have not enough active people to exercise leadership. Most Party members and live-wires have joined co-operatives, and those who have not are all with those mutual-aid teams which are all set to form co-operatives in 1956. There are 69 Party members in the three villages all told. Eight — 11.6 per cent of the total — are in mutual-aid teams. There are 112 members of the Youth League all told, with 28 in mutual-aid teams — 25 per cent of the total. As regards team leaders, 27 of them, or 44.3 per cent, have been on the job for two years; 34 of them, or 55.7 per cent, took up the job only recently. Among them, 19 — 31.2 per cent — are active, fair-minded and capable; 11 — 18 per cent — are active, but less fair-minded; 31 — 50.8 per cent — are not

active at all. In villages where co-operation has become more general, many team leaders complain that "to be a team leader won't get you very far. The longer you lead a team the smaller it gets and the harder it is to get work done."

3) **The question of leadership.** Many cadres down in the villages have not yet fully understood the new situation brought about by the growth of the co-operative movement; they have not learned how to solve the new problems facing the mutual-aid teams. In their present mood they would rather see ten mutual-aid teams go down than let a single co-op fail. For this reason, a number of mutual-aid teams run their production less satisfactorily than they ought to. In the three villages 45 teams — over 70 per cent of the total — have no production plans at all. As far as mutual benefit is concerned, only 17 teams — 28 per cent of the total — have made any definite provision in this matter, while 44 teams — 72 per cent — have done nothing at all. It is true that the three villages have already made preliminary comprehensive plans for the mutual-aid and co-operative movement and have set up "networks" to link the two forms of co-operation. Nevertheless, when it comes to the actual operation of these networks, too much time is spent on swapping experiences about the work of the co-op, and such questions as how the co-op should give a lead to the teams, and what is the best way of helping them, have been neglected. Theoretically arrangements have been made for the co-op to keep contact with the teams, but such contact is more apparent than real. The officials on the spot have not done enough to educate the team members patiently or to give them whole-hearted help. In directing the work of the team they are hot-tempered and arrogant. Sometimes they go so far as to scoff at and scold the members.

That being the case, if we are to give full rein to the peasants' enthusiasm for production and launch an all-out movement for higher yields by expanding mutual aid and co-

operation, we must take steps, in more ways than one, to give effective leadership to the mutual-aid teams.

First, it must be clearly realized that questions having a direct bearing on the economic interests of co-op members not only concern the co-ops themselves but have immediate impact on the attitude of the peasants outside of the co-operatives. To improve the work of mutual-aid teams and consolidate their position, it is, therefore, necessary, at the same time as the co-operatives are being given a check-over, to make the masses who are not members fully acquainted with the way in which the co-operatives deal with questions affecting the economic interests of their members, and to popularize the voluntary principle and the idea of mutual benefit and the actual steps leading up to their formation. When plans to expand co-operatives are found impracticable they should be amended or new over-all plans drawn up in their stead.

Secondly, contacts between the co-operative and the mutual-aid team must be made more practicable and the purely formal approach to the question scrapped. The better-run teams should forge closer working relations with "average" ones. In particular, those which are prepared to come together and form a co-operative some time in the future should, starting right now, see that their contacts are closer than before, support each other, work together harmoniously, and organize productive work well at every season. Teams which are far too small should be helped to pool their productive efforts at certain seasons, always voluntarily. Those teams which are too weak to get a decent output on their own should also be persuaded to merge voluntarily with other teams.

Thirdly, it is necessary to make unremitting efforts to prevent rich peasants from corroding the mutual-aid teams in a disguised manner. Village cadres must be educated to recognize the rich peasants for what they are and what they are likely to do in the new situation, to protect themselves from being taken in or falling into their trap. That is the way

to keep undesirables out of the mutual-aid teams. It is also necessary to do much more to educate people on unity between poor and middle peasants, and get both to understand the reasons why co-operation would be mutually beneficial and why estrangement would harm both. On that understanding and in the light of actual conditions in the localities concerned, mutual-benefit arrangements should be drawn up. Something should be done to prevent mutual-aid teams throwing out during the busy farming season households which have no horses. It is also necessary to stop them using horses and paying little or nothing for their use.

Fourthly, for the benefit of the cadres down in the villages it is necessary to make an analysis of the present situation as regards mutual-aid teams. The purpose of this analysis is to get them to realize how important it is to give the mutual-aid teams better leadership so that they can fulfil plans for higher output, and to give an impetus to the co-operative movement as a whole. It is to make them realize, too, that in 1955 the question of mutual-aid teams is more complex than in any previous year, and that this calls for a new approach and new methods to study and solve the problems that face them.

## THE LESSON OF THE "MIDDLE-PEASANT CO-OP" AND THE "POOR-PEASANT CO-OP"

(By the work team in Louhsia Township, *Fukien Daily*,  
August 16, 1955)

*The problems stated here are of nation-wide significance.*

*We must try to win over the middle peasants. Not to do so is wrong. But on whom must the working class and the Communist Party rely in the countryside in order to win over the middle peasants and socialize all of rural China? The poor peasants, of course. That was the case when we struggled against the landlords and carried out land reform, and that is the case today when we are struggling against the rich peasants and other capitalist elements so as to bring about the socialist transformation of agriculture.*

*In both these revolutionary periods, the middle peasant wavered in the initial stages. It is only after he sees the irresistible trend of events and the revolution is about to triumph that the middle peasant decides to join forces with it. The poor peasants must work on the middle peasants and win them over, so that the revolution will continue to grow stronger by the day, right up until final victory.*

*Like the peasants' associations in the old days, the management committees of the co-ops should also take in the old lower middle peasants and some representative both old and new well-to-do middle peasants—provided they have a relatively high*

*level of political consciousness. They should be allowed to participate in the management committees, but should not constitute more than about a third of the committee membership. The other two-thirds should be poor peasants (meaning those who are poor peasants today and former poor peasants who have moved up to become lower middle peasants).*

*Except for lower middle peasants and certain of the old and new well-to-do middle peasants who have a very high level of political consciousness and are really fair-minded, capable people, generally speaking, only poor peasants should hold the key posts in the co-ops. (To repeat—"poor peasants" includes the poor peasants of today and all of those former poor peasants who have become lower middle peasants since land reform.)*

*In Fuan County, Fukien Province, the co-op led by the poor peasants and the co-op led by the middle peasants manifested two different attitudes toward the cause of socialism. This kind of situation should not be regarded as exceptional. It is quite commonplace.*

— EDITOR

Everybody who has worked or is working in Louhsia Township, Fuan County, Fukien Province, knows that it has two agricultural co-operatives of equal size, one a "middle-peasant co-operative" and the other a "poor-peasant co-operative." Why are they so styled? Partly because the members of one are quite poor and those of the other are pretty well off. But more important is the fact that the leaders of one co-op are poor peasants and those of the other are middle peasants. The "poor-peasant co-op"—its proper name is the Hsinfu Agricultural Co-operative—has 17 households, only three of

which are middle peasant; of the poor-peasant households, two are now actually new middle peasant. Li Lao-tung, the chairman, and the other officials are all poor peasants. The co-op has neither cattle nor a harrow. The "middle-peasant co-op" — its proper name is the Hsinkang Agricultural Co-operative — also has 17 households, of which six are middle peasant, seven poor peasant, and four new middle peasant. Cheng Chien-chang, the chairman, and the other officials are all middle peasants. The co-op has four head of cattle and plenty of means of production. The members live fairly well.

When they were first organized, each of these two co-ops had its own production difficulties.

The Hsinfu Co-op which had no oxen hired one; it had to borrow a harrow and, with a loan it raised for the current year, bought a plough. When the plough was in use, the peasants used to say, "Take good care of it. It's the only one we have. If it's spoilt, we won't get another!" Three member households had no hoes. In 1954 a blacksmith on a visit happened to stay at Chairman Li's. It was then that the co-op collected some scrap iron and asked him to make three hoes. There were only four matting raincoats for twenty working peasants, so it was difficult to work on the farm when it rained.

With the Hsinkang Co-op, things were different. Its 17 households had four head of cattle, two used for ploughing its own land and the other two rented to a mutual-aid team, four ploughs and three hoes. Two of the ploughs and one hoe were not in use. Because they had cattle, they got more manure. Actually they now have over a hundred piculs of spare cattle dung for 1956. The owners of the cattle which were hired out were thinking of selling them together with the extra ploughs and hoe which the co-op had no use for.

As conditions in the two co-ops varied, so did the enthusiasm with which the members ran their co-op and the way they worked. The Hsinfu Co-op had nothing to fall back on. It had a lot of troubles. But the members were all convinced

that the only way to get rid of poverty was to run the co-op well, so enthusiasm ran high. As Li Lao-tung, the chairman, said: "Chairman Mao has led us to stand on our own feet. No matter how high the mountains are, our determination's even higher. We may suffer a bit now, but everything will be all right in future." Whenever a member had any trouble, the officials immediately made suggestions and found a way out. Last March, Li Shih-hsin, Wang Yu-ming and six other households ran short of food grain. The co-op officials at once took the matter up with the Party branch, which recommended them to sign a contract with the supply and marketing co-operative for felling and chopping firewood. But even felling and chopping firewood needs some outlay, and the members had neither grain, nor axe, nor saw — some of them had not even straw sandals. The management committee talked the problem over and suggested that the co-op should first scrape together some food grain and lend it for the time being to the members who were going to do the felling and chopping. The chairman was the first to produce forty catties of dried potatoes. Cheng Cheng-ling, Chen Yung-ti and some other members also gave something. The chairman then borrowed axes and saws, and bought straw sandals for six members who had none. In three days they felled and chopped over two hundred piculs of firewood and received 45 yuan from the supply and marketing co-op according to the terms of the contract. That solved the shortage of food.

Although the Hsinfu Co-op produced no more than others, the members were devoted to it. In the spring of 1955, when the wheat field was short of manure, the members scraped together five yuan and used it to buy fertilizer to give the crops an extra dressing. As a result, the co-op reaped 23 piculs of wheat, from which each household received over a hundred catties. In 1954 Li Lao-tung and Li Yung-ti, a middle peasant, were the only ones who had grown beans on a few *mou* and they had weeded only once and applied fertilizer only once. In 1955 the co-op went in for beans and got a



yield of 12-13 piculs; they weeded twice and applied fertilizer three times. The rice field, too, was hoed and fertilized once more than usual. In the same year after the bean crops were reaped, they derived another income of more than 100 yuan from the sale of firewood. The receipts from these two sources helped to tide the co-op members over till the early rice was harvested. So their difficulties were solved.

The chairman got the full support of the members. Even people who didn't belong to the co-op used to say: "Li Lao-tung really is a fine chap — so polite and so fair in his dealings." At times, when Li Lao-tung was up against something really tough, he would wonder: "Can a co-op like this keep on?" But when he recalled the past, his enthusiasm came back. He remembered that during the Kuomintang reactionary regime when he and his five brothers had had to part company, he had worked for twenty years in Hsiapu as a hired labourer, often late into the night making sugar for a landlord. Now, in the co-op, the land he manages and the grain harvested all belong to the members themselves. What does a little hardship matter? Since the land reform five years ago life has become better and better. If the co-op does well this year, if all difficulties can be overcome, next year will be better still. When he has straightened his own ideas out, he always explains things to the members, so the whole co-op, as one man, tackles its difficulties to make it a success.

In Hsinkang Co-op, where middle peasants run the show, the picture is different. In spite of the many advantages it possesses, it has not done good work in getting everybody pulling the same way, in organizing mutual assistance among the members or in overcoming difficulties so as to make the co-op successful. The members who were poor peasants moaned about the middle-peasant officials, saying they were biased in the way they handled questions and did not help members who were in trouble. The mother of Cheng Cheng-yang, a poor peasant, said: "It's a good thing that the government calls for the organization of co-ops, but a chairman

must be fair in his dealings and pay attention to his members' troubles. Our chairman doesn't understand the difficulties poor peasants have as well as Li Lao-tung." She has good reason to say so. In early July, when her son fell ill, she could not draw any money from the co-op as the chairman and cashier had both gone off to attend a meeting and nobody was taking care of the co-op's business. She had to go to Li Lao-tung's for help. Li's brother lent her a yuan and Li urged her to see that her son got medical treatment. Three days later the chairman and cashier of her own co-op came back. Off she went again to borrow some money, but the cashier told her that the question would first have to be discussed. Another three days and still no money! Then the other members got impatient too and went to complain. "Even if it means you've got to go a-begging you've got to give something, when she has been begging for three days," they said. Only then did the co-op lend her 15 catties of unhusked rice.

Hsinkang Co-op had a rule that the members' contributions to its share fund should be based half on the amount of land pooled and half on labour. All the middle peasants paid their contribution in manure. The poor peasants could not afford to do so. Another rule said that if any member dug a root of young potatoes, he must repay the price of the best root lifted when the crop was dug in autumn. The well-off middle peasants had no need to dig potatoes while they were small, so this rule did not worry them, but on the poor peasants, it weighed pretty heavily.

After they'd heard all about conditions in these two co-ops, the Louhsia Township Branch of the Chinese Communist Party and the township officials all agreed that it was just like attending a lecture on policy in regard to the different classes. They saw how valuable and how immensely important was the Party's policy of promoting mutual aid and co-operation by banking on the poor peasants and solidly uniting the middle peasants. A study of conditions in these two co-

ops has convinced them that in the movement for co-operation it is indispensable to rely on the poor peasants and unite the middle peasants; that it is to the mutual advantage of the poor and middle peasants alike to come together and mutually disadvantageous to split. They are convinced that political and economic unity between the poor and the middle peasants is the only way of creating a tremendous force. They see that the poor peasants must keep the lead in the agricultural co-operative, while at the same time making every effort to rally the middle peasants. If a co-op does not have enough poor peasants as its core, it can easily slip into the ways of the Hsinkang Agricultural Co-operative which discriminates against poor peasants. That is not the sort of things which co-operatives are set up for.

### **HOW CONTROL OF THE WUTANG CO-OPERATIVE SHIFTED FROM THE MIDDLE TO THE POOR PEASANTS**

(By Chou Ching-wen in issue No. 9 of the *Hunan Mutual Aid and Co-operation*, July 26, 1955)

*This is a common and serious problem. Party committees at every level and the comrades sent into the countryside to direct the work of co-operation should give this problem their fullest attention. The co-op management committees must see to it that the present poor peasants and the new lower middle peasants have the decisive voice in their councils, with the old lower middle peasants and the well-to-do middle peasants — whether old or new — serving as a subsidiary force. Only thus can unity between the poor and middle peasants be attained in accordance with Party policy; only thus can the co-ops be strengthened, production increased, and the socialist transformation of the entire countryside be correctly accomplished. Otherwise, there can be no unity between the middle and poor peasants, the co-operatives cannot be strengthened, production cannot increase, and the socialist transformation of the entire countryside cannot be achieved.*

*Many comrades do not understand the reasoning behind this. They agree that it was necessary for the poor peasants to have been dominant during land reform because the poor peasants then constituted*

from 50 to 70 per cent of the rural population and had not yet risen to the status of middle peasant, while the middle peasants at that time wavered in their attitude toward land reform. These comrades agree, therefore, that it was absolutely necessary then for the poor peasants to play the decisive role.

But say these comrades, now we are socializing agriculture, most of the former poor peasants have already become middle peasants, and the old middle peasants own a good part of the means of production. Unless the old middle peasants take part, they say, the co-ops' shortage of means of production cannot be solved. And so, these comrades believe, the slogan "Rely on the poor peasants and establish their control over the co-ops!" should not be raised now, that slogans of this sort are of no benefit to co-operation.

We consider this line of reasoning all wrong. If the working class and the Communist Party want to use the spirit of socialism and the socialist system to completely transform the system prevailing throughout the countryside of private ownership of the means of production in small peasant holdings, they can do so relatively easily only by relying on the great mass of the former semi-proletarian poor peasants. Otherwise the transformation will be very difficult.

The rural semi-proletariat are not so insistent on private ownership of the means of production in small peasant holdings; they accept socialist transformation fairly readily. Most of them have already become middle peasants; but compared with the old middle peasants, except for a few poor peasants who have become well-to-do middle peasants, the majority are of a relatively high level of political consciousness and often recall the hard life they led in the past.

Furthermore, the lower ranks of the old middle peasants are fairly close to the lower ranks of the new middle peasants, both in economic position and in political outlook; but they are different from both the upper ranks of the new and the upper ranks of the old middle peasants — that is, the well-to-do and comparatively well-to-do middle peasants.

In the process of achieving co-operation, therefore, we must pay close attention to: (1) the poor peasants who are still having difficulties, (2) the lower ranks of the new middle peasants and (3) the lower ranks of the old middle peasants.

The people in these three categories accept socialist transformation fairly easily and should be brought into the co-ops first, a group at a time and at various intervals. We should select some who have relatively high levels of political consciousness and good organizing ability and train them to become the core of leaders of the co-operatives. We should particularly stress finding this core of leaders from among the present poor peasants and from the new lower middle peasants.

This is not to say that we will have a re-division of rural classes. It is, rather, a statement of the principle which Party branches and comrades sent to guide the work of co-operation in the countryside should make sure to grasp, a principle which should be proclaimed publicly to the peasant masses.

Nor are we saying that the well-to-do middle peasants may not join the co-ops, only that we should wait until the level of their socialist consciousness has been raised, until they show a desire to join and are willing to accept the leadership of the poor peasants (including the present poor peasants and all the former poor peasants who have become lower middle peasants). It is then that we should allow them

into the co-operatives. Don't force them to join before they are willing just for the sake of obtaining the use of their draught oxen and their farm implements. Those who are already in and want to remain in may continue to do so. Those who want to withdraw, but change their minds after a bit of persuasion should also be allowed to stay. In any event, people who are a little short on the means of production can organize co-ops too. Many co-operatives formed by poor peasants and lower middle peasants have proven this.

Nor are we saying that not a single well-to-do middle peasant may become an officer of a co-op. Individual well-to-do middle peasants with a high level of socialist consciousness, who are fair and capable and have won the respect of the majority of the co-op members, may also become officers. However, the co-operatives must see to it that control is in the hands of the poor peasants (to repeat once more, including the present poor peasants and all of the former poor peasants who are now lower middle peasants. They are the majority or, in some places, the great majority of the rural population). They must comprise about two-thirds of the co-operative's membership. The remaining one-third should be composed of the middle peasants (including the old lower middle peasants and both the new and the old well-to-do middle peasants).

As to the guiding principles of co-operation, we must carry out a policy of mutual benefit to both poor and middle peasants; no one should be allowed to suffer a loss. For this purpose too we must put the poor peasants in control. In those co-ops where the middle peasants predominate, the poor peasants are always being hurt and squeezed out. The experience of Kaoshan Township, Changsha County, in the prov-

ince of Hunan, tells us plainly: It is both necessary and possible to give control to the poor peasants, and go on from there to strengthening unity with the middle peasants; that any other course of action is dangerous.

The writer of the article understands the Party line thoroughly. His action was correct too — first completing the urgent task of increasing production, then establishing the dominance of the poor peasants as leaders. As a result, the poor peasants were relieved and happy and the middle peasants willingly complied.

Another important thing the writer tells us is what to do about a co-op that is in a chaotic condition. Should it be dissolved? Or should it be reorganized so that it goes from a state of chaos to a state of health? Is it possible to reorganize and strengthen such a co-op? The writer tells us very convincingly: Do not dissolve the "third class" co-operatives; reorganize them. After they have been overhauled there is not the slightest doubt that third class co-ops can become first class.

There is already considerable experience of this kind all over the country, not only in Kaoshan Township, Changsha County.

— EDITOR

## I

The Wutang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, Kaoshan Township, Changsha County, Hunan Province, consists of 21 households (14 poor-peasant and seven middle-peasant households) and possesses 208 mou of land which its members pooled as shares. It was formed by three mutual-aid teams in January 1955, and two of them were seasonal teams, rather weak. While the co-operative was being set up, the mem-

bers were not fully educated in the spirit of co-operation and the class policy was not strictly followed. This gave rise to subsequent problems in running the co-op. After the establishment of the co-op, there had been too much in the leading personnel of the co-op. As a result, very few of them had a systematic and deep understanding of the situation. Their bureaucratic leadership not only failed to solve existing problems, but allowed the situation to deteriorate. The problems manifest themselves in the following:

1) The poor peasants did not gain ascendancy, especially in leading the management and supervisory committees. The management committee had seven members. The co-op chairman was a poor peasant, but he was also chairman of the peasants' association in the township. He did not spend much time running the co-op and was on very friendly terms with a middle-peasant vice-chairman on whom he relied to do a great part of the work of the co-op. Another vice-chairman, a poor peasant, had difficulties in maintaining his family and had a compliant personality. He was ignored, cursed and ridiculed by the middle-peasant vice-chairman. His prestige among the co-op members was low and his opinions did not carry weight. The book-keeper was an eloquent, literate middle peasant. Having a certain amount of ability, he had rather high prestige among his fellow co-op members. The supply-clerk for the co-op's property was an honest and reliable poor peasant. By and large, he could do the work assigned him with credit. But he lacked the courage to criticize others, and therefore his ability to improve the general situation was very limited. The committee members in charge of youth and women's work were all from poor families, but they were young and not good at farming. They said little at meetings, and did not take any active part in helping run the co-op. The supervisory committee had three members. The chairman and another member were poor peasants. But one had risen to the status of middle peasant economical-

ly after land reform. All he said and did tended to the side of the middle peasants. The other was not keen on his work and paid little attention to co-op affairs. Neither satisfactorily fulfilled their duties in controlling and supervising the management of the co-op. The third member, a middle peasant, had a closed mind, and did as he pleased. Sometimes he even abused his authority and nullified resolutions adopted by the management committee and grabbed profits for the middle peasants in violation of all established principles. From all this, it can be seen that to all intents and purposes, it was the middle peasants who were running the show both in the management and supervisory committees of the co-op. Tien Ming-teh, the middle-peasant vice-chairman, said: "We middle peasants won't do anything for the co-op if we're not in power."

2) Production work was poorly managed. The possibility was always present that the plan to increase output might not be fulfilled, and even that production might decrease. This could be seen from two instances: a) The most important way adopted by the co-op in 1955 to raise output was to plant a double-crop rice, which accounted for 76 per cent of the co-op's total projected increase in output. But the plan was not fulfilled. The original plan was to plant 55 *mou* to the second crop in between the rows of the first. This was actually done on only 43.6 *mou*. They planned to set aside 15 *mou* of land which would be planted with two crops, one after another, but only 13 *mou* were so planted. b) The seedlings did not grow very well and some were particularly bad. Inspection on the spot revealed that: the seedlings that were tolerably good and promised a possible increase in output occupied 112.6 *mou*, 54.13 per cent of the co-op's total land. Those that were just tolerable and could be expected to reach the level of 1954 occupied 54.86 *mou*, 26.37 per cent of the total. And those that were bad and threatened a lower output occupied 40.54 *mou*, 19.5 per cent of the total. What

was the root of the trouble? The poor peasants in the co-op had not been mobilized and the middle peasants had the upper hand. When the middle peasants joined the co-op, they generally wavered, had no firm intention of running the co-op well and did not try to take an active part. When they planned production, they would leave a way out for themselves, which consequently harmed the co-op's production. For instance, they did not like planting a double-crop rice, which, they were afraid, would exhaust their land (middle peasants generally had better land suitable for a double-crop rice). So they deliberately did not prepare enough seeds in time. As a result, the seeds were sown too late and in too small a quantity. The plan for a double-crop rice could not be carried out very well. They felt that the centralized plan to apply fertilizer to the co-op's land would benefit the poor peasants' land but undernourish their own. Therefore they put more than 20,000 catties of dung on their own fields, while more than 80 *mou* of unfertile land owned by the poor peasants were given a small portion of the manure, and were mostly fertilized only by silt dug from ponds. Therefore the seedlings in the poor peasants' fields could not grow very well. Having no confidence that the co-op could be managed well or crops in the co-op be reliable, the middle peasants kept more "private land" than was allowed by the regulations right when the co-op was being set up. They also secretly worked on rented land. During busy seasons, they did their own work first and regarded co-op production as of secondary importance. As a result, the co-op's farm work was put off. The transplanting of seedlings was about a week later than in 1954. The work of weeding and adding manure was started only about a month after the seedlings were transplanted. These all were, without doubt, important causes for the co-op's poor output.

3) The policy of mutual benefit was not strictly carried out, with the middle peasants enjoying great advantages at the expense of the poor peasants. This can be seen from the

following: a) The price of homestead manure was too high. For instance, the hog-dung of co-op members was sold to the co-op according to three classes of quality: first class 0.6 yuan a picul; second class 0.5 yuan a picul; and third class 0.3 yuan a picul. In other co-ops, there were also three classes: generally, first class 0.4 or 0.5 yuan a picul; second class 0.3 or 0.4 yuan a picul; third class 0.2 or 0.3 yuan a picul. So, the prices paid by this co-op were 0.1 or 0.2 yuan higher per picul. But the prices set in other co-ops were close to local market prices. This showed that the price for homestead manure was set too high in this co-op. And since homestead manure was mainly the dung of hogs or cattle, as a rule, the middle peasants had more such manure than the poor peasants. Some poor peasants had no domestic animals, so they had no animal droppings to sell. Setting the price too high was mainly in the interest of the middle peasants, not the poor peasants. b) The price for green manuring crops was also set too high. When the co-op was being formed, the green manuring crops were not growing very well, so they were sold to the co-op according to three classes of quality, when this land was pooled in the co-op. First class was 1 yuan a *mou*; second class 0.8 yuan a *mou* and third class 0.6 yuan a *mou*. The prices set were reasonable by and large. After the co-op was formed, the crop began to grow well. The middle peasants went back on their word, and threatened to take the green manuring crops back. They wanted to bully the poor peasants into agreeing to a higher price. They won—it was agreed upon that first class would be 2.0 yuan a *mou*; second class 1.6 yuan a *mou*; and third class 1.2 yuan a *mou*. Since green manure fields were also mostly owned by middle peasants, the higher prices also served their interests and were disadvantageous to the poor peasants. c) Wage for tending cattle was set too high and the assignment of households for this purpose incorrect. The co-op had two water-buffaloes and three oxen. All had been sold by its members to the co-op as common property. The wages for tending cattle

were: 75 catties of grain a month for tending a buffalo and 60 catties of grain a month for tending an ox (from April to October). This was higher than the customary local wage. Such being the case, the original owners (the middle peasants) of these animals vied with one another to tend the cattle and refused to let the poor households with weak labour power or old men and children having only half labour power do the job. After repeated discussion in the management committee, the middle peasants tended two of the animals and the poor peasants three. But one middle peasant would not accept the management committee's decision and doggedly took away an animal which the committee had assigned to a poor-peasant household, and locked it up in a private stable. This middle peasant wanted to keep the animal so as to get the high wage. d) The work fixed under the responsibility system was calculated unequally. Work with no fixed quota was assigned to middle peasants and work with high quotas was assigned to poor peasants. Technical work like ploughing or hoeing was generally done by the middle peasants. Such work had no set quota and work-points were calculated in terms of days. Ploughing or hoeing the land by driving a water-buffalo would get 10 points a day, ploughing or hoeing the land by driving an ox 9.5 points a day. For instance, a middle peasant Hu Tzu-fa left home late and returned early, and in two days hoed only 4.2 *mou* of land by driving an ox (under ordinary conditions he should have done that amount in a day), but he got 19 points. Miscellaneous jobs like building balks between fields and sinking pits to decompose manure were usually done by poor peasants. Such work had set quotas and the calculation of work-points was very strict. No matter how hard a peasant worked, he could never get seven or eight points a day. For example, the building and repairing of balks between fields (including trimming ragged edges and repairing the banked sides) was so unprofitable a job that only one point could be earned for every 6.5 feet worked. The facts showed that an average worker could

earn only five or at most six points a day. Furthermore, the middle peasants lived better, so they had more time at their disposal to work in the co-op, while the poor peasants were as often as not handicapped by their hard life, and did not have as much time to work in the co-op. So there was a big disparity between the work-points earned by the middle and poor peasants. From November 1954 to April 17, 1955, the work-points of the members of the co-op totalled 14,418.8. Of this, 7,216.13 went to seven middle-peasant households, each of them averaging 1,030.87. The highest number of work-points got by one of them was 1,539.18. The 14 poor-peasant households received only 7,202.67 points, averaging 514.48 points each. The lowest number of points for one poor-peasant household was 101. Such a situation was bound to be a source of trouble when the final distribution of earnings was carried out in the autumn.

Because of these problems, in the four months of production after the formation of the co-op, there was much confusion and vacillation among the co-op members, and seven households one after another wanted to pull out. The organization of the co-op was loose, meetings of team members and co-op members were often poorly attended and did not achieve any positive results. At the meetings, co-op members did not see eye to eye and some made a fuss about wanting to leave the co-op. The leading members in the co-op were often at wits' end to deal with the problems. It was clear that the problems were quite serious. There was a need to check up, consolidate and improve.

## II

In view of the serious situation, the work team sent by the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party working in Kaoshan Township, Changsha County, dispatched Tang Tung-sheng to make a thorough study of the problems of the Wutang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative and took

a series of steps to check up, consolidate and improve it. He has great achievements to his credit. His methods of work and experience were the following:

1) In checking up on two matters and taking stock of three problems he helped the co-op members overcome two extremes in outlook and adopt effective steps to make up for the negligence in production. The work of checking-up started just on the eve of cultivating the rice fields. Two extremes of attitude were prevalent among the co-op members. One was pessimism and despair. The people with this attitude were baffled by the sheer number of problems and disheartened by the prospect of a bad harvest. They complained and grumbled, seeing no way out. At the other extreme was blind optimism. Such people thought there were no serious problems and that production was "pretty good." They took it easy and made no earnest efforts to mend the state of affairs. Both extremes were equally harmful and had to be overcome. The methods adopted for this purpose were checking up on two matters and taking stock of three problems. They started with checking up two matters: the production plans and the seedlings. All were agreed that the production plans had for the most part been fulfilled and that there were certain favourable conditions to raise the yield. What they had already achieved was big. But some of the plans had been fulfilled badly (for instance, the lack of enough seed, sowing too late, fertilizing the fields improperly, etc.), the seedlings were growing poorly and some were particularly bad. If they did not add more field-work and manure and make great efforts to help the seedlings grow well, the plan to increase output would fail and there was even the threat of decreased output. Then they took stock of three problems: the number of days they had to make up for their negligence, the amount of labour power, and the manure available. It was then some twenty days from the summer solstice, and just the time when seedlings would do well. If they wanted to add more field-work and manure, there was still much time

that could be turned to good account. From that day to the summer solstice, the men and women members of the co-op could contribute 800 work-days, so there was no shortage of labour. And there was plenty of manure available. The manure stored and newly collected by 21 households in the co-op, was estimated at 80 piculs of ox-dung, 100 piculs of ditch waste, 20 piculs of peat, ten piculs of human excrement and 30 piculs of sediment from puddles in which dish-water and slops were disposed of. Besides, they had ready cash of 80 yuan with which they could purchase 430 catties of ammonium sulphate and 200 catties of bone meal. By the check-up and stock-taking, all co-op members were helped to understand the importance and possibility of seizing the good opportunity to make amends for their negligence in production. They also had the material conditions that could be turned immediately to advantage. In this way, the two extremes in outlook were effectively combated. Many leading personnel and members of the co-op said this: "After checking up on two matters and taking stock of three problems, we now have a clear idea of our situation, we see things better and we have a way out. We're sure that we'll make up for the negligence in our production." Under these favourable circumstances, a resolution was adopted by the co-op management committee which raised the call for action: "Make the best use of the time at hand to increase field-work and manure, and work to carry out the co-op's plan to increase output." Effective measures were put into force: every household contributed labour power, every field plot was worked over, everybody collected manure and every plot had manure added. All co-op members were mobilized to make up for the past negligence in production. In a matter of some twenty days, all the co-op's fields were weeded twice or three times and manured as planned. Water conservancy work was also undertaken and insect pests exterminated. The seedlings shot up before their very eyes. A check-up made not long ago revealed that: 171 *mou* of land, 82.45 per cent



of the total, seemed very likely to show an increase; 32 *mou*, 15.38 per cent of the total, was expected to show an increase or reach the 1954 level, and 4 *mou*, 2.17 per cent, probably would have a decrease. As the young plants looked quite sturdy and everyone was pretty sure of bigger yields, the leading personnel and all co-op members were buoyed up with the hope of a better co-op. Chang Chun-fa, the co-op chairman, said: "Twenty days ago, we were sad when we looked at our seedlings. Now we're happy when we see them. With the crop coming along well we're more confident. We'll certainly have a better co-op."

2) Through deep-going education and the policy of mutual benefit, the unity of the co-op members was strengthened and the co-op's organization consolidated. Because of bigger output, the co-op members had more faith in the co-op and no longer wavered so much in their opinions—they became eager to solve problems that still hindered their progress. At this juncture, the problem of non-mutual-benefit was rightly placed on the agenda. This problem not only widely affected the economic interests of the co-op members, but would also have a great influence on the consolidation and development of the co-op. Therefore it had to be handled correctly and with great care. Not all co-op members shared the same opinion or attitude. The poor peasants were unanimous in their demand that this problem be solved. They were afraid, however, of offending the middle peasants and making management of the co-op a difficult business, or they found themselves in an awkward position, a bit too diffident to say straight out what they thought about the matter. The middle peasants, for their part, found all sorts of lame excuses to put the matter off. For instance, they said the question was hedged in with difficulties, or there was no accurate statistics, or their situation differed from that of other co-ops, etc. They arbitrarily insisted that the matter be left alone. Or they would not attend meetings to discuss the question, trying to delay it for good. So a real education was needed to

get both parties to investigate the matter without prejudice. The methods adopted for this education were mainly small meetings of co-op members and personal talks with individual members. Concrete instances were cited, discussed and analysed: why and how there was no mutual benefit and what problems had been created. Gradually all saw the matter in its true light and understood the situation better. So they started to take a different attitude toward the question and consciously and willingly came to grips with it. After repeated democratic consultation in the management and supervisory committees, a proposal was made. It was submitted to a general meeting of co-op members for further discussion, revision and final sanction. By this process, the problem of non-mutual-benefit was settled in a fair and satisfactory way. For instance, the price for hog-dung was cut from 0.6, 0.5 and 0.3 yuan for the three different classes to 0.5, 0.4 and 0.25 yuan respectively. The price for green manuring crops dropped from 2, 1.6 and 1.2 yuan a *mou* for the three different classes to 1.6, 1.3 and 1 yuan a *mou*. The wage for tending a buffalo was cut from 75 catties of grain a month to 60 catties and that for tending an ox from 60 to 45 catties a month. And all five of the co-op's draught animals were tended by the poor households which had old men and children, so as to give them a chance to increase their income. Only the problem of work-points—some calculated too strictly and some too loosely—still remained, for the past figures were in quite a mess. Immediate readjustment seemed impractical and this question was left to be solved later. The responsibility system and estimation of work done by each person was put on a sound basis, for the most part, and there was no discrimination against the poor peasants. With the problem of non-mutual-benefit solved, both the middle and poor-peasant co-op members were satisfied. There was no longer any misunderstanding and they became united for the common good of the co-op. Thus, the co-op's organization

was consolidated. Hu Shou-shan, chairman of the supervisory committee, said: "To tell the truth, only now are things being decided fairly, as if they were weighed on a scale. The middle peasants as well as the poor peasants are now satisfied."

3) The class policy was put into practice — poor-peasant leaders were helped to form a leading core and they assumed ascendancy in the co-op. As was said, the co-op had failed to fulfil its production tasks well and its operation of the policy of mutual benefit was poor. The root cause was that the poor peasants were not leading the co-op. So in the process of checking-up, apart from making up for the negligence in production and solving the problem of non-mutual-benefit, close attention was paid to the class policy, by promoting poor peasants to leading positions and ensuring the hegemony of the poor peasants. The methods adopted were: a) Through discussions and personal talks the class policy was explained to the poor peasants, who were also educated in the spirit of socialism, helped to overcome their feeling of inferiority and enhance their class consciousness and active desire to run the co-op well. For instance, Fan Yu-fu, a poor peasant, considered himself poor, incompetent, inferior and hopeless, and therefore he paid no attention to anything in the co-op except his own specific field of work. After attending several discussions and having several heart-to-heart talks, he began to become aware of his responsibility as a poor peasant and became enthusiastic in running the co-op. He attended all meetings, displayed great moral courage to express his ideas and took a lead in production. In short, he became a really active poor peasant. b) In all meetings, support was given to the correct opinions of the poor peasants and their exemplary deeds were commended. Gradually the erroneous ideas of the middle peasants who had looked down on the poor peasants were put right. Efforts in this respect have proved successful. Now the poor peasants in the co-op speak out and go about their work with

great confidence. They are no longer thrust into the background and their prestige is no longer undermined by the middle peasants. Some middle peasants, who used to make light of the poor peasants, have now changed their ways of thinking to a great extent. Middle-peasant vice-chairman Tien Ming-teh often elbowed aside and treated contemptuously the poor-peasant vice-chairman. After the co-op started its check-up, nothing of the kind has happened. He criticized himself in the management committee: "In the past, I looked down upon the poor peasants, because, to my mind, they were incompetent and didn't keep their word. Now I know I'm wrong. I'll rely upon the poor peasants to run the co-op well."

c) In the management and supervisory committees, the poor peasants were given full support and full confidence was placed in their ability. They were trained in actual work and helped to do their work well, so that they could become more competent and their prestige as leaders enhanced. This has also proved successful. Now the poor-peasant chairman handles both the affairs of the township and the co-op. The poor-peasant vice-chairman is now a well-trained administrator. He is resourceful in work and is becoming popular with his fellow co-op members. Other poor-peasant committee members are also more class-conscious and have greater faith in the co-op. Now a leading core has been formed by the poor peasants which has the dominant position in leading the co-op. The middle peasants no longer have the upper hand. In the supervisory committee, the poor-peasant chairman and committee member are quite competent at present. They show great concern about the affairs of the co-op and are bold in criticizing. No longer influenced by the middle-peasant member, they are playing a decisive part in the committee. d) The poor-peasant co-operation fund, government loans and relief fund have been properly used to solve the difficulties of the poor peasants so that they can concentrate on doing their production tasks and assigned work. This has proved to be very important. For instance, a leading

member of the co-op, a poor peasant, expressed himself in a little jingle:

*"With money and rice, things are easily done,  
With no money or rice what can I run?  
Just see what government help has done,  
Through thick and thin I have really won!"*

From what has been described, it can be seen that the co-op has taken on a new appearance since the check-up and the solution of a number of the chief problems. Now it is on its feet and what it has achieved is noteworthy. But it should be pointed out that if the leadership is not strengthened or work is halted at this stage, many problems may reappear. We cannot rest on our laurels. We must maintain firm leadership to consolidate and improve the co-op by keeping in close touch with the actual production tasks.

### STRENGTHENING THE CO-OP—A GOOD EXAMPLE

(By the Department of Producers' Co-operation of the  
Lungchi Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist  
Party, July 9, 1955. See the *Fukien Rural Work*  
*Bulletin*, No. 13)

*This is a very good account of how a co-operative was strengthened. It deserves to be studied widely.*

*The birth of a new social system is always accompanied by a great uproar and outcry, proclaiming the superiority of the new system and criticizing the backwardness of the old. To bring our more than 500 million peasants through socialist transformation is a project of earth-rocking, heaven-shaking dimensions which cannot possibly be achieved in an atmosphere of calm seas and gentle breezes. It demands of us Communists that we patiently educate the great mass of the peasants—who are still burdened with many of the habits and ideas of the old society — and explain things to them in vivid terms which they can easily understand.*

*This work is now going forward in every part of the country. Many comrades in the rural areas have turned out to be excellent teachers. The method described in this article — "Make four comparisons and five calculations" — is a very useful way of showing the peasants clearly which system is good and which is bad. They understand the moment they hear it.*

*Such methods are extremely convincing. They are a far cry from the sort of thing done by the incompetent teachers, who over-simplify the problem with such so-called slogans as "Either you follow the road of the Communist Party or you follow the road of Chiang Kai-shek." This is just labelling people to cow them into compliance instead of coming forward with something positive and stirring.*

*But taking the peasants' own experiences and analysing them in detail — now there is a method that is really effective.*

— EDITOR

The "Pioneer" Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Lungfeng Township, Hua-an County, Fukien, is a big one with 75 households. It has done quite well in production, and early rice crops in 1955 were expected to be some 20 per cent better than that of 1954.

But the co-op had many problems. For one thing, it had been badly hit by natural calamities in the early months of 1955 — of its 320 *mou* of paddy fields, 220 *mou* had been transplanted on time, 40 *mou* had been planted out after the rains, and the remaining 60 *mou* had not been planted out at all. The cost of production was high. A great deal of manpower was used. The farm work extended over too long a time owing to the drought. The relations between the poor and middle peasants in the co-op were rather confused. The leaders of the co-op were out of their depth when it grew to a considerable size; none of their experience had prepared them for work on such a scale.

Thirty of the member families doubted whether they would get a higher income when the summer harvest was over, so they fretted and worried. They weren't sure they had been wise to join the co-op. A few other members had also lost their enthusiasm for one reason or another.

Lin San-hsiang, for example, had a land share in the co-op, but took no part in any of its work, preferring to reclaim land and grow sweet potatoes on his own. Some members carried on subsidiary occupations for their own benefit and did not join those organized by the co-op. Participants in the latter were credited with one work-point for every ten *fen* earned. But many doubted whether they would actually receive ten *fen* when the co-op worked out its distribution of gains.

Other members felt that the co-op restricted their activities, that they were not "free" in it. Lin Ta-teh, a middle peasant, said: "I can work and I have my own ox. On my own I could carry my rice seedlings and plough to the fields and transplant two *mou* a day. What was the use of joining a co-op and being tied hand and foot?"

For such reasons, seven families were preparing to pull out of the co-op in the autumn. As for many of the new members, though they worked hard, they had their own worries. Their feeling was, "Let's see what the autumn harvest is like, then we'll know if the co-op is worth anything."

Other problems concerned the arrangements made for mutual benefit. The middle peasants complained that the fodder rations for the oxen were too small, that the animals weren't getting enough to eat, and that the co-op wasn't paying enough for their use. The price paid for fertilizer — twenty *fen* a hundred catties for first-rate animal manure and for the same amount of night-soil four *fen* a "degree" (a measure of density) — struck the middle peasants as somewhat low. They also considered it unfair to collect share fund on land and manpower on an equal basis. (Thirty per cent of the co-op's earnings were paid out on land shares.) A few members reclaimed land on their own to grow sweet potatoes, extending their personal holding and upsetting the running of the co-op as a whole.

What steps did the co-op take to strengthen itself?

1) It put its trust in the Party branch. It trained a core of functionaries from among the membership. It cleared up incorrect ways of thinking and clarified the method of work.

Before anything else was done, the Party branch reviewed the existing situation. It found that only a few work teams had been sent by the county government to the township. The township officials failed to devise enough ways and means. The co-op spread its energies in too many different directions. The mutual-aid teams needed a check-up to put them on a sound basis.

As to what remedies should be adopted, the Party branch reached the conclusion that it was necessary to begin with correcting wrong ideas and attitudes toward the check-up among the co-op officials and taking steps to strengthen the co-op. At the start, the Party members and the co-op officials differed on the question of the check-up. Only a few of the latter took it seriously and were willing to play an active and responsible part in it. Most of them didn't think there was any way out, and preferred to rely on the work teams from outside to solve their difficulties. Some were blindly complacent and thought "there aren't any problems left to be tackled." Some were even inclined to take hasty steps and to "strengthen" the co-op by expelling two or three "bad members."

Having understood this situation, the Party sub-branch in the co-op encouraged the co-op officials to attend training courses organized by the township to train leaders for the consolidation campaign. The study helped them to a better understanding of what had to be done, and corrected their mistaken views. Further discussions took place at enlarged meetings of the Party sub-branch and the co-op management committee, and at other meetings. These also helped the co-op officials see their way to take the lead in the work of consolidation campaign. After adequate training, 23 out of the 25 officials of the co-op took the initiative in this work and functioned as its leading core from start to finish.

2) Production was pushed ahead by checking over the farm work and organizing labour emulation. Labour emulation had been going on rather smoothly from the time the co-op was enlarged. When the consolidation campaign was started, farm work was examined and production experience summed up. The close relation between strong organization and the work of the production brigades was made apparent. After democratic discussions, the first brigade was chosen as the best and received the red banner, while the fourth brigade was criticized for its inferior work. Then the membership was rallied for participation in the strengthening of the co-op. The aims of the consolidation campaign and the reasons why a more firmly based co-op could give higher yields were explained to them. Since all members were interested in the good yields, they became convinced that improvement was necessary.

3) The co-op carried out step-by-step educational work to give the members a proper outlook. By "making four comparisons and five calculations," the advantages of co-operation were made clear.

The four comparisons were:

- (a) Which is the best way of farming: co-op, mutual-aid team, or individual?
- (b) Which is better, socialism or capitalism?
- (c) Which system is better, one that involves exploitation or the one that doesn't?
- (d) Which is better, individual prosperity or common prosperity?

The five calculations were:

- (a) How much has been accomplished in beating natural calamities?
- (b) How much income has been derived from subsidiary occupations?
- (c) How many additional work-points were earned as a result of keenness in work?

(d) What were the benefits and how much did output increase, as a result of co-operation between the poor and middle peasants?

(e) What were the difficulties in production and living, and how to solve them?

The benefits of co-operation were enumerated at a general meeting of all members. In combating drought, single, centralized management combined with collective effort had enabled the co-op to transplant 220 *mou*. If the members had been working individually, no more than 170 *mou* could have been transplanted under conditions of natural calamity. With co-operation it had been possible to transplant 50 *mou* more. Considering that 350 catties of rice could be harvested from a *mou* of land, the co-op made it possible to get 17,500 catties more than individual peasants could have done in the same year.

The co-op had changed 110.67 *mou* that had been intercropped to single crops. Without the co-op, only 30 *mou* could have been changed over. Reckoning that the change-over meant an additional 200 catties per *mou*, output would increase by 22,134 catties.

Fighting drought under centralized management, and raising water to irrigate large tracts of land instead of small plots one at a time, saved much manpower. When farming individually each household had to spend an average of 30 work-days to irrigate the fields after winter cultivation. For the 75 households in the co-op this would have meant a total of 2,250 work-days. But for its early crop in 1955, the co-op needed only 400 work-days to carry water, push waterwheels and tend the irrigation channels. The saving was no less than 1,850 work-days. Reckoning a work-day at ten catties of rice, the total savings here were 18,500 catties.

With a big pool of manpower under its management, the co-op was able to get work done more efficiently. During the spring drought, when everything had to be done very quickly, over twenty members were sent to villages as far as 20 *li*

away to look for seedlings. About a dozen worked on the waterwheels day and night. All draught animals and seedling planters were organized for emergency works. As a result, 40.27 *mou* of rice fields were planted. It was reckoned 250 catties would be grown on each *mou*, raising total output by 10,067 catties. Scattered farming could not have solved such difficulties in seedlings, draught animals, manpower and irrigation, and only five *mou* could have been planted under such conditions.

When the co-op was still a mutual-aid team in 1954, sweet potatoes had been planted on 36.19 *mou* of paddy fields. In 1955, under the single, centralized co-operative management, ten *mou* of this land were hit by drought and thus left for the coming year's seedlings, while 26 *mou* were changed to terrace land. If each *mou* could give 200 catties more after this was done, the co-op could increase its yield by 5,238 catties.

Co-operation between the poor and middle peasants helped get better yields. Poor peasants in the co-op had 100 *mou* of land pooled in the co-op. Yield on their plots could increase by over 20 per cent on the average, and much more in some cases. The 1.67 *mou* of paddy field owned by Lin Chunmu, a former farm labourer, could yield 2,000 catties in the early crop season as against 800 catties. If an additional 140 catties could be harvested on each *mou* of land owned by the poor peasants, the total increase would be 14,000 catties.

The middle peasants also benefited from the co-op. They began to understand that if they stood together with the poor peasants both would share the benefits, while if they farmed separately both would lose. Some middle peasants had had the mistaken view that "joining the co-op means to slave for the poor peasants," but the facts caused them to give it up. In changing small plots into large tracts for cultivation, 27 boundary ridges between the fields were removed. The new land thus acquired could yield 540 catties, in addition to the savings in manpower.

Division of labour and specialization by trades brought higher income from subsidiary occupations. During the long period of the fight against the drought, the mutual-aid teams could not prevent all their land from being affected. The co-op not only saved its crops but managed to earn 1,545 yuan from side occupations. "In such a serious drought," said Lin Yu-tou, a middle peasant, "you'd have to work in the fields all day. If there was no co-op, how could we get anything from side-line production?"

These practical examples and calculations were a good lesson to the members. Unfounded ideas such as "there is more leisure in mutual-aid teams or individual farming than in the co-op," or "poor peasants gain from the co-op but not middle peasants," or "a poor peasant can't get much from the co-op because he has no ox, little manure and little labour power" were all dispelled. The result was high spirits and new confidence that the co-op could be strengthened and run properly.

Then, each production group as a unit, led by the core members, began to make its four comparisons and five calculations.

All the members, men and women, young and old, were encouraged to make these reckonings and compare their present with their past. One hundred and fourteen people from the 75 households in the co-op attended meetings on the subject, and learned much in the discussions. Among them, 102 members made comparisons and calculations based on their own experience.

Before the consolidation campaign started, Lin Chu-tou, a middle peasant, had intended to pull out of the co-op after the autumn harvest. He felt that the co-op had brought him troubles, forced him to work hard, and tied up his time. Of the 6 *mou* he put in the co-op, 3.9 *mou* could not be planted in the early season and he had been ill for two months. When he had been a member of the mutual-aid team in 1953, all members had had to turn out for the harvest under heavy

summer rains. Even though he fell sick, he had gone out to the fields to reap the rice crop. Apart from the fact that he was very ill himself, his ox was getting weaker and weaker from overwork, so he finally had to stop when there was a lot of work still left to do. If he had not joined the co-op, his income from the early crop in 1955 could not possibly have exceeded 1,000 catties of rice. After deducting wages and costs, that would have left him a net 700 catties. In other words, he would have gone bankrupt in 1956.

In the co-op, though Lin Chu-tou was ill himself, his wife and children could get suitable work. Following spring cultivation they earned 1,300 work-points, and they expected to get an additional 400 by June. Moreover, the manure he turned in was valued at 330 catties of rice. So he was able to get 1,330 catties more than farming by himself, even without counting his land-dividend. When Lin learned the result of the detailed accounting, he said, "If I were not in the co-op, my illness would have meant land unplanted, and my ox would have died of overwork. Joining the co-op is like taking the highroad and crossing a big bridge. Even if I were threatened with having my head cut off, I'd still stay in the co-op."

Lin Chin-ching, another co-op member, had a somewhat similar experience. While he was still in the mutual-aid team his family lived in poverty, and his father fell sick. So for some two years his 1.3 *mou* of land were left idle. His mother married again after his father died in 1955. He was the only one in his family who was able to work and he had no ox. If he had stayed out of the co-op, there would have been no way for him to overcome his difficulties in farming. But now, more than 700 work-points were credited to him in the early crop season and his land grew crops. He said about this: "Outside the co-op, poor farmers have poor crops and the sick leave their land uncultivated. Inside the co-op, your crop is no longer poor, even though you are not yet well off." Fifteen living examples of this kind were selected. The mem-

bers involved all spoke about their own experiences. This had a profound effect on the other members and raised their understanding.

Some peasants said: "Without these calculations it's hard to understand what it's all about. After them, you know what's what." Take the case of Lin Tien-teh, the middle peasant, who had been wavering all the time in the co-op, taking two steps back every time he took one forward. After the calculations he no longer repeated his old refrain: "My buffalo is strong and I can work hard. On my own I could carry my rice seedlings and plough to the fields and transplant two *mou* a day. Better pull out of the co-op and farm by myself." Instead, he was determined to stay in.

The middle peasant members also changed their former idea that "only the poor peasants gain a lot from the co-op but the middle peasants gain nothing." Of the eight member households that had decided to pull out, six changed their minds after the calculations, and the remaining two decided to think it over.

The steps for consolidation became a popular demand among the members.

4) Education was given on the co-op regulations and the principle of mutual benefit. Existing problems were found and settled.

The problems first dealt with included selfish behaviour and ideas among the members, stealing co-op property, cheating the co-op and shoddy work, violations of labour discipline and careless handling of common property.

Taking advantage of the higher awareness of the members, the co-op officials led them to examine these problems. Lin Tien-teh who had stolen four catties of bone dust from the co-op, and Lin Tai-wang who had stolen forty sweet potato seedlings, criticized their own faults. Selfish ideas were condemned and a good start was made in inculcating the concept of love for the co-op. Unity among the members was

strengthened and the meaning of labour discipline was made clear to everyone.

Problems in connection with policy and organization were grouped according to their nature and importance. Solutions were first discussed in the co-op management committee. Later they were adopted by a general meeting of all the members. They were:

A. Strengthening political leadership. A school for adults was to be established and political and general education groups organized. The dependents of co-op members would also meet twice a month when political courses would be given.

B. Encouraging members to conclude pledges incorporating the idea of love for the co-op, and to observe labour discipline.

C. Specific measures:

1. For farm work or the use of draught oxen, fixed standards were to be worked out, based on acreage, type of work, place, time and wages. The quality of ploughing and rational use of animals were to be ensured. Grass ration for both oxen and buffaloes (40 catties and 50 catties a day respectively in the past) were raised by ten catties a day in each case. The idea of protecting the oxen by better care was to be popularized.

2. Price of fertilizers. The price paid for first-rate animal manure was set at 20 *fen* per 100 catties, and for the same amount of night-soil four *fen* a "degree." The middle peasants thought the price was too low and below the actual value. After adequate discussion it was found out that the price set for animal manure wasn't low, but there were shortcomings in the rice husk market which should be improved. If the price of animal manure was raised, it would hurt the interest of the poor peasants. This problem had therefore to be approached in two ways. On the one hand, co-op members should be encouraged to use grass instead of husks in composting; on the other hand, suggestions for improving the husk



market should be referred to the departments concerned. The price set for night-soil was found to be really too low. It was raised from four *fen* per "degree" to five *fen*. Both the poor and middle peasants were satisfied.

3. Share fund. The previous practice of collecting 50 cents from every *mou* of land and from every worker was found to be not entirely fair. After consultation it was decided to collect one yuan from each share (100 catties) of the crop set aside for the payment of land-dividends.

4. Central management of subsidiary occupations. First a general review was made. It was found that subsidiary production by individuals, instead of within the co-op, had been due partly to the way of thinking of certain members, and partly to the rigid policy of the co-op. Now, it was decided that for every eight *fen* earned from transporting grain tax one work-point would be credited to the member who did the transporting. One work-point would be credited to any member earning ten *fen* in other transport, building, manufacturing soda, carpentry, etc. In all transport work, the co-op would receive 80 per cent of the income. The member who did the work would get the remaining 20 per cent.

5. The problems in management were mainly connected with contracted work and pledged yield. The output for which production brigades in the double-crop rice fields had contracted with the co-op had been set somewhat high. The fourth production brigade had agreed to a contracted quota requiring a 40 per cent output increase, and many members complained about this. It was therefore decided to cut down the average contracted output per *mou* by 5 per cent, so as still to provide for a general increase of some 20 per cent. Sweet potatoes and single-crop rice were not subject to the contracted-quota system. So they were to have their work and yield quotas worked out according to various standards. The output quota for sweet potatoes was to be converted into terms of rice for purposes of valuation.

Taking the 1954 output as the basis, the estimated 1955 output for different types of land was classified into four categories. Planned increases of yield over 1954 were set at 5, 10, 15 and 20 per cent respectively. The co-op, in the future, was to have "more work put on the contracted basis and less work with contracted cost."

## A MESSY CO-OP IS STRAIGHTENED OUT

(By the Hsichou County Committee, Chinese Communist Party, in the *Yunnan Rural Work Bulletin*, No. 111, June 30, 1955)

*This material highlights an established fact, namely, that any co-op can be put in order, no matter how chaotic its affairs may be. Because all co-operative members are working peasants, although various strata among them may disagree on many things, they all can ultimately be made to understand. At times, some co-ops fall into a really terrible state. The sole reason for this is that they cannot get the Party to lead them; the Party fails to explain clearly its policy and methods to the people.*

*"We know that co-ops are good things. But after we formed ours, the Party county committee, the Party district committee and the village Party branch all ignored us. Maybe they think our hamlet is too poor. We don't eat very well; our houses are crude. Maybe that's why they don't come."*

*It is precisely this sort of thing which is responsible for the so-called "mess." There is no other reason. If a co-op cannot get leadership from the Party, of course its affairs will be in confusion. The moment leadership is given, the confusion ends.*

*The article also raises the question of whether co-ops can be established in backward parts of the countryside, and answers with a definite affirmative. The writer describes a co-op in just such a locality.*

*About 5 per cent of China's villages are backward. We must build co-operatives in every one of them and, in the struggle to do so, wipe out their backwardness.*

— EDITOR

The Tungsheng Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Komu Township, Hsichou County, Yunnan Province, was organized within ten days in the autumn of 1954. Because it was set up in such a hurry, not enough had been done to prepare the peasants' minds for it, and mistakes were made in carrying out the policy. Besides, there were only a few people to lead the co-operative and not such capable ones at that. They did not know what to do about the production tasks in hand, with the result that production was in chaos and the co-op members were wavering.

1) After the co-op was formed, nobody was put in charge of production because cadres were inexperienced and the key personnel did not know how to give collective leadership. There were only two Youth League members in the co-op to help push the movement. The 21-year-old chairman was too young to give a lead. The vice-chairman only thought of working for himself and his family. The person in charge of supplies and the one supposed to look after subsidiary production did not trouble themselves about co-op affairs, but baked tiles together with villagers outside the co-op instead. The nine members of the management committee had met only once after the co-op was formed, and even then not all were present. Naturally the meeting didn't arrive at a solution of any problem.

2) There were neither long-term nor short-term plans for arranging production. Jobs were assigned haphazardly, and in a number of cases people did as they liked. Everyone scrambled for what was easy to do; the hard work was left undone. Members knew that they could collect pay for the

work they did. But they did not know how to calculate the work done and how to write down the work-points earned. At one time, the work-points were not put down for two whole weeks while people were quarrelling about them. The members were discouraged. Villagers outside had almost planted all their maize and rice when the co-op had not even completed its ploughing. In the months after the co-op was set up to February 1955 they accumulated a mere 10,000 catties of manure. The book-keeping was in a mess. No statement was published of work-points earned after the co-op was formed.

3) Payments for the use of members' draught animals and farm tools were most unreasonably set. The co-op had 11 animals at its disposal. Because the co-op's fields were scattered, an ox could work at most two shifts a day; in the majority of cases, an animal did one shift only. The amount credited for each shift was six points. The amount thus realized in a year was not enough to keep the animals in fodder, so all their owners could rear was gaunt and lean cattle. Only three animals were really strong enough to do any ploughing. The use of large farm tools was not paid for and the work-points were unreasonably fixed. For a shift of ploughing with an ox a co-op member could get at most four points, but a day's hoeing he could get eight or nine points. So the members preferred hoeing to ploughing. For all these reasons, the co-op had nothing to show that collective management was superior to that of peasants working on their own, and the members lost confidence. Some did odd jobs to add to their income, some were thinking of pulling out. The vice-chairman himself had applied for permission to withdraw from this co-op and to join another.

The chaos prevailing in the co-op was mainly due to the fact that the Party committee of the county had overrated the situation in Komu Township and thought that there was a good enough foundation on which to start co-operative farming. The fact that some of the villages were backward had

been overlooked. Chungkou, for instance, the village in which the Tungsheng Agricultural Producers' Co-operative was located was one of such villages. When co-ops began to be set up in the autumn of 1954, the most active people joined the "Starlight" Co-op. In order to complete its task, the county Party committee hastily turned two seasonal mutual-aid teams with only two Youth League members in them into the Tungsheng Co-op of 20 peasant families. It was felt at the time that the new co-operative would be off to a good start, with the co-operatives that had been established earlier giving the lead. But once the Tungsheng Co-op was formed, neither the local Party branch nor the cadres tried to understand what was really the matter, they simply acknowledged passively that the key personnel of the co-op was not as capable as that of others. Hence, for a long time they did not realize what the real snag was. On top of all this, certain abuses in the grain policy led to a lessening of the members' desire to make the land yield more.

Under the direct guidance of the regional Party committee, a member of the county Party committee came to Komu Township and gave it his full attention. As a result of his investigations, the problems mentioned above regarding production were brought to light. With a clear picture of the situation in his own mind, he proceeded to help the local Party branch study it and unify their estimate of it. Overcoming their apathy and conceit, he made it his personal business to lead the members of the Party branch in examining the affairs of the Tungsheng Co-op. While trying to organize production, he found where the snag was, got hold of the knottiest problems and proceeded to solve them. His way of working was to consolidate the co-op by means of organizing production, and to stimulate production by consolidating the co-op.

First and foremost, steps were taken to carry out the Party's class policy correctly in the rural areas, that is: to rely on the poor peasants, to ask them to air their views on co-opera-

tives and on production, in order to get a true picture. The comrade from the county Party committee and members of the local Party branch met with the co-op cadres for informal discussions. After this, a meeting of poor peasants was called at which the "New Life" Co-op (one of the older co-ops in the township) was held up as an example of the superiority of co-operative farming with its higher yields. It was explained that only by the co-operative road could the peasants hope to rid themselves from poverty and lead a prosperous life. As a result, the poor peasants began to show confidence in co-operatives and wanted to join. The comrade from the county Party committee and members of the local Party branch, for their part, made self-criticisms at the meeting for their past lack of concern for the Tungsheng Co-op.

They then threshed out the co-op's production problems and asked the assembled poor peasants to say all they had to say. The following views were then heard. "It's not that we haven't wanted to join. But the cadres didn't give the proper lead. We've seen with our own eyes that outside the co-op the planting of maize and rice is nearly finished and that all the ploughing is done, while the co-op hasn't done a thing, not even ploughed its 14 *mou* of non-irrigated land. It'll have a food problem, without ever being able to think of increasing its production. That's a terrible thing to look forward to..." And one of the co-op members said: "We do want to do well in production, but the co-op has only a few weak draught animals. We should buy some large, strong ones but we haven't got the money to pay for them." Others said: "The co-op is short of both fertilizer and seed. Where do we find the money for 500 catties of bean-cake residue and 25 catties of soya-bean seed?"

Once the comrade from the county Party committee had seen what the real situation was in the co-op, he expressed his readiness to help the members out of their production difficulties and suggested that the best way would be that they themselves found the methods and means to overcome them.

In the discussion, the suggestion was put forward to grow more green manuring crops to make up for the shortage of fertilizer. Part of the money for buying cattle should be paid by the members themselves. A small loan should be taken to enable the co-op to start its maize and rice planting. This would make everybody feel better and more confident towards increasing production. In accordance with these wishes, and after consultation with the co-op cadres, it was decided to raise a loan of 245 yuan from the state bank and credit co-op for the purchase of means of production. Then the various production tasks were assigned among the co-op members. Everyone got busy, so that all past anxieties were allayed. In the division of labour it was decided that the men were to plough, while the women in the co-op were to cut turf and green manuring crops and to plant maize.

In order to remove the causes for anxiety and to make the members more enthusiastic for higher yields, further steps were taken to find out what questions regarding policy still remained and to clarify them. First of all, the government's grain policy and the policy for co-operative farming were clearly defined. The policy on co-operation was explained as being based on the voluntary principle and on mutual benefit. The grain policy was explained as being one where, "if you have a greater surplus of grain, the state will buy more; if you have less, it will buy less; if you have none, you won't be asked to sell; and families short of grain are assured their supply from the government." To enable the peasants to have a better understanding of Party policy, and do away with their worries the "three fixed items" policy was publicized in accordance with a directive by the provincial Party committee, i.e. fixed quota of output, fixed quota of grain to be purchased by the government, fixed quota of grain to be supplied by the government. Originally, 15,590 catties of rice were to have been supplied to 31 households in the village where the Tungsheng Co-op was located. After the government's grain policy was fully explained, three of these

households which actually had enough grain of their own confessed that they did not need any extra rations, thus reducing the amount the government had to supply by 4,540 catties. One of the co-op members said: "If I'd known the policy as I know it now, I wouldn't have applied to the government for 200 more catties of grain." On the question of fixing work-points, it was decided after full democratic discussion that the original arrangement of crediting six points for the work of an animal and only four points for human labour in ploughing had to be altered, so that eight points were credited for the animal and seven points for manpower. The value of a day's hoeing was reduced by one point. When manure was contributed as investment in the co-op, it was to be graded according to value. Members were to contribute seed in proportion to the yield of their land. The interest paid on the members' investment in the co-op was to be at the same rate the credit co-op paid.

When all these problems were solved, the members forgot their worries and became quite enthusiastic, promising to put greater energy into their work. Two members told a co-op meeting that they would buy two big draught animals (which they have since done). Through the co-op members' better political understanding and their rising enthusiasm for production, a general membership meeting was called to sum up the work. The meeting discussed means to give greater stimulus to democratic practice, to perfect the systems of work, improve the leaders' style of work, reinforce the key personnel of the co-op, and heighten the members' enthusiasm to produce more and more.

At the meeting the chairman appraised the work done since the co-op was established, pointed out the problems that remained to be solved, and the reasons why they had arisen. He examined critically his own past conduct and encouraged the members to speak their mind. Their criticisms were very much to the point. "Chairman Mao tells us to set up co-ops and we know that a co-op is a good thing. But when we set

one up, nobody bothered about us, neither the county nor the district Party committee, nor the local Party branch. They haven't been here even once, perhaps because they don't think much of our poor little village, where they can't get good food and accommodations. . . . The co-op chairman hasn't taken a responsible stand. He rarely says anything and doesn't seem to care. Our book-keeper can make speeches that sound delightful, but he doesn't follow up his words with actions. . . . Our co-op ran into trouble not because we members didn't want to do our jobs, but because the cadres didn't give us a lead." After this, the cadres of the co-op made their self-criticisms and guaranteed to work better henceforth. On this basis, various systems were discussed and agreed upon for a rational distribution of the work. The management committee of the co-op was to meet once every three to five days to discuss production problems; production teams would meet once every three days to assess the work done by the members, to note down the work-points earned and to divide up the work for the next few days. A general membership meeting once a month was to sum up the work and publish accounts.

As a result of these measures taken, there was much greater enthusiasm for co-operative work among the members, so that the planting of maize and rice and the ploughing of the co-op's 14 *mou* of non-irrigated land were completed within three days.

## ON WIDENING THE SCOPE OF WOMEN'S WORK IN THE AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

(By the Democratic Women's Federation of Hsingtai  
County, November 1955)

*This is a very good article. We hope that all county Democratic Women's Federations will follow the example given and that county Party committees will improve their leadership in this matter so that—in accordance with the principle of equal pay for equal work—every woman who is able to work will take her place on the labour front. These things should be done as quickly as possible.*

—EDITOR

In 1952, seven pilot agricultural producers' co-operatives were set up in Hsingtai County, Hopei Province. At present, after some three years, there are 812 co-operatives, constituting 66.8 per cent of the county's peasant households. These co-operatives have been set up in 397 villages which constitute 92.3 per cent of the total number of villages in the county. Women have taken an active part in various kinds of work in the co-operative movement, and many of them have become key personnel and activists. When Chairman Mao's directive on agricultural co-operation reached the county, the responsible cadres of the women's federation saw more clearly than ever the significance of the principle of "comprehensive planning, more active leadership." On the basis of the comprehen-

sive plan for agricultural co-operation drawn up by the county Party committee and the concrete conditions in local women's work, the county women's federation decided upon the main tasks to be fulfilled by women during the first five-year plan period. These were the tasks: go a step further in mobilizing and organizing the mass of women; actively support and participate in the agricultural co-operative movement and the campaign to increase production; promote the socialist transformation of agriculture; support the nation's socialist industrialization; and educate women to work for the fulfilment of the first five-year plan. The plan for women's work for the whole county and concrete measures to carry it out were made.

1) The county Party committee's plan for promoting the co-operative movement was as follows: "There are 66,040 households in the county, of which 7,544 poor-peasant households, 15,574 lower middle-peasant households and 4,243 upper middle-peasant households have already joined the co-operatives; and 270 ex-landlord and rich-peasant households should be expelled from the co-operatives. There are still 12,143 poor-peasant and lower middle-peasant households which have remained outside the co-operatives. It is planned to admit an additional 6,604 households into the co-operatives in 1955. In 1956, another 8,211 households, including a number of politically conscious upper middle peasants, will be drawn in, so that the membership will come to 90 per cent of all the peasant households. By 1957, it is expected that more than 92 per cent of all households will be members of co-operatives and the rich peasants eliminated as a class. Thus complete co-operation will be achieved." This plan requires that the women's federation should know what the women of all social strata think, at the various stages, about agricultural co-operation, and take appropriate steps to educate them in socialism constantly and thoroughly, so as to raise their political consciousness and enable them to keep pace with the development of the co-operative movement.

2) To develop production and increase income by all possible means, it is necessary to utilize the labour power of women in a planned and reasonable way, so as to bring their potentialities into full play. At present, 71 of the county's 812 agricultural producers' co-operatives have long-term plans and short-term arrangements for both men and women. All these are "Class 1 co-operatives," constituting 41 per cent of the 173 Class 1 co-ops or a little more than eight per cent of the total number of co-operatives in the county. Those which have reasonably arranged seasonal work for women are 521 co-operatives (i.e. 64 per cent of the total): 419 Class 2 co-operatives (the total in this category being 535) and 102 Class 1 co-operatives. There are, however, 220 Class 2 and Class 3 co-operatives which have not made proper arrangements for the utilization of labour power; rather than give the women work on ordinary days, they would call upon them suddenly for work. Some of these co-operatives, though very few, do not engage women in any kind of work at all. In view of this, it is necessary that, in 1956, more than 90 per cent of the Class 1 co-operatives should have long-term plans and short-term arrangements for both men and women; all Class 2 co-operatives should have seasonal arrangements, and as for the Class 3 co-operatives, 40 per cent of them should have seasonal arrangements, while all of them should have temporary arrangements and should engage women in work on a rational basis. By 1957, long-term plans and short-term arrangements should be the general practice in all co-operatives.

To achieve these targets, the women cadres in the co-operatives should be educated to take the initiative and suggest to the leadership that the labour power of women members be included in the over-all plans of the co-operatives. They should also take the initiative to help the Party committee understand the actual situation, and suggest that production achievements by women be summed up so as to get rid of the men's usual contempt for women's working ability. It

is also necessary to teach the women members to take up needlework during the slack seasons and inclement weather, to accept willingly any work given them in accordance with the principle of division of labour, and to take an active part in the co-operative's production. Where the soil is rich, attention should be paid to the proper division of labour for deep ploughing and intensive cultivation, general field work and the application of fertilizer. In land-short areas having ample labour power, both men and women members should be provided with adequate work, bearing in mind a proper division of labour and occupations.

3) To ensure success in division of labour and occupations, efforts should be made to enable women members to raise their scientific and technical level in agricultural and subsidiary production, and to mobilize them to participate in the movement for technical reform in agriculture. The women of Hsingtai County have been enabled to master the technique of seed selection, seed soaking, seed dusting, insect control, thinning by hand, artificial pollination of corn, cotton growing, etc. Besides this, however, different demands should be set upon women in different areas according to the varying conditions.

(1) In hilly and thickly-wooded areas where arable land is insufficient in comparison with the comparatively large population, the following measures are to be taken: raise per-unit area yield; grow fruit trees and plant trees in large numbers; develop animal husbandry in a planned way; energetically expand a diversified economy, beneficial to agricultural production, to include poultry-raising, sericulture and bee-keeping. So, apart from learning agricultural techniques and being able to do field work, women should also learn the techniques for raising poultry and pigs, breeding silkworms, and keeping bees.

(2) In semi-hilly areas with large stretches of comparatively level land, cotton is the main crop; but in these places irrigation facilities are inadequate. As most of the

men are out as traders or working on water conservancy projects, there is a shortage of labour power. In these areas, therefore, women should learn such modern cotton-growing techniques as pruning, thinning out side branches, cutting the terminal bud off the main stem, cutting the terminal bud off the side branches, general pruning, careful pruning and insect control. They should also take part in the main field work during busy seasons, and learn such techniques as full seed germination, preserving soil moisture, raising pigs, and accumulating compost.

(3) On the plains with vast fertile land and with irrigation facilities, it is suitable for growing food crops. In these areas the women's main tasks, besides participating in field work, are to raise large numbers of pigs and collect more fertilizer. Therefore, women must learn how to raise pigs, in addition to various kinds of agricultural technique. In those villages where reeds are grown, women should learn to weave mats and raise their quality.

Generally speaking, in raising the technical level of women, the specific requirements are as follows: Three to seven skilled women technicians are to be trained in the county. Five to fifteen women technicians are to be trained in every big or medium-sized co-operative, and three to seven women technicians in each small co-operative. These women technicians should help the mass of women master technique. It is also necessary to train a large number of women in the technique of using new-type farm implements to set the pace. When the mass of women have mastered production techniques, they can help promote the expansion of agricultural and subsidiary production. Luchia Village is the key place for raising pigs. The whole county, which has 10,000 pigs, should aim to increase the number to 18,000 by 1956, and 23,000 by 1957. Peikou Village is the key place for raising poultry. The target for the whole county is 132,080 fowls by 1956, and 198,120 by 1957. Shuimen Village is the key place for breeding silkworms. The whole county, with

its present 34,200 catties of cocoons, is to reach 35,000 catties by 1956, with no increase for 1957 because of the limitation of mulberry trees.

To achieve these targets, all women must first be brought to realize the significance of raising their technical level. Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish close connections with the agro-technical stations, and whenever a training class is run in the county, district or township, efforts should be made to ensure that 30 per cent of the trainees are women. In day-to-day work, the co-operatives' women cadres should help the women members study technique. Methods that can generally raise the women's technical level, such as teaching each other and learning from each other, men teaching women, and coaching apprentices, should be promoted.

4) To encourage women to take part in production and to protect the physical and mental health of their children, mutual-aid organizations to take care of the children should be expanded. The present 843 creches and seven nursery stations in Hsingtai County fall into these four categories:

(1) Small temporary creches. There are 398 such creches where neighbours and relatives act as nursemaids or the mothers take turns to look after the children. In most cases the nursemaids are paid in the form of exchanging labour.

(2) Seasonal creches. There are 363 such creches led by the co-operatives as a whole and run by separate management. They have regular nursemaids, periodic meetings and sanitation work. A fairly rational system is used to assess work-points, some assessed by production teams, some paid directly by mothers with work-points.

(3) Year-round creches. There are 82 such creches which were first established in 1952. They are directed by the co-operatives' special committees for the care of children and are formed by a production brigade or a production team. There are regular meetings, a system of assessing



work-points and sanitation regulations in these creches. The nursemaids are chosen by democratic election.

(4) Nursery stations. Children from four to seven years old are placed in these stations. One or two teachers teach them to sing and tell stories to them.

On the present basis, it is required that by 1956, 70 per cent of Hsingtai County's big and medium co-operatives set up creches, and 50 per cent of the big co-operatives organize nursery stations. At the same time, small co-operatives with favourable conditions should also set up creches when necessary. By 1957, all the big and medium co-operatives should have creches; all the big co-operatives and 50 per cent of the medium co-operatives should organize nursery stations; and 50 per cent of the small co-operatives should set up creches.

Before organizing creches, it is necessary, first and foremost, to look into the need and the possibilities. For instance, it should be known beforehand how many women are unable to take part in production because they have to look after their own babies, and how many old women are there who can look after babies. After thorough investigations, the women should be brought together to talk the matter over and see what problems or worries they may have. In the light of all this, they should then be persuaded to take part in production or work for the creches. While organizing creches, it should be seen that work-points are being assessed reasonably, so that all parties concerned are benefited. After the creches are formed, constant attention should be paid to the state of mind of the mothers and nursemaids; meetings must be held at regular intervals and problems dealt with in good time. Also, the nursemaids should be taught the rudiments of sanitation to protect the children's health. Only when all these tasks are carried out can the creches be run well, expanded and improved step by step.

5) It is necessary to have a plan for training a large number of leading women personnel for production teams and co-operatives. In the 812 co-operatives of Hsingtai County

there are now 2,871 key women workers (472 co-operative chairmen, 917 management committee members, and 1,482 brigade leaders). They may be classified into three categories according to their political consciousness and working ability:

(1) Under the first category are those who are concurrently chairmen of township women's federations and co-operative chairmen or management committee members. The majority of them are key personnel who took part in the land reform. There are 575 women under this category, more than 20 per cent of all the leading women. Just and impartial, they work actively and have a firm standpoint. They always take the initiative in guiding work according to plan. They are able to discover and solve problems in good time and overcome difficulties, and are therefore respected by the masses.

(2) The majority of women under this category are concurrently committee members of the township women's federations and co-operative personnel. They are for the most part key people who emerged in the movement to raise output before 1952. They number 2,008 which is 70 per cent of the total. Full of enthusiasm in their work, they are able to lead the other women members along and fulfil the tasks given them by the leadership. But when confronted with difficulties, they are not always prepared to deal with them. They are not tactful enough, and they rather tend to depend on the male personnel in the co-operatives to solve difficult problems for them.

(3) Under the third category are most of the key personnel who have come to the fore since the co-operatives were set up. There are 288 of them, over 10 per cent of the total. They lack experience and are not very capable in work. Some of them give guidance to the other women to take part in production only when their personal interests are not affected. In the face of difficulties, they easily become discouraged and start grumbling. A few only take into account their personal interests, and think that

to give too much attention to public affairs is detrimental to their own interests. These women, of course, cannot do much in the way of giving leadership to others.

The fostering and training of the aforementioned three categories of key personnel needs to be strengthened and their ability raised. By 1956, the efficiency of key personnel now in the first category will have increased. Seven members in this category will be given special help to learn overall management of a co-operative, while 40 per cent of the existing key personnel will be raised to the level of those in the first category, and 55 per cent to the level of those in the second category. By 1957, 55 per cent of the existing key personnel should reach the level of those in the first category, and the number of those now in the third category should be reduced to the minimum or to zero. It is necessary to train more key personnel at all times and to send them to places whenever they are urgently needed. By 1956, all big co-operatives should have women chairmen (or vice-chairmen), committee members and brigade leaders; the medium co-operatives should have 80 per cent of the required women personnel, and even small co-operatives, where conditions are ripe, should have women chairmen (or vice-chairmen) or women committee members. By 1957, all big and medium co-operatives are to have women leaders (from chairmen to committee members, brigade and team leaders). As for the small co-operatives, those with favourable conditions are to have women chairmen (or vice-chairmen), and those with less favourable conditions should have women committee members. New co-operatives, big and medium-sized, are to be provided with women personnel as soon as they are established.

The training of women as key personnel should depend mainly on the township Party branch and the co-operative leadership. They should teach the women good methods in work and give them appropriate praise and criticism as the occasion may require, so as to improve their working ability gradually. It is also necessary to maintain close connections

with the county rural work department, so that whenever a training class for co-operative personnel is opened, it can be asked to draw in a certain number of women. In the winter of 1955, besides the 200 women trained by the rural work department, 350 others will be trained by the county women's federation.

6) Put the township women's representative conference on a sound basis so that, under the unified leadership of the Party branch, it will play a more active role in encouraging women to take part in the agricultural co-operative movement.

All in all there are 112 townships in the county. The women's representative conferences in 48 townships, i.e. 42.8 per cent of the total number of townships, have regular meetings and take initiative in work. The women's representative conferences in 43 townships, i.e. 38.39 per cent of the total, do not have any system or regular meetings and do not take any initiative in work. In the remaining 21 townships, the women's federations do not assume their responsibility and give no help whatsoever. These women's representative conferences should be given a thorough shake-up and strengthened accordingly. By 1956, 60 per cent of the township women's representative conferences, after having their organizations strengthened and their working system put on a sound basis, should take initiative in work. It is planned that, by 1957, all the women's representative conferences in the county will have good working systems and will be able to take initiative in work.

The strengthening of township women's representative conferences should be linked with the central tasks, and, through education and re-election, enough personnel should be trained and the organizations consolidated. The overwhelming majority of cadres in the township women's federations in Hsing-tai County are concurrently co-operative personnel. As for the few townships where personnel of the women's federations are not concurrently co-operative personnel, it should be proposed to the township leadership that they also become

co-operative personnel. This will help promote the work. (It is correct for co-operatives to have personnel from the women's representative conference, but whether they should all hold both posts concurrently depends on the concrete conditions in each place—All-China Democratic Women's Federation.)

To carry out, step by step, this plan for women's work, it is necessary for the county women's federation to improve its methods of leadership, to take the initiative in securing the Party's guidance and in maintaining close contact with all departments concerned in a planned way. The county women's federation must change its present method of giving only general leadership; it should pay special attention to key problems, sum up experience and promote work as a whole. Its collective leadership and its links with the lower units of the women's organizations must also be strengthened. As regards the various meetings to be held, the following is recommended: The committee of the county women's federation shall hold a conference every month; the county women's representative conference shall be held once a year; joint meetings of chairmen of township women's representative conferences shall be held twice a year, and meetings of their executive committees four times a year. It is advisable also to adopt the method of giving guidance by letter (i.e. before and after a certain stage in work, the township women's representative conferences should each write a letter to the county women's federation, which in turn should reply to each township women's representative conference). This method will serve to promote work and give information about the actual situation. Meantime, the women personnel in the basic units should help the Party branch mobilize women Party and Youth League members and activists to study Chairman Mao's directive on agricultural co-operation and, bearing in mind the comprehensive plans for each township, to map out plans for women's work and carry it out through concrete tasks.

## WOMEN JOINING IN PRODUCTION SOLVE THE LABOUR SHORTAGE

(From the *Chekiang Rural Work Bulletin*, issue no. 60,  
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*Prior to the spread of co-operation, many parts of the country suffered from a labour surplus. With the coming of co-operation, many co-ops are finding themselves short of labour. It has become necessary to get the great mass of the women—who have never worked in the fields before—to take their place on the labour front.*

*This is an important development. Many people never expected it.*

*People used to say: We are bound to have a labour surplus after the co-operatives are formed. We have too large a labour force already. What shall we do if it gets any bigger?*

*In a great many places when co-operation came into effect this fear was sent flying. There was not only no excess of labour power—there was a shortage. There seemed to be a labour surplus in some places for a time immediately after co-operation started. But this was because the co-ops there had not yet launched into large-scale production, had not yet begun additional money-making activities, had not yet started intensive cultivation.*

*In a considerable number of localities where the co-ops have gone in for large-scale production, increased the number of their side lines, extended their*

*exploitation of nature in every way and do their work more skilfully, they find that they do not have enough labour power.*

*This condition is only beginning to make its appearance. We will see more and more of it as the years go by. The same thing will happen after the mechanization of agriculture. In the future there will be all sorts of enterprises that people have never dreamed of, raising our agricultural output to several times, a dozen times, perhaps scores of times, its present level.*

*The development of industry, transportation and trade will go even further beyond the bounds of our ancestors' imagination. Science, the arts, education and public health will do the same.*

*China's women are a vast reserve of working power. This reserve should be tapped and used in the struggle to build a mighty socialist country. To encourage the women to join in the work, we must abide by the principle of equal pay for equal work, men and women alike.*

*All co-operatives can learn from the experience of Chienteh County in Chekiang Province.*

—EDITOR

In the Chienho Advanced Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Ankou Township, Chienteh County, Chekiang Province, there are altogether 77 households, with 87 males having full labour power, 28 males with half labour power and 88 females with full or half labour power. Located in a semi-upland area, the co-op has under cultivation 320 *mou* of irrigated rice fields, 302 *mou* of non-irrigated land and 200 *mou* of upland plots. Its main crops are rice and corn, followed by sweet potatoes and wheat.

Before summer, all the seedlings of the co-op turned withered, and 20 per cent had already shown their root. Originally the co-op had decided to accumulate over 260,000 catties of fertilizer, but only 90,000 catties were actually collected. In the fields of spring crops, 80 per cent of the weeds were left unhoed. The irrigation work had not been completed. Early crops had not been sown. Not enough firewood for cooking was gathered. When all this was discovered in the course of field inspection, concrete steps were immediately taken to remedy it. A fortnightly plan was drawn up, according to which 1,667 work-days were needed. That would be too much for the men in the co-op if they were working by themselves, and the more so when the time for summer harvesting and planting came. Thus, most of the women were got into the job to help carry out the plan. As a result, only in four days, 105 *mou* of rape had been reaped (this entirely done by women), more than 56,000 catties of ash compost collected, over 1,600 sprouts of edible amaranth and pumpkins planted on the 15 *mou* of land kept by the co-op members for their own use, and 55 plants of sunflowers grown beside the houses. In addition, 59 women and children gathered a week's supply of grass to feed the co-op's 50-odd pigs. In enrolling women for their service, the co-op stressed the following two points.

#### MOBILIZE MEN AND WOMEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

I. Through field inspection, the co-op found out where the shoe pinched in production. The next step was to draw up short-term plans, and make arrangements for the available labour power. This revealed how intensive the work should be and how far the shortage of labour power would go. Efforts were then made to point out to both men and women in the co-op why women's service was indispensable to production. The men were told to get rid of their usual contempt for the women's working ability, while the women were urged to give up their old idea that production was men's job only.

II. Attention was called to the possibility of increasing the yields by using more fertilizer. In 1954, the old co-operative had applied 460 catties of ash compost to each *mou* of land and got a bigger crop. But the land of Lo Kuang-tou (who was then not yet in the co-op), adjoining that of the co-operative, yielded 60 catties less per *mou*, because he had not been able to apply to his land ash compost three more times as the co-op did, although he had used other fertilizers as much as the co-op had done. This was used as an example to encourage the women to think by themselves how to collect fertilizer. They were told to pile up large quantities of compost by clearing the surroundings of debris, etc. This done, they would be able to ensure increased yields of rice, corns, sweet potatoes and other food crops, and thus to support the nation's industrial construction and to better their own living conditions.

III. The meaning of women's emancipation was reviewed. They were urged to recall their unhappy past, compare it with the present, and look forward into the future. They were called upon to play a more active part in production.

Through all these means, the women realized what their effort would bring about, and so became sure of themselves in work. Some of them said: "These are good times. We are no longer limited to the old routine of doing cooking, washing dishes and raising pigs," and "to collect more fertilizer in the spring means to harvest more grain in the autumn." Based on the co-op's over-all plan, each group mapped out its own fortnightly plan for 100,700 catties of compost in addition to reaping rape. The day after the plan was decided upon, most women got grass, chaff and slops ready for the pigs, so that they might have more time for field work.

#### HELP WOMEN SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS

I. The co-op helped the women make the best use of their time and abilities.

(1) The division of labour between men and women was arranged in the following way: Men did such heavy work as building irrigation projects, fostering well-grown seedlings, tilling rape fields, and undertaking subsidiary occupations. Women took up lighter work like preparing ash compost, harvesting rape, and growing early crops.

(2) Work was likewise properly divided up among women themselves. Of the co-op's 88 females with full or half labour power, 32 were employed to reap rape, the rest to collect fertilizer and to cultivate early crops. Nursing mothers were allowed to work near their homes, while strong young women went to work in distant fields. For instance, there were three nursing mothers in the first group who were assigned to gather rape near their houses, so that they could go home to feed their infants three times a day.

(3) Family members also had a division of labour to settle both domestic duties and field work. Take the example of Hung Shui-hua. There were five members in her home. Her 22-year-old daughter-in-law worked for the co-op regularly. Her daughter, aged 17, reaped rape and gathered fertilizer, in addition to cutting grass to feed the pigs. She herself, being over 50 years old, stayed at home cooking, washing, feeding pigs, tending the cattle in the pasture occasionally, and looking after a neighbour's child. Both her husband and son took part in the co-op's field work.

II. The co-op saw to it that the rule of equal pay for equal work for men and women alike was observed, and that the work done by each was properly appraised and paid for. Formerly, the co-op paid its members according to a "fixed rates with flexible assessment" system. It had turned out that women got only four to six work-points each for a day's work while a man used to get ten—an unfair treatment for women. Besides, ash compost and products of side occupations were not paid for in terms of work-points. The co-op bought them in cash, thus depriving the women doing such work of the right to sharing the benefits derived from

the autumn harvest. The payment set by the co-op for such work was not reasonable either. For instance, ash compost was fixed at only 15 *fen* per 100 catties (this was afterwards increased to 22 *fen*). Naturally, the women refused to collect it. They all complained: "Even we work ourselves to death, we get nothing out of the increased crops."

So the leading personnel of the co-op put such problems before the members to consider, and necessary remedies were made. Since then, compost collecting and subsidiary occupations were, among other things, assessed and given work-points according to the quantity and quality of the work done. The number of work-points assigned to women was also properly readjusted. Take, for example, brick-and-tile maker Liao San-hao, who worked intensively like a man. Her average work-points for three days were raised from the original 6 or 7 to 12 or 13. Wu Shu-ying at first refused to work out a plan for collecting fertilizers. But the next day after the work-points were readjusted, she went out before dawn to shovel sod for preparing compost. Su Lien-chu's mother used to mow grass for pigs only, now she gathered fertilizers as well.

III. Due attention was given to women's special problems arising from their participation in farm work. Experimental nurseries were set up in groups Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The members of these three groups had 16 children, but only four of them were looked after by their grandmothers when their parents were out in the field. So arrangements were made for the care of the rest. Besides talking the mothers round to continue to work, the co-op tried its best to convince them of the advantage of leaving their children to a nursery. It also got to teach the new nursemaids to do their work well and to be worthy of the task entrusted to them by the co-op members. As for the payment, the mothers and the nursemaids came together and fixed it in a way beneficial to both parties. The agreement was as follows: (1) For each child of one or two years old, 13 *fen* was charged per day, for such child was most difficult to handle and needed feeding by the

nursemaids (but the food was provided by the mother). (2) For each child from 4 to 12 months, 12 *fen* was charged per day. The child was taken twice a day to the mother working in the field for breast feeding, while the mother went to the nursery to milk the child once. (3) For each child under four months, 10 *fen* was charged per day. The child was taken three times a day to the mother working in the field for breast feeding. (4) For each child between two and three, 8 *fen* was charged per day. (5) For each child between three and five, 4 *fen* was charged per day. (Nursemaids working for the co-op members should be paid by work-points like the co-op members themselves — Editor of the *Chekiang Rural Work Bulletin*.)

Only when the problem of child care had been thus settled could the mothers attend to their work whole-heartedly. Hu Shou-chu had to take care of her four-month-old infant baby herself that she was unable to go out to gather grass for pigs. But now she was there reaping rape or busied with other subsidiary production. Statistics for April 24 and 25 show that of the 18 women engaged in reaping rape, eight had more than two children each, and four had a baby under four months. Some of the mothers said: "When the nurseries have been set up, we can work with all our heart."

## A YOUTH SHOCK BRIGADE

(By a work team of the regional working committee of Central Kwangtung, New Democratic Youth League.  
See *Youth of South China*, No. 16, August 25, 1955)

*This is a very good article. It can be used as a reference everywhere. The youth are one of the most active and vital forces in society. They are the most anxious to learn, they are the least conservative in their thinking. This is especially so in the era of socialism.*

*We hope that the various local Party organizations will help and work with the Youth League organizations in determining how to bring the power of our youth into the fullest possible play. We must not lump them together with everybody else and overlook their special characteristics.*

*Of course the young people must learn from the old folks and adults. With the consent of the old folks and adults they should engage in all sorts of useful activities as much as possible.*

*Old people and adults are relatively conservative. They often retard the progressive activities of the youngsters. Only after the young people make a success of something are their elders willing to concede.*

*This article describes that situation very well. Naturally, no compromise should be made with con-*

*servative ideas. All right then, let's see what we can do about it. If we are successful, the conservatives will have to give in.*

—EDITOR

The youth shock brigade of the No. 9 Agricultural Producers' Co-op in Hsinping Township, Chungshan County, Kwangtung Province, was formed in the spring of 1955, when the whole township was preparing for the spring ploughing. First proposed by the local group of the Youth League, the brigade was set up with the help of the local Party branch.

At present, the brigade has 36 members. Under the direct leadership of the Party branch and the management committee of the co-op and with the encouragement of the local Youth League group, it not only has stood in the forefront in combating natural calamities, but has also been active in all types of daily farm work. The brigade achieved remarkable success and helped raise production. Thus it has become an active force in the co-op. Speaking of the brigade, Liang Wu-tse, the vice-chairman of the co-op, said: "With such a shock brigade always on the go, there is nothing that can stop us now."

Such high praise from Vice-Chairman Liang was not given out of politeness.

On the very day the brigade was formed, it threw itself heart and soul into preparations for the coming ploughing. At that time, the co-op was engaged in mud-digging work. An important measure in the co-op's plan to raise production, this was no easy task since it involved dredging some 60,000 boat-loads of mud from the nearby river in the short span of 80 days. And at the time there was shortage of both manpower and food. At first some of the co-op members did not see the point of the mud-digging work. "It is a nuisance, this mud-digging," they grumbled. "You get a backache digging all day long, and your hands ache poling a boat. And the weather is bitter cold. We are not going even if you gave us gold." The result was that only 30-odd co-op members

showed up for work and the average per day was only a little over 400 boat-loads of mud, or half the planned amount. This was the state of affairs when members of the brigade accepted the assignment from the co-op management committee. They were told that their job was not only to mobilize the co-op members to go out in full strength, but even more important, to raise efficiency themselves to bring more mud back. The brigade members vied with each other in asking to be assigned the most difficult job. They raised the slogan "Let's do a good job, don't fight for work-points, don't take the boat back unless it is fully loaded." On the first day, 17 of the 23 youth brigade members who went out, fulfilled the co-op production target, five overfulfilled it, and only one, who was younger than the others, fell behind. Their success was a stimulus to the others. In no time, the whole co-op was involved in an emulation campaign to get more mud in, with more and more people taking part in the work. Through its collective efforts, the brigade developed a new method to collect mud which pushed the daily collection up from 280 to 410 boat-loads. When this method was popularized, the efficiency of the co-op members increased as a whole: the daily average was raised from 660 to 1,030 boat-loads. In this way, the mud-digging work was finished on time.

In the spring-sowing season, Hsinping Township was hit by a drought more severe than the peasants could recall for many years. The seed beds were crusted with alkali. This seriously threatened the timely sowing and transplanting of the seedlings. Faced with this menace, the co-op management committee adopted an emergency measure. It decided to borrow some land in Tunglung Township, some 40 li away, to use as seed beds. But this was more easily said than done, for more than 2,000 catties of seeds had to be transported to Tunglung Township to plant the 26 *mou* of seedling plots and people had to be sent to Tunglung Township to take care of the paddy fields. Some of the co-op members opposed this decision. Some said: "Nature always

provides a way out. It won't be long before it is raining cats and dogs. Why make such a fuss and waste so much labour for nothing?" Others said: "Let those who are willing to go that far for seedlings do the transplanting themselves." The youth brigade was the first to respond to the call of the co-op management committee. A score of brigade members undertook this laborious work, guided by some experienced older peasants. They worked four days and nights straight in Tunglung Township. Neither their unfamiliarity with the land, relative lack of skill, lack of sleep, nor any other difficulty stopped them. The 26 *mou* of seedling plots in distant Tunglung Township were finally planted and the threat of alkali destruction was averted. Two weeks later, the seedlings grew up, full and green. All this time the alkali menaced their own village of Hsinping Township. This stubborn fact taught all members of the co-op something. They began to see that the co-op management committee had done the right thing, and so had the youth brigade. "The sooner we shake off our conservative outlook, the better!" many co-op members admitted. Others said: "With such dogged determination, we can overcome any difficulty."

However, the battle was not yet won. After the threat of drought was defeated insect pests came. These insects were rice borers and they attacked seed beds. Unless they were wiped out quickly, the seedlings would be seriously damaged. The co-op decided on a campaign to wipe out the insects, but here again a conservative attitude born of superstition came out: "Dragons in the sky, insects in the paddies, there is nothing unnatural about that." "The insects come by themselves and die by themselves; they will be all finished after a storm, why worry about them?" These were some of the sayings of the village wags. But not so the youth brigade. Led by the Party, the 23 members of the brigade got together to study the life cycle of the insect and the damage it does. They proposed a method to kill off the insects right in the seedling plots, and were the first to spread "666" insecticide



powder in the nursery. They also brought back from the seedling plots a lump of larvae laid by the insects. Through their actions, they taught the masses that it was not a difficult or impossible thing to wipe out the insects in the seed beds as many had believed. They showed that the insects would not die off by themselves. On the contrary they would tend to spread all over if left alone. What was more important, it would be even more difficult to wipe out or even prevent the spread of the insects after the seedlings were transplanted to the paddy fields. Inspired by the brigade's example, a campaign to wipe out the insects was started in the co-op and thus the insect menace was checked in good time.

When the farming season for the co-op came, the brigade again faced a difficult problem. Since its members were scattered among the various production brigades, and since these teams had different work and their own problems, how would the brigade remain active as a group all the time? How could the initiative of the brigade be fully used in the regular production season? The problem became very complicated. After consulting the local Party branch and the co-op management committee, the members of the co-op decided to take the following steps.

First of all, separate shock groups were organized in the different production brigades, with each electing its own group leader. The group leaders were given time by the co-op to hold short meetings to discuss the conditions and problems in their brigades, so that they could assign work to their members to improve the weak points in the work of their brigades. They also arranged for meetings of all brigade members to sum up experience gained during the season, to commend and honour their most outstanding members and set specific demands upon themselves. Secondly, when the production of the co-op required it, the members of the brigade were asked to work together, as in the case of some urgent or difficult task, or carrying out some ex-

perimental farming on a small piece of land. Thus the youth shock brigade was able to remain active under united leadership even when they were divided into several separate groups. It was able to remain a moving force, actively taking part in the co-op's production while carrying out its many-sided activities.

In 1955, the co-op planned to carry out close planting of paddy seedlings on 700 *mou* of land. This was a radical departure from tradition. So at the beginning some co-op members were skeptical and began to grumble. "If you plant them so close," some said, "you get a lot of stalk but not much rice. And if that happens, see if we don't make the management committee pay for it." "The mud-digging work gave us enough trouble, and now they think up some queer close-planting method. If I had only known all this, I probably wouldn't have joined the co-op." Here again members of the youth brigade made themselves useful. They patiently explained to the other co-op members the reason why close planting would bring a bigger yield. At the same time, they themselves strictly followed the instructions of the co-op management committee about close planting. Liang Yun-teng, a member of the brigade, was a new hand at planting, but he did not want to lag behind. He used to get up early in the morning, before dawn, and head straight for the paddy field to do the planting. He learned as he worked and tried his best to meet the standard fixed by the co-op. He ultimately had one of the highest record in the co-op by planting over one *mou* a day. Encouraged by the example of the shock group led by Liang Yun-teng, the No. 1 Production Brigade came out first in planting in the whole co-op. These examples from the youth brigade had a direct impact on the other co-op members. In the end, the target to turn 700 *mou* of land to close planting was overfulfilled.

When the weeding period came, the co-op introduced a new weeding method, but again many co-op members did not have much faith in it. They were worried that this new

method might break the stalks. "I would rather pull out the stalk and plant it back afterwards than do this," some insisted. Members of the brigade were again the first to respond to the call of the management committee. They made a trial run in a plot of 20 *mou* and the result was excellent. After the weeding, the stalks in the plot grew better than any other piece of land. The local Party branch invited members of the various co-ops to see the plot and study the result for themselves. Everyone agreed that this was an advanced method which should be popularized, and the grumbling that "this would ruin the stalks" died out in no time.

When the system of responsibility was adopted in the co-op, many thought the idea was that only quantity and speed count. For example, when close planting was introduced, many people planted the seedlings a distance of 15 inches apart instead of ten inches as required. Others, in order to gain more work-points, planted as quickly as they could without any regard to the quality of their work. Faced with this challenge the youth brigade called an emergency meeting and decided to combat the irregular practices. When the 23 members returned to their production brigade, they immediately drew up their pledges to plant their seedlings according to the co-op regulations. They also agreed to keep an eye on each other, criticize anyone whom they found doing shoddy work in the planting, and praise those whom they found planting well. From then on, nobody dared cheat on the work.

The youth brigade played the role of vanguard not only in popularizing new techniques and guaranteeing the quality of the work. They also fought against situations in which no one in particular was held responsible for some job.

In the spring of 1955, the co-op's more than 8,000 stalks of corn were threatened by drought. But because everyone then had his hands full with other jobs, the season being one of the busiest of the year, nothing was done to save the corn. On their own initiative, the young people asked the

management committee to let them take care of the corn. Using their rest period after supper, they did a fine job—watering, replanting, loosening the soil, weeding, fertilizing, etc. The result was a bumper harvest for the 8,000 stalks of corn.

One day, after they had finished mud-digging, members of the brigade found the boats left to the mercy of the weather in the paddy fields with no one to take care of them. They immediately used half a day's time to clean up the boats and put them in order. Later, when they found farm implements and compost were lying around without anybody taking charge, they sent the co-op management committee a five-point rationalization proposal to solve this urgent problem. It was accepted.

Thus the youth brigade of the No. 9 Agricultural Producers' Co-op in Hsinping Township became a real moving force in the co-op. "They can be called the heart of our co-op," is how the co-op members speak of the youth brigade.

Why is it that this shock brigade could achieve so much success? First, because since its formation it has closely relied on the leadership of the local Party branch and the co-op management committee. In its regular activities, it always seeks the guidance and support of the Party and the management committee. It always acquaints the leadership of the co-op with the facts and situation and invites them to their meetings. The Party branch and the management committee put work of the brigade high on their working agenda. Whenever the management committee discusses production plans or is about to adopt any important measures, it invites the brigade to send its representative to sit on the meetings and gives the brigade appropriate assignments. When the brigade has some success, the Party and the co-op management committee always commend them before the other co-op members and sometimes give them material rewards. This leadership of the Party and the co-op management commit-

tee, is the main reason why the brigade has been able to play such a useful role in the co-op.

Secondly, the Youth League group was really able to act as the backbone of the brigade. By using the diverse means and forms available, it was able to conduct constant political and ideological education among the members of the brigade through concrete and living examples. This made it possible to arouse and sustain the labour enthusiasm of the members. It has made the brigade a politically conscious force in building socialism. Since the formation of the brigade, the Youth League has organized scores of studies on "how to be a good co-operative member" and some six Youth League courses. By concrete analysis of the problems and thinking of the members, through discussions and heart-to-heart talks, the young people were brought to see how they could exert their efforts and help promote production. Through the daily routine of work, the Youth League carried out education among the young people, teaching them to love their co-op, their country, and the collective.

During the spring ploughing, half of the brigade's members received public commendation and four were admitted into the Youth League. This was a great encouragement to the young people. Moreover, the Youth League members were able to educate the masses by their own exemplary behaviour. They also helped the other members of the brigade to overcome ideological problems and difficulties. Hence, members of the brigade always felt the loving concern of the Youth League for them. They all wanted to distinguish themselves in their work, to improve themselves and become Youth League members.

Thirdly, the brigade has a large core of active members. This was not the case at the beginning when most of its work devolved on the brigade leader and vice-leader. With the growth of the brigade's membership (from 12 to 36) and the accompanying increase in tasks, the brigade began to pay attention to the problem of training a core. Activists were

assigned all kinds of work and at appropriate times given help in summing up their experience. Through tempering in day-to-day work, they already had six comparatively strong core members capable of doing independent work. Four of them could shoulder leadership tasks. At the same time, the brigade stressed the strength of collective efforts. The members were consulted by the core members on all issues concerning the brigade. This formed a solid nucleus of leadership. This is why, no matter how difficult the circumstances, the youth shock brigade could always act as a shock unit on the production front.

Fourthly, the youth shock brigade, centring all its activity around production, was good at grasping the key problems in production and overcoming weak points. For example, during preparations for ploughing, they saw that the mud-digging work was the key to success. Therefore they put forward the slogan: "Let's do a good job, don't fight for work-points, don't take the boat back unless it is fully loaded." When the seedlings were seriously menaced by alkali, on their own initiative they applied to the management committee for permission to plant the seedlings in distant Tunglung Township. In everyday production, the main work of the brigade is to popularize advanced technique and guarantee good quality in field work, and to help the management committee combat any situation in which work is nobody's particular responsibility. On all these major issues, the youth brigade has made outstanding achievements, contributing directly to increased production. The brigade also laid great stress on overcoming weak points in production. Facts have proved that astonishing results can be achieved in this respect the year round with alert minds that are keen in discovering problems. These are the broad areas in which the youth shock brigade works at all times.

## A SERIOUS LESSON

(By Yen Kuang-hung, a *Shansi Daily* correspondent,  
February 1, 1955)

Political work is the life-blood of all economic work. This is particularly true at a time when the economic system of a society is undergoing a fundamental change. The agricultural co-operative movement, from the very beginning, has been a severe ideological and political struggle. No co-op can be established without going through such a struggle. Before a brand-new social system can be built on the site of the old, the site must first be swept clean. Old ideas reflecting the old system invariably remain in people's minds for a long time. They do not easily give way.

After a co-op is formed it must go through many more struggles before it becomes strong. Even then, the moment it relaxes its efforts, it may collapse.

The Sanlousze Co-operative in Hsiehyu County, Shansi Province, nearly collapsed, even after it had grown strong, because it relaxed its efforts. Only after the local Party organization criticized itself, returned to teaching the masses to oppose capitalism and strengthen socialism, and resumed its political work, was the crisis averted and the co-op enabled to continue its development.

Opposition to selfish, capitalistic spontaneous tendencies, and promotion of the essence of socialism — that is, making the principle of linking the collec-

tive interests with the interests of the individual the standard by which all words and deeds are judged — these then are the ideological and political guarantees that the scattered, small-peasant economy will gradually be transformed into a large-scale co-operative economy.

Ideological and political education is an arduous task. It must be based on the life and experience of the peasants and be conducted in a very practical manner, with careful attention to detail. Neither bluster nor over-simplification will do. It should be conducted not in isolation from our economic measures, but in conjunction with them.

We already have considerable rich experience in this kind of work on a nation-wide scale. Almost every article in this book shows that.

— EDITOR

After the autumn harvest in 1954, the three-year-old Sanlousze Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Hsiehyu County, Shansi Province, nearly went to pieces. This was a bitter lesson for the Sanlousze branch of the Chinese Communist Party.

## DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

When the Sanlousze Agricultural Producers' Co-operative was first formed in the spring of 1952, all the members were confident that they could run it successfully. And they did gather two bumper harvests in succession, thanks to the conscientious work of every member, the rational use of land, plus vigorous government help. In 1952, the co-op reaped a harvest of raw cotton averaging 100 catties per *mou* of irrigated land; this was 30 catties more than the year before the co-op was set up in 1951. The average yield per *mou*

of cotton planted on non-irrigated land was 59 catties, or 16 catties above 1951. And in 1953, the co-op had an even bigger harvest. The yield per *mou* of wheat, for instance, jumped from 102 catties in 1951 to 155; that of raw cotton on irrigated land rose to 105 catties, and on non-irrigated land to 63 catties. In the summer of 1954, the co-op won the title "model co-operative" because its wheat yield was the highest in the whole county.

As a result of constantly increasing production, the income of the co-op members grew and their livelihood steadily became better. While in 1951, the year before the co-op came into being, the average income per household was only 420 yuan; in 1952, the first year the peasants farmed co-operatively, the figure went up to 522. In 1953, this rose to 868 yuan. In the past years, the co-op members have added 63 new, tile-roofed rooms to their homes. It was common for them to make new clothes and buy bedding, thermos flasks, electric torches, galoshes, etc.

The situation turned the heads of the leaders in the Party branch. They began to feel proud and complacent. On the one hand, they thought, "Ours is an advanced co-op. Our members are highly conscious and we don't lag behind in anything. We can't fail even there's no leadership at all!" On the other hand, they felt: "Now that we've increased our production, let's enjoy ourselves a bit!" So, beginning in 1954, the Party branch slackened its leadership over the co-op and let things drift, especially politico-ideological work among the members.

#### CAPITALIST IDEAS TAKE OVER

And this was the crux of the problem. Now that the Party had given up its efforts to educate the co-op members in the spirit of socialism, capitalist ideas gradually gained a free rein and, with each passing day, became more and more

threatening. The spontaneous tendency towards capitalism clearly showed itself in the following three respects:

1) Secret trading for private gain and alienation from the co-op. Some people felt work in the co-op was too hard; that they could not live as freely as they liked; and that there was not much to gain even though they continued to farm co-operatively. More than 30 members, among them five Party members, were swayed by such ideas in their thinking and behaviour. For instance, co-op member Lu Chien-kang, formerly a poor peasant, had risen to the status of well-to-do middle peasant after he joined the co-op, and his ideology began to change accordingly. In 1953, he thought of trading in chickens to make big money, and so secretly bought 1,200 chickens for 100 yuan; but he finally lost money. Another member, Lu Ping-nan, thought he would strike it rich by dealing in draught animals behind the backs of his fellow members. He lost 500 yuan. There was still another example: Party member Li Chun-shan, ignoring the production needs of the co-op, sold his sturdy mule valued at 300 yuan; then he bought a bony ox for only 120 yuan and used the rest of the proceeds to engage in trading.

2) Complacency with life as it is, self-indulgence, extravagance and idleness. More than 50 members were people of this sort. They seem to think: "Now that we've enough food to eat, enough clothing to wear and enough money to spend, what else could we wish for?" Some of them said, "We suffered half a lifetime in the past, now we can enjoy a comfortable life!" Some families even bought two bicycles. Lu Shun and three other members bought four carriages among them for 800 yuan, for the sole purpose of going to the trade fair to see the opera. As for food and clothing, they were even more extravagant.

3) Indifference to production in the co-op. This manifested itself in the appalling falling-off of labour discipline. Many co-op members thought this way: "Times are much better and we will have more than enough to eat, even if we

work less than before." Seeing that some of the others were getting richer by trading, some of the co-op members became disheartened in work, uncertain whether they would reap the fruit of their labour. So when the busy hoeing season came in 1954, members generally went to the fields late in the morning, and returned home long before sundown. Even while they were in the fields, they dallied over their work and what takes one day to do was not even completed in two.

Because the ideology of the spontaneous tendency towards capitalism took root among the members, the co-op's production plan for 1954 encountered two main difficulties. One was the sharp decline in investment in production, because members shifted their money to undesirable channels. When the co-op had only 22 households in its first year, 5,500 yuan was invested in production, and in the second year, investment increased to 15,000 yuan. But in 1953 when the co-op grew to 113 households and tilled 3,008 *mou* of farm land as against the former 501, investments fell sharply to about 2,500 yuan. This led to a big decrease in the amount of fertilizer applied to the cotton fields in 1954, averaging only one cartload of farmyard manure, four catties of cotton-seed cake and five catties of chemical fertilizer per *mou*. While in 1953, the amount of farmyard manure used was three cartloads per *mou*. Although there was a shortage of draught animals that year, the co-op members bought none; instead they sold 10. The other difficulty facing the co-op in production was that labour efficiency had dropped tremendously, and less and less work was done on the land. In 1953, a total of 40 work-days was spent on each *mou* of irrigated land, and 6 work-days on each *mou* of non-irrigated land. But in 1954, this fell to 8 and 5 respectively, so that the total work-days put in on the 1,148 *mou* of cotton fields were 1,450 less than in 1953.

As a consequence, an unfortunate thing happened: The 1954 cotton yield not only failed to catch up with the target set for increased production, the yield of raw cotton per *mou*

of irrigated land dropped from 105 catties in 1953 to 80 catties; that on non-irrigated land from 63 to 48. Taking both kinds of land together, the average yield per *mou* was only 52 catties, that is, 13 catties less than the mutual-aid team headed by Lu Ching-ming of the same village. Compared with the planned figure for increased output, the co-op reaped 32,088 catties less of raw cotton, incurring a loss of more than 31,000 yuan. This of course caused the members' income to fall greatly. For each work-day, a member received only 1.2 yuan, or 0.478 yuan less than 1953; for each *mou* of land pooled, the owner was paid a dividend of only ten yuan, or four yuan less than 1953. In 1954, 21 households had a shortage of grain for four months' consumption, whereas in the year before there was no such instance.

When it came to distributing income after the autumn harvest, therefore, the co-op members were profoundly discouraged. More than a dozen of them, including Wang Erh-yin who had invested more than others, asked to withdraw. The co-operative, once the pride of the peasants, was on the verge of collapse.

#### IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

As things stood, the question of whether the co-operative would survive depended exclusively on dispelling the complacency and indifference of which the Party branch had been guilty ever since the co-op had reaped rich harvests, and on success in educating the co-op members in socialism and thus eradicating the influence of a rich-peasant ideology.

The situation was very grave. So the county Party committee decided to send its deputy secretary, Li Pu, to Sanlousze to help the Party branch and the co-op leadership check over and consolidate the co-op.

First of all, the Party members were organized to study the two documents, "The Eight Requirements of a Communist" and "The Lesson to Be Drawn from Ignoring

Politico-Ideological Work by the Tsao Lin-shui Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Changchih County." At the same time, they were led to discover the causes for the decreased cotton output and the resulting problems by making detailed calculations and comparisons. Party branch secretary Hsiao Chan-sheng took the lead in making a self-criticism of his self-complacency. This encouraged others to come forward and consciously examine their own errors. For instance, the vice-chairman of the co-op, Chang Tso-pin who is in charge of political work, criticized himself for dereliction of duty. Members Li Tung-lien, Li Chun-shan and others examined their capitalist ideas of self-enrichment through secret trading, and unwillingness to invest in the co-op. Then the Party called upon all members to be bold and launch a resolute and concerted struggle against the influence of the rich-peasant ideology and thereby consolidate the socialist position of the co-op.

Now that all the Party members were ideologically united, the Party branch decided to start a mass campaign of self-criticism and ideological examination among the co-op members, with the Party members taking the lead. Throughout the ideological struggle, efforts were centred around the following three points: First, by making a comparison between the past and the present and visualizing the future, the co-op members were helped to criticize their erroneous ideas about resting content with present living standards and indulging themselves in extravagance, without thinking in terms of the long-term interest. On the one hand, the Party branch acquainted the masses with the happy life of the Soviet peasants and, on the other, it helped them review the suffering before liberation. With the help of the Party members, most of the co-op members gradually came to realize that the Soviet Union of today was their tomorrow, and that a happy life was just beginning for them, so if they rested content with things as they were and no longer worked diligently or invested to expand the co-op's production they could not

guarantee their present happy life, let alone an even better one such as the Soviet peasants have. But there were still some who could not see it. They said: "We'll concentrate on the present and let the future take care of itself!" At this point, the Party branch seized upon the example of co-op member Lu Pai-jen to help them understand the connection between the present and the future, and between the interests of the individual and those of the collective. Lu Pai-jen, who used to fritter away his days, became reluctant to invest in the co-op. No longer concerned with the needs of the co-op, he sold his mule. He squandered the money, buying a ewe for 130 yuan and a bicycle for 165 yuan. Finally, he could not make ends meet without outside help. This story was an eye-opener to these people. They began to see that "When the lake dries up, its outlets have no water"; that happiness of the individuals depends on the increased production of the whole co-op; and that only by constantly investing in the expansion of production and helping consolidate the co-op, could they increase their own income.

Secondly, the co-op members were helped to realize more clearly the difference between choosing this road or the other. Contrasts were made between pre-liberation and post-liberation days, and facts presented showing the development of the co-op's production and the constant improvement in the life of its members in the last three years. It was on this basis that the Party branch led the masses to discuss: "What made us poor in the past? Why does the Party lead us in getting organized? Should we exploit others?" Thus most of the co-op members had their thinking clarified. But there remained some who were more deeply influenced by the capitalist ideology and still thought like this, "You say it's wrong to take the capitalist road, but it brings you a lot of money. You also say the agricultural co-op is the right thing for us, but you earn only a yuan or so for a day's work, and nothing else!" To expose this erroneous thinking, the Party branch presented a series of facts well-known to all and used

them to help the peasants to choose between the two totally different paths and their consequences. On the one hand, there was the case of Lu Chien-kang, who was interested only in doing trading and making lots of money and who had no heart to work diligently in the co-op. But he failed at everything and, in a year, lost nearly 1,000 yuan. (This figure included the payment he would have received for work-days in co-op production.) All this brought him to the brink of bankruptcy, and it was only thanks to education by the Party branch and assistance by the co-op that he was enabled to tide over the difficulties. The exact opposite was the story of Lu Yang-cheng, who had regarded the co-op as his own home from the day he joined and worked as hard as he could. That was why Lu Yang-cheng and his family had a better life with each passing day. Of his family of four, only one was counted as a full labour power, but still they received more than others in 1954. Their income that year was 750 yuan or more, dividends on land included. This method of contrasting facts helped co-op member Lu Ping-nan and others to see and criticize their own capitalist thinking. As Lu Ping-nan put it, "I used to think that trade brought lots of money. I would never imagine that Lu Chien-kang would end up in such a hole. So I started trading in draught animals and chickens. In the end, I lost more than 500 yuan. Now I see that capitalism is a blind alley. We'll only have a better life if we stick to the road of co-operation and work in the co-op heart and soul. It's shameful and dangerous to speculate and exploit others!"

Thirdly, the Party branch analysed the fact that the co-op had a decreased cotton output in 1955 because less work was done on the land. It organized the masses to discuss the relations between the interests of the individual and those of the collective. This was another deep-going education for the co-op members who were helped to correct their wrong attitude towards work. Said Lu Pai-jen, "In 1954, when it was estimated that the cotton output would be less, everybody

complained that their income would be cut. But I thought differently: 'I've more work-days to my credit, and won't get less, no matter what the cotton output!' Then we came to distribute the income after the autumn harvest, and I found that I received 262 yuan less than in 1953. So now I understand that if the co-op output declines, I'll also be affected, even though I do have more work-days than others." In the discussion, the Party cited Lu Yang-cheng for his love of the co-op, respect for common property and observance of labour discipline. One after another, the co-op members pledged that they would learn from Lu Yang-cheng and work hard in the co-op by uniting as one and by mutual help and encouragement.

Following this ideological work, the Party branch strengthened its politico-ideological leadership over the co-op by taking the following organizational measures: a) Tighter Party discipline. Party activities of some sort are to be arranged once a month without fail, and the leading role of the Party members in the agricultural co-op given full play; b) Another deputy leader assigned to each production brigade for political work in it. This deputy leader must make periodical studies of the thinking of the co-op members and do more effective day-to-day politico-ideological work among them; and c) 18 more subscriptions to the *Shansi Daily* and *Shansi Peasant*, and strict observance of the practice of reading newspapers to the co-op members on the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 13th, 16th, 19th, 23rd, 26th and 29th of each month.

#### A NEW LIFE BEGINS

With the checking over and consolidation completed, not only was the co-operative put on a firmer basis, but 92 households were admitted as new members. Now that the socialist consciousness of all the co-op members was greatly raised, the Party branch again guided them in discussing and



drawing up the co-op's production plan for 1955. It was unanimously agreed that 2,500 cartloads of compost be prepared by decomposing wheat brans and sorghum stalks in the winter, so that in 1955, each *mou* of land would receive three cartloads of manure as a basic amount. In the meantime, the co-op concluded a contract with the local supply and marketing co-op which is to provide it with 10,000 catties of manure, 20,000 catties of cotton-seed cake, 5,000 catties of chemical fertilizer and a double-shared plough, for the winter of 1955 and the spring of 1956. To ensure that its plan to expand production would be carried out, the co-op decided to sell the state 51,700 catties of raw cotton, and 60,000 catties of cotton seeds. Of the proceeds of 47,200 yuan from this sale, 20,000 yuan will be invested in agricultural production, 21,000 yuan distributed to its members, and the remaining 6,200 yuan deposited in the bank. Lu Yueh-hsing and others have voluntarily invested 205 yuan of their savings in the purchase of draught animals, so that now the co-op has 43. At present, a surging winter emulation drive is sweeping the co-operative.

## **A CO-OPERATIVE GROWS STRONG IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CALAMITIES OF NATURE AND CAPITALIST THINKING**

(By the Chiungshan County Committee of the Chinese  
Communist Party, October 10, 1955)

*The experience of the Red Flag Co-op of Hainan Island has again demonstrated the superiority of big and advanced co-operatives. After only one year as an elementary co-op, the Red Flag is preparing to move on to the advanced form.*

*Of course, this is not to say that all co-ops should do likewise. They must first consider whether their conditions are ripe, then decide when it will be best to combine with other co-operatives and form an advanced co-op. Generally speaking, three years from the organization of a co-operative is about right.*

*The important thing is to create examples to show the peasants. When they see that large and advanced co-ops are better than small and elementary co-ops, they will want to combine their co-operatives and organize advanced co-ops.*

—EDITOR

### **I**

The Red Flag Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of the First District, Chiungshan County, Kwangtung Province, is the largest of its kind on Hainan Island. The co-operative consists of 329 households with 1,181 people living in 15

villages. It has 3,842 *mou* of irrigated and non-irrigated land and 3,600 *mou* of hilly slopes. Apart from this, it has 7,000 *mou* of land which has been left unused for years, and about 40,000 *mou* of waste hilly slopes that can be reclaimed and planted to various types of coarse grain and sub-tropical industrial crops.

The Red Flag Co-operative was formed in October 1954 by combining three small co-operatives and drawing in 13 mutual-aid teams and three individual peasant households. It is located in an old revolutionary base where the people, with a comparatively high level of political consciousness, have complete faith in the Party. The Party branch in the co-op (its predecessor was the Tuchiao Township branch) was established thirty years ago, and has ever since remained active through the various periods, leading the peasants in prolonged struggles against both the Kuomintang reactionaries and the Japanese aggressors. The Party branch, with 55 members at present, has always enjoyed great prestige among the people. The co-op has a Youth League branch with 61 members.

The history of the Red Flag Co-operative in the past year has been one of resolute struggle by its members, led by the Party branch, against natural calamities and bourgeois ideology. The experience of this struggle has demonstrated that, once the Party branch really plays its role as a nerve-centre and firmly grasps the two basic tasks of constantly improving its work in giving leadership to the management of production and of strengthening political ideological work, it is absolutely possible to consolidate a large agricultural producers' co-operative, though it may be more difficult than in the case of a smaller one.

## II

The Red Flag Co-operative was established at the time when winter planting began. There was confusion in the

management of production and there were mistaken ideas among its members. In the first place, the members cared very little about the co-op; they were only interested in gaining their own ends at the expense of the co-op. No sooner had the assessment of land, other means of production and labour been completed than Ting Man-ying, a Party member, took his ox which had been assessed by the co-op at 116 yuan to the market and sold it for 120 yuan, thus making an extra four yuan. This aroused great indignation among the other members, as he had not got the consent of the co-op. Some of the members took advantage of the co-op in small matters. Having pooled their cattle in the co-op, they took the halters home and asked for new ones instead. The co-op bought a hundred new halters and all of them were issued in no time. Members living in the villages of Fengya and Taolin put their cow-sheds to other uses after having joined the co-op, leaving the co-op's 40-odd head of cattle without any shelter whatsoever. Farm implements were left here and there, without anyone to look after them. A new improved plough was damaged soon after it was bought. "What is mine is really mine, the co-op's property belongs to a thousand people." This attitude of looking after only one's own interests without any regard for those of the co-op created considerable difficulty in management. Secondly, the members' attitude towards work was far from satisfactory, and labour discipline was slack. When the co-op was first formed, the membership was large and management difficult; while the co-op's officers were as busy as bees, there was utter confusion among the rank and file. Work areas were not clearly defined, and no specific requirements were set for work assigned. The question of establishing a system for checking up on any work done was not properly solved either. To top all this, not much was done to raise the political and ideological level of the members. Lack of discipline and a conservative outlook on the part of the members seriously hampered production. For example, people crowded to the fourth work

area as soon as the gong sounded, while in the third work area, the brigade leader could not find anybody willing enough to do the ploughing. Some of the members devoted their energies to their own subsidiary occupations, while others grumbled about the co-op not buying enough halters. In the second work area, the members would not carry out the assignments given by the management committee of the co-op.

Confronted with these problems, the Party branch adopted two emergency measures. Firstly, it began to educate the members to love the co-op as they love their own homes. While it criticized the errors of Party member Ting Man-ying both within and outside the Party, it praised Mrs. Wu and seven other exemplary members, thereby helping everyone to recognize that it was the right thing to do to love one's co-op as to love one's own home, and that the attitude of "what is mine is really mine, the co-op's property belongs to a thousand people" was erroneous and shameful. The members gradually came to cultivate the collective spirit. Thus ended the first round in the battle which the co-operative launched against bourgeois ideology and the lack of discipline of small peasants. Secondly, work areas were clearly defined, permanent production brigades formed and the system of responsibility introduced. As a result, the confusion prevalent in the early days of the co-op was ended. Immediately after these measures were taken, the Party branch called on all the members to give their heart and soul to the spring ploughing, and it organized Party and Youth League members to lead all the co-op members in intensive spring ploughing.

But, as ill luck would have it, when the ploughing just got under way, Hainan Island was hit by the worst frost in many years (the Island seldom has frost). All the 907 *mou* of sweet potatoes that had just been planted were seriously affected and the young leaves began to wither. Nearly 20,000 catties of early paddy seeds just sown were also affected by

the exceptionally cold weather. Due to the continuing cold spell, grass also withered and fodder became scarce. The life of 650 head of cattle was endangered. In these serious circumstances, the Party branch resolutely led all co-op members in taking immediate action to combat the calamity. For days the members carried water and sprinkled it on the shoots, packed earth near the roots and applied manure. Due to the effectiveness of organized action, most of the sweet potatoes were saved. The early paddy seedlings which could be transplanted to 1,586 *mou* of land regained their normal growth, after the co-op members had watered them and applied ash compost and cattle dung to keep them warm. Hay, which had never before been used to feed cattle, was now used as feed and all the cattle were blanketed with straw. At the same time, cow-sheds were built and all the cattle saved from the cold. (In early 1954, more than 1,000 head of cattle throughout the county died of cold.)

A series of measures for improving farming technique was also adopted by the co-op, centring round close, cluster planting of paddy seedlings. All the co-op's 1,586 *mou* of early paddy were ploughed during the winter. The 19,020 catties of seeds required were carefully selected. The methods of improved seed beds, wide sowing and the cultivation of strong seedlings were adopted, and before the planting fully 800 catties of manure were applied to every *mou* of land as planned. As a result, the seedlings grew sturdy. The co-op also reaped two rice crops from 669 *mou* of land which previously only produced a single crop, thereby increasing the income of the members by one harvest. In the 896 *mou* of transplanted paddy fields, all the seedlings were planted closely in small clusters according to plan. In the past, the peasants had never selected seeds, nor applied any manure, and they did only a bit of rough ploughing. Now all this was changed. In preparation for ploughing, the co-op built 13 lime-lined manure pits with a total capacity of 80,000 catties. (In the past there were no manure pits in these parts.)

The co-op also made 1,560,000 catties of compost from 560 piles of straw, and accumulated 1,430,000 catties of compost from other sources. This completed all the necessary preparations for spring ploughing.

### III

When it was time to transplant the seedlings from the seed beds to the paddy fields during the spring-ploughing season, the entire county was again hit by a natural calamity — this time drought, and the Red Flag Co-operative was among those most seriously affected. The drought lasted for more than eight months during which it rained only twice, and each time the rainfall was scanty. All the paddy fields of the co-op became dry and cracked (some of the fields did not fully recover even by the time of autumn harvesting). The Party branch led all the members in a resolute struggle against the drought. They dug 133 wells and irrigation ditches, and watered the fields day and night. As soon as a plot of land was watered, seedlings were planted and measures taken to ensure their growth. The threat of a crop failure through drought was finally overcome, and the members overfulfilled the plan for the crop area for the first six months of the year. Compared with 1954, the increases in acreage were as follows: paddy, 555 *mou*; groundnuts, 392 *mou*; taro, 105 *mou*; sesame, 32 *mou*. Sugar-canes and drought-resistant crops, such as pumpkins, hairy sweet potatoes and maize, were also planted. When the members of the Red Flag Co-operative fought against drought, they dug a large ditch, 4 miles long, 1 1/3 yards wide and 1 yard deep, for both drainage and irrigation purposes. When this ditch was completed, over 1,000 *mou* of land were brought under irrigation, of which more than 800 *mou* were turned from single to double crop paddy fields. The digging of the ditch was originally scheduled to take ten days, but thorough mobilization work by the Party branch and the Youth League

branch and good organization of labour brought it down to six days only. The ditch was surveyed and planned by the peasants themselves. After its completion, inspection by the water conservancy section of the county government proved that it was in every respect up to standard. The summer harvest showed that, in spite of the serious drought, the paddy yield of the Red Flag Co-operative fell by only 20 per cent, much less than the average decrease suffered by the five other smaller co-operatives in the township which was 35 per cent (the worst being 50 per cent).

The drought which had not abated seriously threatened the summer planting. The Party branch, relying on the experience gained in the spring ploughing and in the fight against drought, led all the co-op members in an even more arduous struggle against the long spell of dry weather, with the Party and Youth League members as the backbone. They widened and deepened the ditches, and irrigated the land. As before, they planted the seedlings as soon as a plot of land was watered, and took proper measures to ensure their growth. In this way they planted more than 3,800 *mou* of late paddy fields in time; they also carried water up the slopes and planted paddy on 1,200 *mou* of hilly land. However, the drought continued for too long a period and the soil had become so hard that the seedlings grew poorly. So the Party branch again led the co-op members in intensive field work. As luck would have it, rain fell at this time, and after some time, the seedlings grew green and healthy. Those planted on the slopes grew better than ever before and an abundant harvest was in sight. On September 25 and 26, however, the Island was struck by a devastating typhoon which continued for two days. The paddy planted on the 1,200 *mou* of slopes was seriously damaged. Although protective and emergency measures were taken both before and after the typhoon (200 *mou* of paddy harvested in great haste and thus saved from destruction), the loss was still very heavy — 50

per cent of the original estimated yield of 120,000 catties were damaged.

The co-op ran into one difficulty after another in its first year, but thanks to the correct leadership of the Party, those difficulties were overcome successively. Although the spring harvest of sweet potatoes had been poor, the early paddy yield reduced by 20 per cent and 60,000 of the estimated 120,000 catties of paddy planted on the hilly slopes lost, the co-op managed to make up for the losses and maintain the annual yield. This was made possible because the Party branch paid especial attention to the most important task of autumn planting, and enlarged the sweet potato area by 1,600 *mou*.

At the same time as struggles were made against natural calamities to increase the output of staple and coarse grains, the Red Flag Co-operative vigorously developed other branches of production to increase the members' income, enable them to tide over the most difficult spring and autumn seasons, and to improve their livelihood. The other co-operatives in Chiungshan County, also hit by the natural calamities, suffered grain shortages in varying degrees. The situation in the Red Flag Co-operative, however, was stable and normal, and every family had enough to eat. During the past year, no one in the co-op bought a single catty of grain from the state or received any relief, and the members were helped to overcome difficulties with income from various types of production. During the year, the co-op earned more than 13,400 yuan from subsidiary occupations alone, more than 6,700 yuan of which were loaned to members who needed help. In the fourth work area which was the poorest, 35 of its 86 households were often short of food before they joined the co-op. But in 1955 they not only had enough to eat, they also had money to buy pork to celebrate festivals. The Red Flag Co-operative not only helped its members overcome their difficulties, it gave help to peasants who had remained outside the co-op. For example, Chin

Hsueh-hai, an individual peasant who had six dependents, had been short of grain since March 1955. For six months, the co-op gave him help to tide over the difficult period. He was so moved and impressed that he has now applied to join the co-op.

The struggle against natural calamities was at the same time a serious ideological struggle within the Party and the co-op. The bourgeois mentality became apparent among the upper middle-peasant members soon after spring ploughing began, and especially during the fight against drought. Fearing that the poorer households would borrow money from the co-op, the upper middle peasants said: "When there is a drought, whoever gets any money owns it." Great efforts were made to combat drought and many work-points were registered. Most of the land the co-op had failed to plant belonged to the poor peasants, so the richer peasants again feared that dividends on land would be cut sharply when the co-op's income was distributed. Those in the ox-cart transport team were especially influenced by bourgeois ideas, for they frequently visited the towns and had dealings with merchants, and they had eyes only for money and the decadent way of life of the merchants. "The money we have earned," they used to say, "has all been eaten up by your work-points." They despised farm work, and when they were out driving the ox-carts, they engaged in business transactions with merchants in the name of the co-op, but actually for their own ends. Some of the members came under their influence and began to have the same mistaken ideas. One of the examples is Lin Chih-tao, a Party member. Before he joined the co-op, he was an ox-cart driver and traded in timber. He led an extravagant life, and he did not change a bit after he joined the co-op. Looking down upon farm work, he just loafed round. The management committee of the co-op gave him work at side occupations which would bring 9 work-points a day and a cash subsidy of forty *fen*. But he was not satisfied and complained that he did not have

enough money to buy tea and meat, and he said that he would quit if he were not given a subsidy of ninety *fen* a day. Seriously influenced by bourgeois ideology, he refused to sell the firewood gathered by the co-op members as a side occupation to the state company or the supply and marketing co-operative. Instead, he sold large quantities of firewood to merchants on credit and made money for himself. Besides, he often engaged in private trade for personal gains. The Party branch held him up as an example for open criticism, and led all the members of the co-op to discuss the two roads open to the peasants.

The political consciousness of the members was greatly enhanced and they all rejected the capitalist road. The criticism and discussion served as a profound lesson in socialist consciousness for the members.

After the onset of natural calamities, the conditions for production in the various work areas of the large co-op differed greatly. The first work area was able to increase its output because it had access to convenient sources of water, while the yield of the fourth work area fell because it had no such facilities. As a result, members of the first work area, especially Party and Youth League members, harboured the extremely wrong idea of dividing up the co-op. This caused mutual distrust between members of different work areas. For instance, members of the first work area complained that those in the fourth work area had not worked hard enough, but shared the fruit of their labour, while members of the fourth work area were afraid that those in the first work area would receive more than their due. Because of this, 39 households insisted on withdrawing from the co-op. These erroneous ideas were also reflected in the Party. The disunity among members of the Party branch was largely due to the lack of confidence of some Party members in the practicability of large co-ops. The Party branch promptly called a meeting, which Youth League members were also invited to attend, to study the spirit of

the resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party. The question of disunity within the Party was properly dealt with. The meeting criticized Party members Chou Hsueh-cheng and Ting Yu-ning, who had become arrogant because of their achievements and created disunity within the Party. The political consciousness of both Party and Youth League members was greatly enhanced. Meanwhile, members of the co-op were organized to study the co-op regulations. The co-op's achievements since its expansion were summed up and everyone was convinced of the excellence of large co-ops. This helped instil a collective spirit in the members and helped them understand better the future of the co-op. Discussions were held and more than 70 exemplary members were commended. All this served to enhance the confidence and determination of the leaders and members in running a large co-op. The question of unity and mutual benefit between middle and poor peasants, which was one of the main problems in the co-op, was also solved. Financial management was improved and leadership strengthened, and three counter-revolutionaries who had hidden themselves in the co-op were expelled. Since the political consciousness of the members had risen considerably, the 39 households that had insisted on withdrawing remained in the co-op. This was the second round in the battle against bourgeois ideology after the founding of the co-op.

The co-op was greatly consolidated after these two shake-ups and ideological battles, and this made it possible for the co-op to overcome difficulties caused by the drought and the typhoon.

#### IV

In the struggles to consolidate the co-op, the Party branch of the Red Flag Co-operative also paid attention to the following important aspects of work:

First, it gave full recognition to the importance of general education and cultural life for the co-op members. Through

the medium of cultural activities, it constantly gave political education to the members. The co-op set up a club, organized an amateur dramatic group and established nine adult schools which gave lessons in the evening. More than 260 members attended these evening classes, most of them were young people. All these schools had a newspaper reading group, and the "Peasant Paper" was regularly used as material for political education. Over the past year, more than one hundred co-op members have learned to register work-points, eighty have learned to read newspapers and more than seventy have become literate. Illiteracy was wiped out entirely among the young members. In addition, the Party branch ran a miniature paper called *Life of the Co-op Members* with no fixed publication dates. This paper enabled the members living in the various villages to understand the situation of the co-op in time, and made it possible for them to exchange experience in production.

Secondly, it not only paid attention to the over-all and regular education of the members, but also utilized every possible opportunity to carry on political and ideological work among them. For example, it regularly conducted propaganda activities through the blackboard news, broadcasts and the local drama. To cite another example, it called a meeting to celebrate the completion of the big irrigation ditch from Tanwenkou to Pohouchiao, during which a group of co-op members were awarded and commended as the "model group" in ditch digging and another as a "team of heroes" in water conservancy work. Eighty-one model members were also given citation. After the completion of every major kind of agricultural work (i.e. after spring ploughing and summer harvesting, and after preparations for autumn harvesting were made), experiences were summed up and this was a most vivid and effective means of giving education to the members.

Thirdly, special meetings were called to discuss the agricultural work for the season. Through these meetings concrete leadership was given. In the past year, the Party

branch called special meetings of stockmen, technicians, book-keepers and members engaged in specific side occupations to discuss and check up on various types of work. Experiences were summed up, work systems established, and division of labour and responsibilities clearly defined. Thus, serious problems in management and production were systematically and quickly solved. For example, when the county was hit by frost, a special meeting of stockmen was called to discuss the ways and means of keeping the cattle fit for spring ploughing. After the meeting, all the cattle were blanketed with straw, and cow-sheds were built so that they could survive the winter. When spring ploughing began, a special meeting on financial work was called to clear the work-point account accumulated since the expansion of the co-op. Members were called on to discuss the question and a set of rules was drawn up. At the same time, the various departments in the co-op signed contracts with five other agricultural co-operatives in the township to learn from each other. This established connections between corresponding functionaries in the various co-ops. Book-keepers from the various co-ops were thus enabled to learn from one another. The book-keeper of the No. 6 Co-operative of Tuchiao Township, who did not know much about book-keeping before, learned to do so in a very short time.

Fourthly, the Party branch, in giving guidance to the Youth League, has succeeded in knitting together the Youth League members into a shock brigade, and has enabled them to display a high degree of initiative and creativeness in combating natural calamities, in technical reforms and in labour emulation. After spring ploughing began, the Youth League branch, under the direct leadership of the Party branch, organized 13 youth shock brigades and 8 technical study groups, with 61 Youth League members as the backbone and rallying 118 young members round them. Day and night, the shock brigades battled against natural calamities; wherever difficulties arose, they were on hand to tackle them. For

example, when the big ditch from Tanwenkou to Pohouchiao was being dug at a quickened pace, all the 13 brigades were thrown into the work, and the ditch was completed in six days, which was four days ahead of schedule. The shock brigades were also vanguards in the ten-day spring ploughing emulation, the four-day emulation to accumulate manure and the seven-day voluntary labour campaign. In technical reforms, too, the young people were extremely keen and active. For example, they led the way in winter ploughing, in selecting seeds, and in adopting new methods in close, cluster planting of paddy seedlings and in preparing compost from straw, in the work on high-yield plots of land and in the construction of threshing floors. Their exemplary action greatly expedited the introduction of technical reforms in the co-op.

The consolidation of the Red Flag Co-operative was, of course, inseparably linked with the help and support given by the Party and the government which gave not only political leadership and encouragement but also material and technical aid to the members of the co-op. In 1955, the government loaned a total of 14,000 yuan to the co-op and over 3,700 yuan to poor peasant members for the payment of membership dues. The supply and marketing co-op signed advance purchases and sales contracts with the Red Flag Co-operative. One of the important factors which helped to consolidate the Red Flag Co-operative was that the government established a provincial demonstration station in its vicinity and this station gave the co-op invaluable technical assistance.

The Red Flag Co-operative has been consolidated, in the past year, through struggles against natural calamities and bourgeois ideology. Members of the co-op have been convinced that only by taking the co-operative road and by collective efforts can it be possible to overcome the hazards of nature, increase crop yield and improve their livelihood. Their socialist consciousness has been greatly enhanced. The

Party branch has also, over the past twelve months, gained experience in running large co-ops. Recently the request that the co-op be developed into a collective farm has been approved, and the Red Flag Co-operative will become the first collective farm on Hainan Island. This joyful news has greatly heartened all the members. "Socialism has come," they all said. They have pledged themselves to carry out the autumn harvesting well, to enlarge the area of autumn and winter planting, to devote themselves heart and soul to their work and to make everything ready for the establishment of the collective farm after autumn harvesting and the general summing-up. With the help of the provincial demonstration station, the Red Flag Co-operative has already drawn up a comprehensive production plan covering the last quarter of 1955 and the years 1956 and 1957. This plan ensures a bright future for all the members of the co-op.



## POLITICAL WORK IN THE CO-OPS

(By the Publicity Department of the Suiyang County Committee, Chinese Communist Party, in the *Work in Kweichow*, issue No. 61, November 10, 1954)

*This article is very well written. It deserves to be recommended to all Party and Youth League committees on a county and district level, and to all township branches. All co-operatives should follow the example it describes. The writer understands the Party line and speaks directly to the point. He expresses himself well, too. You know what he means at a glance and his article is free of Party jargon.*

*In this regard, we should like to call the reader's attention to the fact that many comrades are extremely fond of using Party jargon in their articles. Their writing is neither vivid nor graphic. It gives you a headache to read it. They care little for grammar or phrasing, preferring something which is a cross between the literary and the colloquial. Here garrulous and repetitive, there archaically cryptic, it is as if they were deliberately trying to make their readers suffer. Of the more than 170 articles in this book, quite a few are heavy with Party jargon. Only after several revisions could they be made fairly readable. Even so, some are still obscure, clumsy and difficult to understand. They would not have been included were it not for the importance of their content. How many years will it be before we see a*

*little less of that Party jargon which gives us such a headache?*

*The comrades who edit our newspapers and periodicals must pay attention to this question. They should demand of the writers articles that are vivid, clear and well put together. Moreover, they should personally help the writers with revisions.*

— EDITOR

In the spring of 1954, three farming co-operatives—Chenkuang, Nungyuan and Yangchiachai—were formed in Kuangta Township of Suiyang County in Kweichow Province. Our Party spared no effort to give them political and ideological leadership at the time when it was needed, and all three co-ops put in nearly a year's intensive work on their farms, finishing up in the autumn with the distribution of the year's harvest. As a result, they find they have made considerable headway and are now on a firm footing. They have created a good impression among the peasants outside the co-ops, who say, "The co-ops do better than us in every way!" These co-ops are really showing the local peasants what co-operation can do. After the year's harvest was distributed in autumn, 14 households joined one or other of the three co-ops. At present, the township has nine farming co-ops; another three are being formed and more will come later. Ninety-three per cent of the peasant households in the township now belong to co-ops or mutual-aid teams, as against only 70 per cent in the winter of 1953.

How did the management committees of these three co-ops carry out their political work?

1) They helped the government personnel sent to assist them and their own committee members to understand the importance of political and ideological education. In the early days of the co-ops, neither the committee members nor government personnel had a correct understanding of this

question. Some of them thought that once the co-op members had been mobilized, everything would be all right. Others said that their time was so taken up in directing the day-to-day work of the farm that they had none to spare for political work. Still others thought of political and ideological education solely in terms of political lectures and the study of political textbooks. Because they neglected political work, the management committees ran into serious difficulties in the work even before spring ploughing. Labour power was poorly organized. People were left idle and the field work was not done well. Later on, the Communist Party county committee pointed out that the management committees should conduct political and ideological education among their members, and link it to their day-to-day work. The leading members of the management committees then went into the problems of the co-ops and their causes at meetings of the Party and the Youth League branches and at management committee meetings, and enabled the government personnel and management committee members to study relevant material. In this way, they all came to understand that the transformation of agriculture along socialist lines is a complicated job. They realized that if they were to guide their members along the road to socialism, it was fairly useless to rely on mere administrative and arbitrary measures alone, in place of painstaking political work; they would have to give consistent socialist education on the basis of the actual problems confronting the members. As expressed by Chen Tien-tsai, a Communist and vice-chairman of the Chenkuang Co-operative, after he had changed his attitude towards political work: "I imagined that as the political consciousness of our members was high, there would be no serious problems. Now I see that to develop a co-op and put it on a firm footing is no simple job." Chen Teh-yun, another Communist in the same co-op, used to be too hasty toward others. With the Party's help he came to see his mistake, and when he came

to mobilize the women members to take part in the spring ploughing, his patience was unending.

2) They enlisted the full help of the Party branch for their political work. There was a Party group in the Chenkuang Co-operative. Being very few in number, the Communists in the Nungyuan and the Yangchiachai Co-operatives formed a combined group. There was a Youth League branch in each of these three co-ops. Guided by the Party branch of the township, political work was conducted among the members of these three co-ops through both the Youth League branches and the management committees with the Party groups as the core. In the Chenkuang Co-operative, for instance, of the four Communists, the co-op vice-chairman Chen Tien-tsai was given the task of leading the political work and work among young people and women members; the other three Party members, apart from leading the routine work of the farm or taking charge of financial affairs, were asked to pay constant attention to familiarizing themselves with the views and worries of all the co-op members, including those on the management committee. Both the Nungyuan and the Yangchiachai Co-ops did rather well in enlisting the help of the Youth League. For example, whenever the Party branch gave him a task, Vice-Chairman Chu Hua-chung of the Nungyuan Co-operative, a Communist, always discussed it first with the Youth League members and reported to them at a Youth League branch meeting. This enabled every one of them to take the initiative seeing the task through. The Youth League branches of the three co-ops gave each of their members the task of keeping in close touch with a definite number of co-op households in the course of their daily farm work. In this way they could discover in good time what were the worries or mistaken views that dampened people's enthusiasm, and so help the Party conduct political work.

All three co-ops paid attention to political education among the more active members outside the Party and the Youth League. They did this in the following ways:

a) Organized periodical study courses for these people to give them basic information about the Party and communism, to help them gain a better understanding of the Party and see clearly the target for which they were doing and work with ever greater enthusiasm.

b) Helped them to understand the general trend of social developments and the benefits socialism would bring to them so that they could cultivate a sincere love for socialism. In analysing typical examples of correct and incorrect views among the members, they learned to distinguish between right and wrong and between socialism and capitalism. Moreover, constant attention was paid to recruiting into the Party or Youth League those co-op members who distinguished themselves in the day-to-day work of the farm. During the past six months or more, in the three co-ops, three members have been admitted into the Party, and five into the Youth League. This has had a tremendous effect in encouraging other active people.

3) Because the leading members of the committees knew what was on people's minds, and what they were thinking, they were able to take up their problems and deal with them in a flexible way, taking all the circumstances into account in every instance. Agricultural co-operation is rather new to the peasants, so it is only natural that they are faced with various worries even after they have joined the co-ops. Some joined with the idea of seeing what came of it, others simply drifted in with the general current. As soon as they started in on the work of the farm, however, it was fairly usual for the newer members to begin worrying for fear they would earn less than when they worked on their own. Therefore, they cared more for the work-points they would get, than the way the work was done. As a result, their work was very sloppy. To change this situation,

an educational campaign was launched in the co-operatives to promote respect for collective interests. It was made clear to the members that "if the lake goes empty, its outlets will be dry too." As part of this campaign, members who took good care of the collective interests were publicly commended. Gradually the members came to see that their personal interests linked with those of the co-op as a whole and the quality of the work improved accordingly. The experience of the three co-ops shows that, to reach this situation, the Party must first train its own members and members of the Youth League to keep in constant touch with all other members of the co-op so that they may become familiar with their views and worries. When a new lot of work has to be planned, they can then look into problems likely to arise. In this way, the Party will be able to anticipate many of the problems and take the initiative in political work.

4) Political and ideological education must be carried out in a living and fresh way. The management committees must therefore regularly sum up the results of the work on the farm and review their own work. In doing this, they must recognize the achievements, no matter how small; for in this way they can give the members constant help in raising their political consciousness, and strengthen their determination and confidence to follow the socialist path. This was done by the three co-ops in the following ways:

(1) They made their summings-up immediately after each stage in the farm work. In these summings-up, they showed the superiority of co-operatives over individual farming, and taught the members to care for collective interests. This reinforced their determination to follow the road of co-operation.

(2) In summing up the help given by the state to the co-ops, they showed the members that the Party and government gave great support to the co-ops because they wanted to help all the peasants take the road to co-operation, the road to common prosperity. They also explained

to the members what advantages the national construction would bring them, so as to enhance their patriotism. As a result of such education, all three co-ops set an outstanding example in selling grain to the state after the autumn harvest. Altogether they sold the state 86,000 catties of surplus grain, more than a sixth of the total amount sold to the state by the whole township.

(3) Through summing up the increase in output resulting from the use of chemical fertilizers, improved farm implements, insecticides and sprayers, they conducted education on the worker-peasant alliance. This helped the members understand the close ties between the workers and peasants and between industry and agriculture, and stimulated their desire to improve production so as to help industrial construction.

(4) By citing and analysing examples of members who pursued their personal interests at the expense of collective interests and examples of members who protected public interests, they compared the two different roads for the peasants—the old road leading to capitalism and the new road to socialism—and gave the members a deeper understanding of the Party's policy for the period of transition to socialism. Thus the members became able to judge which of these two attitudes in dealing with personal and public interests was correct and which incorrect and to distinguish clearly between bourgeois and socialist ideas.

(5) Other methods they used were: (a) Political education through the to-and-fro of discussions on the summing up of farm work between the committees and the rank-and-file members. (b) The management committee assigned every one of its members to exchange views with a particular co-op member, in order to settle his worries or correct his mistaken ideas. (c) They publicized good examples for all to follow, by publicly commending outstanding members and their accomplishments, regularly electing model units and model co-op members and giving

them prizes and commendation. In the spring and after farm work was completed in the autumn, all three co-ops elected their model members and units. This greatly stimulated the members' enthusiasm towards production and raised their political consciousness. The criteria used to choose the models were: love of country, concern for the co-operative, protection of public property, keenness for work, outstanding achievements in work. At the same time, the erroneous ideas and actions of some members were suitably criticized. (d) They organized regular study courses, the content of which was decided upon according to the existing ideological problems among the members.

These co-ops had certain shortcomings, however, in guiding political and ideological education. Sometimes the political work was not carried out regularly. Not enough attention was paid to recruiting new members into the Party and Youth League, which at present are too small. Moreover, there was one-sidedness in educating the members on the importance of improving farming methods: they popularized better ways of selecting seed and planting rice, which was of course necessary, but neglected to stress the value of improved farm tools. The Chenkuang Co-operative, for instance, left two new-style ploughs lying idle for a whole year. One co-op gave too little attention to educating its members in their responsibilities towards society as a whole.