[MC5 comments: Below I have collected quotes from Leon Trotsky on "war communism" and attached the sources from marxists.org. If we keep in mind Trotsky's particular rhetorical style, especially if we substitute the word "communism" wherever he says "socialism," because remember, he does not believe in "socialism in one country," then we can see where Progressive Labor Party obtained its ideas (supposedly new) about "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "communist" economic production relations that it talks about in "Road to Revolution." It's as if PLP read Trotsky's description of war communism and became even more enthusiastic than Trotsky was about it. Trotsky admitted that Lenin accused him of an excessive preoccupation with "war communism" methods, but Trotsky also claims that Molotov sought to scheme with Stalin and Zinoviev against him by exaggerating the question. Later in life, he tried to claim that his ideas for NEP should have been adopted in 1920 and not 1923 as decided by Lenin and that his ideas of agricultural collectivization should have been adopted before Stalin carried out collectivization. In any case, Trotsky admitted he became for a while the greatest defender of war communism, relatively speaking. The fact that PLP's most basic ideas on united front and socialist revolution come from Trotsky does not prove that they are wrong, only that PLP is confused and that someone is probably not honest in revealing who deserves credit for their ideas. The keys to the PLP line are here: use of force and administrative measures politically and equal wages and rations economically.] To define War Communism, three questions are most pertinent: How were the food supplies obtained? How were they apportioned? How was the operation of state industries regulated? The Soviet power did not meet up with free trade in bread grains but with a monopoly resting on the old commercial apparatus. The civil war shattered this apparatus. Nothing remained for the workers’ state except to improvise hastily a substitute state apparatus for siphoning the grain from the peasants and concentrating the supply in its own hands, Provisions were distributed virtually without regard to labour productivity. . . . This was achieved by fixed food rations. Both the confiscation of grain surpluses from the peasants and the apportioning of rations were essentially measures of a beleaguered fortress and not of socialist economy. The bourgeois apparatus of economic management was destroyed not only on a national scale but within each individual enterprise. Hence arose the elementary burning task: to create a substitute apparatus, even if only a crude and temporary one, in order to extract from our chaotic industrial heritage the most indispensable supplies. . . . The policy of paying equal wages. . . . You might ask whether we had expected to make the transition from War Communism to socialism without making major economic turns, without experiencing convulsions, without executing retreats, i.e., effecting the transition more or less along a steadily rising curve. Yes, it is true that at this period we did actually think that the revolutionary development in Western Europe would proceed more swiftly. http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1924/ffyci-2/20.htm When the change to the market system was rejected, I demanded that the “war” methods be applied properly and with system, so that real economic improvements could be obtained. [Bold-face mine--MC5. This is the entirety of the PLP line, that the war communism model was not pushed hard enough. It comes right from Trotsky.] In the system of war communism in which all the resources are, at least in principle, nationalized and distributed by government order, I saw no independent role for trades-unions. If industry rests on the state’s insuring the supply of all the necessary products to the workers, the trades-unions must be included in the system of the state’s administration of industry and distribution of products. This was the real substance of the question of making the trades-unions part of the state organizations, a measure which flowed inexorably from the system of war communism, and it was in this sense that I defended it. The principles of war communism approved by the ninth congress were the basis of my work in the organization of transport. The trade-union of railway men was closely bound to the administrative machinery of the department. The methods of military discipline were extended to the entire transport system. I brought the military administration, the strongest and best disciplined at that time, into close connection with the transport administration. This yielded certain important advantages, especially since military transport again assumed first importance with the beginning of war with Poland. Every day I went from the war commissariat, whose operations destroyed the railways, to the commissariat of transport, where I tried not only to save the railways from final collapse, but to raise them to a higher level of efficiency. http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1930-lif/ch38.htm