This is an archive of the former website of the Maoist Internationalist Movement, which was run by the now defunct Maoist Internationalist Party - Amerika. The MIM now consists of many independent cells, many of which have their own indendendent organs both online and off. MIM(Prisons) serves these documents as a service to and reference for the anti-imperialist movement worldwide.
Maoist Internationalist Movement

Second-guessing MIM on the Peruvian anti-police struggle in France, 1993-

October 14 2006

Two days ago, MIM received a criticism for "hegemonism" for attacking SARBEDARAN, an organization that turned its knife in the back of the Peruvian People's War on behalf of The Man in the aftermath of the Gonzalo arrest. What an irony, MIM accused of "hegemonism," against SARBEDARAN, to which MIM is tempted to say, "if only." This is the second time that MIM has gone into the issue of trying to second-guess what MIM did in the peace accords struggle for Peru.

It's quite a picture these people must have to come up with something like MIM "hegemonism." It's obvious anarchism, at best, identity politics in the middling case and CIA tactics at the worst. MIM has no state power to "dictate" to SARBEDARAN. Quite the contrary, it is SARBEDARAN allying with U.$. imperialist state power and trying to dictate to the international communist movement. When Mao criticized Euro-Communists for dictating to the Third World, those Euro-Communists were in Parliament and even voted against decolonizing Algeria for example. MIM is no where close to having the kind of powers that Euro-Communists had. Nor is MIM trying to by-pass an actual revolutionary movement in Iran, just some traitors with a record of stabbing People's War in the back. In contrast, the people our critics are defending have gone so far as to pose as Peruvians at crucial moments to assume leadership roles and by-pass the PCP. PCP has to take some of the blame for that for never clearly stating its view of the one international party idea that was originally the Comintern. Quite the contrary, PCP was in bed with those who believe Mao's criticisms of the Comintern were "exaggerated." Even when the PCP issued its Central Committee criticism of the RCP=CIA on this topic, it did not go far enough into what is permissible and not permissible in international relations among parties.

MIM is not here posing as Iranian leaders of People's War. For that matter, there is no Iranian People's War; although there is a Kurdish question. The resolution for disbanding the RIM is signed by everybody in their own names and no outrageous claims have been made for those signatories. MIM's regrets or second-guessing about the Peru peace accords plots stem from different directions than its own "hegemonism."

Right from the beginning of the struggle after Gonzalo's arrest, MIM said, "Gonzalo Thought is free." Eventually we took back part of a relevant article along those lines when we learned that there was dissension. As it turns out, there was a major shortage of Peruvians who wanted to disassociate Gonzalo the man from Gonzalo's thought and this was largely connected up with the partially correct thrust of wanting to fight for him in prison. More than one international Maoist party stood for Peruvians to get their leader back by revolutionary means, and if not to keep building for the day when they could. All the focus on Gonzalo in prison kept the focus in the wrong place. In France and the united $tates we could do petitions or public events, but participants of that struggle said the principal contradiction for the whole world was to get Gonzalo out of prison and they did not stress revolutionary means. It was an attempt to transfer the situation where Mao said "we have nothing" in the imperialist countries to the whole world where People's Liberation Armies were a possibility. So this publicity effort centered around Western Europe led naturally into the peace accords direction, especially if anyone in Peru mechanically copied what they saw abroad.

MIM has talked about this before and the question of persynality cults and why historical idealism has a progressive role to play in countries where semi- feudalism dominates. MIM does not tolerate it in the imperialist countries. We once had a comrade leader pretend to have bird poop on her shoulder to get out of one situation of adulation and have people "get real."

Even from an international perspective, why do the imperialist countries have to generate anymore pressure for persynality cults than already exists in countries needing bourgeois stages of revolution? One interesting thing is that the Turkish comrades sent MIM a redone graphic taking Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao out of the sky with Kaypakkaya. For one it lead to questions about what relative roles the five had versus the one, but also, Marx, Engels and Lenin opposed persynality cults.

There is no denying that the Lin Biao disaster in China deflated many of the historical idealists fighting on the proletarian side and that turned out to be the politically decisive moment when Zhou Enlai engineered a comeback for Deng Xiaoping. It was not that the enemy waged a successful military or economic battle suddenly. What happened was that Mao appeared fallible, because his anointed successor failed. For the long run thinking processes of Chinese, it was even a good thing, but for the short run it meant the bourgeoisie in the party had free reign and the whole proletarian side was "depressed," perhaps for the first time for some. MIM and others have done an in-depth study of the Lin Biao deflation in direct discussion with Chinese masses. We must not assume that with China's great socialist construction and socialist education from 1949 to 1976, there was no metaphysics. Quite the contrary, metaphysics was to be found at all levels of society. If Nepal, India, Turkey or the Philippines ever get to socialism, we suspect there may be similar pressures. It does not mean we have to become Trotskyists and write off what can be done with peasants, but we have to be aware that even bourgeois people in such a society are from a society of peasants. No one escapes completely.

Gonzalo was the favorite among oppressed Peruvians in a way that is hard to imagine in the West. When Peruvians turned to their international news, they found Bob Afakean. The positive effect of the Bob Afakean cult was to rally any mechanical historical idealists to Gonzalo. They simply copied what they saw in the Afakean cult and so would think nothing unusual about it. In the same way, people who are mechanical come to the united $tates and assume there are Euro- Amerikan peasants and exploited workers.

MIM is gratified to know that there were Peruvians (not just in exile) who knew about MIM and saw an example of totally anonymous leadership, even before the arrest of Gonzalo. There was no argument from authority with MIM.

The trouble came when Gonzalo landed in prison. Peruvians did not know much about the example in the Philippines. When they looked at the united $tates, they saw Afakean staying as leader despite being in long-term so-called exile. The same is true of Marx and Lenin: they appeared to have to move around a lot. So it would be like seeing your mother, grandmothers and great-grandmothers from arranged marriage and then thinking it was normal for you too. Top leaders stayed leaders perhaps when they should not have.

Top party leaders in Third World countries should be deflated all the time. There should be no historical idealists among leaders. Along these lines, exposure to MIM would be good for party leaders in the Third World. Whether the party leaders in the semi-feudal countries have to rally historical idealists, the answer is yes, but MIM is not saying how. In the imperialist countries there is no positive role for rallying people to a party with historical idealism. They should be rallied to mass organizations with bourgeois idealism.

In a criticism, the revolutionary camp told MIM we should not have taken back what we said about "Gonzalo Thought is free" in our 1994 self-criticism. Peruvians initially took underlying Comintern issues as formalities, without saying so. We at MIM prioritized fight against Cominternism, but the Peruvians at the time prioritized timing issues, and thought MIM's self-criticism meant there was some kind of factional activity to be afraid of.

MIM emphasized that it was up to the Peruvians--just as our supposed anti- hegemonists say now--and our revolutionary camp friends said we were wrong for being that anti-hegemonist. In 2006, again SARBEDARAN is playing some counterrevolutionary role, but we do not say it is up to the Iranians this time around. It is up to the truly exploited and oppressed Iranians, not some U.$. lackeys.

MIM and the Peruvians fought over various issues, prior to Gonzalo's arrest, but we never had the all-out struggle over the question of Comintern organization. In retrospect, we should have, but it was not in the repertoire of things PCP talked about directly except for "red fraction" until the "New Flag" controversy forced the issue out.

An all-out battle over the Comintern issue prior to 1992 might have hurt feelings, but MIM would have been in a position to be more assertive after the arrest of Gonzalo had we had the struggle. We would have known what the Peruvians were trying to do by criticizing RCP=U$A while staying in the same association with them. What was especially vexing was how they criticized us for colluding with RCP=u$a when we were not the ones with ties to them! Did they think about how that would look to any Maoists outside RIM?

If the Peruvians had Comintern centralism, then MIM should think twice about asking them to disrupt it is how we came to see it. Also the idea of distributing El Diario Internacional might have been under a Comintern-style centralism so how does it help for MIM to advocate disruption of centralism in that situation; (although it was going to be disrupted one way or another). If one thinks about how a peace accords plot comes down in a situation like that, one can see that it would have been better to be real clear about what central discipline really was. In other articles, MIM criticized the lack of "real time."

Criticisms of MIM regarding SARBEDARAN show that there is no winning. On the one side we have the Liberal post-modernist youth plus experienced CIA vets telling us to watch hegemonism even when SARBEDARAN is undertaking open counterrevolution. On the other hand, the actual criticism at the time was something New Flag might have picked up from the revolutionary camp, which was that MIM was "colluding" with RCP=CIA.

People were wondering why we did not move to elbow RCP=CIA into the oblivion it deserved. When we did not do that, some might have come to the conclusion that RCP=CIA and MIM must both be CIA, that CIA was playing "both sides" and taking no chances. We can see how some reasonable people looking at the situation would think, "gee here is MIM's chance to really separate itself from the pack, now that Gonzalo has been arrested." A bit cynical of course, however, it is logical if you are trying to uncover a police plot among exiles. You expect MIM to act in sectarian fashion and then it doesn't, so then you wonder if MIM is in on the plot. That's good reasoning, and MIM believes that the enemy did play both sides of the peace accords issue for reasons of intelligence-gathering. The objective was to support the peace accords side and keep an eye on the revolutionary side.

Something we have been telling people is that lately MIM is dealing with infiltration. So here is a situation where Gonzalo has been arrested by ordinary police infiltration, not a major battle. One of the most likely places to look for spies would be the RCP=u$a. Then when you cannot force MIM to stand sufficiently differently than RCP=U$A, you start to doubt MIM too. There's actually good "logic of the struggle" political security in that thinking.

It's important that in a situation like that, one show in action where one stands and part of that was the Peruvians themselves even showing MIM where they stand. Likewise, MIM is showing very stoutly where it is standing on Iran and we hope to cut down the process of forming a revolutionary camp to an even shorter length of time than in 1993's split. Even if no Iranian Maoist Party develops, this is crucial for all countries facing the exact same circumstances, the Islamic countries.

One point where people could second-guess or criticize MIM on the Peru-related struggle of 1993 onwards is on the question of nationalism vs. hegemonism. MIM tended to see PCP as "colluding" with RCP=U$A. We were justified especially in reference to publicity in the united $tates-- perhaps our national focus. If some thought of MIM as "colluding" with RCP=U$A on Peru issues, then that could be in reference to the aftermath of Gonzalo's arrest. So if nationalism causes one to focus on one's local issues, then MIM would tend to see PCP as colluding with RCP=CIA and if the revolutionary camp of Peruvians looked at MIM colluding with RCP=CIA it would be based on prioritizing other issues.

MIM did not play an immediate and direct role in overthrowing the pro-peace accords faction in exile. We just kept publishing and distributing our paper. In actual fact, we always leaned to the revolutionary camp, but it had reasons to fear in regard to that, especially since obviously with infiltrators the whole question is one of double-dealing. MIM is not double-dealing on Iran today. It has already established that it will break relations with anyone on the wrong side.

Back in the peace accords struggle, we also told the revolutionary camp point-blank many times that "it was up to Peruvians." This can come off as right opportunist. Was MIM implying that a Peruvian for peace accords in France was worth a shit? Who was worth a shit if it was "up to Peruvians"? Was it up to Fujimori? In 2006, another train of thought that occurs to me trying to stand in others' shoes is that when MIM said "up to Peruvians," was that a veiled threat to go to the peace accords camp (especially given that the revolutionary camp would probably know about erratic behavior toward us in France based on procedure at the time). What we would like to draw out for today's readers is that a lot of time can be lost in this sort of thing and we need to recognize that some formulations really don't work as well as they sound. "Up to them" is one of those formulations that can only go so far. It has to be kept within limits. In our defense, MIM never threatened to go to the peace accords camp if our demands were not met. This left the peace accords camp in the state it is today--still paying homage to RIM. On the other hand, we can still second-guess us and wonder if MIM could have sped things up by seeing it the Peruvians' way, which was basically not seeing a Comintern or Avakian leadership issue and acting as if they did not exist despite formal appearances otherwise. Before the peace accords plot and after, the vexing thing was how Peruvians criticized the RCP=CIA while still staying attached to it in name through the RIM.

In actual fact, people need to understand that MIM chose the revolutionary camp over the peace accords camp. That sounds simple, but it is not especially at first when no one trusts anyone else and there is obvious double-dealing going on. By appearances, identity and formality, MIM would have chosen the peace accords camp. Instead, what we need to realize is that there is "diversity" in the Third World and we should support the revolutionaries. For us it was relatively easy, a nice clean-cut choice eventually. It was only at first when everyone was wondering who was going to turn out how. It's a two-way street, because MIM also does not know how various Peruvians are really going to turn out.

In retrospect, it is possible that some others were over-reading MIM tea leaves. There was some highly erratic behavior toward MIM in France, including naming MIM the vanguard of the united $tates (something we did not publicize) and then a few months later slamming the door in our faces: "you've got to be joking." Despite this, people were hyping suspicions and thinking we were dealing with a peace accords Peruvian in France. In 2006, we can see only two bases for that--our self-criticism and one article where we criticized the ultraleft in 1994. That criticism of the ultra-left did not come from the PCP. It was ours, and who knows, this may have given the SIN the idea that it could come out and attack revolutionaries in exile. People who have given blood to struggle and are experienced in dealing with police plots study each word much more carefully than our TV clicker zombies in the imperialist countries.

At the time of vacillations in France, MIM interpreted it as the PCP being PCP, but in actuality it may have stemmed from a plot whereby the peace accords exiles crossed a threshold at which they felt free to jump out. MIM tried to find the exact logic of vacillations in France in timing but our study a few years after could not detect it exactly. We still see some deal made with RCP=CIA which caused the peace accords faction the confidence to jump out and dump its previous statements about MIM, but we did not say that to anyone. Going into 1996, there continued to be allusions to MIM as having some deal with France, but again the timing of the discussion was wrong. If there would have been some such deal it would have been before the big exile split. In retrospect, perhaps tea leaves readers were jockeying for an impending split, but how it looked to MIM is that we never got what we wanted from France and we were unable to understand the actual driving force in France's vacillations. Had we known what was going to develop, we might have aimed at a broader investigation at that moment. Even the revolutionary camp had to be supported just on a Peru basis. That is probably how everything had to be uncomplicated. To some extent, MIM entered Peruvians' shoes politically.

In October 1992, we said, "Now more than ever, after the capture of Comrade Gonzalo-Chairperson of the Communist Party of Peru- the bourgeois media will bombard us with lies and distortions about this hemisphere's shining star." In MIM Notes 69, we tried to piece together who captured Gonzalo. However, it may have been disinformation, coming from the bourgeois media as it did. It was issue number 70 for November, 1992 where MIM launched an attack on metaphysics regarding Gonzalo, because "Gonzalo Thought is free." We specifically disowned the perynality cult yet again. People who read MIM literature carefully going back to the early 1980s know that we attacked the persynality cult from the beginning. We did so again in our RCP Study Pack. In January, 1993 we reported that armed attacks were still ongoing in the People's War. In February 1993, we were still pushing the persist line. In 2006, we would say that www.redsun.org's line is still not as advanced as what MIM was saying in 1993 (never mind what Peruvians were saying) and it's time to recognize it's not going to change.

In December, 1993, MIM printed from El Diario Internacional. In issue 82, November, 1993, MIM called the peace accords "tricks." In MIM Notes 84 January 1994 we wrote a self-criticism which in turn generated criticism that may have lasted another two years.

The self-criticism was correct that our initial report based on two weeks of bourgeois news was based on just that--bourgeois news. We had not heard from anyone that mattered. Looking at this self-criticism that MC5 was decisive in pushing, the thing that really stands out is that we supported the leadership of the PCP under Chairpersyn Gonzalo; even though he was in prison, contrary to previous articles that all stressed the masses make history and will find new leaders.

We never used that phrase before in relation to someone in prison. That was very sloppy and having just noticed it in 2006, we don't know how it got in there. We do have MC5's self-criticism in relation to this problem. We do know that MC5 pushed for the self-criticism based on where we were headed if we started following bourgeois news ahead of what we heard from Peruvian communists. Had MC5 not pointed this out, out of fear of Cominternism, the self- criticism including the part "under the leadership" of Gonzalo probably would not have happened at all. MC5 acted hastily from the possibility of Peruvian dissension, but then caused another error to be made. How it looks is that we were afraid we slandered Gonzalo based on bourgeois news reports and then to make up for that, we said he should lead the party. The self-criticism was terrible really, and MC5 has taken the chief blame.

Before 2006, MIM thought of the self-criticism controversy as basically our being seen as right opportunist for taking up the Cominternism problem to retract a correct line. In other words, we got lucky reporting the bourgeois media correctly and we should have shut up then and instead we introduced this thing where we said Peruvians should decide. That's what some thought the whole issue was, but reading it again, we see that tea-leaves readers might take it as supporting the leadership of Gonzalo from prison--a complete error terrible to contemplate in what impact it might have caused.

Then in issue 86, we again see the idea that Gonzalo is still the chair of the party, this time under the signature of MC432. Issue 88 had our top notch journalistic work on the issue of gays in Peru which caused some NGOs to back down in their attacks on the PCP.

In June 1994, MIM put out an article on Maria Elena Moyano, a Peruvian government official that some Amerikan circles directly supported. We took heat for that issue bringing the article all over the Internet to combat the humyn rights groups and pseudo-feminists misrepresenting the cause. There was even a TV commercial that referred to MIM's crusade, not directly on Moyano but how if you want the "other side" on Peru, you have to go to the Internet. In issue #93, we are back to just saying "under the leadership of the PCP" with no mention of Gonzalo.

In November, 1994 MIM published a correct article from New Flag. However, it was a case where a swindler used MIM to publicize his own operations, by at first waving the red flag. In December, 1994 MIM specifically said it opposed the peace accords idea and started attacking the "Right Opportunist Line" as mushing together humyn-rights organizations with revisionists and then saying that the main tasks were along those lines. 12 years later, the RIM is only just starting to deal with what the ROL really referred to. On the other hand, MIM boosted the New Flag as the new leadership of the RIM in December, 1994! That along with the "under the leadership" of Gonzalo part of the self-criticism are what stand out as we re-read what MIM did while the PCP still existed as a vital force. Issues 84 and 86 were real errors and getting on board with New Flag to reorganize the RIM was a real stunner.

That's pretty much the end of the story, because then Maoist Sojourner arose to take the news from the Peruvian exiles. New Flag started out as not just working with but loyal to MIM. Then New Flag irritated us for quite some time while we stayed silent. Finally, New Flag went berserk against Luis Arce Borja and more than MIM could see there was something wrong going on. New Flag ended up crawling back to Afakean and then disappearing.

And it turns out that people on edge for police plots were right to be on edge even in France. We're second-guessing MIM and others here now, but people looking at the margin were wondering how dare RCP=CIA even think of shutting down El Diario Internacional distribution and going off to study a couple years if MIM were truly breathing down its neck. We covered Peru the whole time Afakeanists were "studying" and our answer to RCP=CIA's squelching El Diario Internacional really came when we started with Maoist Sojourner. The Maoist Sojourner had the added benefit of separating wheat from chaff in MIM's own internal ranks.

From MIM's point of view at the time, it was all eyes on Peru. We wanted Peruvians to tell us they had a new leader. We had done a lot more work than they had to distinguish our line from RCP=u$A while they were in the Comintern with the RCP=U$A--that's what we told New Flag on first encounter. Peruvians tended to evaluate us relative to RCP=U$A on a narrow set of issues that totally excluded that it was PCP in the RIM with them, not us. Comrade Luis Arce Borja rightly concluded that RIM-type organization just leads to trafficking and other problems of opportunism and sectarianism.

In retrospect, in 1993 and 1994, supposing there were a Peruvian revolutionary looking at the situation, maybe it would not have been totally ridiculous to judge MIM based on whether we would help disrupt Peruvian exile operations. Maybe Peruvians in that situation would think CIA would go to the trouble of forming a MIM and distributing papers and so on, just to get a look at the Peruvian exiles or maybe that plus other things. At the very least, there could be CIA infiltrators in MIM causing problems.

If we raised a total ruckus against RCP=U$A to "force it" to distribute El Diario Internacional, it would have been "disorder under Heaven," but Heaven would have been Paris--a bad train of thought from MIM's point of view trying to escape Comintern thinking. Drawing attention to Heaven would have seemed to have strengthened Afakean's hand, if we think of peasants looking for a leader.

On the other hand, there really were tasks to do in France and the u$a and the enemy really did come to disrupt them. Therefore, one could think MIM was too stand-offish, even "right opportunist," with this Peruvians-should-decide line. Peruvians were not going to be the only ones to decide if Revolution Books distributed El Diario Internacional and similar such issues. The obvious parallel today is that Iranians alone are not going to decide about all the demonstrations against Iran in the united $tates. The UN is also involved. Simultaneously, MIM is going to have to comment on the Iranians involved.

Luis Arce Borja has not asked MIM to attack SARBEDARAN in 2006 and as far as we know, he opposed something else we did recently. Then again, Luis Arce Borja is not seeing the Iran events all happen as first-hand as MIM is.

Some rumors go so far as to say that the whole PCP from beginning to end was CIA. That would explain Gonzalo's capitulation. Bourgeois journalists should definitely look into the "war on terror" use of the PCP.

MIM tried to fend off rumors and did not talk about the issue of Gonzalo's capitulation. If revolutionaries got him out of prison, he could be questioned then as to what he was saying about peace accords.

Gonzalo's line was correct and an example to study. Historical idealists would not have studied his line if they had known he was a capitulator. Perhaps U.$. imperialism would use a revolutionary struggle to punish someone else. Once Fujimori reached great heights from attacking PCP and tightened relations with the united $tates, the Yankee imperialists punished him too. Without going so far as to saying PCP was CIA from the beginning, and the Navy prison was some kind of Hilton Hotel, MIM tries to picture how some things would look to Peruvian revolutionaries concerned about CIA/SIN infiltration. Here the experience of seeing Huey Newton abandon politics is relevant.

To the people of the Peruvian exile community, it might seem there was a shortage of people who know up from down. And were the people ready to deal with a police plot abroad was another question. These questions pointed toward what sort of leaders do we deserve. It's not just that leaders sell-out the people, but people can drive their leaders out of politics. In this case, the Peruvians in exile had a remarkably advanced class consciousness and spirit which seemed to shatter with the arrest of Gonzalo, leaving people saying things one never would have guessed. The Peruvians were a sight to behold, one that trained and inspired MIM comrades.

If we were to second-guess what happened in exile, we have to wonder if having enough people subjectively prepared and ready to deal with police plots would have mattered. The CIA/SIN were not able to get a united exile voice for peace accords. Nor were they able to have Revolution Books distribute just the peace accords side. Instead, RCP=CIA took a break, which even had the advantage of not putting Avakian forward too much. So this is an example of "logic of the struggle." Ideally if you are CIA/SIN, you want everyone to distribute peace accords literature, but if that is unfeasible you go for your second-best choice or maybe third-best. RCP=CIA's sinister closing off of El Diario Internacional did hurt, but it did not succeed right away either. MIM was still mostly saying all the right things and distributing them inside u.$. borders, in bigger ways than the RCP=CIA ever distributed El Diario Internacional in the past. So when the armed struggle continued and it became clear that the first round of peace plots was not going to work, Afakean realized he had to set up new institutions to fake support for the revolution. These institutions even claim to have some two-line struggle difference with him.

People are now complaining that MIM is disrupting its support for certain leaders of People's Wars. Yet we think there is a big difference between MIM's timing on behalf of Aztlan and Iran, and RCP=CIA's timing in abandoning El Diario Internacional just when the peace accords thing came out.

To this day, RIM is justifying keeping counterrevolutionaries in party ranks so that they may be educated against Hoxhaite metaphysics--as if these counter-revolutionaries really cared anyway. It makes total sense when the leadership is CIA: water everything down when the CIA is already in control. Take in zombies. Fight for the counter-revolutionaries to be included in the party, says the RIM. And then let 90% of your followers brag how they have bigger organizations than the revolutionaries do.

For the CIA/SIN, every day that El Diario Internacional appeared to have disappeared after the peace accords plot in 1993 was a victory. The CIA/SIN did win a victory in closing down the propaganda/ideology/theory generated organism in exile. Time was of the essence to keep the El Diario Internacional going. MIM calls this the "inherent logic of the struggle." We must learn to see the "inherent logic of the struggle" at any given time, because CIA operates in many guises.

Today the CIA would like to keep its SARBEDARAN project alive long enough to get to the invasion or have the option of an invasion with SARBEDARAN puppets ready. For this, the more zombies that are around, again the better to cover up the CIA plot.

In the guise of fighting Hoxhahite metaphysics, the RIM fought for the counter-revolutionaries. That is still plain-as-day to anyone who can read. In fact it is not Hoxhaite to exclude counter-revolutionaries from two-line struggle. It is a crucial matter of being able to maneuver adroitly as revolutionaries. El Diario Internacional needed to come out and be distributed. For that to happen, the leadership channel to exile had to be overthrown and the peace accords plot denounced--all of this as quickly as possible. That meant pitching overboard some excess baggage.

There is one more lesson from the struggle that needs to be drawn out. There is nothing metaphysical about not training CIA agents. Counter-revolutionary material needs to be tossed and not spoken with, because it only learns how to hide its tactics better. After the arrest of Gonzalo and the peace accords plot, it was inevitable that the enemy would attack in exile, but who is going to become revolutionary and who is going to go the other way. The more the enemy is trained for that situation, the more confusing the enemy can be. The enemy can read El Diario Internacional if it wants to know what is going on. It does not deserve anymore spying or training opportunities than that.

The next question would be, if MIM and others had their act together, could the whole peace accords faction have been stymied from the beginning of the struggle in exile? Could Revolution Books have been forced to distribute El Diario Internacional? Would things then look differently now? Is there some portion of MIM blame in not speeding up revolutionary unity despite MIM's eventual distribution of large quantities of literature? Could there have been a struggle to squelch the peace accords thing more or less from the beginning, at least in exile? Or would that be idealism? For MIM to have taken a more assertive role not just in its own work but in turning the screws on others, we would have needed a couple differences in line--more optimism in the labor aristocracy and more "hegemonism" on organizational questions.

Against us and worth contemplating is that in the given situation, MIM was more equal with Peruvians in exile than it looked, because the whole issue was quickly establishing who to trust and not to trust through stand and action. Sure, Peruvian exiles would know much more about Peru than us, but keeping in mind that some of those exiles would be infiltrators, mutual anxieties tended to even out the possibilities that MIM could actually participate as much as anyone else.

Now we will really mess with the minds of any youthful "anti-hegemonists" sliding into identity politics. Suppose that Gonzalo has been arrested and you are a remaining free PCP leader in Peru. You don't like what RCP=CIA did and you believe your exiles are fighting (who knows with what motivations) and you don't know how they will turn out. Besides, all indications would be that the enemy will try to make a move even among the exiles. (Even MIM was receiving death threats.) Could it possibly be that in that situation you in Peru choose to trust someone no one would think of? And suppose you really need to play a vital role, but you say, "it's up to the Peruvians." Sound like a good video game? Then how about reading some Marx about how the class struggle ends up being led by leaders produced by "accident." There's nothing saying that an imperialist country comrade's contribution to struggle at the margin will not be the straw on the camel's back that leads to victory--even in Peru. Politics is that important. Most of the straws on the camel's back come from people in Peru who will never have contact with the West, but maybe it just needs one more straw, an interaction of the external and internal.

There's a danger that if the struggle against sectarianism as defined by the petty-bourgeoisie is undertaken, security matters of a crucial nature will be passed over. Sectarianism is putting the interests of the organization above the strategic needs of the oppressed and exploited. Now a whole bunch of organizations are covering up for Iranian lackeys of imperialism. MIM has reached that point with CIA and RIM where the ruckus has to be had on Iran--no matter how "sectarian" or "hegemonist" people say we are.